National Question in Central Europe

Democratic Responses to Unresolved National and Ethnic Conflicts

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NATIONAL QUESTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE:

DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO UNRESOLVED NATIONAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

BUDAPEST, 22–24 MARCH 2013

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

Institute for **Cultural Relations Policy**

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FOREWORD

The second international conference organised by the Institute for Cultural Relations Policy (ICRP) was hosted by the King Sigismund College in March 2013. The keynote speakers of the event included academics and directors of various NGOs and think tanks from the Central European region, as well as representatives of the Hungarian Government. During the three days of the conference nearly 20 speakers held their presentation in front of an audience of nearly 100 participants from more than 10 countries.

As a part of the initiatives of the Institute for Cultural Relations Policy the conference was aiming to provide a forum to researchers, experts, young intellectuals, political actors, decision makers and other stakeholders involved in social sciences to present their researches and activities about the solution of Central European national challenges and problems. The ICRP initiated this forum to facilitate better understanding of the cultural diversity of Central Europe besides political, economic and legal aspects in ethnic and national minority conflict resolution.

On the basis of participants' feedback, the forum fulfilled its goals and preliminary expectations. We believe this meeting was the first milestone of a long-term cooperation in Central Europe.

The papers outlined below provide various ideas, visions and opinions about ethnic minority issues, national identity questions, interstate relations, conflict resolution, legal issues and integration policies as they try to give a better insight into the historical, social and political aspects of the national question in Central Europe.

Therefore, we are grateful to the authors and co-authors for their most valuable contributions to the National Question in Central Europe conference.

Finally, the editor would like to thank the members of ICRP Advisory Board for assistance and the sponsors for supporting the event and the proceedings.

A PLADOYER FOR DIVERSITY

NATIONAL IDENTITY QUESTIONS, AND ETHNIC MINORITY ISSUES INSTRUMENTALISED BY POLITICS

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Introduction

Post-1989 development in Slovakia attracted a lot of academic attention mostly due to more complicated path to consolidated democracy than that of its neighbours. Slovakia represented a post-communist "show-case" of raised nationalism accompanied with clearly identified populist politics. Foreign scholars (Deegan-Krause and Haughton, 2008; 2009) as well as domestic experts (Mesežnikov and Gyárfášová, 2008; Mesežnikov, 2009; Učeň, 2004; 2007; 2009; Gyárfášová and Jupskas, 2012) focused on identification causes and consequences of national populism and instrumentalisation of ethnic minorities issues by politics in general, and some concrete political parties in particular.

The following study explores the metamorphosis of national populism and radical right agenda in Slovakia, their historical legacies, main actors, policies impact and the most recent faces of this phenomenon.

Historical legacies and concepts

Nationalism and radical right political parties did not emerge in CEE countries "from the scratch". There are deep-rooted legacies, historical backgrounds and structural conditions which drove and formed the post-communist radical right. Bustikova and Kitschelt made a complex comparative analysis of legacies which are "…deep durable causes that affect the potential for radical right wing politics across the post-communist region" (Bustikova and Kitschelt, 2010, p.29). According to them legacies create the baseline for patterns of party competition, shape partisan politics, and thus mold a proximate cause of radical right mobilisation (Ibid., pp.29-30).

In accordance with earlier academic works on this issue we tackle the post-communist radical right as a phenomenon *sui generis*, inherently shaped by the historical force of state socialism and the transformation process (Minkenberg, 2009). However, the "weight" of different factors could hardly be precisely determined. Radical right is usually related to nationalism,

they are close "bedfellows". Following the Cas Mudde's conceptualisation we see populist radical right as a specific form of nationalism (Mudde, 2007, pp.30-31). Moreover, we see the concept of nativism very useful for further distinctions since "...an ideology which holds that the states should be inhabited exclusively by members of the native group ('the nation') and that non-native elements (persons and ideas) are fundamentally threatening to the homogenous nation-state. The basis for defining (non)nativeness can be diverse, e.g. ethnic, racial or religious, but will always have a cultural component" (Mudde, 2007, p.19).

The role of collective identities, above all the ethnic ones, has been subject of dozens of studies analysing the transition developments in post-communist countries. Let us mention just one illustration taken from Elster et al. who are pointing at number of generalisations about the role of ethnicity and ethnic politics in Central Eastern European (CEE) countries. Authors are more specific about five of them, whereas the first generalisation says that "the very notion of nationhood in CEE is not Western, 'republican', and based upon the common citizenship within the 'demos' but ethnic, cultural and 'Herderian', based upon the distinctive and exclusive identity of the 'ethnos'" (Elster, Offe and Preuss, 1998, p.252). They conclude with short but very pertinent remark: "Democracy is good for ethnic mobilisation, but not vice versa" (Ibid., p.254).

In terms of legacies, Slovakia stands for a good illustrative country case. The structural opportunities for emerging radical right are effected also by its ethnic heterogeneity, combination of cultural (identity-based) and socio-economic appeals as well as nature of conflict in the early time of transition. Moreover, Slovakia was facing the triple transition (in addition to political and economic, the nation state building dimension was highly relevant, more than for the Czech republic after the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993). Summing up, the entire set of factors has created relatively favourable environment for activities of radical right populist and nationalist groups. They include the creation of independent statehood, the ideological and political legacy of domestic fascism dating back to the first half of the 20th century (including the so-called "first Slovak statehood" of 1939–1945), the multi-ethnic composition of the population and changes in the population's ethnic and confessional structure in the 20th century (i.e. expulsion of non-Slovak ethnic groups).

Over the past century, the Slovaks formed part of five constitutional entities (i.e. Austro-Hungarian monarchy, the first Czechoslovak Republic, wartime collaborationist Slovak state, renewed Czechoslovak Republic and independent Slovak Republic since 1993). Furthermore, during the 20th century, Slovakia experienced a great variety of political regimes, ranging from monarchist semi-authoritarianism to pluralistic democracy, fascist totalitarianism, limited "national" democracy, communist totalitarianism and a rotation of liberal and illiberal democratic regimes during the post-communist transition.

In Slovakia, the tradition of nationalist appeals to voters was rooted even before the WWII, when appealing to one's ethnic origins was prevalent. While most leading Slovak politicians of the 20th century interpreted the so-called "Slovak issue" as a combination of historic, constitutional, social and cultural issues, they also emphasised ethnic and nationalist elements and self-identification based on ethnic origin and affiliation to ethnically defined community,

i.e. nation and its language. This tradition has had its adherents after 1989 as well. And also as consequence, in the 1990s Slovakia represented a case of a weak left-right division and confirmed the hypothesis of R. Inglehart and H.-D. Klingemann from 1976 that "left and right would perform poorly in certain countries, particularly those with open question of national identity" (Krause, 2000, p.27). Slovakia's troubled development in 1990s (specifically between the split of Czechoslovakia in 1993 and the 1998 parliamentary elections) could be used as an empirical evidence.

All in all we could summarise the legacies into three clusters:

1. Structural factors: Slovakia is a country with a dominant titular ethnic entity (i.e. Slovak nation) and a dominant confession (i.e. Catholicism) but simultaneously with a relatively high degree of ethnic and denominational diversity that is represented by numerous ethnic minorities and groups as well as religious communities.

2. Historical legacies: Over the 20th century, the Slovaks formed part of five constitutional entities (i.e. Austro-Hungarian Empire, the first Czechoslovak Republic, wartime Slovak State, renewed Czechoslovak Republic and independent Slovak Republic). Independent Slovakia's founding narrative is one of overcoming foreign domination, first Hungarians and then Czechs – not to mention 20th century entanglements with Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union.

3. Transition model: After 1989 Slovakia went through "triple transition", nation state building process, identity-based politics.

Content, appeals and form of national populism/s are extremely context dependent. So, when examining populism in Slovakia, it is important to bear in mind all these more general socio-political and historic factors.

National populism in 1990s

Slovakia, as a relatively newly formed democracy, has not only a very unstable political system with a volatile electorate, but also weak socio-economic ties between political parties and their constituencies. One of the structural factors of the post-communist political development is ethnic heterogeneity. National issues have been strongly politicised and national populism has become one of the most effective populist appeals in the past twenty or so years. The populist parties have all been in office, and their impact on Slovakia's consolidation of democracy and ambitions to join the EU has been enormous, above all in the 1990s. Many issues and appeals favoured in populist politics reflect nationalistic concerns, based on the distinction between "us" and "them", inclusion and exclusion. A dominant feature of national populism is articulating the populist argument in national terms and mistaking demos for ethnos (Učeň, 2004, p.52).

Several types of nationalism emerged in Slovakia after 1989. Deegan-Krause identified following:

- "Peripheral nationalism against a domestic majority: Czechs
- Peripheral nationalism against regional or global institutions: The West
- Peripheral nationalism against a foreign state: Hungary
- State-building nationalism against a homeland minority: Hungarians
- State-building nationalism against a non-homeland minority: Roma
- State-building nationalism against co-nationals: Non-nationalist Slovaks." (Kevin Deegan-Krause, 2004).

These nationalisms have had various "political weight" in course of the post-1989 development. In the early stage of the transformation process (1990–1992), the two relevant national populist political parties emerged on Slovakia's political landscape; both of them ruled the country between 1994 and 1998 and both of them have participated in power in a subordinated position after the 2006 elections. One – the Slovak National Party (SNS) – drew its voter support mostly among radical ethnic nationalists, while the other – the Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) – based its strategy on resistance against the launched liberal reforms and on power ambitions of its leader Vladimír Mečiar who systematically built his image of an unfaltering defender of ordinary citizens' interests.

Unlike in Poland, Hungary and the Czech Republic where people's dissatisfaction with the course and results of early stages of the transformation process benefited primarily leftist parties (i.e. the communists, post-communists and social democrats), the greatest beneficiary of voters' disenchantment in Slovakia was the HZDS. Immediately after its founding in 1991, HZDS became a dominant political force in terms of voter support. HZDS populist mobilisation strategies at the early stage of its existence were based on also on encouraging nostalgia about life before the communist regime's collapse; appeals to ordinary people, blue-collar workers, residents of rural areas and smaller municipalities, "producers of material goods" that view the life through common sense, as opposed to sophisticated and over-elaborate urban intellectuals who deal in activities that bear no immediate material benefits for the society and above all on nationalism and defence of "national and state" interests of the state established by the ethnic majority, which endorses more or less overt anti-minority resentment.[1]

As a result of its election defeats in 1998 and 2002, the HZDS spent eight years in opposition. The whole this period the party's coalition potential neared zero and its voter support showed a constant decline. Although the HZDS toned down its hard populist rhetoric, it continued to be led by the same political figure – Vladimír Mečiar, whose nature did not show any signs of change. Compared to 1992 (37.3%), 1994 (35.0%), 1998 (27.0%) and 2002 (19.5%), the party's result in elections 2006 was almost a fiasco (8.8%). Despite that, the HZDS became part of the new ruling coalition and after eight years in opposition it rose to power again.

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[1] For more details see Gyárfášová and Mesežnikov (2013).

Participation of HZDS in the government was enabled by the power calculations of another populist party Smer led by the former vice-chairman of post-communist Party of the Democratic Left Robert Fico who offered coalition cooperation to HZDS (in spite of the fact that in 2002–2006 the mutual relations between the HZDS and Smer were extremely hostile) as well as radical nationalist SNS. One of the most important reasons behind the HZDS' swift acceptance of Smer's invitation to become part of the new government was yearning of Mečiar and his party for social and political rehabilitation. However, HZDS' electoral support as a ruling party in 2006–2010 was eroding significantly, in elections 2010 it failed to reach the threshold of 5 per cent followed by total decline in 2012 early election leading to political oblivion.

Mainstream radical nationalists – Slovak National Party

The main political vehicle of the "mainstream" radical nationalism is the Slovak National Party (SNS). It is a typical representative of radical right politics. According to terminology suggested by Cas Mudde (2011, p.12), the SNS can be defined as a "populist radical right" party, whose ideological background represents a mixture of nationalism and xenophobia, authoritarianism and populism. However, in the case of the SNS, the proportions of the three mentioned elements are uneven: the shares of radical nationalism and xenophobia seem to be greater than the share of populism. Common typical methods used by the populists usually include appeals to ordinary people via promises to protect their interests against those who do not care about them in an apparent effort to attract the so-called protest voters, harsh criticism of the political establishment, incumbent administration and established "mainstream" parties for their alleged corruption, the unclear program orientation and proclaiming "people's character" of their own political creed, attempts to appeal to the broadest possible electorate combined with labelling certainly social groups as "isolated" from the common folk (e.g. the wealthy, capitalists, sophisticated intellectuals, etc.), egalitarian motives in addressing voters and generally anti-elitist rhetoric; advertising their own "know how" to solve existing social maladies, promises of swift changes for the better, adapting proposed solutions to prevailing public opinion trends, etc. However being a permanent constituent part of the established party system since its foundation in 1990 and frequently acting as an actor of clientelist and corrupt practices while in the government, the SNS felt itself restricted in using unlimited populist appeal for the mobilisation of voters. As a result of its performance, the party itself is perceived by a significant segment of the electorate as a part of the corrupt political elite.

SNS proclaims itself as the most authentic proponent of the Slovaks' national aspirations in such areas as building of national state, protecting the Slovaks' national interests, supporting their national culture, interpreting their national history, shaping relations with neighbouring Hungary, influencing policies with respect to ethnic minorities (especially ethnic Hungarians). It is the most relevant actor of radical (though not anti-systemic) nationalism in Slovakia. The party enjoyed a strong position within the power system thanks to its ability to capitalise on xenophobic and anti-minority sentiments of certain population segments and due to coalition strategies applied by other populist parties. The policies pursued by SNS negatively affect the

atmosphere in society and worsen the overall situation of ethnic minorities. While the SNS does not aspire to undermine directly the liberal democratic regime, some of its priorities contradict some principles of liberal democracy.

Founded in 1990, SNS publicly subscribes to the legacy of "historic" SNS that existed in Slovakia until 1938. "Historic" SNS, however, was a moderate nationalist party that formed an important part of the so-called Autonomist Bloc in interwar Czechoslovakia. It was established by Lutheran politicians and gained support especially among Slovak Lutherans.

The new ("restored") SNS was the most vocal political force behind the Slovak separatist movement between 1990 and 1992. Relatively quickly after its emergence and entry to parliament, it began to further the concept of Slovakia's state independence. SNS has been a parliamentary party between 1990 and 2012, except the electoral term of 2002–2006, when it dwelled outside parliament after a defeat in 2002 elections that came about primarily as the result of internal rift within the party. In periods of 1993–1994, 1994–1998 and 2006–2010 it formed part of the ruling coalition, which allowed it to influence public policies in important areas of society. In its activities SNS combines radical-nationalist rhetoric and authoritarian proposals with political and electoral mobilisation through the so-called ethnic card. The party always used its position in the executive power to pursue its nationalist agenda. An essential part of this agenda was the constant effort to undermine the standard of minority rights, particularly those of ethnic Hungarians living in Slovakia.

Party's leaders frequently used confrontational rhetoric and aggressive tone and made offensive statements aimed at political representatives of minorities, political opponents and independent media. The party is usually supported by voters with nationalist views who prefer authoritarian concepts of society's political organisation. SNS coalition potential (i.e. its ability to coalesce with other parties) strongly depended on power ambitions of other "nationally oriented" and populist parties (including the left-leaning Smer-SD). In Slovakia's modern history, the moderate centre-right and centre-left parties have never approached the SNS with an offer to form coalition governments unlike national-populist parties (ĽS-HZDS and Smer-SD) which offered SNS to coalesce with them in 1993, 1994 and 2006.

In its programmatic documents the SNS defines itself as "a nationally oriented, conservative, right party, based on the European Christian value system, with three program pillars— national, social and Christian. The SNS continues the Cyril–Methodian, Štúr's and Memorandum [of the Slovak nation] state-building traditions, in line with the legal acts that led to the sovereignty of the Slovak nation and the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic" (SNS, n.d.). The SNS declares itself a "party, which adheres to the ideological legacy of the founders of the [historic] SNS in 1871". Its mission is "to unite the Slovaks at home and abroad; to maintain the national sovereignty of the Slovak Republic; to increase, strengthen and improve patriotic awareness of the Slovak nation, especially in linguistically mixed areas of the Slovak Republic; and to improve the attitudes of citizens to Slovak statehood" (SNS, 2009a).

However, in 2012 early general election the party failed to qualify into the national parliament, what means an important turning point in term of electoral support of the "traditional" radical right nationalists. SNS became an extra-parliamentary party with

relatively limited impact on political and public discourse. Main factors which can be identified in the background of this development can be summarised as follows:

1. Strong competition for radical right agenda from two sides: nationalism light represented by Smer-SD, which is a strong party with highly appreciated competence in social and economic issues; from the other side – extreme radical parties and groupings, above all the ĽS-NS. This party is feeding on the wave of anti-Roma sentiment among part of the population;

2. Lower salience of national agenda – could be traced back to the split of Party of Hungarian Coalition (SMK) in 2009 and the foundation of electorally more successful party Most-Híd (Bridge) which tries to address not only Hungarian but also Slovak voters and is less vocal in defending the rights of Hungarian minority in Slovakia. It smoothed partially also the bilateral relation between Slovakia and Hungary because the ruling Fidesz fosters relations with SMK and not Most-Híd represented in the national parliament. The mutual cooperation of "complementary nationalisms" (that of Viktor Orbán and the other by Robert Fico) does not simply work.

3. Lowering the salience of national agenda which was the key program of the "single issues" SNS means that the party has to look for new program and issues. The euro-scepticism has not work as efficiently as may be expected because the electorate shows pro-EU bias – typical characteristics of Slovak public in general.

4. Index measuring the public's receptiveness and the potential support to radical nationalist and right-wing radical/extremist scene identifies lower values when party/ies close to (light) nationalistic politics are in power, what is the case for the electoral cycle 2012–2016.

5. Last but not least the party is weaken by internal quarrels and tensions which lead to splits and the replacement of long-serving chairman Slota. Although this change was pre-negotiated, party failed to avoid sharp internal conflict between new leader and some representatives of the former leadership, including Slota himself.

Albeit opinion polls, conducted after elections 2012, have indicated that part of SNS traditional core voters still continued to support this party, giving it certain hopes to reach 5% votes and to sustain as relevant political force, its political revival in future electoral term is an open question. The recent re-branding campaign under the head-line: "We change SNS. We want to change Slovakia!" does not reach out, yet, the polls date are below the threshold.

Impact of nationalistic discourse on society and political scene is enormous. The appeals of the SNS is based on ethnicity. It addresses "Slovaks", referring to "us" (Slovaks) and "them" (Hungarians or Roma, or any "others"), it denies the principle of citizenship and sees (more or less explicitly) the non-Slovak ethnic groups as the second-order-citizens, often labelled as not loyal enough. The "ethnicisation" of the public discourse is one of the main consequences of the SNS campaigning and rhetoric. Of course, there are other political parties and leaders who have contributed to this, but the SNS has dominated nationalistic discourse and moved the borders of what is permissible and what is mainstream far beyond liberal democratic civic

culture. Above all, the 2010 election campaign appealed to the electorate by using nationalistic and xenophobic slogans such as "We will not give up Slovakia!", implying that the SNS would not give up Slovakia's territory to Hungary. Territorial integrity and raising the spectre of irredentism – one of the constituent parts of national populism – was put across in the slogan "Let our borders remain our borders". The SNS billboards spread the image of the Hungarian enemy and called for vigilance, suggesting that Slovakia – its integrity, its children, the lives of its men, and so on – was in danger. This campaign brought even the "xenophobisation" of the public discourse.

Another ethnic group that is stereotypically depicted by the SNS as a threat to all hard-working and order-loving decent Slovaks is the Roma. Interestingly enough, in 2010, and more so in 2012, the nationalistic appeal of the SNS was not successful in elections as it was in 2006. However, it opened the door for less radical nationalism to be more "salonfähig".

Smer party – successor or inheritor of HZDS?

Party Smer grown to be the most popular party in Slovakia. On opposing the economic reforms it won the election 2006 and became the electoral winner of 2010 general elections with 35% of votes. To label this party as a populist one is more controversial but many authors clearly agree upon the fact that it manifests populist features (Deegan-Krause and Haughton, 2009; Mesežnikov, 2009; Učeň, 2009). Smer has a position of broadly defined mainstream party, which combines above all two sources of populist agenda: national populism and social demagogy while applying "standard" populist methods like anti-establishment and anti-elite appeals, scapegoating of elites and positive valorisation of "the people" and alike. The party has been established in late 1999 by a maverick from the transformed post-communist party Robert Fico. Initially it avoided any ideological profile using self-characteristics as "pragmatic" or third way alternative. This positioning came out the fact that the new party stood between two polarised blocs, which represented the dominant political conflict of 1990s – HZDS and centre right liberal pro-reform parties. The party also utilised the bonus of being new, anti-corrupt (according to Smer, other parties, representing the competing blocs, were equally corrupt). It pretended to be "new direction" in the politics ("Smer" means "direction" in Slovak). After the lukewarm result in 2002, the party turned left and started the process of "social-democratisation" (adding of affix SD – Social Democracy to its name) which went hand in hand with ethnisation of the agenda. In 2006 Smer won 30% of votes on the wave of the criticism of the economic reforms and formed the government with SNS and HZDS. The factors catalysing Smer's decision to form a new government with the populist HZDS and radical nationalist SNS included its conviction that these two formerly opposition parties that along with Smer criticised various policies pursued by the previous centre-right administration would help Smer to implement its declared "social-democratic" program with strong etatist elements and the nationalist orientation of Smer's leaders who tended to define ethnicity as the foundation of political cooperation between political parties.

Persisting high voting preferences (rating) of Smer after elections 2006 were cemented by the way its leader and prime minister Robert Fico advertised his administration's priorities, as he

pointed out the emphasis of his cabinet on tackling Slovakia's domestic problems instead of pursuing "irrelevant" foreign policy activities, providing for ordinary citizens, bringing pressure to bear on energy producers in order to reduce gas and fuel prices, defending citizens against foreign monopolies, etc. Many voters who sympathised with authoritarian and egalitarian approaches might be attracted to Fico's charisma; still others might positively perceive nationalist rhetoric that was quite often used by a number of Smer leaders.

Four years of governance did not lead to the weakening of Smer's public support. However the electoral victory (35% of votes) in 2010 was not enough for building a coalition – there were no available partners. In regard of political and public discourse the rule of Smer was characterised by "etatisation" and "ethnisation". The party leader's rhetoric is about "taking care for common people", offering protecting hand to those who feel to be left behind. Due to the differences between the populism of the transition decade represented by HZDS and the nativist nationalism of the Slovak National Party the instrumentalised populism of the Smer party inspired to call it "neopopulism" (Učeň, 2009, p.32).

In the years 2010–2012 Smer was the strongest opposition force. After elections in 2012 it formed one-party government. Since 2005 Smer declares itself a social democratic party. In its last election manifesto it emphasised more the issues of effectiveness of governance, stability for the country, security for citizens etc. In the electoral document, containing provisions about necessity to strengthen the social cohesion of society, policies of strong "welfare" state and strengthening its regulatory function, there were no any direct references to the social-democratic ideological and value basis of the party and the word "social-democratic" even did not appear at all in the text. Some questions that form an integral part of the agenda of European social democracy (minority and human rights issues, rejection of ethnic nationalism), were given in Smer's programmatic document the relatively small, almost marginal attention, and the used formulations were rather general and did not reflect the multi-ethnic character of the Slovak society. The intensity of nationalist appeal in the election campaign Smer-SD, however, was lower in 2012 than in 2010, when the party used the ethnic (mainly "Hungarian") card as one of the main tools of mobilisation. The reasons of the lowered weight of ethno-nationalist mobilisation in communication activities of Smer-SD did not reflect changes in its program and value profile, but were connected rather with consideration of purely practical nature: in conditions of relatively high electoral support, indicated by opinion polls, the intensive use of ethnic card was not necessary. The way how Smer emphasised its "leftist" character and its approach to the profiling questions of value dispute between the left and the right indicated that Smer still remained in positions of the so-called "old" but not "new" left.

However, the nationalism and the "ethnic card" is a "sleeping giant" of Slovak politics. At the ceremony for 150th anniversary of Matica Slovenská the Prime Minister Robert Fico in his speech said: "We created our independent state first and foremost not for minorities, although we respect them, but for the Slovak nation. We go by the rule that the state is national and our society is civic. It is a strange trend that the problems of minorities are put before the state-

forming Slovak nation..."[2] Furthermore, Fico also said that some minorities have been trying to "blackmail" the state through the issue of minority rights. These views raised a lot of critiques inside the country but also from the European People's Party (EPP) in the European Parliament, they were deemed as "unacceptable". There were recidivates of the Matica Slovenská address but all in all we could say that the second term of PM Fico is less relying on nationalistic appeals (more social ones).

Popular demand for radical right

Studies discussing the phenomenon of radical right traditionally focus more attention on political actors or their agenda and appeals. Less attention is paid to analysing the electorates or the public mood. In other words, one can read much more about "political supply" than about "social demand". A project which does analyse the demand for extreme/radical right parties is DEREX – one of analytical methods for identification of potential support to extremist political activities.

As for Slovakia the data for four cycles of measuring DEREX index (2004–5; 2006–7; 2008–9 and 2010–11) show an interesting trajectory: Starting with 10.8% it declined to around 6% during 2006 and it returned to higher scores (10.4%) during the last cycle. The explanation can be traced back to the political situation – in 2006–2010 Slovakia was governed by the national-populist coalition comprised of Smer-SD, Movement for a Democratic Slovakia (HZDS) and the Slovak National Party (SNS) that inflamed the nationalist discourse. Individual government parties de facto competed with each other in taking the more radical anti-minority (especially anti-Hungarian) positions both in the rhetoric and in terms of practical policies (Mesežnikov, 2013).

The data for individual DEREX dimensions show that the decline in 2006–2009 was caused by a significant – almost 50% – drop in anti-establishment attitudes (from 30% to 15% and 17% respectively), and by a significant drop in the category of fears, distrust and pessimism (from 25% to 17% and 18% respectively). On the other hand, in this period an increase was noted in the category of prejudices and welfare chauvinism – from 27% to 33% and in the support to right-wing value orientations – from 19% to 29%. How to read these findings? When the Smer-SD – SNS – HZDS coalition was in power their voters were more satisfied, less frustrated by politics, they have got the feeling they are represented, it's "their" political elite who is in power. Nonetheless, the prevailing political and public discourse enhanced and fortified the nationalistic prejudices, social chauvinism as well as the right wing values. Of course we should be very cautious "and should speak rather of the degree of receptiveness or openness to such appeals rather than observe their presence or absence" (Mesežnikov, 2013). This receptiveness and the potential support to politics that is close to radical nationalist and right-wing extremist scene. It is a kind of mutual "counter-balancing" of two trends:

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[2] Address delivered in Martin., 150th anniversary of Matica Slovenská, February 26, 2013.

1. situational (according to the on-going development of party politics and electoral performance of individual parties) changes in trust in the institutions and in the extent of social pessimism,

2. long-term trends of deepening prejudices, anti-immigration sentiments and authoritarian values.

Such "counter-balancing" is, of course, purely statistical and ultimately does not neutralise the undesirable authoritarian and xenophobic sentiments and ideas. Such situation is likely to persist as long as the supporters of political parties (in this case, especially the voters of Smer-SD and other formations close to it) derive their trust in the democratic order and democratic institutions from the very fact that the representatives of these parties work either in the government or in the opposition. Besides, politicians' appeals and voters' views often interact to create some sort of perpetual bond in which it is often impossible to tell the cause from the consequence and a subordinate variable from an independent one (Mesežnikov, 2013).

Conclusion – let's promote the diversity

Slovakia entered the third decade of its independence, the democratic regime is three years older. The nationalism which characterised first two decades is diminishing. The form we face now is nationalism without authoritarianism, rather an efficient blend of nationalism and social demagogy than authoritarian national populism. We could also observe that on the side of the public there is a weaker demand for nationalistic agenda. Though new forms and targets of nativism are emerging, among them above all Roma minority, migrants in general and Muslims in particular. Parties also appeals against other than ethnic minorities – be they sexual, life style or other minorities.

The euro crises also brought euro-sceptical agenda also to newer, post-communist EU member. Radical right-wing and nationalistic parties across the EU present the integration as a threat to national sovereignty and national cultural identity. Cas Mudde conceptualised the euro-sceptical positions which use populist appeals in terms of centre-periphery cleavage. Shortly before the big-bang enlargement in 2004 he expected that "one possible way in which EU accession could influence party competition in the new member states: in transforming the already present regional divide into a full populist, anti-EU enter-periphery cleavage" (Mudde, 2004, p.2). Furthermore, he pointed at Euro-scepticism which would mix populism with peripheral frustration. The centre-periphery divide in combination with national populist anti-EU position would be perfect also because it has links back to the classic populist discourse of the 1920s and 1930s in this region which posited that the key struggle was between rural and "national" people and the urban and cosmopolitan elite (Mudde, 2004, p.7). However, the winner-losers of integration dividing line did not work very well, at least not in Slovakia – people in the poorer regions saw EU funds as possibility to balance with more developed regions, not talking about balancing the capitals. In addition, the Europhoria was general, wide-spread across very different social environments; EU-sceptical feelings could be hardly mobilised before the crises. Now, almost one decade after the EU accession, SNS

has started to use the EU issue. It represents a "text book example" of the peripheral nationalism which is against global institutions, the West, and the EU. For example SNS has tagged the EFSF as "a mega-betrayal on the Slovak nation". The nationalists' arguments go further on in losing the (national) sovereignty and avoiding being "the servants of the West". The Euro-scepticism of the SNS has a "pattern" of radical right-wing parties, such as the True Finns or Freedom Party of Austria (FPÖ). It is an open question if this agenda will work in the future also in pro-EU biased Slovakia. As for the 2012 election it did not, and SNS was not able to reach the parliamentary threshold.

To lower the demand for radical right and the public s receptiveness for national populism is a long term challenge. In respect of Slovak-Hungarian relations and mutual perception we see some small steps done, for example Slovak-Hungarian European Forum – established by the Slovak Foreign Policy Association, efforts by the historians on both sides but also some signals that we are ready to share common cultural heritage. Of course, much more has to be done.

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RROMA PEOPLE IN THE ROMANIAN
NATIONAL ELECTIONS 2012

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Abstract

The paper is presenting the Rroma of Romania in the electoral process of 2012. It focusses on the parliamentary elections of 2012 in Romania and it explores the Rroma' golden opportunity created then to Rroma large access in the House or even in the Senate.

It is mapping the electoral results for Rroma. In the electoral terms, the Rroma golden opportunity missed. However, the activities done in the field, the networks established, the allied mobilised are to be consider as a valuable political capital. It means an important progress in the field of Rroma electoral capability to organise grass roots supporters and to understand the context of accessing to the political representation.

Learning the lesson of 2012 failure, the paper is trying to explore how to construct the Rroma way of continuity, and to emphasise an ignored actor in their access to political power. It is the case of the universities.

The paper concludes that the Rroma access to the House, proportionally with their percentage in the general population, it is a source to develop an inclusive Romanian and European society.

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Introductory remarks on Rroma in Romania and in Europe

The Rroma peoples have the most visible European ethnical presence in the EU, but also they are the most unknown groups of people to our fellow European citizens.

A simple review of some facts on their situation proves that they are a large variety of groups with impressive dimensions. As a statistical construction, it is one of the biggest[1] and one of the most diverse[2] "traditional" minority spread out in all the EU (and in Europe, too). The Council of Europe uses – for 2010 – the figures of 7 million for the EU only.[3] In percentage it means 1.7% in total EU population. The more recent official estimations – on the Official web page of EU Commission: Justice and Home Affairs accept the figures of 10 to 12 million in Europe with 6 million living in EU.

According with Rroma estimation in percentage, the Rroma peoples represent 2.4% of the total EU population. By comparison it is a population comparable with the population of any EU member states at a medium size (Czech Republic, Portugal, Sweden, Hungary) and larger than the population of the half of EU Member States.

Figure 1. Rroma distribution alongside the EU

Source: a map proposed, in 2010, by the author – Pop, Lia – using CoE data.

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[1] The appreciation is common in the EU's documents. Let's quote the EU Commission's official page: http://ec.europa.eu/justice/discrimination/roma/index_en.htm. Accessed in August, 2013.

[2] They are diverse in terms of the oral languages spoken and of the oral culture, of professions, of their groups' history, and geography of migration. The most visible groups are the Rroma, Kale, Travellers, Gypsies, Manouches, Ashkali and Sinti, Romanichel.

[3] Council of Europe http://web.archive.org/web/20091006045453/http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/ Documentation/strategies/statistiques_en.asp, on the ground of the data published by the Institute for Quality of Life (1998): Framework Convention state report (1st cycle) (1999): Research Institute for Quality of Life (2000): PACE doc. 9397rev (2002) on Legal Status of Roma: corroborated with UNDP report At Risk (2006): International Comparative Data Set on Roma Education (www.soros.org) (2007): J.P. Liégeois "Roms en Europe" (2007) Roma Education Fund report (April 2007).

They are also, the most vital groups in demographical terms, at least, at the most poor and illiterate groups' level. At a first glance it could be seen that: a) *the Rroma population under 15 years*: 35.7% (compared with the 15.7% EU average); *the average age at Rroma level* is 25 years (compared to the 40 years average in EU); birth rate is 5/woman compared with 1,36 EU; fertility age is 16 to 45 years.[4]

It is also right that, the *Rroma average mortality rate* is 2 to 6 times higher than in the majority; that the *average life expectancy* is 10 years lesser than for the majority.[5]

In Romania, the Rroma distribution – according with the official registration – is represent in the maps below.

Figure 2. Rroma in Romania. Density/county

Source: The map is a capture from NARP – Romanian National Agency for Rroma People - 2009.

At least, for the Rroma Groups of Romania there is also truth that:

The Rroma groups are the groups with the largest national and extra national *mobility* (among the European people).

They are the groups with the strongest *inhomogeneity* – in terms of history, of geography, of language, customs and culture, of professions, of education, of economic and social status, of willingness and abilities to integrate in a classical European society – among the ethnic groups in the EU.

The Rroma are the groups with the most *un-known* (and *un-recognised*) *cultural contribution* to our contemporary civilisation, with the invisible elites.

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[4] The Sources are the Council of Europe Archive. The figures used represent an extract – related only with the EU member states - without Croatia. http://web.archive.org/web/20091006045453/http://www.coe.int/t/dg3/romatravellers/Documentation/strategies/statistiques_en.asp

[5] The data source is the Council of Europe data.

The Rroma are the European groups most exposed to be subjects of *discrimination and of xenophobia (anti-tsiganism)*. It is fair to account that it is and could be not *openly assume* in today Romania, but intensively consumed in many limitative social conditions.

Politically, Rroma groups are in a desperate need to take action and to change their life full of deprivations, stigma, and internal and external conflicts. They get support in many international organisations, in American NGOs, in European associations and mainly, in the EU strategies.

1. 2012 Romania – Opportunities for Rroma parliamentary representation

1.1. The electoral context in Romania 2012

Briefly characterizing the Romanian Electoral frame in 2012, the years of National elections in term organised[6], it is to take into account:

   a) the electoral effects of an anti-popular management of the Sovereign Debts Crisis outcomes on Romania, effects generated and used outside of Romania;

   b) the political consequences of a non-democratic treatment of popular vote casted in the summer of 2012 (July, 29) against Basescu and his political family (In December 2012[7], Romania was remaining in a long lasting, but unexpected sovereign debt crisis, severely hit by the politic of austerity[8] recommended by IMF [CE and WB too] and embraced by the government for personal reasons; dramatically humiliated by the Traian Basescu's non legitimate re-instauration as President, after a popular vote to dismiss him. In the electoral year 2012, Romania's feeling were focus on the swapping of the governmental forces. It is the case of the Conservative party, DLP - PDL in Romanian Language – and of its allies, mainly President of the Republic, Traian Basescu, the *de facto* leader of the Party and the Fuhrer of the anti-popular political trend);

   c) the political "reimbursements" of government with the persistent impudent elements and with the abusive and corrupt publicly well-known sides;

   d) the readiness of the angry electorate to participate in the electoral process and to vote anything except the engineers of the destruction of people life and right to dignity;

With such a situation, theoretically half of the Romanian political spectrum – the space occupied before by the Conservatives – was free. (The free political space offers a rare political opportunity: to win the new political players.)

Consequently, it has been the best opportunity to aggregate a Rroma political force and to send it into National Parliament.

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[6] That means completely predictable.
[7] 9 December was the electoral day in Romania in 2012.
[8] A solution publicly contradicted – directly in Bucharest – by Nobel Prize winner, Joseph Stieglitz (among the other).

Concretely, in 2012, it was a leading battle anti-President Basescu and pro-President.

The figure bellow is suggesting the field of the battle.

Figure 3. The main political actors in Romanian parliamentary elections 2012

Source: An image proposed by the author, Pop, Lia.

The electoral theme in Romania's 2012 elections was a simple one: *Basescu (and the Conservatives) Down!*

It was a very strong theme. It was embrace even by the Conservative's team. They did not propose a credible alternative theme. They had to conduct their battles responding to the allegations on the corruption, abuses, complete submission of any leader – *y compris* the Prime Minister – to Basescu's trifles. They had to defend themselves because they imposed extreme sacrifices to a people long time oppressed and politically starved.

The complex reason behind the simple theme was to *overturn the Government who capture the Crisis and which accepted the Austerity, is to overturn the Austerity!* Overturn the Government who abused the power and practiced on the large scale the corruption is to put an end to the political abuses and corruption. It is to reach an honest leadership and free country.

With such a complex reason, it is quite clear that around 40% of political scene was calling for new actors. That means a free space for new actors, where for Rroma at least of 15%. (That is because the new forces, did not allow an anti-Rroma – anti-minority – discourse.)

A confusing electoral law[9], inspired by a confusing concept of a mix electoral system, also opens excellent opportunity for new political players. The law combines the votes casting on the bases of the "winner takes all" with the rules of transforming votes into seats, on the double level constituency (college and constituency). The non-valorised votes in a college – the votes that did not reach the 50%+1 in a college[10] – summarised, at the constituency level, in the benefices of the party, which get the seats on the distribution according with D'Hondt

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[9] Romanian electoral law/2012 LEGE privind organizarea şi desfăşurarea alegerilor pentru autorităţile administraţiei publice locale şi a alegerilor pentru Camera Deputaţilor şi Senat în anul 2012, precum şi pentru modificarea Legii administraţiei publice locale nr. 215/2001 [pdf] Available at: <http://www.mai. gov.ro/Documente/Transparenta%20decizionala/Proiect%20de%20lege%20alegeri%20generale%202012.pdf> [Accessed in August, 2013].

[10] The votes needed for a seat direct secure.

method. The rests re-summarised at the country level, also in the benefices of the parties. A new redistribution allows them to secure seats.

A concentration of a political force at the constituency level in such conditions – political and created by the electoral procedures – offers to it the best chance to get into Parliament. Each Rroma group is quite united inside. They are hierarchical organised, under a personal leadership of a Bulibasha Chief/King/Leader. In the large cities, there are many groups, many leaders. As consequence, a kind of an endless and noisy quarrel characterises their social life. Where they fail to recognise a leader, the ordinary people are eager to be submit to a strong leader (a parochial one), with a patronizing style.

In terms of electoral campaign, that means that there are appropriate conditions for a successful campaign. (Among the campaign organisers, there is a saying: the electoral contest decided by Rroma! The saying is translated the fact that in the campaign, they are used efficiently by all the political forces. Unfortunately, they sell their votes.)

1.2. Did the Rroma groups succeeded to transform the excellent opportunity into the golden results?

The electoral results in 9 December 2012 were concentrated in two features:
   a) An overwhelming investment (70%) in the anti-Basescu (anti-Conservative) forces and the sweep out of the Parliament of the ex-governing Conservatives;
   b) Large electoral success of a populist and nationalistic party – a television party Dan Diaconescu.

The results for Rroma were inversely proportional with the opportunity. Concretely, quite nothing! Their actions did not affect the political life in terms of MPs positions. The figures bellow presents the results.

Figure 4. Romanian parliamentary elections 2012's results – votes and seats – according to ECB

Popular votes for **"LEFT" — USL - SLU** (SD+ Liberal Conservatives + Conservatives + National Union for the Progress of Romanian)	# VOTES	%	# SEATS S: + 39 CD: +78	%
	S: 4,457,526	60,7% S.	S:122 (ACS: 63 PNL: 51 PC: 8)	69.32%
	CD: 4,344,288	58, 61%	CD: 273 (ACS: 159 PNL: 101 PC: 13)	66.26%
Minorities representatives		Each of them at least 10% of national electoral coefic.	18 in CD	0,24% x 18
Popular votes for **RIGHT ARD (DRA)**	S: 1,239,318	16.72%	S:24 PDL: 22 FC: 1 PNTCD: 1	13.64%
	CD: 1,223,189	16.52%	CD: 56 (PDL: 52 FC: 3 PNTCD:1	13.59%
PP DD	S: 1,236,144 CD: 1,081,601	14.63%	S: 21 CD: 47	11, 93% 11.41%
DAHR	S: 388,372 CD:	5.25%	S: 9 CD: 18	5.11% 4.37%
TOTAL	S: 7,390,037 CD: 7,383,236	100%	S: 176 CD : 412 588	100% 100%

The legend:

SLU – in red: the Political Alliance – SOCIAL LIBERAL UNION (SLU)
  Social Democrats (members of PES) with the
  Liberals and Conservatives (members of ALDE in EP)
ARR – in green: the ALIANCE RIGHT ROMANIA (ARR)
  Democrat Liberal Party (DLP) – the governing party
  The People Party – Dan Diaconescu (PP DD)
  Democratic Alliance of Hungarians of Romania (DAHR)

  Source: Table done by the author – Pop, Lia – 2013, using official data.[11]

According to the diagrammed results, the Rroma specific representation is not visible in the large Romanian Parliament (the largest in the Romanian history).

The Rroma representation is one single seat in the Chamber of Deputies, a seat secured by the law provisions for minorities. The traditional name of the representative is Nicolae Paun the MP which represents the totality of the 620,000 persons officially registered as Rroma (in Romania). He is the head of the Association the Party of Rroma. (Partida Romilor – in Romania).

To understand the problem, it is to see how well represented are Rroma by comparison with other ethnic minorities of today Romania.

The DAHR is represented in the current legislature by 27 MPs, to a population of 1.2 million self-identified as Hungarians in Romania. That means 1 MP of every 45,000 of Hungarians (1,200,000/27=45,000). They are the single minority represented and having a parliamentary group both in lower and in upper house of Romanian Parliament.

Comparing the representation of Hungarians (of Romania) with the Rroma it results: 1 MP of every 45,000 and 1 MP of every 620,000 of Rroma. That means around 15 times a less represented Rroma person.

Comparing the representation of Ruthenians (of Romania) with the Rroma representation in the National Legislative, it results: 1 MP[12] of 257 people in Ruthenians' case, and 1 (a single) MP of every 620,000 of Rroma. That means a Rroma person is more than 25,000 times less represented, by comparison with its fellow Ruthenian.

Quantitatively, the results are incredible poor (Figure 5), in spite of the golden conjecture.

Qualitatively, the persons, who represent Rroma peoples, and who openly declare their Rroma ancestors, are:

  Nicolae Paun, MP – the occupant of the secured seat, and having an extremely poor Rroma support – others two famous Rroma name in Romanian Legislative,

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[11] The results in the Romanian parliamentary elections 2012 are available online at: <http://www.becparlamentare2012.ro> [Accessed in August, 2013].
[12] The Ruthenian's MP name is Gheorghe Firczak.

Madalin Voicu MP – a Half Rroma persons, with Communist aristocracy roots, member (SD) integrated in the Social Democrat Party – Left, Family of Socialists in PE, a Kashary[13], in Rroma understanding;

and Damian Draghici (SD), senator – a Rroma extremely successful musician, with Luti ancestors.

They are Rroma too, according with their self-identification – but they are not Rroma representatives. Madalin Voicu is a *Kashari* Rroma;

For the purposes of this paper, they could be accepted as Rroma MPs active in the Current Romanian House of Deputies and Senate.

Figure 5. The results for Rroma in the Romanian elections 2012

Rroma MPs in Romanian Legislative 2012-2016
Lower House

Source: a chart done by the author – Pop, Lia – using official data.[14]

2. Lesson to be learned

Learning the lesson of 2012 failure, the paper is trying to explore how to construct the Rroma way of continuity, and to emphasise an ignored actor in their access to political power. It is the case of the universities.

According with this paper, firstly, it is to analyse the outcomes in the perspective of the causes, of "what was not enough done to win". Secondly, to explore the meanings of what the promises of success would have meant. Thirdly, it is to identity new allies.

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[13] A Kashary is one who loosed its Rroma identity and did not know genuinely the language as a mother tongue. Madalin Voicu mother is a non Rroma person.
[14] http://www.becparlamentare2012.ro

2.1. Causes of the harsh defeat of the Rroma in 2012 Romania's parliamentary elections

According with the data and knowledge, available for this paper, two kinds of variables are responsible for the results.

The first cause came from the difficulties encountered by the Rroma groups to act politically in an internal coordination.

There are too many ambitions among the Rroma, too many un-patient and willing to social access persons, in each Rroma group. They could be characterised[15] as traditional elites, modernizing elites and false elites.

If the traditional elites act for the group – economically, religiously, morally, and socially –, if the modernizing elites do the same, plus prepare the political participation of Rroma, the false elites and the most powerful is acting against the Rroma interests on the long run.

The prominent members in the Rroma community – as interlopes or simply successful economically persons – claim noisily, sometimes, violently the leadership of the group and the right to involve them in activities not all the time legal or moral. Beside of perverting the new generations to immoral, illegal, and antisocial activity, they destroy the social links of the Rroma tradition aggregations: the respect for the elders, for the authority. They – unconsciously – teach in the large society the lesson of questioning the principle of authority and they call for the anarchy (a state of affairs that is more convenient for their illegal activities). Among the gangs, there are continuous fights, with so violent moments, that they end into crimes. Concluding it is to say, that they, instead of the work for aggregate the group, each of them acts to constitute its own gang of supporters, ready to fight, lie, or to be mute for him. For the gang members, the accession as well as the fall of the new leader, means personal accession or failing.

For the imperative of the strategic coordination of Rroma in order to gain politically, the gangs' activity is the most dangerous process. They obstacle for at least a generation the capacity of the groups to reach a consensus.

The present leaders' limited actions for the Rroma in need persons and groups, together with their personal non-undoubted morality – accusations of corruption and abuse of power toward the new leaders are frequent in the groups – are also a way of preventing the aggregation to back of a strong leader.

Besides, there are voices which the new educated elites of Rroma – which accessed a lot of international programs – of being a *programo-cratia*, instead of being social activists in the benefices of the grass roots communities.

The incredible material difficulties of the groups' members combined with their disappointment that a supported leader did not reduce it immediately are inhibiting the capacity to aggregate of the groups.

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[15] See for more Pop, L.: *Two Rroma elites.* [pdf] Available at: <http://kv.sapientia.ro/data/miremir/LIA_POP.pdf>

The leadership group's limited culture and experience of acting in coordination as well as the miss of specific media communication are also factors that explain the limited and precarious needed coordination for a successful electoral campaign.

The second cause – according with a leader of new Rroma forces, Marian Daragiu[16] – came from the institutional design of the "affirmative action" in Romania.

The main law in the field, the law on the status of minorities, is constantly, deferred, since 1995. That means quite a decade! The project is, time to time amended; time-to-time on the parliamentary agenda, but it is not vote yet. According with, the effective act that provides the affirmative action for Rroma, the electoral law, only one representative of an ethnic group is entitle to get a seat in the Parliament. It mentions the representation in the exceptional condition of the Romanian electoral law and the possibility of minority organisation to run in the elections is under the condition of being a member of the National Council of Minorities[17]. However, the Council is coordinated by the Parliamentary Representative in office. So NO ROOM for new competitors! The battle is even dramatic because it involves funds[18] distributed by the Romanian government to cover each minority's needs for preserving and developing their cultural identity.

Briefly, that means that, in the electoral battle, only one association, with such a purpose, is registered.

It is also to note that the concept of the affirmative action and of the reflexive equilibrium of John Rawls (A theory of Justice, 1971)[19] must be adapted to Romania's social conditions and to wisely defined (for and among minorities) in such a way to avoid any imbalance with the majority condition. There are risks to nurture a new xenophobia, out of a wisely projected, self-adjusted, and generally accepted balance among the parts of inclusive society.

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[16] Marian Daragiu is the National leader of the Aliata Civica a Rromilor din Romania. An interview with him was conducted for the purposes of this paper, in 5 February 2013 and available in the Personal Archive of the Author – Lia Pop.

[17] LEGE privind organizarea şi desfăşurarea alegerilor pentru autorităţile administraţiei publice locale şi a alegerilor pentru Camera Deputaţilor şi Senat în anul 2012, precum şi pentru modificarea Legii administraţiei publice locale nr. 215/2001 [pdf] Available at <http://www.mai.gov.ro/Documente/Transparenta%20decizionala/Proiect%20de%20lege%20alegeri%20generale%202012.pdf> [Accessed in August, 2013]. Namely the Romanian Electoral Law, Art. 2, m which is defining the notion of the electoral competitor is establishing for an organisation of minority as a *sine qua non* condition to be part of the Minority National Council… (organizaţie a cetăţenilor aparţinând unei minorităţi naţionale reprezentată în Consiliul Minorităţilor Naţionale…)

[18] According with the press – having as direct source the Govern Secretariat Office – in 2012 DAHR received 17.178 million lei, Asociatia Partida Romilor "Pro-Europa" 11.164 and Uniunea Culturala a Rutenilor 11.164. Taking into account that the medium monthly salary in Romania is 2028 lei one could have an image of the funds available for the parliamentary groups.

[19] Rawls, J., 2012. O teorie a dreptatii (A Theory of Justice, 1971). Iaşi: Editura UAIC, Traducere Horia Tarnoveanu.

2.2. What the possible political success would mean?

For the Majority, the Rroma access to the House would meant an important impulse for a Consensual Democracy – in Lijphart[20], terms -, in the Representative Institution as well as in the society of large, via media. Treating them in the House as partners in a responsibility for the nation wellbeing the political projects for people benefices. They would emphasis nosily and dramatically the needs of their voters and would inspire a parallel approach from the majority side.

Their presence as a group - accessed on an equal foot with any other representative – will inspire a culture of tolerance and non-discrimination, instead of nurturing a devised polity/democracy in Romania. Their presence would impose a political discourse meant to dialogue, not to annihilate the Opposition.

It is presumable, that it would also initiate a new trend in the top MPs political culture: the Political Culture of responsibility/accountability to minorities' identity developing.

For the Rroma minorities the Rroma representatives could have been an impulse to assume an effective and accountable management in implementing Strategies devoted to Rroma emancipation.

The Rroma electoral success could have been new opportunities to develop sustainable policies of Inclusion addressed to the Majority – namely new opportunities to develop sustainable policies of Inclusion addressed to the minorities of Romania, to Rroma, especially. For the Rroma, it could have meant credits for a new phase of the Rroma Emancipation: teaching the Rroma Communities the lesson on the duty of the specific contribution to the general society's consensus and to the general development. It would transform the Rroma conscience groups from a net consumer understanding into a NET CONTRIBUTOR, in internal Romanian life and the EU project *United in Diversity*.

Generally, the Rroma MPs, by their simple presence would be the gross impulse to revive the EU project of MULTICULTURALISM or to change it into an INTERCULTURAL PROGRAM.

2.3. Who are the un-identified allies?

Maybe in the Romanian society, there are many cultural or civic forces ready to support the new Rroma elite, to take their social responsibility as members in the Parliament.

This paper is drawing the attention to the academia resource.

In order to prepare the multiple face of Rroma emancipation and its leading force, the modernizing elites, the Academia could play a crucial role. It is right, to construct a social culture and a cohesive elite, it takes time. Nevertheless, without it, it takes even longer.

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[20] Lijphart, A., 2000. *Modele ale democraţiei.* (Democracies in 39 Countries). Iaşi: Editura Polirom, Traducere Cătălin Constatinescu.

Looking to such a possibility, the kind of strategic project helping the Rroma emancipation could be draft as bellow:

I.   TO DOCUMENT THE RROMA STATE OF AFFAIRS

- to develop reliable data base on Rroma' situation: from points of view as Demography, Geography, History, Mobility and Migrations;
- to construct available data base on Rroma CULTURE, LANGUAGES, MUSIC and DANSES…;
- to enlighten their contribution to the universal patrimony of values and achievements
- to make them eligible and well credited academic subject in the academic programs as Political Sciences, Social Sciences and Philosophy, History...

II.   TO DEVELOP SCIENTIFIC INQUIRIES RELATED TO ALLEGATION ON THE PROBLEMS CREATED BY RROMA IN DIFFERENT HELPLESS COMMUNITIES – AS THE RURAL COMMUNITIES OF THE EASTERN HUNGARY AND WESTERN ROMANIA

- on the pretending uncivil behaviour of the youngsters in the areas controlled by Rroma;
- on the pretending misuses of the public amenities or in teaching in social programs such habits;
- on the claimed threats and terror on the old citizens destroying their civil security and teaching in social programs the civic duty of respect for the Other and the social need for mutual trust;
- on the supposed acts of supposed Rroma criminal networks, on necessary rigorous legal approach to them, and on the necessary groups' de-solidarity with them.

III. TO DEVELOP SCIENTIFIC INQUIRIES AND REFLECTIONS RELATED TO THE RISCKS AND THE OPPORTUNITIES IN BUILDING AN INCLUSIVE SOCIETY

- on *How the mutual trust could be initiate among the neighbours with different cultures, among the natives and the new comers, among the settled and the visitors*?
- on proposing reflections on future EU with a Rroma population included vs. an antagonised ones;
- on scenarios in an ageing EU with accepting the Rroma resource or rejecting it, and managing the new migrator waves.

IV. TO CONTRIBUTE THE FORMATION AND THE CONTINUOUS TRAININGS OF THE RROMA MODERNISING ELITES

- to develop for Rroma students an inclusive and rewarding atmosphere in the basic academic classes (BA degree), in MA modules, in LLL structures;
- to support from special budgets the long lasting networks among the trainers and trainees.

V.   TO EXPLORE A NEW PERSPECTIVE – INCLUSIVE – IN THE HIGH LEVEL FORMATION

- to deliver regular PHILOSOPHICAL COURSES/conferences ON THE OTHERNESS, in the MA programs devoted to the formations of the future political scientists, managers, teachers, professors, journalists, priests and other religious leaders…;
- to budget the special conferences delivered by Rroma specialists within the Universities;
- to offer within the universities free qualitative courses and conferences on Rroma highly credited (in the ECTS);
- to offer in the communities around the universities systematic conferences on the field of inclusive society.

VI. CONTRIBUTING TO BUILDING OF PATTERN OF THE INTERCULTURAL CONTINUOUS EXCHANGE

- to develop academic structures to study and to propagate among the non-Rroma the nowadays Rroma' reality; cultural contributions; social resources…
- to initiate public conferences on Rroma on Problems with the Rroma speakers invited in the Universities;
- to include academic topics on Rroma in general programs for the teachers, journalists, and political scientists.

The academia readiness to support new social tendencies is beyond the doubts. (In Romania facts as establishing the programs on Rromani language, in Bucharest University, the MA for Rroma women in the Feminist studies in SNSPA – Bucharest; the good managing of the affirmative action for Rroma students and many others are the irrefutable proves.)

The strategic coordination of academic resources seems to be the missing factor in having a more contributing ally for Rroma emancipative efforts, in the Romanian Society.

Conclusions and Recommendations

The golden opportunity to Rroma access in the Romanian Parliament was missing in 2012.

Nevertheless, with serious and persisting contributions to Rroma general inclusion, the next generation of educated Rroma, willing to help their fellows, the chances to overcome the obstacles will fructify.

The persisting efforts to defeat the inner mentality of being the people who permanently and progressively in need and the majority mentality of seeing the OTHER as an INTRUDER into our POLITY   or as an ENEMY will be a bad social memory.

The continuous actions on the grass roots of the new leaders would success to aggregate the political actors and to reach the political coordination's goal at least at the leaders' level.

Their affirming as reliable partners in social actions will change the majority readiness to look to Rroma as a guilty on duty people, as a common scapegoat. For the majority eyes, the Rroma leaders' seriousness and effective involvement in a social problems solving will transform them into respectful partners and their people in identifiable complementary ALTERNATIVE RESOURCE IN SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT!

The Rroma elites – as an educated and politically trained one, with the already known supporters – already defined its strategies and actions. They are in the full capacity of accommodate them with the new challenges and presumable constraints.

The academia – according with the before plea – could be involved by the impulses as the Rroma modernizing group calls, the governmental focused programs and the inner academic and civic interests.

With a complex national program, converging the efforts in Rroma inclusion of political incumbents, the next Rroma generation have the chance to be not any more a discriminated, a generation with social problems. The chances to succeed are proportional with the willingness to overpass the current conditions among the Rroma young parents and with the persistent and coherent policies of inclusions offer by the incumbents in the EU, all around, and in Brussels, mainly. Their determination to eliminate any opt outs in the field, the persisting and strategically oriented contributions of Rroma elites, the predictable efforts of the outside supporters, the academic strategic involvement, will transform the Rroma populations in an respectable and emancipated one. With such efforts, the next Rroma generation will be considered as a chance, not as a problem in the European society.

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ROMA-MINORITY ECONOMIC EMPOWERMENT?

AN ANALYTIC ASSESSMENT OF THE NEXUS BETWEEN WELFARE STATE EFFICIENCY AND POVERTY ENTRAPMENT. PERSPECTIVES FROM HUNGARY AND ROMANIA.

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* * *

Introduction

According to official statistics there are 205,720 Roma in Hungary and 619,007 in Romania[1]. Double or triple the numbers and you will arrive at a number more reflective of reality. The simple fact of having to make use of variable estimations instead of accurate statistics when studying the Roma-minority is one of the most problematic issues around the topic. There is a severe lack of statistical data on minorities in general, and especially for Roma. More importantly, for this particular minority it is nearly impossible to attain reliable data because there are many sociological undefined boundaries of the ethnic minority *appartenance*. A considerable number of Roma do dot declare themselves as being Roma, either due to inherited fears from the pre-communist and communist times, when it was necessary to conceal the Roma-minority belonging, or simply because they are integrated to such an extent into the society that they do not consider themselves as a distinct part of it. There are also cases of mixed marriages, fear of discrimination or desire to belong to a different social group that makes the determination of the Roma ethnic belonging an unclear and hard to define concept.

However it may be, the statistics show that by 2015, 25% of the population entering the labour market in Hungary will be of Roma origin and Romania follows faithfully a similar pattern with the prediction of 21% (World DataBank, 2010). The demographic situation, in terms of demographic current and age-structure, is worsening in both countries among ethnically Romanians and Hungarians, while the Roma population has an increasing trend. It is not merely a social problem anymore, therefore it is of utmost importance to include the Romani into the formal economic sphere and into the society as a whole. ***The million dollar question is: how to do it?***

The overall perception is that "the Roma rarely work or are legally employed, they are not diligent tax-payers, they are uneducated and often illiterate" and bound to remain a shameful stain on the white image of capitalist *human-rightist* European area. The former Romanian

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[1] The numbers are according to the latest official censuses (2001 in Hungary and 2011 in Romania).

Minister of Foreign Affairs in the Emil Boc government once commented that "there are some physiological, natural problems of criminality […] especially among Romanian citizens of Roma origin." (minorityrights.org, 2010; Romea CZ, 2010) Notwithstanding that the former government official describes the situation with obvious political (in)correctness, the present situation did not arise from "natural" causes, but as consequence of bad-management in the last two and a half decades of democracy and new-born capitalist system.

Conceptual framework

I. Situating the topic in the field

The transition period in both Romania and Hungary had a negative impact on the well-being of the population. Currently, in Hungary, out of 10 million citizens, approximately 3 million live below the poverty line and in Romania, 9 million out of 20 are facing the same situation (Murgu, 2012; Szocpol Ökopolisz, 2012). The 29.9% of poor Hungarians and 41.4% of poor Romanians are the general research subjects of the present study. Within this context, the Roma-population is over-represented in the poverty statistics and is barely represented in the growth and development statistics, hence they represent the specific research subjects.

The economic development of a country is measured in GDP, GDP per capita, productivity rates or capital accumulation. According to the above mentioned numbers, roughly one third of Hungarians and half of Romanians are passive actors of economic development. If we add social development to this equation, the picture will become even gloomier.

The role of a welfare state is to give support to the disadvantaged part of the population through "promotion of the economic and social well-being of its citizens, based on the principle of equality of opportunity, equitable distribution of wealth and public responsibility for those unable to avail themselves of the minimal provisions for a good life"

(britannica.com). Certainly, the previous definition can be regarded as simplest and traditional in Gosta Esping-Andersen's interpretation, which gives the warning that "the concept of welfare state is too narrowly associated with the conventional social-amelioration policies" (Andersen, 1990, p.6). However, even considered in a broader sense and from a different ideological perspective, the author agrees that "social policy is not only emancipatory, but also a precondition for economic efficiency. The social rights, income security, equalisation, and eradication of poverty, that are universalistic welfare state pursues, are necessary preconditions for the strength and unity that collective power mobilisation demand" (Ibidem, p.13).

The definition of the "welfare state" is in perfect harmony with the recent development strategies that the European Union is promoting and trying to enforce. The targets of the Lisbon Strategy and its successor Europe 2020, the Stability and Growth Pact, the EuroPlus Pact and several other pacts, to which both Hungary and Romania are signatory, therefore sustain the existence of an efficient welfare state, independently of its nature (liberal, continental or social democratic), which can enhance the poverty alleviation and offer viable development opportunities to the disadvantaged groups. Furthermore, the European institutions are actively involved and deeply committed in the promotion of Roma-minority development and inclusion.

Within this constructed framework, the integration of the Roma-minority into the economic and social spheres of the society appears to be a focus of the day. The hopes are that, in time and with sustained efforts, providing incentives and support for the Roma people (for instance in education, employment or health care), will sustain the creation of the human capital that is a precondition for a strong middle-class and a sustainable economic development.

II. Research question & Research hypothesis

The study will focus on finding the answer to the following main research questions:

    i)   What is the role of the welfare state into the process of poverty alleviation in the case of Roma-minority? On which grounds should the state structure policies to address efficiently the Roma-minority's needs?

    ii)   To what extent the weakness of the welfare state is a manifestation of or a contributor to the persistence of the poverty in Hungary and Romania?

    iii)   Balancing the analytical concept of "welfare state" and the empirical data, can it be stated that Hungary and Romania are indeed functional welfare states, able to structure and secure the legislative, structural and functional framework, in which a strategy for answering the poverty challenge responds to the imperatives of the socio-economic inclusion of the poor strata of the society in which the Roma-minority is included?

Sub-questions

Which factors differentiate the situation of the Roma from the majority population dealing with severe poverty?

Are the Roma targeted policies efficient for the economic empowerment of the minority? Or rather the Roma problems can be handled only in the broader framework of poverty?

Which are the factors that contributed to the weakness of the welfare state? Which are the factors that influenced the poverty rate?

Where does the viability of a welfare state intersect with the socio-economic development and with the enfranchisement of a decent living standard?

Therefore, firstly, I argue that the Roma economic problems, due to the complexity of the situation, can be handled only in the broader framework of poverty issues. It is first needed to structure an *efficient* strategy for answering the general poverty challenge and only afterwards the Roma specialties could be dealt with. There is indeed an overlap of the Roma-minority and the poorest strata of the society, and the Roma minority's precarious situation presents a complex set of factors that determine the social and economic exclusion. But considering the macro-economic development and the present shape of the Romanian and Hungarian welfare states, the focus on the elimination of general poverty should be the primordial aim. Hence the second hypothesis is structured as following: given that the Roma-minority shares many of the same characteristics with the poor strata (poor education, poor housing conditions, poor health, etc.) and considering that the social states in the two countries were rather unsuccessful in improving the life conditions of the people entrapped in the poverty cycle, the answer to the challenge of including the Roma in the social and economic spheres is linked intrinsically to the solution to the general poverty issues. Thirdly, I assume that Hungary and Romania do not have the characteristics of efficient welfare states and are not capable of structuring the necessary preconditions for a social and economic sustainable development of the poor strata of the society in which the Roma-minority is over-represented.

III. Field of study, new approach and obstacles

The character of the thesis is interdisciplinary regarding the field of study and mixed regarding the approaches. The interdisciplinary study field is bespoken by the complexity of the Roma-minority situation and by the complex concept of "welfare state". The topic will be addressed both from a sociological and historical perspective, mainly in the first chapter, as well as from an economic and developmental point of view, notably in the second and third chapters. The legislative field will be also employed upon need. The qualitative and comparative approaches will be synergised and used conjointly, considering the countries in focus, namely Hungary and Romania.

The vanguardism of the research lays in the exposure of the blatant paradox between the promoted social inclusion and the systemic reproduction of poverty. Although at a declarative level the reduction of poverty has been a panoptic aim of national and international political bodies, the poverty has been induced and determined by the influence of *realpolitik* currents of ideology. The Roma-minority social inclusion scheme is viewed as a frame without contents since it is based on a defective welfare state system. It is senseless to aspire to the socio-economic inclusion of the Roma community when the mainstream poverty trends are succumbed by the moral laxity of the political and economic decisions. The second point of vanguardism of the present research is the study of the Roma-minority as an inclusive part of the mainstream poverty, although many researchers tend to study the issues separately, considering that the Roma-minority homogeneity overtakes the differences among them. Although it is not a matter of doubt that the Romani people are more likely to be exposed to poverty, the lack of statistics to measure the extent of the effects of the social policies on the Roma and the fuzziness of the identity and ethnic belonging quench the attempt to study the Roma-minority (in itself) in relationship with the welfare state.

The obstacles of the research were related to the scarcity of statistical data on minorities and how representative the statistics are for the entire Roma community. The voluminous amount of studies regarding the Roma-minority were many times confusing and multi-sided considering that every researcher or scholar has a different approach and consequently different conclusions, and from a theoretical perspective, they can all be true. But the extent to which every truth can be applied in reality is limited in this case. That is the reason why the analysis could be open to contestation, given the fact that it would be impossible to cover all the perspectives and the approaches of the issue. Another problematic point was the reluctance of researchers or specialists in the field to accept interviews or discussions and the reluctance of ordinary Roma to engage in discussion and respond to questions.

IV. Methodology

The research will be based on the analysis of previous studies, examination of legislative acts and consultation of the public media available. As economic analysis will be also included into the content of the thesis, statistical data (quantitative and qualitative) is of utmost importance.

Furthermore, the informal interviews conducted both with academics and researchers as well as ordinary Roma, Romanian and Hungarian alike, will be used to strengthen or contradict the theoretical linchpins.

Bringing examples from Hungary and Romania, the first chapter will give priority to the Roma circumstances in CEE, by addressing the socio-anthropological and economic issues. The chapter will offer a brief historical background of the presence of the minority in Europe, followed by an assay of the ethnic self-definition of Romani. The purpose of the historical summary is to highlight the impact of the historical circumstances over the present marginalisation and discrimination of the Gypsies. The issues of identity and ethnicity of the

Roma will be relevant in the context of the inconsistency of statistical data and its impact on the policies aimed at the development of the minority. Further ahead, few examples of policy initiatives for Roma-minority development will be used in order to highline the causes of the unsuccessful integration of the minority, despite the commitments and efforts. Following the historical epic thread of the political transformations that took place in Central and Eastern Europe, issues such as social exclusion, traditional discrimination as well as identity and belonging contradictions will be carefully looked upon. The core purpose of the chapter is to argument that the Roma-minority is a deeply diversified and stratified community in social and economic terms, to such an extent that it cannot be approached as a singular generic entity but as an amorphous one, that can be dealt with only in the broader issue of general poverty.

The second chapter will analyse the macro-economic development, the history and the functioning of the welfare state in Hungary and Romania, in order to emphasise the performance of it in closing the poverty gap. The first section of the chapter will emphasise the role of the welfare state considering the present internationalised economic activity, while the following sub-chapter will scrutinise the extent and the causes of the poverty range in the two focus countries. The new challenges of the welfare state in the present globalised world are affixed to a two-folded dimension of action: economic empowerment as a first step towards social inclusion of the disadvantaged population and proficient social investment in human capital as a cornerstone of sustainable economic development. The following section of the chapter will address specifically the welfare state's impact over the bottom poor class in Hungary and Romania, with the purpose of analysing the extent to which the welfare state is actively efficient in the process of poverty alleviation. The chapter will primordially focus on two main areas of investigation, namely employment and education, considering the tight connection between the two and regarding them as relevant spotlights of the complex mix of cultural, institutional and socio-economic archetype of the welfare state.

The third chapter will further explore the financial dimension of the welfare state, namely the social spending, social redistribution and resource allocation as well as their role in alleviating the economic pressure of poverty. Social policies, institutional conditions, political commitment as well as funding and redistribution efficiency, are issues that will be analysed conjointly to the purpose of clarifying the relationship between the welfare state's redistributive efficiency and poverty rate decreasing. The first sections will focus on the presentation of the income redistribution framework. Romania and Hungary bear a considerable financial burden represented by the extended part of pension beneficiaries and a sizable share of social income beneficiaries as a consequence of persistent low employment rate. The focus will be put on the governmental approach in dealing with poverty, contouring simultaneously the possible pitfalls of the welfare distribution mechanism. The final section of the chapter will be dedicated to the attempt to fit the two countries in focus within Gosta Esping Andersen's categorisation of welfare state models.

V. Terminology explained

The terms "Roma", "Rom", "Romani" and Gypsy will be used interchangeably and they represent umbrella terms used to define the overall population of the minority, regardless of the subgroup, economic or social status or country. The usage of the term "Gypsy" does not imply any pejorative sense nor expresses racism, "gypsyphobia" or any kind of discrimination. The term "human capital" will be used to describe the condition that enables a person to be self-sufficient in every-day life, with sufficient intellectual and social skills, able to respond to the requisites of the present society. "Social exclusion" represents the circumstances of people entrapped in inferior life conditions, characterised by the inability of the system to grant membership in the society. "Social policies" and "anti-poverty policies" are regarded as the sum of measures the state takes, for the protection of the groups at risk of poverty. They include not only financial redistribution as social income benefits but also the efficiency and *quality* of state social provisions (as for instance education, health, social protection, etc.

Previous work on the topic. The nexus between welfare state and Roma-minority

In accordance with the principles and the good practice of academic writing, the review of the literature written on the topic is as valuable and fruitful as it is necessary and un-unavoidable, since it provides the starting point for the commencement of any research. Compliance with the good practice of academic writing will be granted by the analysis of a selection of literature in the field. Considering the ubiquity of the Roma-minority topic in the public discourse as well as the polarised dimensions and the complexity of the matter of contention, an exposure of the entire literature would not only be impossible to achieve, but it would be furthermore irrelevant to the established research hypothesis. The literature review will focus on presenting the main controversies that surround the topic of Roma-minority and the approaches of the welfare state as a sum of social measures for the poverty alleviation.

The methodology used for the exposure of the reviewed literature will take 'ACC' form, namely ARGUMENT CONNECTION and CONCLUSION. The *argument* will comprise the resumed core ideas of the readings as well as other relevant points for the research; the *connection* section will give priority to similarities or different issues encountered in Romania and Hungary or similar ideas commented or interpreted in different ways; while the *conclusion* will offer a proper closure, gathering the substance of the readings. For the sake of the organisational discipline, the literature will be analysed conjointly, unless the nature or importance of a certain article requires otherwise. The core ideas extracted from the literature will represent the starting point for the hypothesis rejection or confirmation.

ARGUMENT

The Roma

Roma-minority has been and continues to be a ubiquitous subject both within the academic circle and among European and national decision-makers. Being the most disadvantaged minority in Europe, the Roma-minority situation has been long debated and analysed on all sides, especially after the fall of the Iron Curtain and even more intensity since the EU enlargement to the East. Historians (Barany, 2002; Kenrick, 2007; Stauber and Vago, 2007) focused on their exotic and tumultuous story, anthropologists (Horvat and Nastasa, 2012; Voicu and Tufis, 2011; Ladányi and Szelényi, 2001) analysed their way of living, their identity and their status, while politicians expressed their concern and commitment to make a change. Policies and recommendations were issued, national and international action plans, with short and long range of effect, were designed. Notwithstanding the actions taken and the resources spent, the Roma-minority's precarious living conditions did not improve visibly. The situation in the field is confirmed by the studies issued by European and national institutions (World Bank; OECD), NGO's (Soros Foundation, RomaniCriss, Romedia Foundation) or Roma-activists (Nicolae, 2012).

From European institutions to NGO's and public national bodies, a wide range of organisations have conducted researches regarding the Roma-minority, scrutinizing different aspects of the vicious circle in which the minority has been trapped since their arrival in Europe. From the literature analysing Roma, a significant amount was issued by the World Bank, exposing the (social and economic) losses and financial consequences of their exclusion from the official economies and official labour markets. The same reports show that their socio-economic inclusion would not only beneficial for the well-being of the members of the minority itself, but also for the economy of the state in which they reside (Economic costs of Roma Exclusion, n.d.). It is much emphasised that Roma traditionally have a generous number of children. Consequently their age average and child per woman indicators are considerably above the EU and national averages (Ringolt, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005, p.xiv). Even though this issue triggers more concern over a possible invasion and conspiracy theories, if considered objectively and hypothetically, it could become a positive aspect since the demography indicators in Europe are deeply discouraging. In other words, the labour market worldwide needs and will always need young workforce. Certainly, quantity of human capital cannot cover nor replace quality since they are complementary, hence it is agreed upon the necessity to help Romani people to integrate in the educational or healthcare system for instance, and in the official labour markets. In other words to fit them into the capitalist *Produktionsweise*[2] and into the society.

The issue that recently hit the Roma population, probably with a higher intensity than the majority of the population, was the current financial crisis and the political turmoil. Both Hungary and Romania, as well as whole Europe, witnessed political changes, extreme turns,

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[2] Mode of production – "the distinctive way of producing", which can be analysed as social organisation or in terms of capital owners and wage-earners. In Marx's critique of political economy it refers to the system of organizing production and distribution within capitalist societies.

dangerous ideological pop-up's which has affected not only the stability of the countries, economically and politically, but also it deeply disrupted the social trust in the state's authority and capacity to ensure social security. The Roma-minority was most probably hit the hardest. The state's ability to provide welfare provisions (even basic) and support for deprived population has decreased considerably while the impoverished middle class has lost a noticeable part of its composition in both countries.

Theoretical conceptualisation of poverty and the welfare state debate

The constitutional basis of capitalist market economies stipulate to the conviction that the population is entitled to receive and benefit from a variety of social and economic rights, among which: education, stable employment, decent living, cultural expression, social and judicial justice, etc. Guaranteeing such rights implies that the state is bound to meet the requirements for the construction of a system that includes a functional social provision system, functional labour market, stable economic environment, transparency and accountability, suitable institutional and administrative capacities (Pogatsa, 2012).

Within the welfare state debate there are: contradictions regarding the extent of the role of the state in providing protection against poverty and socio-economic risks, and dichotomies regarding the understanding of the theoretical base of granting social rights. Some scholars, among which T.H. Marshall, Claus Offe and Zygmunt Baumann, agree upon the fact that social rights should be granted on the basis on citizenship, as enforced legal rights, which leads to a de-commodification of social rights in which the individual become entirely independent of the cash nexus (Andersen, 1990; Andersen, 2002; Hemerick, 2013; Bauman, 2005). Baumann's vision of the welfare state is uncontroversial:

> "by proclaiming that decent and dignified life should be assured at all times and to all members of the polity 'as a right', *regardless* of their own contribution to common wealth, the idea of public welfare allowed (explicitly or implicitly) for the possibility of separating livelihood from the 'socially useful', productive contributions deemed to be possible solely in employment, and by the same token sapped the work ethic's most sacrosanct and least questioned premise. It rendered the right to dignified life a matter of political citizenship, rather than economic performance." (Baumann, 2005, p.46)

Going contrary to that stream, other scholars (Cutright, Wilensky, Beveridge, Okun) argue that such an approach of the welfare state would generate a considerable burden for the state budget and would endanger the function of the state. Hence it is argued "that every single citizen is entitled not to an outcome, but to an opportunity. This means that the state has the role of creating the preconditions for citizens to achieve these rights insofar as this is possible." (Pogatsa, 2012)

The book of Gosta Esping Andersen, "The three worlds of welfare capitalism" is regarded a classical work in the field. The core idea of Andersen's interpretation of the welfare state functioning is that only a strong middle class, financially secure and independent, can ensure the proper functioning of the socio-economic sphere and defend the ethos of democracy. In

the world of capitalism Andersen identifies three models of welfare states: **Nordic, liberal and continental.**

The Nordic model focuses of the government pillar and "it has actively 'de-familiarised' welfare responsibilities with two aims in mind: one, to strengthen families (by unburdening them of obligations) and, two, to strive for greater individual independence. It has actively de-commodified citizens' welfare needs, thus seeking to minimise the degree to which individuals' welfare depends on their fortunes in the market" (Andersen, 2002, p.13). The liberal model puts greater emphasis on market-based solutions, "encouraging private welfare provisions as a norm, and by limiting public responsibilities to acute market failure" (Ibidem, p.15). The last of the models, the continental, sustains "adherence to traditional familial welfare responsibilities" (Ibidem, p.16), focusing on the family pillar for the absorption of majority of the risks of social inclusion and poverty.

CONNECTION

A shared characteristic of the literature on the topic is the omnipresent complaint regarding the statistical data on Roma-minority. In one way or another, all the articles mention the unreliability of data, the un-representativeness of the statistical indicators and the flaws in the construction of the statistical methodology. Either footnoted or expressed directly, this concern of the academics over the un-reliability of statistical data will be among the core arguments in favour of the confirmation of the work hypothesis. The statistical data are notoriously difficult to attain and unreliable, although it is frequently mentioned that it is of utmost importance "to increase the availability and quality of information about Roma" (Ringolt, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005, p.xxiv). Regardless of the urgent need of statistics for ethnic minorities, neither Romania nor Hungary collected disaggregated data for the ethnic minority, as well as it did not try to collect data with anonymous character for instance.

The connection between the welfare state and the process of poverty gap closure lies in the ability of the state to structure efficient social and anti-poverty policies and to ensure a stable environment for the economic empowerment of the disadvantaged poor strata, to the purpose of social inclusion and enfranchisement of a decent living. Regardless of its structure or model, the welfare state is the entity which should enhance the economic and social upgrading of those entrapped, temporarily or lengthily, in inferior life circumstances.

CONCLUSION

The Roma-minority, being a national and ethnical minority in Romania and Hungary and being recognised as an economically and socially deprived group, qualifies for the fulfilment of the requirements of a functional welfare state. In relation to the Roma-minority the welfare state should respond to their needs and 1.) offer equal opportunities for personal development but consider also the differences (talents, skills; culture); 2.) to ensure that the labour market can actually offer a sufficient number of opportunities; 3.) ensure "active participation" in a

flexible labour market sensible to individual and family needs; 4.) ensure or support their full integration in the society through efficient mechanisms and measures.

Chapter I – The Roma

I.1 Roma-minority in Hungary and Romania – Historical insights of the poverty cycle

As unfortunate as it may appear, all the political and economic transformations that took place in Europe in the modern era, had a more or less negative effect on the Romani "out-comers". As James Goldston underlines, they are "strangers among us. Lacking a territory and a government of their own and numbering only eight to ten million, the Roma today are in many ways Europe's quintessential minority. Although they have lived in the region for 500 years, the Roma's history in Europe has been characterised by alienation, persecution and fight" (Goldston, 2002, p.147). Since their arrival in Europe, that is believed to have occurred between the 9th and the 14th century (see Ringolt, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005, p.89; Cooper, 2002, p.69) from Northern India, the Gypsy population has lived at the society's periphery. In Wallachia and Moldova (currently part of Romania), the Gypsy people had a long history of enslavement starting with the 14th century, which lasted well into the 19th century. In the Hungarian kingdom, the Hapsburg policies imposed forced "magyarisation" and eradication of the nomadic lifestyle. "By the late eighteenth century, by virtue of social control and coerced consent, very few Roma were identified as Roma; and by the late nineteenth century, very few Roma admitted who they were" (Crown, 1996, cited in Koulish, 2005, p.313). Throughout the entire Europe oppressive laws were adopted for the eradication or assimilation of the "un-wanted" Roma population. As Fraser notes, "[h]ad all the anti-Gypsy laws which sprang up been enforced uncompromisingly, even for few months, the Gypsies would have been eradicated from most of Christian Europe well before the sixteenth century" (Fraser, 1995 cited in Ringolt, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005, p.6). With no homeland nor a state to speak up on their behalf, the Gypsies were entirely at the mercy of the societies they lived in. Palm-readers, horse-traders, metal-workers, musicians, nomads and always aliens, they had no sense of historical homeland nor a sense of collective identity or solidarity. Even going back to their arrival in Europe, the Roma-minority, as we call it today, was divided in multiple subgroups, similar in some aspects (origins or language) but distinctive in others (occupation, culture, religion) (Ringold, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005, p.10), distinctions that deepened over time. Roma, as an ethnical group, never kept track of history and most of what we know about their roots today, was discovered or supposed by researchers. However, **marginalisation and discrimination** have been common over time. Ernest Hemingway's novel "For Whom the Bell Tolls", envisages in a quotation, a historical perception of this minority that is also shared by many diplomats and ordinary citizens of today: "The gypsy... is truly worthless. He has no political development, nor any discipline, and you could not rely on him for anything." Paradoxically, this exact attitude can be blamed considerably for their social exclusion and marginalisation.

The Second World War and the Nazi ideology furthermore persecuted the Roma-minority for all intents and purposes. Many Romanian Gypsies were deported to Bug (concentration camp

in Transnistria). According to the estimates roughly 25,000 Roma people were deported, out of which one third deceased during the Antonescu regime (Baumgartner, n.d). In Hungary the situation was similar. "Between 1944 and early 1945 *thousands* of Slovak and Hungarian Roma were killed or deported to concentration camps. Roma especially from Southern and Western Hungary were arrested and on death marches, driven to the central camp at Csilla near the city of Komárom in Northern Hungary" (ivi)[3].

In both countries the communist regime and its proletarian ideology, had double-edged impact on the Roma ethnic minority. On one hand, the forced assimilation process came with a relatively positive wind of change if we consider the employment, housing or education aspects. In the full-employment welfare-state system the Roma had worked indeed, the employment rate between Roma and non-Roma being roughly similar. The school attendance for Roma pupils increased significantly as did the level of literacy. Housing was also on the list of provisions for the Roma and many of them were offered a place to live. On the other hand, the Roma remained at the bottom-line of the society, occupying the low-skilled jobs, receiving a precarious degree of education (often in separated class rooms or in class rooms for mentally disabled) and housing at the periphery of cities, isolated and detached from the majority of the population. Marginalised and with continuous pressure from the state's forced integrationist approaches, mistrust was fomented between the Roma and the outside society, either if we talk about institutional bodies or *gadjiè*[4] population. Not to mention that the assimilation efforts came with cultural repression and aggressive "systemisation". The gains of the communist approach were tempered, and many academics assert that perhaps it furthermore helped to perpetuate the earlier inequalities and contributed forward to the amplification of the socio-economic gap between the majority and the Roma-minority.

Pursuing the goal of transforming the Roma into "useful" members of the society the communist regimes in Romania and Hungary had different approaches. The political scientist Edward Friedman defined a three-line model of communist systems in terms of policy shifts which he applied to China, namely: Stalinism, Titoism and Maoism (Friedman, 1982, pp.159-195). Within the social policy spectrum, the Stalinist approach puts emphasis on coercion and repression. Titoism focuses on smoother policies, based on the principle that each country should approach socio-economic issues according to its specific, without following an imposed pattern, while Maoism addresses specifically the eradication of inequality. Using Friedman's labelling, in the area of welfare provisions for Roma (employment, education, medical care, housing), both countries followed the Maoist pattern and sought to promote a certain degree of equality. In the "assimilationist" attempts however, Romania followed a Stalinist policy for the integration of the Roma. Through forced settlement and relocation, suffocation of the cultural expression[5], heavy-industry low-skilled employment and denial of ethnic minority status, the nomadic life-style of Roma was mostly

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[3] There are many suppositions regarding the number of deaths among the Roma. Some are exaggerated (Fraser, 1995) others are more moderate but there are no documents to sustain any of the estimations.

[4] Gadjò (sg.) / gadjiè (pl.) – the term used by the Romani people to define a Non-Roma or outsider.

[5] In many of the interviews with Roma Musicians in Romania (very appreciated even in the communist period) the respondents mentioned that besides the fact that they were forbidden to sing any songs in the Romani language, they were also "persuaded" to sing communist songs, praising the regime or Elena and Nicolae Ceausescu. At that point many Roma singers ended their carriers willingly.

eradicated, their traditional activities were abandoned or exercised outside the official economy and their ethnic identity was suppressed. Hungary on the other hand, under the influence of the *goulash communism*, adopted a Titoist approach for the Roma-minority. The Hungarian communist society, frequently referred to as "the happiest barrack in the socialist camp", allowed numerous amenities not available in other socialist states in the Eastern bloc and offered more liberties to its minorities also. The practice of some traditional Roma vocations were allowed, few cultural Roma organisations were permitted to exist, the semi-nomadic life style was tolerated, while the ethnic minority status was granted in 1979 (Kenrick, 2007, pp.117-122). Nonetheless, the soft approach in Hungary did not contribute significantly to the wellness of the Gypsies and it may have contributed to the preservation of a low level of societal integration and a higher degree of discrimination from the majority.

Social and economic barriers were gradually and continuously forged between the Roma-minority and the outside society. **At an inter-relational level, the outside society nurtured discrimination which became a traditional part of the Roma stereotyping. In return the Gipsy communities fomented distrust against the outside society and found relief in their traditions and their sub-group security.** Spatial and social isolation occurred as a consequence of marginalisation. The oppression and the forced assimilation during the communist regimes further enforced the insecurity and the inferiority complex of being Roma that was created over time.

I.2 Gypsy identity? Roma label? Roma statistics?

A puzzling anthropological and statistical image of Roma ethnic minority

The discourse of the Gypsy identity cannot be otherwise than long and extremely tangled given the uniqueness of the community itself. The Roma-minority is the most unusual and paradoxical ethnic group. As a transnational, non-territorial and heterogenic minority, the ethnic identity of Gypsies is multi-dimensional and multi-layered. There are numerous sub-groups included into the all-inclusive "Roma" appellative, such as Sinti, Hajdu, Szatmar, Bihar, Vlaxitka Roma, Beas, Lovari, Kalderaš, Čurari, Manouches, Romungro, Modyars, Rudari, Kaale, etc.[6] The umbrella term "Roma", has been used to label inclusively dissimilar people, commonly referred to as Gypsies, but it does not define nor a homogeneous group in terms of social inclusion and life status neither a common ethnic identity. Unluckily, a fully reflective terminology to define this peculiar minority has not been yet brought up.

Some Gypsies are organised into smaller hereditary occupational groups, namely Tinsmiths, Musicians, Kettle-makers, Blacksmiths, Horse-traders and so on, each of which with sociological variations in their set of values and traditions, different levels of social inclusion and different levels of economic stability. Some of the communities (for instance some

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[6] For a complete classification of the Romani subgroups see "Roma and Gypsies – Definitions and Groups" [online] Available at: <www.imninalu.net/Gypsies.htm>

Lingurari groups in Romania)[7], live detached from any broader historical or structural framework and form an "embryonic state", following the "feud model" (Acton, Caffrey and Mundy, 1997, pp.237-239). Yet, this aspect cannot be generalised, other Roma being more individualistic. The members of some communities live together as neighbours, respect a certain unwritten soft law and follow the guidelines of a traditional way of life, but moderately, respecting in the same time the general rules of the society and identifying themselves with the majority (see Voicu and Tufis, 2011; Janky, 2012). **"Fundamentally, however, all European Roma share to some extent the same origins, language, culture and historical background […] Because of the diversity of the Gypsy people, it is unclear what *the* Romani identity is – especially since many Gypsies do not consider themselves members of a cohesive ethnic group but instead they identify themselves with the subgroup to which they belong"** (Barany, 2002, p.15; see also Barany, 1994; Janky, 2012).

Countless scholars have theorised and categorised the concepts of identity and ethnicity and numerous theories have been applied to the Roma-minority, in search of a certain clarity in this field. According to Steward "with the exception of the Gypsy intellectuals who run the political parties, the Roms do not have an ethnicity" (Steward, 1997 cited in Barany, 2002). Adam Smith considers that in the absence of a fully inclusive denomination of a group, or when the confusion created by the use of various denominations with diversified meanings (as in the case of Roma) suggests a reduced degree of social cohesion of a community, putting in doubt its existence as a ethnical community (Smith, 2008, pp.33-34). Horváth and Nastasa share Adams's and Steward's opinions in the book "Roma or Gypsy – The dilemmas of an ethonym in the Romanian space".

Their extensive analysis over the Romanian Roma identity in relationship with the "Roma" label frequently emphasise that the Roma activists tend to unify the variety of Gypsy subgroups under one label (that of "Roma") elaborating a unifying discourse but ignoring the differences that stratify the community (Horváth and Nastasa, 2012, pp.15-37; see also Boia, 1998; Kapralsky, 1997, p.273). The same study stresses the complexity of the Roma/Gypsy identity and presents different ways of self-perception of the Romani people.

Focusing on a group of Musician Roma in Romania, Margaret Bessinger's article perfectly reflects the bi-polarity of the Gypsy identity. The Musicians are ashamed of other groups of Gypsies and look down on them: "We are Gypsies, but not like *them*!" (other group of Roma) or "There aren't differences between *tigani*[8] and Romanians […] But once we put down our instruments, we are just '*Tigani*' all over again!" (Bessinger, 2001, p.32; see also Voicu and Tufis, 2011). Basing her ideas on Powell's identity theory of "who we *are* is much dependent on who we *are* not", Bessinger cites Elena Marushiakova to emphasise an extremely relevant trait of the Roma-identity: "ethnic identity of Gypsies is extremely complex and multi-layered. The only clear-cut distinction is that between 'our people' and 'strange people',

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[7] Some of the Roma communities, as the one mentioned, have their own system of justice within the community, that exerts the law and the social control within the "embryonic state". The kris represents the tribunal, a key institution for the enforcement of the Roma Code within the Romanipen, which represents the traditional Gypsy way of life. The judgments of the "kris" ensures and enforces the integrity and the unity of the Romani community and uphold the Romanipen.

[8] Tigan (sg.) / Tigani (pl.) – Gypsy.

where 'our people' are solely the members of the same group, and all the rest are 'strangers', both the surrounding population and other Gypsy groups" (ivi). There are numerous qualitative sociological studies that reflect the attitude of certain Roma groups towards the majority of the population and towards other distinct Roma groups (see Voicu and Tufis, 2011; Beissinger, 2011; Steward, 1989; Ladányi and Szelényi, 2001). Either in terms of language, values, traditions, ways of living, income level or education, the Roma minority is a deeply stratified community and a consensus regarding their status in the society cannot be reached nor considered in a generalised manner.

The list of scholars interested in the field that have scrutinised the Gypsy identity is endless and the discourse is Sisyphean. However the Roma identity issue in itself is not the focus point of the present analysis and it is relevant only when it comes to the self-identification of the minority's individuals and the statistical accuracy given by that fact. Who is a Gypsy? Who is a Roma? What is a Gypsy/Roma?

Once again, the diversity of Roma-communities stratified by sociologists on 5 levels:

A) **Roma that share all the traditional characteristics and self-identity as being Roma in all circumstances (official, administrative and informal);**

B) **Roma that share all the traditional characteristics and are identified by third parties as being Roma (through life-style, language, traits, etc.) but do not self-identity as being Roma in the official and administrative areas;**

C) **"Modernised" Roma that changed their life-style in the sense that they are socially and economically alike to the majority of the population. They do self-identify as Roma and are identified by third parties as being Roma only by the virtue of their own identification;**

D) **"Modernised" Roma that tend not to identify as Roma or have identity-fluctuations. They might or might not be identified as Roma by others;**

E) **"Ex-Roma" that either integrated or assimilated into the society to such an extent that all the distinctive features disappeared. In their case the external or self-identification as Roma may or may not occur but it is irrelevant.** (Horváth and Nastasa, 2012, p.206)

Referring strictly to Romania and Hungary, the above classification can be applied successfully and additional points can be added. There are cases of lack of official documentation which makes a part of the Roma-minority "invisible" to the country statistics. Additionally, in Romania, in the counties with Hungarian majority there are for instance Roma that declare themselves to be Hungarian (Bădescu, Grigoraş, Rughiniş, Voicu M. and Voicu O., 2007). In Hungary, the Vlach Romani that originally came from Romania in the middle of the 19th century, in certain contexts declare themselves Romanians.[9] Other Roma

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[9] It is certainly not clear how visible these facts are in the statistics, and the extent of the "nationality exchange" of Transylvanian and Vlach Roma can only be supposed from the ominous results of the national censuses. But it is important mention the phenomenon because this fact sustains the argument of inaccuracy of statistical data for Roma as a cause of the un-clarity of ethnic identity. The described situation matched with the statements of Roma during field discussions.

do not agree with the "Roma" label and call themselves Gypsies (*tigani, ciganok*) or use the name of their sub-group to express their ethnic belonging.

Commenting on the cultural integration of Roma, Béla Janky aptly notes that during the communist "assimilationist" policies but in the last decades as well, many Roma have been culturally and economically integrated in the society, but not many studies are focused on this part of the minority. There are a voluminous number of studies about those Roma living in extreme poverty or those who have successfully arisen from extreme need, but a limited number of studies regarding the areas with moderate degree of poverty (Janky, 2012). Continuing on the line of economics, many researchers (Koulish, 2005, p.317; Janky, 2012) have reached the conclusion that **self-identification of Roma decreases with economic and educational achievement**, while other researchers assert that **the Roma label is generally attached to a particular poverty rate and degree of social exclusion rather than to a specific ethnic group** (Ladányi and Szelényi, 2001, pp.79-89).

The implications of the identity, belonging and self-identification have a very strong impact over the accuracy and credibility of the statistics regarding the Roma minority. The literature in the field recognises the lack of data and the inaccuracy of quantitative and qualitative statistics and this fact is acknowledged fully, since all the studies on Roma dedicate at least one paragraph, if not an entire chapter, to complain about this issue.

From a legislative point of view, self-identification as Roma is an individual choice. Article 7 (point 1) of the Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities in Hungary and Art. 3 of the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities in Romania assert that any person has the right to acknowledge and reveal, <u>or not</u>, its *appartenance* to a national or ethnic group.[10] Collection of data on ethnicity and race has been a controversial issue, and the statistical data on Roma has multiple drawbacks considering the un-clarity of ethnicity, identity and self-identification earlier discussed.

> "Censuses and other statistical surveys seldom attempt to predefine ethnic or national groups on the questionnaires. Instead, they base themselves (and this is typically the case in Central and Eastern European countries) on the perceptions and the image the interviewees have of themselves. This presupposes that a population actually defines itself in terms of ethnic or national group criteria and that ethnic demarcations are regarded as meaningful and informative. The more heterogeneous a population from a historical, cultural and racial viewpoint and the more society and politics highlight such differences, the truer this will be" (Haug, 2001, p.307).

If self-identification is prone to the own perception of the individual and to the judicial right of revealing or not the ethnic identity, research studies that are based on external identification are subjected to variations of time, personal perception of the identifier and social barriers between the two parts. Hence, in various occasions the observer's identification can be easily influential, not entirely accurate or not representative for the entire minority. (Kosa and Adany, 2007; Horváth and Nastasa, 2012, p.207; Ringold, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005, p.xix). The qualitative data, in this case it has its own flaws as well, since it captures the

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[10] For more details see "CONVENTIA-CADRU pentru protectia minoritatilor nationale" [online] Available at: <www.anr.gov.ro> and "Act LXXVII of 1993 on the Rights of National and Ethnic Minorities" [online] Available at: <www.refworld.org>

situation only in a single area or group, focusing only on certain factors, not being representative for the entire minority and in addition it can be biased because of the subjectivity of the researcher (ivi).

In sum, the Roma-minority cannot be generally put inside a framework, sociologically, economically and statistically, because it is simply impossible to generalise regarding its status. **The policies aimed to socially include the Roma-minority are, or should be, based on field reality, on accurate data.** If a vulnerable group - as Roma-minority as a whole is frequently called and out of which a significant part unquestionably is - cannot be defined, nor their socio-economic status described in general terms, it means that the efforts to help the minority are based on a balloon full of air and it shouldn't be surprising that the situation of the minority has not improved considerably, simply because it is unclear towards whom the efforts are directed.

Henceforth, **"because of the unreliability of statistics on the Roma it is difficult to estimate the percentage of the population this represents"** (Cooper, 2001, p.73) especially since members of the community itself confess "regretfully that Roma have no Luther King of their own, suggesting that Roma may be too diverse to unite behind a single leader" (Ibidem, p.75). The concept of "Roma", as whatever makes the entity definable and recognisable, and the "Roma/Gypsy identity" (or the so-called *Romanipen*) are both fluid notions and everybody (legal bodies or individuals) adapts and uses the terms as one pleases in order to serve the purpose.[11] Although it may be perceived as an offensive statement, the truth is that nobody is culpable. The elusiveness and inconclusiveness of the Roma identity and belonging leaves space for interpretations since the concepts of identity and belonging of the Roma-minority are deeply unclear and hard to define.

The Roma-minority is not a homogenous group and cannot be treated as compact because there are discrepancies within the group related to 1.) degrees of social inclusion, 2.) differentiated economic and cultural status not visible in the statistics 3.) differences in the value orientation of different Roma groups 4.) disharmony between rights and obligations of certain Roma groups, and 5.) the dilemma of pertaining or not to the minority itself.[12] Not being a homogeneous group, the statistics are unreliable and vague, expressed continuously in estimates, hence the analysis regarding this particular minority do not capture the general image, rendering the situation of Roma in CEE inconclusive. **"Such [statistical] data is practically unavailable in relation to the Roma. There is only scattered empirical evidence to work with. It is not surprising that there is often no coherent strategy for improvement when the basis for policy is almost non-existent. Whenever there is a strategy (like in the case of Romania or Hungary), the lack**

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[11] Many of the studies on Roma-minority poverty, the term "Roma" is used to define more an economically poor group rather than an ethnical group. For instance in one study it is specified: "In the context of the FRA and UNDP, World Bank/EC surveys, the term Roma is therefore used as an umbrella term within a policy context dealing primarily with issues of social exclusion and discrimination, and not with specific issues of cultural identity. However, this must not lead to the erroneous perception that all Roma live in conditions of social and territorial exclusion and marginalisation" (The situation of Roma in 11EU member states 2011).
[12] Interview with PhD Associate Professor Emeritus Gyorgy Jenei (Corvinus University of Budapest).

of funding and organisational capacity prevents its efficient implementation, and both prior and posterior evaluations are missing." (Pogatsa, 2012)

From these facts arises the question: *how can the Roma-minority situation be properly addressed if the problem is an equation with multiple unknowns?*

I.3 Welfare provisions for Roma. Policies on paper

Since the fall of the Iron Curtain, the Roma minority in Central and Eastern Europe had the opportunity to improve its status in a freely manner, without cultural constraints and without "assimilationist" intents, as it was the case in the communist period. The EU ethical code of values puts special emphasis on "respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member States in a society in which pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between women and men prevail" (eur-lex.europa.eu). In accordance with the EU values, Hungary and Romania alike, have constructed since 1989 the framework of minority rights, required among the points for European integration.

The European institutions, namely European Parliament and European commission, prepared and developed EU frameworks for the Roma integration strategies up to 2020, in order to tackle with the issues of poverty and exclusion of the Roma minority. Additionally, the member states were encouraged to issue, put into practice and constantly enforce national strategies for the socio-economic inclusion of Romani people.

The EU has taken action in a legislative direction for both economic and social inclusion of the Roma, supporting financially the member states through European funds – the European Social Fund (ESN), European Regional Development Fund (ERDF) and the Agricultural Fund for Rural Development. Hungarian and Romanian Roma people for example, could have been the potential beneficiaries of more than 50% of the planned ESF supported actions for the period 2007–2013 (Roma inclusion in Romania, 2011, p.37).

International initiatives towards an improvement in the life conditions for Roma-minority crystallised in various projects such as the Decade of Roma Inclusion. The Decade was the first significant international initiative which targeted the most disadvantaged and sizeable cross-border minority in Europe. The Decade was an international project initiated by the Open Society Institute (OSI), the World Bank (WB) and the European Union (EU). Through the Decade, the signatory states, among which Romania and Hungary, hoped to add some speed to the efforts for the improvement of the Roma status by involving the minority itself in the assessment and decision-making process. The priorities of the project were: **education, employment, health and housing.** Unfortunately, in the same way the Lisbon strategy failed to meet its goals by 2010, the Decade of Roma Inclusion failed to upgrade the living conditions of the community by 2010 (see Preoteasa, Serban and Tarnovschi, 2011; romadecade.org).

The European Platform for Roma Inclusion and the EU Framework for National Roma Integration Strategies up to 2020, are also among the international Roma-aimed initiatives. "The Platform's objective is to improve the coherence and efficiency of the political processes developed in parallel at national, European and international level, in order to create synergies" (Roma inclusion in Romania, 2011, p.155) while the EU Framework is simply a belated (re)acknowledgement by the European Parliament, that the Roma is a minority of considerable size which is in a disadvantaged economic and social position, encouraging the member states to take action regarding the Roma issue. "The proposed Framework establishes a ten year period to significantly improve the living standards of the Roma people. More precisely, the Framework identifies the same four goals for Roma Inclusion: **access to education, employment effectiveness, access to healthcare and housing**" (Ibidem, p.160). Additionally, each signatory member developed its own national strategy and institutional framework for the development and social inclusion of the Roma-minority. **The international Roma programs however did not have the expected impact and the results were scarce in all four directions** (see romadecade.org; edumigrom.eu; romanicriss.com; soros.ro), the bold aims continuing to exist solely at a declarative level.

The prospects of EU accession certainly influenced positively the path of law adoption in the field of minority rights through the commitments each country took, and the need to respect the *aquis communitaire* and the international norms. Much attention was given to the Roma integration previous to the EU accession (Constantin, 2007; Constantin and Lantschner, 2011). In terms of legislation in the minority rights field, both countries have enacted and passed laws according to the European values and an institutional framework for the Roma-minority's exertion of rights was also created. In spite of the different levels of economic development and the different waves of European integration (2004 – Hungary and 2007 – Romania), the situation of Romani in Hungary is not strikingly different from the situation of Romanian Romani, which raises questions regarding the reasons of this situation.

Looking from a country-based perspective, Hungary and Romania had different start points in transition and different patterns of economic development as well as different approaches for the minority's development. "More policy and project activity related to Roma has taken place in Hungary than in any other country in Central and Eastern Europe" (Ringold, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005, p.124). Partly because of i.) the Trianon "wound" that determined the country to be more involved in minority issues due to the large number of ethnic Hungarians living outside the motherland borders, ii.) because of the eagerness that made out of Hungary a forerunner to the EU accession and iii.) the rapid development of civil society (Ibidem, p.125). Romania's commitment to its minorities had a slower pace and was often interrupted by a high degree of misconceptions.

In Hungary, the Roma targeted strategies for social and economic integration started much earlier and has a faster development. As early as 1991 a unique local system of minority self-management was created in Hungary in order to facilitate communication between the local authority and the minority, to voice the minority's needs and to create a grass-root development. The Local Minority Self-governments established through the Act 77 on the

Rights of National Minorities created the legal context for a system of minority self-governance at local level. Out of nearly 800 MLSG, 477 were created by Roma.

> "The minority self-government (MSG) system is the primary mechanism through which Roma, and Hungary's other national and ethnic minorities, are able to voice their consent in areas of importance to the minority. The MSG has two main functions: to represent Roma interests and to establish Roma cultural autonomy. It has the authority to maintain institutions in the areas of education and promotion of traditions and culture, as well as to establish minority media. And any decision of the local government concerning education, media, language and promotion of culture may be taken only after the approval of the minority self-government" (Koulish, 2005, p.307).

The MLSG are consultative bodies but with restricted veto rights on issues such as education or culture that directly concerns the minority but it has no actual power of governance. Although the resources were scarce, the MLSG system had good outcomes in developing programs, cultural activities, involvement in social-welfare and political elite establishment (Shafft and Brown, 2000). In spite of the good results in the specified areas, Robert Koulish's study shows that the rating and the efficiency of the minority self-government system into the eyes of the Roma themselves, is prone to variations based on self-acknowledgement of Roma ethnicity, education level, income, and poverty status, suggesting that "assimilated Roma are the quintessential victim of minority rights […]. Regardless of individual identity choices, assimilated Roma are counted as Roma" (Koulish, 2005, p.322) and ending with the conclusion that MLSG is "impotent" and flawed. "Its narrative of equality and freedom of choice conceals the absence of mechanisms that would integrate these rights into the Roma's everyday experience" (ivi).

Sergiu Constantin's study mirrors some of the same aspects that were underlined previously. In the article, the author provides a detailed assay of the influence that the EU had over the changes that took place in the minority rights development in Romania since 1989 and uses the theory of Europeanisation, concluded by Radaelli, to explain the process of minority policy change in Romania. Similar to the categorisation found in the "Roma Inclusion in Romania: Policies, Institutions and Examples" (Roma inclusion in Romania, 2011, p.163), three different stages are identified within the process: *inertia* is the first and started immediately after the regime change in 1989 until 1995. Within the six years of inertia "the government was very vocal in expressing at international arena, its European integration goal but unwilling to implement minority-oriented policies at domestic level" (Constantin, 2007, p.84). The extension of the rule of the communist elite, which remained in power after 1989, surely looked with reluctance towards the reglementation of the minority policy and had "an ambiguous orientation towards West" (Ibidem, p.84). The *Absorption* period arrived once the opposition parties came into power in 1996 and the prospects of EU accession were getting closer. Within the absorption period, which lasted until 2000, the circuits of the system started to move and visible changes were made in the minority rights regulation. However, "the wave of new legislative and institutional measures was not a coherent domestic reform but rather a process of absorption of legal standards" (Ibidem, p.85). It is strongly emphasised that in spite of several positive results in the minority legislative field, the period was affected by a lack of consensus and a rather unclear path of the situation of ethnic minorities in Romania. Since 2000 onwards, the *Transformation* or *the period of assuming responsibilities* began. A

transformation that besides a very slow pace, also had the flaw of being very disproportionate for the different ethnic minorities and considerably unclear and un-consensual. Another important point touched by the study is the structural disparity between the approach of different minorities in Romania, namely Hungarian and Roma for instance. The role of the Hungarian-minority representative body (DAHR) is clearly visible in the shaping of the minority policies, while the Roma representatives were rather marginal if not completely absent.

The foundation stone of the Roma-policy initiative in Romania was the "Romanian National Strategy for Improving Roma Conditions 2001". The strategy organised the institutional framework charged with the implementation of targeted Roma-minority policies and, more importantly, it set out the ground and the priorities for the action plan towards an improvement of the Roma population's standards of life. At the time, the Strategy was well received both by Roma representatives (since their recommendations were included in the final version) and by the European institutions which were assessing Romania's behaviour towards its minorities due to the much expected EU accession.

> **"Although important, both politically and socially, the Strategy's implementation was characterised by a number of negative aspects. Among which: the lack of an ex-ante evaluation, the general description of the actions proposed for implementation, the insufficient allocation of governmental funds for the Strategy implementation, the lack of a clear assignment of the duties related to the Action Plan implementation, the lack of an effective monitoring of the evaluation mechanisms, etc."** (Roma inclusion in Romania, 2011, p.166).

The present on-going policy targeting the Roma-population (the "Strategy of the Romanian Government for the Inclusion of the Romanian Citizens belonging to Roma minority for the period 2011–2020") states that it "is based on a proactive approach aimed at increasing the overall standard of living of the population and stimulating earnings from employment by facilitating employment and promoting inclusive policies" although scarce funding is allocated for active labour market policies and social policies (Roma inclusion in Romania, 2011, p.168; see also Messing, 2013; Szalai, Carson and Kusa, 2009). Although the current strategy for Roma-inclusion is a follow-up of the first strategy which was well received, the experts affirm that "the present Strategy, as adopted and submitted to the European Commission, does not comply with the EU standards on public policy documents and that it was adopted rather too imperiously and without taking into consideration the remarks received from the civil society" (ivi)[13]. The strategy was created superfluously and without knowing if the previous one actually gave any results or not.

> "This Strategy was adopted by not taking into consideration the impact on the society of the former strategy, simply because no assessment was carried out to this purpose. All these aspects could make questionable the effects of the future actions intended to reaching the objectives meaning that of 'ensuring continuity of the actions undertaken under the Romanian

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[13] Further critical comments and an objective analysis of the Romanian Roma Inclusion Strategy is available at www.romanicriss.org and assessments of the national strategies for Romania and Hungary are available at: www.romadecate.org.

Government Strategy for Improving the Roma Condition for the period 2001–2010', seems to remain only declaratory in this context" (Ibidem, p.170).

The examples of Roma-minority initiatives aforementioned show that **what the governments considered to be well structured policies and favourable provisions for the Roma-minority were often incompatible with the needs of the Roma and the way in which the initiatives were carried out was not appropriated for a successful inclusion**. A very reflective way to describe the character of the targeted Roma policies is by using Roni Stauber and Raphael Vago's interpretation of human rights: "Utopia and ideology are two types of cognitive biases: utopia is a vision that does not yet correspond to social reality, while ideology will never correspond to it completely" (Stauber and Vago, 2007, p.150). The targeted Roma policies developed until nowadays can be placed somewhere in between of utopia and ideology because: **i.) on one hand due to the heterogeneity of the minority and the flawed statistics, it is hard to construct a policy that could would respond the different needs of the Gypsy communities; ii.) on the other hand, even if we assume that such a policy would be set out, the use of funds for Roma-minority in Hungary and Romania are in a shadow of darkness. Funds are often reported as insufficient in both countries; iii.) last but not least the use of the scarce allocated funds is often not monitored or the legislation allows or overlooks a misuse and/or a mismanagement of the resources** (Ringold, Orenstein and Wilkens, 2005, pp.134-148; Roma Inclusion in Romania, 2011; Toth, Darateanu and Tarnovschi, 2010; fonduri-structurale.ro).

The World Bank, the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (FRA) and the United Nation Development Program (UNDP) undertook mass research projects based on surveys in different EU countries in 2012, as to assess the situation of the Roma and the outcomes of the policy initiatives.

> **"The results were shocking in many respects. Although governments and societies have been aware of Roma exclusion and deprivation, the magnitude and the similarity of exclusion patterns across EU Member States is striking and leaves no excuse for delaying swift, effective action to improve the situation. […] In December 2010, the Roma Task Force (RTF) announced its first findings, highlighting that EU Member States do not yet properly use EU funds for the purpose of an effective social and economic integration of Roma. The RTF identified weaknesses in the development of appropriate strategies as well as specific measures to address the problems faced by Roma, including implementation problems at national level due to a lack of know-how and administrative capacity to absorb EU funds. The RTF report also determined problems in providing national co-financing, as well as a lack of involvement by civil society and Roma communities themselves."** (The situation of Roma in 11 member states, 2012, p.5)

I.4 Roma-minority. Barriers to socio economic inclusion

Considering strictly Romania and Hungary, in the four problematic areas (education, health, employment, housing) that are the focus of most Roma targeted policies, there are significant differences in terms of access to welfare services and the actual benefit of it. It is a field reality and the available statistics show a deep gap between ethnic Romanians and Hungarians

and ethnic Romani, with regard to the level of education, level of health, employment and access to housing, fact that cannot be contested nor overlooked. Hence, a brief description of the Roma problematic is needed in order to identify the extent of the issue.

Issue: Education

Numerous studies since 1990 onwards show a gap between school attendance and performance for the Roma and non-Roma children. Among the factors that influence the level of education of Roma are: extreme poverty, discrimination, inadequate mono-lingual curriculum, school segregation, lack of teacher support, lack of early formal education[14]. Illiteracy is also a serious problem that the Roma community faces. The more forward on the scale of study level, the higher the discrepancy between the Roma and the non-Roma population.

Issue: Employment

There are individual barriers to employment for Roma (poor education and level of aspiration; health condition; rural location; migration; type of family model and circles of solidarity) and institutional/employment barriers (access to formal labour; non-recognition of the skills obtained at the work place; lack of official documentation; scepticism of employers towards Roma; stereotyping and discrimination; weak political representation of the minority; labour market barriers; no opportunities for long term contracts with stable benefit offerings; no available jobs in general). Moreover the programs destined to qualify Roma (various training courses or short termed schools) lack the certainty of finding a job after graduation, fact that renders them unattractive for those Roma that would be willing to enrol.

Issue: Health care

Taking into consideration the cycle of vulnerabilities in education, the poor financial situation and housing conditions similar to those encountered in medieval times, it is of no surprise that the health condition of the Roma-minority is directly proportional with the overall condition. Based on studies conducted by different NGOs or foundations (Romani Criss, Sastipen Roma Center for Health Policies) the studies reveal some statistical facts that mirror the health situation of the Roma.

> "Many Roma cannot benefit of access to public health services because they cannot prove their capacity of insured due to the absence of their identity documents, the absence of stable incomes, their non-compliance with the requirements set forth in Law 416/2001 on the minimum income, the absence of a stable job, their impossibility to enrol to a family physician because of their informal housing conditions or because they cannot submit the documents proving they are

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[14] See for instance the Case of Horváth and Kiss v. Hungary (Application no. 11146/11) – European Court of Human Rights.

socially assisted and, thus, they are not insured, according to Law 95/2006. This situation forces many Roma to use the emergency medical services when their diseases aggravate and significantly deteriorate their health condition. In such circumstances, the costs for treatment exponentially increase and cannot be afforded by most of such Roma patients" (Roma Inclusion in Romania, 2011, p.197).

Besides the lack of knowledge of the Roma people regarding their rights and entitlements to healthcare services there are also other factors contributing to the present situation. Discrimination, transposed in the reticence of the medical personnel to provide what is actually not a favour, but a duty of the medical employee, namely, quality medical services. The life expectancy for Roma is with 10 years less than that of the non-Roma. Being located mostly in rural areas where generally the social services are either inferior to say the least or completely inexistent, the access to quality health services is a high peak to reach.

Issue: Housing

The lack of proper housing conditions the prospects of better education, better health condition and better employment for Roma.

> **"[I]n the policies for Roma social inclusion area, housing is still the most neglected, in terms of ensuring the right to a decent house and allocation of resources specific for this area. Living in at the outskirts of big cities or in remote villages, the prospects of having the will, knowledge and finances to look for education, health services and employment decrease considerably unless some support and guidance is provided."** (The situation of Roma in 11 member states, 2012, p.200)

The housing conditions for some Roma communities in Romania are similar to the ones in Africa rather than a European Union MS, especially in the rural areas. According to the study "The Situation of Roma in Romania 2011 – Between social inclusion and migration" issued by the Soros Foundation under the project EU Inclusive, in Romania, only 36% of the houses inhabited by Roma are connected to the water system, 24% have access to sewing, and 16% have a toilet inside the house. The houses are either improvised or they are declared to be private property but the documents that certify the possession are most of the times inexistent. Henceforth, the most fortunate of Roma are more likely to live 2-3 in a room, in a house which provides the absolute minimum of comfort. Even if we consider the pre-crisis construction boom in all European countries the situation did not change much, since 97% of the construction project were directed towards the urban areas (shopping centres, multisala cinema and offices-to-let), and not towards the rural areas where most of poor Roma are located.

Issue: Discrimination. Social exclusion. Marginalisation

Discrimination in everyday life, at school, in finding a job or in front of a civil servant is a long debated aspect of the Roma issue. It is acknowledged that the large-scale discrimination

phenomenon exists in both countries and it does not show overall trends of lessening. Similar patterns of discrimination are identified; similar arguments and consequences are emphasised.

However, the process of diminishing or totally eradicating a traditional discrimination, which has been nurtured for hundreds of years, cannot be otherwise but a long, discontinuous and disrupted process, at least until everybody will realise that multi-culturalism is not anymore something temporary, but everlasting. If poverty could be dealt with rather rapidly if the will to do so, the fight against discrimination is a much more complicated task. After centuries of inequality and unequal access, the Roma communities do not possess the cultural capital and the material resources to emancipate themselves socio-economically. But discrimination comes rather from factors related to traditional poverty, lack of education over time and peripheral economic participation and not from "natural causes" as it is frequently stated by different public figures.

Discrimination is a specific feature of the Gypsy communities and it differentiate them visibly in comparison with the majority of the poor population. If we can assume that a poor Roma and a poor Hungarian for example, can face the same economic difficulties in everyday life, we can certainly agree upon the fact that they <u>do not</u> face the same degree of discrimination. The Roma will be subjected to stereotyping from outside and he will respond with a reticent even violent attitude towards anything which comes from outside the boundaries of its circle of trust (family, friends, community). This issue should profoundly preoccupy the law-makers when thinking about what particular kind of help to provide to the Roma minority.

As it was often emphasised during the previous analysis, the Gypsies live in separate communities, at the margins of villages, in abject suburbs and neighbourhoods, isolated from the outside society, fact that can only contribute to the social exclusion of the Gypsy communities. Their level of trust is minimum and their unwillingness to receive help or opportunities for life improvement is more likely to be perceived by the society as a reluctance toward a chance for better life. However it is doubtful that any person would rationally respond with a decline when put in front of the reality of changing bad circumstances into a decent life.

Issue: Cultural preservation and gender inadequacies

The most traditional Roma way of life is subjected to rigid rules that limit the access to what the rest of the society consider a normal life. **It is believed among Roma, that once a member goes up on the scale of wellness, the Gypsy culture and identity has been betrayed.** During many of the discussions with ordinary Roma, they emphasised that the Gypsy culture and solidarity can be preserved only through the maintenance of the distance between them as a group and the outside world. When a Roma succeeds in a carrier, in education or if it climbs upward the scale of income ranking, it is most likely that its community does not recognise him as part, in the same way he himself does not identify anymore with the Roma-minority. An observation that could be drawn from the literature and

enforced by the field interviews with Romani people, would be that they might have a distorted image of culture, especially if we take into consideration that there is no history, common traditions or homogeneous common language to unite them. **The culture that many gypsies envisage is directly bound to a state of poverty that became a shared historical characteristic together with the discrimination and isolation.** They may not see culture in songs, heroes or ethnic anthems but they interpret culture as a **"culture of poverty"** that followed them along the history. It cannot be stated that the Roma do not have a culture, on the contrary, but they frequently mix culture with poverty, which became a stigma attached to their belonging. This fact is also a specific problem of some Roma communities that should be on the minds of the decision-makers when forging targeted policies for Roma.

Gender in Gypsy context is another prominent feature of inequality. In a Roma patriarchal family the woman has specific roles, deeply bound to the household and tied the authority of the male component of the family. **Certainly, similar situations can be found in Romanian and Hungarian families, but the extent of the servility of the woman is definitely clearer in a Gypsy community and with far more consequences in the opportunity for life improvement.** Gypsy women are more likely to give up school or not to attend at all, mostly due to early family responsibilities or the general opinion of the head of the family, that considers schooling either useless or dispensable in the case of young girls. Similarly, a higher percentage of Roma women do not work and are in a worst health condition than men. In the light of the new challenges of the internationalised market and considering the demographic changes, female participation to the labour market is not only necessary but also a precondition for economic sustainability. According to Andersen, "sustainable and effective policies to combat social exclusion combine child, family and woman-friendly policies within an integrated strategy" (Andersen, 2002, p.30).

I.5 The Roma and the poor. The poverty overlap. A conclusion of the chapter

The content of the chapter focused on several main arguments, which are relevant in the attempt to assay the role of the welfare state as a contributor to the enfranchisement of decent socio-economic status of the Roma-minority.

Firstly, it has been shown that, as a consequence of historical discrimination and marginalisation, the Roma-minority displays a multi-layered and complex identity concept: A) there are multiple variations in the economic status of the people belonging to the Roma-minority; B) there are multiple sub-groups within the minority that do not share the same set of values, the same cultural habits, sometimes not even the same language; C) there are dichotomies in the life style, authority recognition and social integration, which depend considerably on the financial stability; D) there is no clear cut definition of what "Roma" is in cultural/ethnical sense, and there is the tendency to assimilate the term with a certain level of poverty than with a homogeneous group of individuals that share common traits.

Secondly, the first findings lead to the explanation of the inconclusiveness of the statistical data available for the study of the minority. The official numbers assert that there are around

200,000 Roma in Hungary and approximately 600,000[15] in Romania, but the estimations point out strikingly different numbers: 600,000 to 1 million in Hungary and up to 2 million or more in Romania[16]. There are many individuals with identity fluctuations, fear of discrimination and alike, that for one reason or another do not declare themselves as pertaining to the Roma-minority. The right to declare or not the ethnicity is an enforceable right based on individual choice. Under these circumstances, the statistical data available is deeply flawed and not reflective of reality. Although, numerous statistical research studies have been set out, the methods of data collection are prone to susceptibility (as a result of the A, B, C, D points above)

Thirdly, through the exposure of several examples, it was emphasised that the targeted Roma measures and policies, national or international, have had limited outcomes. Although, there are some positive results and potential for future improvement, the approach of the Roma minority within the policy structure was inappropriate. Both Hungary and Romania appear to have at least on paper well-articulated policies, but the practical results have proved more complicated. In numerous cases the vision of the policy did not match with the needs in the field. Considering the differences within the group (A, B, C, D) and the flawed statistical data it is not of surprise.

Social policy, as any other policy, is based on accurate statistical data and it is difficult to construct a targeted policy for Roma, without knowing the exact number of recipients. The lack of effectiveness in the enforcement of the legislation, the lack and/or bad management of allocated funds and the institutional confusion are additional causes of the scarce positive outcomes of the targeted Roma policies. **Despite the national and international efforts, the real impact of the Roma-policies in the four focus areas (employment, housing, healthcare and education) remained scarce and the minority is still struggling to escape from inferior life circumstances.**

> "National governments have proved incapable of handling the issue. While there is no shortage of declarative, large scale programs such as the Decade of Roma Inclusion, the reality on the ground is strikingly discouraging. Not insignificant amounts of investment have been spent on Roma issues by states in the region without any clear cut strategy, and almost a complete lack of monitoring. There is no consensually accepted, thought strategy of socio-economic integration, and while the human rights approach to the Roma issue has achieved some success, the socio-economic dimension continues to worsen. Pilot projects never become full-fledged general programs. Interventions are often discontinued before they could achieve real results, or are not funded to an extent that could achieve tangible results. Reviews made by agencies such as national courts of auditors are now available to prove that investment into the Roma issue is deeply flawed." (Pogatsa, 2012)

Fourthly, the main aims of the policies for Roma social inclusion have been in the fields of: education, employment, housing and health care. However, these four main areas are also problematic in the discourse of non-Roma poverty. In Romania and in Hungary, as a consequence of the transition period, a rather considerable percentage of people live in

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[15] According to the latest population censuses in each country.
[16] The numbers differ from source to source: European Council, European social fund, OEDC, World Bank.

poverty or are at the risk of it (see Fig.I.1 and Fig.I.2), and certainly it can be agreed upon that not all of it are Roma.

Fig.I.1 – Severely materially deprived people
% of total population (2011)
Romania and Hungary comparative chart

Source: Eurostat

Fig.I.2 – People-at-risk of poverty and social exclusion
% of total population (2011)
Romania and Hungary comparative chart

Source: Eurostat

Romani people share a significant number of characteristics with the overall population that lives below the poverty line in Romania and Hungary. **Education, employment, housing and health are also common areas that are problematic in the everyday life of all people that are in a poverty circle regardless of their ethnicity. Living in the same environment and facing the same economic upwards and downfalls, like inflation, wage rises/cuts, economic growth or stagnation, the Roma and the non-Roma face similar economic challenges.** Differently from the Western societies, the regime change that took place in 1989 influenced considerably the structure of poverty and the persistence of it, while the welfare state structure had to pass through drastic changes (from full-employment paternalistic welfare state to tax collection redistributive welfare state) and its capacity to respond to the challenge of poverty was certainly limited.

Certainly, there are specific barriers for the Roma-minority, that block their economic empowerment and social inclusion. **Some of these barriers were exposed previously, and they are related to discrimination, isolation (spatial and social), marginalisation, cultural preservation and prominent gender inequality, barriers that severely hinder their opportunity to a life upgrade.**

It is not a sole coincidence that the poorest areas of the country, usually the rural remote villages, are the location of most poor Romani people. Being marginalised and living at the periphery of the society, the Roma population has less and poorer access to quality education (which is useful for finding a better job), employment (the jobs, even the low-skilled ones are more likely to be abundant in areas which are economically developed), access to health-care (many of the small local health-care centres are poorly equipped and do not offer proper care). Being discriminated against further shrinks the circumstances of Roma.

Bela Janky's article underline that the level of poverty among Roma in Hungary is much dependent of their geographical position. Most of the Gypsies in Hungary live in the economically disadvantaged areas of the country (NE and SW of Hungary), which lack the infrastructure and the job opportunities that would lead to the regional development and an active labour market for the local population. The mentioned areas have the lowest income and employment levels. (Janky, 2012; Pogatsa, 2012). The same study further notes, based on studies from 2003 that the Gypsies in Hungary are indeed among the 10% of poorest citizens but not the majority(!).

Another study conducted by Erzsebet Debreceni in 2007 concluded that the employment rate for Roma in Budapest is 48%, close to the average of 56% employment rate in Hungary (Budapest Status on Employment, p.8) while at national level the Romani employment rate is strikingly lower than the national average. This implies that in big cities as Budapest, where there is economic potential and there are available jobs, the Roma are employed and do work, breaking in the same time the mythical stereotype of Gypsy laziness.

In Romania the pattern is similar. Considering that it is less developed in terms of infrastructure than Hungary, most of the rural areas are disadvantaged economically, and offer little prospects for personal development. According to 2011 census, 46% of Romanians live in rural areas, and the Roma are proportionally located in the poorest village areas (recensamantromania.ro) According to Fig.I.3, in the rural area in Romania there are severe financial problems which attract consequential issues. As the administration system has been decentralised, the schools and the hospitals are administered and financed by the local city hall. Taking a glance at the redness of the Romanian map, we can conclude that under-financing in rural areas is a ubiquitous phenomenon. We can observe that only around big cities, the level of poverty decreases.

Fig.I.3 – Poverty level in rural and urban areas.
Budgetary resources of the city halls (reported to population)

Source: Soros Foundation. Toth, Darateanu and Tarnovschi: "Autoritatile locale fata în fata cu fondurile europene"

In order to study in a non-superficial and efficient way the role of the welfare state in the poverty alleviation process of the Roma-population, there would be the need to use accurate data on the economic and social status and disaggregated statistical data on minorities. However such statistical data does not exist. There are only scattered empirical data, namely studies and qualitative researches, which are not covering the reality of the entire minority.

> "This has to do with both the willingness of states to handle the problems and the identifiability of minorities. Since the experience of the interwar period, when ethnic, national and religious identification led to the mass extermination of Jewish, Romany and Slavic citizens in Central European states, countries of the region have taken the approach of not identifying citizens on these bases and not collecting statistical data according to ethnicity and religion. While this liberal approach is understandable and acceptable based on the historical precedents, it makes it impossible to assess the social and economic situation of minorities." (Pogatsa, 2011)

Under these circumstances, the most viable way to proceed with the study of the Roma poverty in connection with the efficiency of the social state, is to extend the analysis to a broader framework, that of poverty and at-risk-of poverty population. It had been emphasised previously that the Roma poverty does share characteristics with the general poverty, hence, studying the poor strata of the society in relation with the welfare state can give relevant insights regarding the Romani.

Having in mind all the arguments aforementioned, the following chapters will be dedicated to the in depth analysis of the functioning of the welfare state in Romania and Hungary and its role in the process of eradication of poverty and in building a human capital which would provide a sustainable economic development.

Chapter II – The state. The welfare state

II.1 Why the need of an efficient "active welfare state"?

II.1.1 General considerations

In 1981 Claus Offe launched a controversial statement, namely that "capitalism cannot live with the welfare state and cannot live without it, fact that guarantees its existence." (Offe 1981 cited in Baumann, 2005, p.47) The applicability of the statement lasted through time, but there are general considerations that ought to be considered in the contemporaneous welfare state debate. We live now in an era of new economic order, increased competitiveness, fast modernisation and globalisation, in which naturally, the lurch of poverty flounder helplessly the economic progress. The playground of the economic actors has changed completely since the 19th or 20th century, when industrial activity and manufacturing low-skilled jobs were the engine of economic development. It is not hard to observe the shift away from the industrial field towards a focus on the service sector, which requires skill and cognitive preparedness in order to cope with the fast moving technological change and with the increased competitiveness and labour mobility (Andersen, 2002; Hemerijck, 2013). The occupational structure that is now efficient in protecting people against poverty has changed considerable, triggering a skill polarisation and an accumulated skill

deficit for a considerable part of the population. Low-skilled persons find it difficult to remain employed in the economic labour jungle, facing in the same time labour market marginalisation and low income, which cannot do anything but to maintain the poverty rates high (Ibidem).

In Europe and especially in Eastern Europe, there is a hard-line historical poverty entrapment, that deepened during the neo-liberal rule, and which now is the butt of all social policies. During the Lisbon European Council in 2000, the thumping aim of the European Union was set out: **"To become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic growth with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion"** through **"investing in people and developing an active and dynamic welfare state [which] will be crucial both to Europe's place in the knowledge economy and for ensuring that the emergence of this new economy does not compound the existing social problems of unemployment, social exclusion and poverty"** (Lisbon European Council, 2000). However, the shaky situation of the European continent nowadays, triggers multiple problems when it comes to fulfilling the noble aim of forging human capital.

Firstly, the present European circumstances are ominous. In the middle of the emergence of a new integrated order and being close to a Brinkmanship of politico-economic and ideological crisis, Europe is in a dodgy position and the welfare state has to consider serious new challenges. There is a negative demographic trend in terms of rate of youngsters to senior population. The older population is increasing, while the fertility rates and child per woman indicators show a significant decrease. Translated into economic language, "the coming working-age cohorts will be small, and they must sustain huge retirement population" (Andersen, 2002, p.28; see also Hemerijck, 2013), putting a significant pressure on the wage-tax and endangering the balance between work and secure pension, unless the productivity of the young is maximised. **"Our human capital constitutes the single most important resource that we must mobilise in order to ensure a dynamic and competitive knowledge economy"** (Andersen, 2002, p.3).

Secondly, there is an on-going **gender revolution.** The women are more and more involved in the labour market and demanding adamantly for a higher degree of independence, which cannot be otherwise than rightful and desirable, both from the financial point of view (more money are entering in the household) and from a societal perspective (gender equality). However, the issue is double-sided because there are collateral risks of the gender revolution. While there are gains in the labour supply force, the instability and vulnerability of the household is increasing. In the absence of steady and efficient "woman friendly policies", that would support women to have a carrier and a family in the same time, in most European countries the number of births per women is in sky-fall decrease, and will continue to be so. Additionally, the family dynamic is changing. The vulnerable single parenthood situations are far more likely to occur than in the past, since marriage had lost some of its Christian and economic bounds and is now more a matter of individual choice.

Consequently, there is the need to stave off the future scarcity of young labour force, considering in the same time the quality and preparedness of the young workforce. In light of

the present economic crises and the declining government revenues, deep cuts were made in welfare and social services for the poor, the pensioners and the unemployed, endangering furthermore the poverty entrapment of the vulnerable part of the society. Human capital is a precondition of sustainable economic development and social investment is a precondition for the welfare *status quo*.

> "It all seems to add up to one great ironical twist of historical change. Probably far more due to structural transformation than to the efficacy of existing welfare programmes, the traditional class divide is, no doubt, eroding. This would, as many social scientists claim, indicate that class no longer matters. The irony is that class may be less visible, but its importance is arguably far more decisive. In knowledge-intensive economies, life changes will depend on one's learning abilities and one's accumulation of human capital. As is well established, the impact of social inheritance is as strong today as in the past – in particular with regard to cognitive development and educational attainment" (Andersen, 2002, p.3).

The welfare state cannot be restrained only to redistribution of wealth, considering that much pressure is put on it by the social and economic changes provoked by the galloping globalisation and modernisation processes. **A re-definition of an "active welfare state"** (Andersen, 2002) **ought to consider with more verve, besides poverty amelioration and remedial policies (which is similar to putting a bandage on a oozing wound), the social investment, equality of opportunity and social justice, in order to create an empowered middle class with the heft to influence not only the economic condition of the society but also the democratic ethos of Europe.** The minimisation of poverty and income insecurity is preconditioned by the effectiveness of social investment strategy.

The outcome of extreme poverty is **the pariah**, entrapped in an inescapable cycle of dependency, insecure and poorly prepared, alienated from the capitalist prosperity and full of apathy towards the social, economic and political course of the world. The pariahs are the part of the population that are manifestly in need of prioritisation. Under the heading "Towards a good society once again", Gosta Esping Andersen comments upon the role of the welfare state in the society: **"The core welfare state issue is not so much how many people at a given moment are low-paid or ill-housed, but how many are likely to remain persistently low-paid and ill-housed […]** *The foremost challenge we face is to avert that social ills become permanent, that citizens become entrapped in exclusion or inferior opportunities in such a way that their entire life chances are affected"* [original italics] (Andersen, 2002, p.6). Andersen rightly views welfare as social investment. Education or health expenditures certainly make people more productive, while a child oriented family policy, enhanced by an economically stable household, will contribute to the ability of the child to learn and develop strong abilities, acquire cognitive skills, that should be regarded as a long term investment in the stockpile of human capital that will avoid the poverty entrapment in the future. Real equality of opportunity for children should be the focus of social policies because, as Andersen aptly notes: "good pension schemes – like good health policies – begin at birth" (ivi). Any commitment to social inclusion and economic performance include a pledge against entrapment in deprivation, especially in times when economic crisis is more likely to affect the disadvantaged groups rather than the upper classes.

In times of intensified economic internationalisation, liberalisation of trade markets, out-sourcing production, rapid pace of technological development and an economic crisis that does not yet show clear sign of minimizing its effects, the risk and insecurity of citizens is growing. **The macro-economic and social policies are as interdependent as the worlds of work and welfare are, and at their intersection point is where the welfare state sustainability is being tested.** The welfare state is not anymore closed and limited to the borders of the national state. The factors that influence the welfare state have widened, due to the market internationalisation, labour mobility and the international economic inter-dependence (See Hemerick, 2013, pp.205-215).

There are, according to Gosta Esping Andersen, three pillars of the welfare state: **the family, the market, and the government**, asserting that the "acute deficit" of a welfare state is visible when, in the absence of one of the pillars, the other two are unable to efficiently take over the failure of the absent one (Andersen, 2002, pp.11-13). **Employment, education and personal development opportunity** are nowadays the *sine qua non* for economic empowerment of the poor strata, and it also matches the requirements for economic development and convergences with the European aim of becoming "the most developed knowledge-based competitive economy." The market is the major employment provider and consequently, the source of income for most families. The government is a regulator of the market and the provider of welfare services and opportunities, that should guarantee to the common citizen the security and the self-respect, in Rawlsean sense, which will enable the large mass of individuals to be active participants to the society to all intents and purposes.

II.1.2 Regional considerations. Central and Eastern Europe

Looking back to history, the new capitalist Central and Eastern European economies are in disadvantage compared to the Western counterparts. The gloomy communist period distanced the new member states from the old ones, by keeping the free market away from the economic sphere for a long time. After the communist regime collapsed, all the economies faced drastic downfalls, that resulted in numerous handicaps (from path dependency to communist economic and social legacy and lack of know-how) that blocked or at least hindered the fast sustainable economic development and convergence with the developed economies. The collapse of the obsolete industrial colossuses, which were forged accordingly to the communist ideology, resulted in a considerable number of impoverished unemployed citizens, that additionally had to pass through painful transitional periods and drastic changes. It is easy to convey upon the fact that the welfare states of Eastern Europe suffered from the handicaps provoked by the communist period. **The poverty structure and extend in Eastern Europe certainly differs in both length and depth in comparison with the Western counterparts** (Hemerijck, 2013, pp.205-220). In the same way, it would be relatively easy to convey upon the fact that the role of the welfare state in reducing the poverty was and certainly still is, far more prominent in the case of Eastern European countries. Hence, a glance into the economic transition of the two countries can explain to a certain degree the maintenance of the high poverty levels.

II.2 The nexus between macro-economic development and poverty entrapment in Hungary and Romania

After the fall of the communist regime, all the East European countries faced the challenge of reconstruction and transformation of their centralised economies into functional market economies, that would place them in line with the capitalist developed countries. Thus, they engaged into intensive reforming processes following different paths, strategies and instruments and having, as expected, different outcomes. Both Hungary and Romania have experienced changes in all walks of social, political and cultural life, and the emergence of the new capitalist order embedded a polarisation in the economic status of the population. The painful transition reshuffle process has left its deep print on the society's well-being, while the poverty rates were highly influenced by the collapse of the socialist industry, the early pensioning policies and the subsequent changes in the benefits system. **In the social policy orientation, employment is among the core issues to be tacked with in order to achieve social inclusion, a better quality of life and eradication of poverty. Much emphasis is being put on employment strategies and labour market inclusion in the literature, because it is considered that it enhances social participation and it contributes to the life improvement opportunities** (Gallie, 2002; Hemerijck, 2013; Andersen, 1990; Andersen, 2002), hence the employment factor ought to be treated with prioritisation in the macro-economic analysis of Romania and Hungary.

Although the Hungarian socialist period shared a great number of characteristics and economic distortions with the Romanian counterpart – such as fixed and subsidised prices, soft budget constraints, *gosplans*, distorted structure of production, lack of comparative advantage, etc. – Hungary maintained a different stream, both in economy and in the political sphere. The *Goulash* communist regime in Hungary was described as the most loose, and the country was also designated as the one with the most favourable living conditions in the communist bloc. Hungary began the economic liberalisation much earlier than Romania and at the beginning of the transition period it already had contoured a quasi-market system and admission to the international financial institutions. However, it also accumulated debts, throughout the '70s and '80s, in order to finance private and industrial imported goods, accumulating a trade deficit of 21 billion dollars by 1989. (see Kornai, 1997)

Differently, Romania was debtless in 1989, but with massive industrial plants that were completely unproductive, which ensured the full-employment of the population that had to pay the state debts not only through their work, but also through the shrinking of their stomachs. The consequences of the communist times in Romania cannot be resumed only to un-productivity and "starveness". Another consequence of the extreme product rationalisation in Romania and the harsh Ceausescu regime was the parallel informal market that was developed in the communist period, as well as a highly polarised society, strictly stratified and definitely not prepared for deep changes (Murgescu, 2010). Additionally, the communist regime in Romania remained in power for several years after the 1989 revolution and consequently, the liberalisation and privatisation processes were slow and disrupted, fact that transformed Romania into the laggard of the Eastern transition countries.

II.2.1 Hungary

After the uprising in 1956, the Hungarian political leaders realised that there were well-defined limits of what Hungarians would not tolerate. This realisation helped to introduce the New Economic Mechanism in 1968, a system which decentralised the authority for decision-making to ministries and local councils, introducing competitiveness and incentives for productiveness. The NEM was the first step taken towards the liberalisation of the economy and the only liberalisation step taken by a socialist country, whilst all the others dismissed the idea and continued "growth without reforms" after the Russian invasion of Czechoslovakia. Although the NEM brought positive results, Hungary started to accumulate debts throughout the'70s and '80s in order to finance private and industrial imported goods, accumulating a substantial trade deficit and consequently a high debt by 1989. Nevertheless, the country's openness continued, with laws and regulations based on a quasi-market system and admission to the international financial institutions. Some of the most important reforms ought to be given a glance in order to highlight the earliness of the transitional start in Hungary. By 1986, 41% of the retail goods were already free of price control (by 1988 – 63% , December 1990 – 90%), while in 1987, in order to harden the budget constraints, the first attempts were made to transform the *Magyar Nemzeti Bank* into a two-tier bank system through the transformation of the three main credit departments into commercial banks. In 1988 a new tax system was introduced, which was similar to the international fiscal practices, while a value added tax and a personal income tax were created (see Kornai, 1997; Pogatsa, 2009).

Hence at the demise of socialism in Europe and beginning of the transition period, Hungary had already taken bold steps towards market liberalisation and was in a better position in this respect *vis-à-vis* the other CEEC's, although it had an ominous level of indebtedness.

In order to stabilise the macro-economic situation, Hungary adopted a heterodox approach which combined monetary, fiscal and income policies. In the first years of transition, from 1990 to 1995, although Hungary had already experienced liberalisation previously, the country had a 3 year transformational recession (due to the loss of the CMEA countries), in which the country saw a fall in the real GDP (Fig.2) and a raise in the unemployment rate (see Fig.3), while increased imports and decreasing exports posed the problem of a considerable trade deficit. Inflation and currency devaluation increased and by the end of 1995 (Fig.1 and 4) hence, the macro-economic situation was clearly not sustainable.

> "The socialist system had bequeathed the country a dire macro-economic heritage, above all a very high foreign debt. In this respect, the starting point of Hungarian economy was worse than for most of the other post-socialist economies. There were many difficult tasks that the government in office in 1990–1994 failed to perform and the succeeding government, which took office in 1994, vacillated for several months to do so. By 1993, the current account deficit had already reached 9% of the GDP. When this recurred in the following year, with a deficit of 9.5%, there was a real danger that the external finances of the country would get into serious trouble. […] The equilibrium problems caused the rise in external and internal debts to accelerate. The growing costs of servicing this debt raised the current account and budget deficit even more, so that further loans had to be raised to cover them" (Kornai, 1997, p.134).

In addition, the artificial growth of 2.9% in 1994 (Fig.2), timid in comparison with other CEES's, and the double-digit inflation rate (Fig.1) was burdening the country's economy even more. The first transitional phase through which Hungary passed was also marked by the unemployment rate increase (Fig.3), due to the accumulated structural problems, the loss of the Eastern European markets and closure of enterprises. Unemployment reached the peak in 1993 (Fig.3), while the real wage, pension and income indexes faced a decrease compared to the level of 1989, a trend that continued until 1997 (Fig.10).

Fig.1 – Inflation, GDP deflator (annual %)
1990–1995

Fig.2 – GDP Growth/GDP per capita growth annual %)
1990–1995

Source: World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) & Global Development Finance (GDF)

In March 1995, on the background of the unbalanced macro-economic situation, the Hungarian government together with the Central Bank announced the implementation of a "Stabilisation package" of laws and regulations to adjust the economy and stop the easy-going reforms. This was defined by Kornai as a "small-scale shock-therapy", that brought a rapid improvement in certain macroeconomic indicators.

Fig.3 – Main labour market trends (within the population aged 15–74)

Source: Hungarian Central Statistical Office

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The package included measures that were firstly aimed at the equilibration of the budget deficit (public expenditure cut by 15%). These measures had impact on reduction in consumption and imports as well as growth of the volume of exports, thus correcting the imbalances and deficits (the effects of the stabilisation package are visible in Fig.3, 4 and 5). To the same extent, the measures were aimed at monetary and fiscal tightening (devaluation of currency and a change from fixed to crawling-peg exchange rate regime).

> "The extensive macroeconomic package introduced in 1995, (which included the adoption of a crawling-peg exchange rate regime, an impressive programme of privatisation and a substantial fiscal tightening), as well as the deepening of structural reforms implemented earlier, created the conditions for remarkable progress of the Hungarian economy over the past two years (i.e. 1997, 1998)" (Kornai, 1997, p.139).

As described in the 1997 Economic Survey of Hungary, these measures served to restore the competitiveness of Hungarian industry and substantially reduce both external and general government deficits. "While domestic demand fell sharply, exports expanded rapidly and inflation fell from a peak of 31% in June 1995 to an average of 23.6% in 1996. At the same time the extensive privatisation of the economy and particularly of the banking system, contributed to substantial micro-economic restructuring and rapid productivity growth" (Kornai, 1997, p.141). Henceforth, some of the macro indicators of Hungary began to stabilise and marked a period of growth due to the positive impact of the measures taken. The improved macro-economic development and lower labour costs boosted the business sector sentiment, which led to a significant increase in investment, a decrease in inflation rate, and an acceleration of the GDP in the following years.

However, as it can be observed from Fig.3, although the unemployment rate decreased since 1995, the measures had no significant impact on the employment rate, which remained more or less at a constant level, with a slight increase from 1997. Even though a decrease in the unemployment rate is cheerful economic news, there is little that this indicator shows regarding the real labour market trends. The employment rate measures the self-employed and the people employed by companies, as a ratio of those of employable age among the whole population (Funk, 2004 cited in Funk, 2009). What the unemployment rate fails to count is that part of the unemployed population that gave up and is not actively looking for a job. The previous remark implies that **during the period 1990-2009 the percentage of employed population remained roughly the same – around 54% - in spite of the significant GDP growth rate shown by Fig.5.**

The intense privatisation through FDI based strategy was already present since 1990 onwards, therefore a considerable amount of capital enriched the state budged. As Janos Kornai emphasises, "the FDI in1995, including sums paid in connection with privatisation came to about US$ 4.6 billion. The scale of the sum can be gauged well from the fact that in 1994, the worst year of external disequilibrium, the deficit of the current account was US$ 3.9 billion" (Kornai, 1997, p.125). Although populist debates over the usage of the inflow capital suggested the consumption of the money, "the economic common sense prevailed at last and, it was decided to use the proceeds of privatizing the key branches for reducing Hungary's foreign debt. Given how large common debt was, the saving of interest in this way seems to

be the safest, and when all is said and done, the most effective investment. That not to mention that a reduction in Hungary's indebtedness has numerous favourable external effects on the country's financial ratings as a stimulant to investment" (ivi).

Fig.4 – Inflation rate 1992–2012
Annual change in consumer price index

Fig.5 – GDP Growth rate 1995–2012
Per cent change in GDP

Source: Trading Economics Statistics

Privatisation in Hungary was FDI based, the two aspects being in inseparable connection. Therefore, a parallel analysis of the two components is relevant for the assessment of country's overall economic structure. **From the outset, Foreign Direct Investment was considered a key element in Hungary's transition and the country was most successful in accumulating the highest FDI stock, commencing much earlier compared with the other transition countries** (See Pogatsa, 2009). The attraction of FDI was strongly sustained by the neo-liberal transition state through substantial support, generously offered by the government. The government offered heavy state subsidies to entrepreneurs, financial and fiscal incentives and numerous incentives of other kind such as individual bargain or industrial free trade zones (IFTZs) (Sass, 2004). **The Hungarian state has been definitely successful in creating an attractive framework for investors, through subsidies and infrastructure, but it failed in creating the same framework for the population's well-being, under the assumption that economic development *per se* will influence beneficially the status of the population and will automatically trigger poverty decrease. The Budapest government was intransigent regarding the realisation of the noble goals of social inclusion through decent employments and alternative labour participation, while only "a few new labour market policies, encouraging entrepreneurship and training for those returning to work have been introduced, along with tax measures intended to reduce the size of the informal economy"** (Fodor, 2006).

Returning to the early transition, the "balance of payment statistics for Hungary suggest very high FDI inflows in the first half of the 1990 (notably in 1993 and 1995 due to considerable privatisation deals) and in 2001, but a considerable drop in 2002–2003" (Sass, 2004) (Fig.7), which to some extent coincides with the slowdown in the country's growth, previous to the EU accession, and the start of the re-accumulation of debts (starting with 2002 – Fig.6). From 1995 onwards and particularly between **1998 to 2003 Hungary had a period of remarkable**

growth (average of 4–4.5% GDP). It is worth mentioning at this point that **by 1998, 80% of the SOEs were sold to strategic foreign investors and in 2003 the privatisation process ended**, while in 2002 the wage increase by 50% in the public sector (Fig.10) contributed to the fall of FDI inflows (Fig.7). The GDP growth experienced by Hungary was thus, **superficial**, based on privatisation deals rather than on productivity, and certainly did not influence highly the social and economic condition of the society.

> "On one hand, the penetration of foreign firms in Hungary is among the highest in the world, which could imply that an upper limit was reached. The large presence of foreign direct investors in many domestic-market oriented activities leaves room for other investors only if the economy is growing rapidly for an extended period of time. In Hungary, many investors could not find further scope for profitability extending their activities and, thus, they started to invest in neighbouring countries, which from 1997 on even led to a considerable increase in outward FDI. Moreover, cost-reducing, export-oriented projects tend to choose other countries in the region with cheaper and more abundant (unskilled and semi-skilled) labour. On the other hand there are numerous unused resources in the country. For example, besides the low labour force participation rate, the availability of unused pools of skilled labour in many regions of Hungary points at yet unexploited foreign investment opportunities" (ivi).

Hungary became, slowly but firmly, dependent on the foreign capital and the scarcity of FDI was reflected in the economic indicators. Starting from 2003, the budget deficit also increased (Fig.9) while the government debt to GDP diminished from 1998 to 2002 and reversed the trend from 2002 onwards (Fig.6). As expected, after the European integration a new wave of foreign direct investment hit Hungary, paired however with FDI outflows approximately equal with the FDI inflows, which came to an end once the effects of the financial crisis began to appear. In 2010 both inflows and outflows have substantial negative levels that indicate the withdrawal of the foreign capital from Hungary and its impact on the country's economy (Fig.7).

Foreign direct investment certainly contributed to the country's development through: a) improved access to capital; b) management know-how and technical skills leading to higher productivity and higher output; c) development of permanent new economic activities and sectors that improved the country's overall competitiveness (for example service sector or car sector); d) higher exports and financial inflows from investing companies as well as spill-overs to local firms. But, as Sass affirms, **"companies with foreign participation may form a separate island in the economy, having very limited links to local enterprises. They may preserve the technological backwardness of the host country by transferring the low value-added activities**, and may lead the host countries to over specialise on a few products (and only in certain sectors), thus exposing it to the business cycle of the world economy" (Sass, 2004). **FDI also increased disparities between regions both in terms of development and wages**, and it limited the sell market of the products manufacture (in Hungary's case the main market for its products is EU-27 and once the effects of the crisis affected the purchasing power of all European countries, the Hungarian economy was struck and exports of the country declined drastically). The recent crisis showed the serious problems that over-dependency can put on economy in general, not only in the case of Hungary.

Fig.6 – Government debt to GDP 1995–2010. Percentage of the GDP

Source: Trading Economics Statistics | Eurostat

Fig.7 – FDI Net inflows/Net outflows 1995–2011

Source: World Bank Development Indicators (WDI) & Global Development Finance (GDF)

Fig.8 – Current account 1995–2012	*Fig.9 – Government budget*

Source: Trading Economics Statistics | National Bank of Hungary   Source: Trading Economics Statistics

Nevertheless, foreign direct investment has had, on balance, a positive effect on the economic performance of Hungary, but it had less impact on the social aspects of the society. However, **being the country with the highest stock of FDI, higher than all the other transition countries put together, Hungary's employment rate over time did not show surprising**

changes, but remained at the average of 50–55 %, lower than the EU-27 average, over the entire period (Fodor, 2006). According to the analysis of the Hungarian statistical office "in the years following the regime change, employment declined considerably mainly due to the economic transformation. This process reached its nadir in 1996, when approximately 3.6 million people had a job – 1.3 million less than in the period of the regime exchange. At the very beginning of the 1990s, the employment rate still exceeded 60%, falling to 52% by 1996. Following the significant fall in the number of employed people, in the first period of the regime change, an increase of 327 thousand (9%) occurred between 1996 and 2006 among 15–64 year-olds, and the employment rate grew to 57%. In 2008 and 2009, in connection with the effect of the world economic crisis on the labour market, employment began to decrease again to reach the level of 10 years earlier (55.4%)" (Hungary 1989–2009, 2010; see also Hungary in figures, 2010) (Fig.3). Real wage indexes experienced a decline until late '90s, but started to increase thereafter and arrived at the 1989 level by 2002 (Fig.10). The increase was relatively steady in the private sector, but much more variable in the state one. **Although the wages increased between 2002 and 2006 by 6–10% (except 2004 when they actually declined), in 2006 they were only a fraction of the average wages in EU-15, whilst in the period after 2006 wages started to decline again.**

Fig.10 – Real wage index/Real pension index/Real income index 1989–2009

Source: Central Hungarian Statistical Office

"Given the importance of FDI for the creation of employment, it is natural to examine the impact of FDI on the regional distribution of employment and income. The findings were absolutely obvious: **as FDI flown largely to Hungary's most developed regions (about 80% of the FDI stock are located in Budapest and in North Trans-Danubia region), it is not surprising that FDI has increased regional income and employment differences. In**

this context, it is worth noting that while wages in the developed regions are higher than in the periphery, this does not apply to unit labour costs, which are lower because of relatively higher productivity in the developed regions. In sum, regional income and employment imbalances increased during the 1990s" (Sass, 2004) and although the government has tried to attract FDI to less developed regions through fiscal incentives or development of infrastructure, the results had limited success.

II.2.2 Romania

As Romania was not pressured by any debt and, additionally, it inherited a rigid pyramidal ex-communist political class metamorphosed into socio-democrat, the transition period was much more docile and passive, characterised by "croni-capitalism"[17] and spontaneous privatisation. Unlike other emerging economies of Central and Eastern Europe, Romania was on the one hand, a slow reformer and on the other hand, demonstrated the lack of transparency and corruption, which interfered significantly in the transition process (Burnet, 2003, pp.36-37). These downsides are clearly visible in the economic growth during the transition period and the outcomes of it. "The new political leaders did not avail of a strategy of transition or of a theory that would have allowed them to try one, but they displayed allot of geniality, enjoyed sizeable popular support to the accomplishment of such a transition and expected the West to come up with the solution complete with help" (Pasti, 2003, p.xv). As it was the case of most ex-communist countries, the Romanian economy suffered a shock at the beginning of the '90s. Inflation rate increased to unprecedented values (Fig.11), while many formerly employed people, mostly low-skilled industrial workers, lost their jobs as a consequence of the obsolete industry close down (Fig.12). **From 1990 to 1993 there were also massive early pensioning policies as a result of the industrial collapse and aiming at a partial limitation of the unemployment** (Dobos, Grigoras and Preda, 2004) (Fig.12). **The early retirement policies that were enacted as a short term emergency solution in order to cope with the out of work population, was certainly a burdening factor for the state budget, especially in absence of an economic re-launch and lack of job opportunities.** Romania (and Bulgaria alike) significantly lagged behind the other ex-communist countries regarding the construction of the necessary frameworks for the post-communist transition. In addition, a large part of the society – the political class included – was not aware of the economic-financial instruments, as well as opportunities and challenges of the modern capitalist economy. In Romania and Bulgaria, unlike Poland, GDR or Hungary, there was no private sector to speak of during the communist regime and all the economy was state owned. Gigantism and economic concentration, without small firms was the order of the day.

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[17] Croni-capitalism is a term used to describe an economy that works thorough distribution of actives to friends or family of those who detain public political functions within the state.

Fig.11 – Romania. Inflation rate 1992–2012
Annual change in consumer price indexes

Fig.12 – Romania. Unemployed persons

Source: Trading Economics Statistics | National institute of Statistics

Source: Trading Economics Statistics | ANOFM

There were many inconsistencies and mistakes during the early capitalist history of the Romanian state, regarding **i.) the precarious and questionable legislation and its enforcement, ii.) the administrative and judicial lack of efficiency, iii.) the corrupted and libellous political class** (Murgescu, 2010; Pasti, 1997; Burnet, 2003). The dull process of transition did not only impoverished the state, but it also affected the future development of the country and further polarised the society into an elitist minority, that got considerable wealthy, and the impoverished majority (See Fig.15).

In Romania, the beginning of the '90s was, for some, a catapult for economic success, while for others it opened the entrance door into the poverty cycle, that was further tutored over time by the economic downfalls and lack of social policies. Professor Catalin Zamfir, director of the Institute for Quality of Life Studies affirmed that **"Poverty reduction has never been part of Romanian strategies in the last twenty years. […] There are no clear, focused programmes with such an objective. As a consequence, we are witnessing a serious deterioration on the labour market and great difficulty for people to integrate into society"** (euractive.com, 2010).

The privatisation process, for instance, had an important role in the selection of sides – losers and winners of transition. Officially, privatisation began in 1990–1991, immediately after the fall of communism, although in practice privatisation was intentionally delayed. **The collapse of the production and the standards of living were not accompanied by rapid and profound social and economic reforms in order to steer the economy towards fast recovery.**

The first step taken towards privatisation in Romania was represented by the law no.58/1990, which divided the state-owned enterprises in *"regii autonome"* (remaining State Owned Enterprises) and *"societati comerciale"* (commercial companies). Only the latter category was available for privatisation in the first seven years of the transition, while the first category, representing nearly 50% of total SOE, remained under the authority of the state until 1997, when the legislation permitted the privatisation of these enterprises (through the Government Expedite Ordinances 30/1997 and 88/1997). The first category of remaining

SOE's were considered part of the strategic industries of the economy (such as the defence or energy), but the legislation at that time was obscure enough to allow the admittance of a large number of other companies, that were not strategic at all, such as construction, trade or tobacco industries. In the first seven years of transition, half of Romania's industries were not even included in the government privatisation plan. Another component that constituted an important handicap for Romania in the '90s (which is also observed in the case of Hungary) was the absence of hefty domestic capital owners, especially since the administrative managers of the enterprises (often ex-communist members or *"securitate's"* agents with high political influence) didn't want to lose control over the industry and consequently tried to delay privatisation until they could evade enough money and be the main beneficiaries of privatisation (Murgescu, 2010).

Only after the crisis reached its peak starting with 1995 (see Fig.11 and 12), under the pressures of the FMI and with the change of the government in 1996, the mass privatisation began, mainly from 1998 onwards, but often with doubtable outcomes regarding profitability (Ibidem). The effects of the privatisation and the capital inflows contributed to the revitalisation of the economy (Fig.14), while the FDI's increased significantly. A crucial factor that influenced the privatisation process and the economic re-launch was the European Union's decision to accept the assessment demands and the start of negotiations for EU integration. Once that happened, privatisation in Romania was hurried and constrained by the need to close all chapters of negotiation process with the EU, which made way for flaws and corruption, consequently leading to disastrous cases of privatisation, which implied i.) enormous financial losses for the state, ii.) the closure of companies that could have been restructured, iii.) loss of many skilled workers, and iiii.) environmental problems.[18]

Contrary to its logic, the privatisation in Romania brought huge profit loses for the state, due to the obscurity of the laws that permitted the interference of individuals interested to gain control over the industry (Murgescu, 2010). The communist inheritance included besides a large number of unproductive industries, incapable to compete on the international market, a strong web of socialist class (ex-communists and secret service agents), that remained in strategic power positions in the government and enterprises (See Solomon, 2010). Thus, since the laws left space for flaws in the process, these individuals used them to their favour. The combination of lack of political foresight, and private, instead

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[18] Some cases of disastrous privatisation were the steel mills "Republica" Bucuresti, "Resita", "Victoria", "Cilindrul" Calan and "Sideca" Calarasi, "UTB" Brasov, "Oil Terminal" Constanta and many other heavy industry plants were unsuccessfully privatised after 1998. The recent history of these factories follows the same pattern. The delayed privatisation led to the accumulation of huge debts to suppliers; afterwards the plants were divided into sections and offered for privatisation. The state sold the plants for derisory prices, below the price value of actives sold, sometimes for a symbolic price of one dollar. After privatisation the factories were closed down, stripped of all machinery and iron structures and sold as scrap metal. Vast areas became ruins and polluted graveyards of the communist colossal industry. In addition to that, in the early '90s, beside the fact that the state maintained these uncompetitive and un-productive plants, in some cases the state even invested millions of dollars to purchase new machineries which were never used. It concerned, for example, the steel mill "Cilindrul" Calan, in which the state invested 20 million dollars between 1990–1996 and then sold it for the final price of 1.5 million dollars or "Siderca" Calan in which the state invested 65 million dollars, even though the plant had already been accumulating debts. (see Corchis and Dima, 2011) The same situation is visible in the case of the on-going privatisation of CFR Marfa, the Romanian railway line company, which at the moment is on the fringes of bankruptcy and will be privatised in the following weeks to come. (see Nastase and Savu, 2013)

of national, economical interest resulted in profitless processes for the Romanian state (Murgescu, 2010).

The economic development of Romania has suffered extensively from the bad management of the privatisation process. Besides environmental problems, as well as the loss of remarkable amount of money, industry wings, a large number of skilled workers were lost. After the closing down of the plants, professional reconversion, additional training or labour inclusion schemes were not considered primordial actions to take for the sustainable development of the country and for the poverty gap closure. As Vladimir Pasti regretfully concludes:

> "The emergence of the private entrepreneurs and the development of the private sector generated many hopes both with politicians and population. They were regarded, by an ideology that was still equating the private ownership with the capitalist system, as a nucleus of Romania's future capitalist economy. They were hoped to be dynamic, resourceful, promoters of high standards of quality and efficiency and they were impatiently expected to extend from services and trade to production in order to bring to the growth of remuneration, especially here, in order to set the Romanian economy afloat. In actual fact, far from being and acting like genuine capitalists, the private entrepreneurs did not go past the stage of pre-capitalist merchants. True, they were profit oriented, they were dynamic and resourceful, but the profits did not come from higher quality or greater supply of products, they came from their ability to suck in the profits from the state sector which was still mindless of the profit" (Pasti, 1997, p.311; see also Solomons, 2010).

Looking at the main economic indicators, the economic performance of Romania looks gloomy and paradoxical. As it was emphasised previously, the transition period and the political milieu contributed to a large extent to the laggardness of Romania. However, Fig.14 shows **an increase in the GDP per capita** during the observed period meaning that roughly all individuals should have taken the spoils of that increase. Contrary, Fig.13 shows the **dramatic fall of the employed people.** The issue can seem paradoxical because unemployed people are more likely to be poorer and more vulnerable and not the contrary, unless of course the state is capable to redistribute generous social wages for all the unemployed. The considerable GDP increase, in spite of the decrease of the employment rate, can be partially explained using Fig.15, that mirrors the substantial income inequality. **Differently from Hungary, which has a rather low Gini coefficient[19] (25%), Romania's ranking peeks a 35%.** Only a part of the Romania's population – the winners – benefited actively from the economic development, while a larger part – the losers – where only marginal beneficiaries.

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[19] **The Gini coefficient** is a measure of inequality of income distribution and inequality of wealth distribution. It is defined as a ratio with values between 0 and 1, where 0 corresponds to perfect equality (everyone having exactly the same income) and 1 corresponds to perfect inequality (where one person has all the income, while everyone else has zero income). Thus, a low Gini coefficient indicates more equal income or wealth distribution, while a high Gini coefficient indicates more unequal distribution. (poverty.org.uk)

Fig.13 – Romania. Employed persons

Source: Trading Economics Statistics | National Institute of Statistics

Fig.14 – Romania. GDP per capita

Source: Trading Economics Statistics | Word Bank

Taking a look at Fig.16, it can be observed that the increase in the GDP per capita was not sustained by current account surplus[20], which can only stake the argument that **the economic development was superficial and not accompanied by a significant improvement of increase in the production level and an increase in the living conditions of the most poor in the society. According to a World Bank report on Romanian poverty, although the poverty rate decreased from 1995 onwards and the living conditions have improved in general term especially after 2002, the poor households from the rural areas did not benefited to the same extent from the economic growth. The same study shows that chronic poverty, contrary to the expectations, increased between 1995 and 2002** (Burnet, 2003, pp.9-13; see also Voineanu and Pacuraru, 2007). Fig.17 brings another argumentation for the persistence of high poverty levels in Romania, since such a sharp decrease in employment (Fig.12 and 13) was not sustained adamantly by the state budget subsidies or aid, because the increases in government spending are visibly higher only around electoral years (2000, 2004, 2006, 2012). **A considerable relief or poverty survival technique in Romania was the informal labour market, which in present is estimated at between 20 to 50%** (Boboc, Titan and Tudose, 2011). According to Funk (2009), **31.7% (2007) of the total employment in Romania, is represented by the self-employed which, as the author argues: "reflects people having been pushed or pulled into self-employment by lack of work opportunities under difficult labour market conditions or higher expected earnings than if they were dependent workers. The push-factor appears to be more important, however. This means that self-employment figures include a large group of subsistence workers, often in the agricultural sector, with low value-added activities, for whom unemployment is not a viable alternative."**

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[20] The **current account** is the sum of the balance of trade (exports minus imports of goods and services), net factor income (such as interest and dividends) and net transfer payments (such as foreign aid). If a short-termed current account deficit can be considered an advantage, in the long run, a current account deficit can hinder economic vitality. (tradingeconomics.com)

Fig.15 – Income inequality: Gini coefficient   Fig.16 – Romania: current account

Source: EU community, Statistics on income and living conditions.   Source: Trading Economics Statistics | National bank of Romania

Fig.17 – Romania. Government spending 2000–2012

Source: Trading Economics | National Institute of Statistics

II.2.3 Poverty Entrapment

The transitional years of the Hungarian economy were deeply marked by the FDI, which was devotedly advocated by the neo-liberal vision of the governments that held power after the regime change. Transition and development in Hungary went smoothly, but dangerously, and the growth proved to be unsustainable once the economic depression started to cut the bold verve of the foreign investors. **Hungary has indeed respected the axioms of Washington consensus with high precision and success, since it was ranked as the leading country among the CEE transitional economies, although perhaps with too much zeal and without questioning its means, since it is true that the 10 points of the Washington consensus do not make any references to employment or social externalities nor social benefits of the growth measurement package.**

Romania on the other hand, went through transition without having a defined strategy and it was highly influenced by corruption and the inefficiency of the political class.

Although Romania has had GDP increase since 1990 and especially before and in the first years after the European integration, growth was no reflected in a higher employment rate or higher living standards for its poor population, simply because this part of the society was not among the political priorities.

The pitfalls of the FDI-based growth in Hungary were the stagnant rate of employment, regionalisation in terms of income levels and poverty location, and transfer of low-skilled/low-added value jobs (manufacturing & assembling), factors that transformed Hungary into a "dependent competitive state" (Pogatsa, 2009; Pogatsa, 2011). **Romania's deregulated transition process impacted greatly upon the bottom population, deepening the inequality gap. Differently from Hungary, that invested considerably in infrastructure in order to accommodate the foreign companies, Romania did not followed the same path and it is still struggling at the moment to improve the conditions for the welcoming of foreign investors still interested in the Romanian low-wage labour market. Consequently, many rural areas, remained underdeveloped economically and fail to offer prospects for personal development.**

If we set out to analyse the recent poverty statistics, drawn from Fig.18 and Fig.19 is that the social indicators of first hand conclusions that can be both countries are worrisome: **i.) poverty rates are considerably high and persistent over time, ii.) a large share of the population is depended on social redistribution iii.) pension, as social transfer, protects a considerable share of the population from poverty.** Consequently both states have a heavy burden hanging on their budget as a result of: superficial FDI-based growth in the case of Hungary and blind, and corrupt vision in Romania. **Hence, we can observe a high catch-up in real GPD but a low or stagnant employment rates.** Fig.20 and 21 give a hint regarding one of the causes of poverty and dependence on social benefits. **Long term unemployment, especially in Hungary (as a result of the FDI based economic growth analysed previously), is a trait that has paradoxically accompanied the economic development of both countries, which suggests the superficiality and un-sustainability of the development process on one hand and the lack of commitment of governments in promoting efficient labour-market inclusion policies, opportunities for training, decent work and personal development, altogether under the term "active welfare state"** (Andersen, 2002; Andersen, 1990).

Fig.18 – Poverty rate before social transfers 2009 (including pensions as transfers)

Fig.19 – Poverty rate before social transfers 2009 (excluding pensions as transfers)

"According to Eurostat data for 2008, 76% of Romanians (compared to 37% of the EU-27) could not afford a week's holiday away from home, 49% could not afford a personal car and 19% could not afford to eat meat, chicken or fish every other day (the average EU figure is 9%, 30% for Bulgarians, 23% for Latvians, 26% for Hungarians, 21% for Poles and 29% for Slovaks). Romania, Bulgaria, Hungary and Latvia have the highest level of material poverty. In 2008, 17% of the EU population was exposed to material privation, with the highest rates in Bulgaria (51%), Romania (50%), Hungary (37%) and Latvia (35%)" (Euractive.com, 2010).

Fig.20 – Long term unemployment as
a proportion of total population 2009

Fig.21 – %of active population who
have been unemployed for 2+ years 2009

Source: Labour Force Survey

Source: Labour Force Survey

The figures show that poverty maintained its high rates because was not addressed properly and was not targeted specifically during the early post-communist period. According to the neo-liberal economic logic, poverty was not targeted directly under the assumption that economic development (the market) *per se* will eradicate poverty and will increment the living standards. But as Andersen suggests, **"the duration of poverty increases substantially when overall poverty levels are high. This empirical relationship is absolutely critical because it suggests that lowering poverty per se is a first and necessary ingredient in any strategy for social inclusion. The negative spiral of social exclusion is primarily caused by lack of access to stable, well-paid employment"** (Andersen, 2002, p.23).

Nonetheless, more work does not necessarily mean less poverty and guaranteed social inclusion. There is a strong tie between the training and education, quality employment, social inclusion and poverty. People without the advantage of possessing proper training, Roma for instance, have but two options: either unemployment or low-paid/low-wage/low-quality employment that is characterised by low level of stability, few opportunities for further training and restrained social inclusion. (Fig.24)

> **"Once people have entered low skilled jobs they find far fewer opportunities for upgrading their skills than are available to people in more skilled work. As a result, over time, they are likely to suffer an accumulating skill deficit, given the rapid process of upskilling in the rest of the workforce, which both acts as a source of entrapment in the poor job sector and leaves them highly exposed to job loss in periods of economic restructuring"** (Gallie, 2002, p.112).

As unfortunate and unfair as it may sound "opportunities and life changes in today's society remain as powerfully rooted in social inheritance as in the past" (Andersen, 2002, p.27) The children brought up in financially unstable households will most probably face the same fate considering that school drop-out is highly influenced by family poverty. **Unless the welfare state is able to structure the preconditions for successful socio-economic integration and if the initial disadvantages are not tamed by egalitarian social arrangements the poverty gap will continue to widen** (Andersen, 2002, p.31). It is worrisome to see that the statistics show that **child poverty has the highest proportion in overall poverty** (Fig.23), fact that endangers the access to education and increases the risks of drop-out. **"There is one basic finding that overshadows all others, namely that remedial policies for adults are poor (and costly) substitute for interventions in childhood"** (Heckman and Lochner, 2000 cited in Andersen, 2002, p.49). Fig.24 conspicuously shows that poverty risk is in a geometrical progression with the education level attainment, hence the quality of the social investment in education is a crucial liaison between economic empowerment, social inclusion and democratic participation.

Fig.23 – At-risk of poverty rate by age groups 2012

Source: European Commission | Eurostat

Fig.24 – At-risk of poverty by education level 2008

Source: Eurostat

Unsustainable growth has been in the case of both Romania and Hungary a characteristic of the development path in the last 23 years although to different extents (Pogatsa, 2009; Burnet, 2003). **The Magyar economy, and Romanian alike, has been dependent upon foreign capital and the long-term governmental strategy was to create the best conditions for FDI inflows (low wages, tax breaks, infrastructure, weak labour unions) neglecting considerably the developing of evidence-based social and inclusion policies, that tackle with the social facet of integration (education, R&D, health, social services for at-risk-of-poverty groups). The Romanian governmental eye was also blind to the deterioration of the human capital. Nevertheless, sustainable economic growth represents the key in the poverty alleviation, but the perspectives remain fragile for both countries without adamant state intervention in the form of social investment.** In both cases "it was assumed that the CEE region has attained capitalism in its western form, especially in the framework of the EU and WTO, and there is no need for structural adjustment or qualitative rethinking, since convergence in quantitative form is automatic" (Pogatsa, 2011).

II.3 Quality and equality of social investment: "islands of excellence in a sea of ignorance" or "tranquil pond with few ripples"?

The welfare state in itself represents a system of stratification and it is "a mechanism which intervenes in and possibly corrects, the structure of inequality" (Andersen, 1990, p.23) and the stratification framework is forged by the effectiveness of social policy and incentive-based social transfers. For instance, Fig.24 identifies the education stratification tied to the risk of poverty. The more educated and prepared an individual is, the less he faces the risk of poverty. Differently, Fig.23 reveals the poverty stratification in terms of age: **in both analysed countries the most vulnerable age group is between 0–17 years old, fact that implies the salient difficulty of youngsters to upgrade their chances to a decent lifestyle and the absence of a child centred social policy.** Looking back to Fig.15, that mirrors the Gini coefficient which measures the inequality rate, we can have a glance over the income stratification. "[W]e see ominous signs of rising welfare polarisation between income and work-poor families on one side, and resource strong families on the other side" (Andersen, 2002, p.27). The stratification embedded by the impact of the welfare social policies can continue. Nevertheless, the argument that can be extracted out of the empirical data is that the sole redistribution of income and the quantity of it is not a solution for the eradication of long term poverty and social exclusion. Providing basic social wages to poor, uneducated, vulnerable individuals does not solve the problem, it just gives a short-termed remedial solution. Not to forget that **"the social security model is also inadequate in meeting the new risk structure because, almost by definition, it secures those who already enjoy security – the stable employed – while excluding those at the fringes. It deepens, in other words the divide between insiders and outsiders"** (Andersen, 2002, p.32; see also Bauman, 2005, pp.43-63). But creating the institutional, legislative and social frameworks that will sustain the creation of a self-sufficient "social class" (Ibidem, p.23), might steer the wheel towards a brighter future in terms of economic development, social citizenship and democracy. Unfortunately, as Bauman aptly notes, **"the 'downsizing' of the welfare state goes hand in hand with the wilting and shrinking of the politically active citizenship"** (Bauman, 2005, p.48).

Although "investing in people" seems to be the new trend in social policy development, which should target the outskirts of the society, it seems that the arms of the welfare state are too short to reach the most in need. Quality social investment can be translated into quality education, health, housing, employment and social services (which are unquestionably among the duties of the welfare state in Bauman's, Andersen's and Hemerijck's reasoning), provisions that ought to respect the principle of egalitarianism and homogeneity, namely that all citizens are equally entitled to benefit from the welfare provisions at the same level of quality. However, the reality in CEE is strikingly different due to numerous dichotomies in the structural functionalism of the state. There are on one hand, urban/rural differences, infrastructural developed/underdeveloped regions, wealthy/poor households. On the other hand, corruption, institutional and political fuzziness, legislative nexuses and societal class discrimination embed a distorted structure of the welfare state, which mirrors **a polarisation between the first rate vs. second rate welfare citizens.**

History, experience and facts have proved over time that **education** is one of the pillars of a strong, self-sufficient society. It is universally agreed upon that an efficient educational system can raise the chances of successful development of a country and contributes greatly to the improvement not only of the standards of living in economic terms, but also in socio-democratic terms. The purpose of an educational system is to create a mind-set. To steer the path that leads towards a self-conscious state of mind of the citizens that ultimately will repay by contributing to the creation of a framework that will ensure the prosperity and development of the entire country. Education represents a critical issue in the Central and Eastern side of Europe because these countries are involved in a race called "market economy" and another called "convergence with the West" that requires extra efforts and an educated population, in order to raise the standards and compete with the challenges of the capitalist market economy. In 1989, the sudden shift towards market oriented financing and the rapid changes that took place in CEE countries made analysts worry about the quality of services in education (Vamos, 2003).

As it can be observed from Fig.25, Romania and Hungary seem to have a rather good incidence of qualification match, suggesting that the labour market skill requests are met by the human capital. Nonetheless, both countries have low and stagnant employment rates and persistent poverty.

Fig.25 – Average incidence of qualification mismatch (2001–2011) in the Member States, % of employees (aged 25–64)

Source: Cedefop, based on EU-LFS data.

"Even a good match in terms of educational qualifications, however, does not mean that individuals necessarily possess the skills required for their jobs. In addition to ineffective education and training systems, inadequate company training, geographical barriers and adverse working conditions may also be of the source of skill mismatches. Reducing skills mismatches thus requires both supply and demand side policy measures. Reforms to increase the responsiveness of education and training systems ultimately need to be combined with the creation of innovative and high-skilled jobs in sufficient numbers." (European Commission, 2013)

The efficiency issue in the Hungarian and Romanian educational systems is a long debated point because even though in the last two decades there were numerous changes in the

institutional and functional mechanisms, the successful performance and efficiency of the system, from the point of view of social demands and development, has failed to meet the requirements of offering <u>equal</u> opportunities for the vulnerable part of the populations. **In present times we can observe an inflation of diplomas, released both by state and private institutions, but a deflation of the quality of the studies and a gap between the educational attainment and the actual development opportunities for all citizens regardless of status. It is worth mentioning that in spite of the inflation of diplomas, by no means should it be understood that in Romania or Hungary the number of graduates is near or above the average. On the contrary, both countries are lagging behind the EU average** (Fig.26).

Fig. 26 – Educational attainment level
(% of the population aged 25–64 having completed tertiary education)

Source: Eurostat

II.3.1 Hungary

Although Hungary has developed rather well its educational system and is now among the elitist (in higher education), there are still barriers that hinder the education opportunities for the poor strata of the society. Issues such as ethno-social segregation (especially for Roma), rural and regional economic underdevelopment, improperly carried out decentralisation of educational system and low educational attainment which represents the mainstream pattern of persistent poor or work-in-poor households are obstacles that still block the equal access to

qualitative education. (Szalai, Carson, Kusa, Magyari and Zentai, 2009; Szalai, Messing and Nemenyi, 2010)

> **"Educational policies seem to centre around corrective measures aimed at lessening the negative impact of socioeconomic differentiation on the students' school achievements. In other words, corrective measures are focused on prevention against school truancy and dropping out, or simply on maintaining full elementary education as the prerequisite of later education and status advance. Measures that are aimed at assisting in equalising school performances are considerably varied among the countries under scrutiny. In some of them, the actual initiatives seem to be aimed at patrolling on the bottom (drop-out) line with little help in reducing all other types of inequalities in attendance, performance and career paths."**
> (Szalai, Carson, Kusa, Magyari and Zentai, 2009, p.17)

The landscape of schooling in Hungary seems kaleidoscopic if regarded in general. Although there is a comparatively better-off structured system in terms of quality than Romania for instance, there are numerous socio-economic fault-lines dividing the children's educational opportunities according to their status. In 2012 reduced student quotas were introduced in Hungary, which triggered numerous street demonstrations since it restricted considerably the chances of students from poor background to benefit from free high education. Higher education admission quotas were considerably diminished, while the government introduced contracts that would force the graduates to stay in the country for several years (see globalvoicesonline.org) **The Hungarian Ombudsman observed:**

> **"As the young people preparing for their final examination but unable to get into higher education as a consequence of changed student quotas did not – and still do not – have at their disposal career orientation possibilities related to further education or choices of professional jobs, clear and easily accessible information material, or professional guidance on the basis of which they could make responsible and informed decisions. The Ombudsman attributes this to a failure of the competent organs and says that this situation has brought about a permanent and present danger of the infringement of legal certainty"** (Report of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, 2012, p.81)

Ubiquitously, pupils from poor social-economic backgrounds are "concentrated in schools far apart in quality and conditions from a distinct other segment of the schools where children from the better-off majority are concentrated (together with the more fortunate upper layers. [T]he emerging divides have far-reaching consequences on all aspects of school life: their implications manifest themselves in significantly departing performances, different qualities of interpersonal and inter-ethnic relations, with important implications on attainable social skills, and also deeply inform the self-portraits that adolescents draw about themselves in the wake of their identity formation and the build-up of plans for the future" (Szalai, Carson, Kusa, Magyari and Zentai, 2009, p.41). Although, the Hungarian government as well as the Romanian one, had initiated several programs to sustain the enrolment and attendance of children from poor background and the programs have emphasised the potential for pro-active improvement in educational

performance[21], "the effective implementation of the listed programmes is severely hindered by the missing building blocks on the lower levels, further embarrassed by the above-indicated hostility and counteracting interests of large groups of the majority society" (Ibidem, p.39) while the pro-active projects were not extended due to lack of financial resources, remaining at the status of successful pilot projects (Report of the Commissioner for Fundamental Rights, 2012).

II.3.2 Romania

Too many critics have been addressed to the functionality and structure of the educational system in Romania in the last years and in spite of numerous changes (as numerous as the changes of the Minister of education, namely 19 times in 23 years), the solution for the efficient quality-biased reform is still pending, while the quality of education is collapsing along with the opportunities of youngsters for a better status. The problems that had never been tacked with are the insufficient financing (in average around 3.5% of the GDP while the EU average is 5%) and the system corruption that disperse the money into private pockets. Especially in the last years a drastic drop in school attendance has been observed[22] while the percentages of students that passed the Baccalaureate exam in the last years are shameful to say the least. After 12 years of education, 1 out of 2 adolescents in Romania do not pass the maturity exam which has decreased its level of difficulty year by year.[23] Considering the low resource allocation for education (see Table 1) and the drastic cuts that were made in education expenditure since the outburst of the crisis in 2008, it is not hard to reach the conclusion that the literature in the field ubiquitously emphasise: besides the fact that state poverty influenced deeply the qualitative trait of studies in general, the population that was mostly influenced and deprived of the fundamental right of proper schooling was the bottom poor class, located in the rural areas. Many schools were closed down, making even harder for children in the remote villages to reach school while scarce income incentives were given to teachers in order to influence them to practice their profession in rural schools.[24] According to a the OECD 2006 Program for International Student Assessment (PISA) the Romanian students (age 15) had the lowest ranking in the "Student performance on the reading scale"

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[21] Some examples of good practices in Hungary are the educational integrational scheme launched in Hungary in 2003, programmes headed by NGO's or by the local minority self-government structures ("Tanoda" program) which aimed to extend the access to primary and secondary education for the poor children. In Romania similar efforts were made both by the government as well as by private NGOs: for instance "The second chance" program, "School mediator" and special places for Roma children in high-schools and tertiary education.

[22] The number of children who dropped out school tripled between 2000 and 2007 according to UNICEF. See unicef.org/infobycountry/romania_statistics

[23] The statistics provided by the Ministry of Education show that in 2011, only 44.72 % of students passed the maturity exam, while in 2012 and 2013 the percentages were 43.04 % and 55.65 % respectively.

[24] According to the study made by the Romanian Federation of Free Syndicates in Education (FSLI) in 2011, the average salary for a teacher of primary and secondary schooling is approximately 400 euro per month, while the entry-level wage for a debutant teacher is 223 euro monthly. An entry level teacher receives in Hungary 716 euro/month, in Austria – 1,982 euro/month, in UK – 1,915 euro/month, in Italy – 1,854 euro/month and in France 1,624 euro/month. Taking the comparison to a higher level, a Romanian debutant teacher receives in one month the amount of money that a teacher with the same qualification in Luxemburg receives in 4 hours, making the Romanian teacher the worst paid in the EU (FSLI, 2011; Realitatea.net, 2011)

(see Hemerijck, 2013, p.280), fact that certainly is worrisome to say the least and it attributes many faults to the system of education of the country.

Paraphrasing the words of the Romanian president Traian Basescu, the internationally known newspaper "The Economist" questioned under the heading of a recent article if the "Romanian school produces idiots?" as the president publicly declared. Since 1990 onwards and especially after the EU accession, Romania has confronted with a considerable brain drain as a consequence of the lack of quality of the schooling system. Many gifted teenagers choose to study abroad after the high school graduation, being conscious of the superficiality of the study process in Romania. The young professionals educated abroad that would desire to return home once graduated, find out that they are overqualified and do not have a place in the Romanian labour market, or would be forced to accept a lower payment.

> "Paradoxically, Romania is also the country where some of the most brilliant young brains in the world are born. Here the rate of gifted children is twice the average worldwide. In July, the country was ranked first in Europe at the International Math Olympics and 10th among 100 countries worldwide. Some of the most feared hackers in the world are operating in Romania. Corporations like Microsoft have a big community of Romanians among their workforce and they keep recruiting more. Most of these achievements seem to be the result of the hard work of individuals combined sometimes with the influence of a great teacher rather than the result of a proficient education system" (The Economist, 2012).

Replying to the president's statement and "The Economist's" article, even if the Romanian school "does not produce idiots", the certainty is that the Romanian state does not know nor it is interested in building and supporting the young and gifted human capital that is one of the last resources of the country, which can be the potential source of economic development and social well-being.

The existing situations in the education and employment domains reflect the character of the welfare state. Scarce social protection, and the unfit provision schemes, envisage a **"bifurcation of the welfare states" themselves, holding that the "decomposition of the universal rights and the turning of the benefits into means-tested provisions (often delivered upon the discretion of the local decision-makers) have led to the actual segmentation of social rights: rights in their true sense for those who cope, and provisions with highly limited civic implications for the poor"** (Szalai, Carson, Kusa, Magyari and Zentai, 2009, p.8; see also Moldenhawer, Miera, Kallstenius, Messing and Schiff, 2009) **Hence, the stratification framework provided by the welfare state in Romania and Hungary does not embed the creation of a stronger middle class by supporting the bottom one, but instead maintains the formed gaps in educational and employment opportunities of children and adults coming from disadvantaged backgrounds. Although the right to quality education is a universal right as it is employment also, the content and approach differs considerably according to the status. As Bauman puts it: "programs for the poor are poor programs"** (Bauman, 2005, p.56). The country reports reveals and the statistics confirm that the measures implemented in the two focus countries, in spite of some positive effects, although scarce, did not manage to cope with the perpetuation of the unprivileged status inherited from the families. "However, there are but few initiatives/programmes that are potent enough to "bestir" average and rather

unexceptional students with disadvantaged background to struggle for attaining a higher level of education" (Szalai, Carson, Kusa, Magyari and Zentai, 2009, p.17)

John Garner rightfully stated that "much education today is monumentally ineffective. All too often we are giving young people cut flowers when we should be teaching them to grow their own plants" which describes accurately, in a very general and metaphoric picture of course, exactly what we tend to see in contemporary times. If education is considered by many to be expensive, we, the present generation, are testimonies of the fact that ignorance costs more than any expensive educational system.

II.4 Excursus: The efficiency of Higher Education in Romania

In Romania the sinuous road towards development and market economy left its deep mark on the educational system, especially in the case of the higher education. Due to the inefficient educational system, even the students that do graduate, do not possess the sufficient skill and abilities to enter the labour market as proper specialists, occupying the job for which they were trained.

The only Romanian university listed into the top of the best word universities according to "The Times Higher Education" ranking is University of Bucharest but the position occupied is not honourable The institution is placed between the position 500 and 600, side by side with Third-world countries such as Bangladesh or Sri Lanka. The ranking was built on five criteria: the evaluation made by the representatives of the international academic sphere; the feedback from employers regarding the quality of the graduates; the rapport between the number of researchers in one university and the number of scientific papers quoted at international level; the rapport between the number of students and the number of teachers in one university, and the proportion of the international faculties and the international students within the program of the institution (Grosu, 2009). According to the QS World University Rankings, Romania has 0 universities listed in the top 100 and top 500, and only 3 in the top 1000. These rankings do provide a hint regarding the quality of education in the higher education institutions in Romania.

According to the Barometer of Quality, released by the Romanian Agency of Insurance of the Quality of the Higher Education (ARACIS, 2010), the universities are not centred on the student but rather on their own survival, the students being important only from the quantitative perspective, as bearers of financial resources (as tax payers or as beneficiaries of state scholarships). Since 1990 the increasing number of universities, both state and private, and the increased number of students led to the decrease of the level of quality of studies, for the sole reason that most of the times the institutions are focused on the chase of money. The same study further affirms that the teachers are relatively critical regarding the quality of students. If in 2009 the opinions of the professors indicated that only half of the entire share of students are satisfactory. In 2010 the percentage went down to 19%. The employers on the other hand remain neutral to the prestige of the university, taking more into account the experience of a potential employee, without analysing into detail the results written on the

graduation diploma, simply because even they remain reticent towards the way in which these results were achieved. Even though the universities are centred on chasing the resources to ensure their own survival, the paradox of the lack of cost efficiency in Romanian high education institution is a characteristic of the system. Year by year the percentage of public spending for education increased (except the years of crisis – Table 1) and the spending per student likewise (Table 2), but the quality of studies decreased mainly because the money were not spend in areas that could improve the standards of quality. In the Ceausescu-period the Romanian high educational system was recognised as functional and qualitative. Before 1989, many universities were constrained to refuse the enrolment of Romanian students in order to cope with the request from foreign countries. In the last five years of communism the education budget was around 0.9–1.1 billion dollars while in 2007 it was 6.8 billion dollars. This fact indicates that even though more money were spent each year, the quality level of studies still decreased, which further means that the cost efficiency and the way the resources are distributed and spent is one of the vicious important anomalies of the system (Ghianu, 2011).

Table 1 – Public spending for education a % of GDP

2000	2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
3.4	3.6	3.6	3.5	3.3	3.5	4.3	5.5	6.0	4.5	3.4	4.0	3.6

Source: Ministry of Education, Research and Youth, General Agency of Budget-Finance, and the Press Desk MECT

Table 2 – Average cost per student – thousands Lei

2001	2002	2003	2004	2005	2006	2007	2008
1,065.3	1,283.3	1,659.7	2,185.8	2,680.9	3,260.8	4,479.7	5,022.9

Source: MECT Ministry of Education, Research and Youth, General Agency of Budget-Finance, and the Press Desk MECT

Although the average costs of finance per student seem small, around 1200 euro/student, the real number has a different value, namely 4000 euro/year, because the official computations of the Ministry of Education takes into consideration only the basic financing. If we use the regressive method, looking at the numbers from 2009 for example, from the 4.5% of the GDP received by the education, 0.8% were allocated to the high education. Half of the sum was used for salaries (a large share, especially if we take into consideration that the wages of the Romanian university professors were among the highest in the CEE countries before the cuts made in 2010) and the rest for investments and current expenses. If we divide the remaining sum to the 250.000 fee-waiver students we have a result of 4,000 euro/student/year (Davidescu, 2010).

Since quality was not an area of investment, a large share of money go went to the new so-called "satellite" university centres. More than 50% of the high-education institutions are young universities that appeared in the last 20 years, while only 18% have a tradition of over 100 years. In 1989 there were less than 20 universities, today there are over 140, out of which 49 are public and the rest pertain to the private high education, some of them being unacknowledged or having only temporary right of functioning. The small, new state institutions, built in the immediate proximity of the big prestigious university centres, are financially supported to build luxurious student campuses (for example Targoviste, Vaslui, Calarasi, Balti, etc.) with public money. The big loss in this case is that these new-born universities do not create the ethos of the "university life" and cannot reach the standards of quality that exist in a long-tradition university.[25]

Another anomaly ubiquitously present in the Romanian high educational system is the fact that the rule of supply and demand of specialists has a logic of its own, without the logical connection that usually links the two concepts. The universities produce specialists that will never find a job domestically because the internal Romanian market has no activity in certain domains (Herlo and Buga, 2009). Nevertheless both the private and state universities provide study programs, financed by the budget or/and private funds that do not offer the graduates any career opportunities. Hence, besides the resources spend on the education of young specialists, the state has to further provide social allowances for the young unemployed without gaining any output from the investment made during the studies.

"For an educational institute the efficiency requirement means that the institution produces a given educational result (output) at a minimum cost, which on the other hand means that the institution produces a maximum educational aspect and result achievable with a given input" (Vamos, 2003). Regarding the quality, the Romanian educational system bears a paradox that divides the opinions: in some universities there can be find excellence and respect for the act of study, both from the teaching staff and students, while in most of the cases, even the minimal conditions that would create the impression that an institution is dedicated to the education of future specialist are non-existent. Some testimonies of the precarious functioning of the state universities were also revealed in the public international eye recently when five representatives of the government, among which the current Prime Minister (Victor Ponta) and the current minister of Education, Research, Youth and Sport (Ecaterina Andronescu), were accused of plagiarism in their PhD thesis. Both the two Romanian officials graduated from the only university listed in the international rankings and one of the oldest in the country, namely University of Bucharest. Hence, if at the highest level of studies and the highest position in a state such situations occur, should it strike as a surprise that at a lower level the quality and respect for the studies is close to minimal?

Switching the focus from state to private institutions the discourse becomes even more tragic. If it is acknowledged that the state universities still provide a certain guarantee of the quality of studies, the private ones can be called educational institutions only in name, because in practice they are pure business. Unlike the Romanian system, in the western countries and

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[25] Interview Catalin Ghinerariu, researcher in the field of Labour and Social Protection. (see also Herlo and Buga, 2009)

USA the best universities are in fact private, and they are present in the first role in the international rankings. In Romania the private universities became the easy alternative for high-school graduates with unsatisfactory results. In 2011 when the graduation rate at the maturity exam was a shameful 44.47% some of the private universities suggested that even those who did not graduated from high-school should be accepted in tertiary level with the possibility to retake the test during the freshmen year. With low taxes the private universities attract a considerable number of students. Almost 400.000 Romanian students feed the 200 million euro budget of 34 private institutions according to an analysis made by The Financial Newspaper on the basis of the balance of payments submitted by the private institutions at the Ministry of Finance in 2010 (Mihai, 2011). Even though the Ministry of Education placed the private universities on the lowest level from the qualitative point of view, the number of students did not contract because the desire of the students is not to achieve excellence in a domain nor to acquire knowledge, but to have the satisfaction of framing a diploma on the wall, even though the document does not certify an excellence or at least a certain level of abilities in a domain. As a matter of fact, 92% of the domestic companies would employ a student that graduated from a public university and most of the entrepreneurs and managers complain about the lack of qualified specialists in various domains in Romania (The Barometer of Quality, 2010).

The fundamental stake of the higher education is the formation of the mind-set that allows people to take initiative, be self-sufficient, capable and creative. The quality of the educational system is measured nowadays in empty numbers of students that enrol in the first year and manage to scroll until graduation. In Romania we can state that there is disequilibrium between quality and quantity and it is a faithful mirror of the society. The main flaws of the Romanian high educational, besides the already small percentage of the GDP allocated to education, is the inefficiency and irrationality in resource allocation and spending, as well as the loss of perspective of the universities. The under-financing deviated the focus of public away from the students and towards their own financial survival and as a consequence the quality of study was overlooked in favour of the quantity. The Romanian universities are no longer centred on the formation of students but rather on the obtainment of the resources, critical for its own survival. The loss of the academic ethos and study essence within the universities has its repercussions on the economic development and labour market placement of young graduates, being difficult to find a job in the specialisation in which a student prepared during the academic studies. There is a dichotomy between universities with tradition (such as medicine and pharmacy), that still manage to attract students from foreign countries due to the seal of quality, and the other universities that do not even appear on the radar of the quality international tops.

Both private and public institutions are in need of a new culture of study, a culture of pragmatism in order to offer students more than a sheet of paper with relative value and no use on the labour marker. From this point of view the Romanian universities offer to little and they are still too "academic" in their demands but to poor in their achievements.

Chapter 3 – The welfare state efficiency in closing the poverty gap

III.1 Social spending and re-distribution of welfare

<u>*III.1.1 Social spending blueprints*</u>

It is not a matter of doubt that the ex-communist countries have experienced deep system transformation due to the transitional period, and in the light of the regime shift, social policy transformation was more a matter of coping with the adjustment to the market economy rather that a pledge to converge with the developed western societies (Hemerick, 2013, p.205). As it has been previously emphasised, the CEE countries had to reform and redesign their structural functionalism from paternalistic full-employment welfare scheme to the market economy scheme and pluralist democracy which implied "a wholesale shift from public to private responsibilities for citizens' life changes and welfare" (Ibidem, p.206).

The social policies at the beginning of the 1990s were characterised by the introduction of rather generous unemployment and pension insurances in order to build the basic safety net necessary under the conditions of mass unemployment and extended pensioning schemes, triggered by the collapse of industrial sector. Social policy was thus used as an anti-poverty buffer, but only as a remedial solution on short-term. At the beginning of the '90s the Hungarian government maintained generous levels of social benefits "based on lenient eligibility criteria including expanded pension entitlements and family benefits with broad coverage" (Ibidem, p.207), while in Romania "a relaxation of restrictions on early retirement led to the fastest surge of retirees of any Eastern European country" (Ibidem, p.208). The safety net for combating poverty was set out through the introduction of the minimal wage and social income benefits. The level of financial security provided by the social wages was low and with the high inflation and the GDP contraction at the beginning of 1990s, the poverty entrapment expanded "not only to the old, where poverty was traditionally concentrated, but also among the young and among low-wage earners" (ivi). An important insight of the social policies in the early '90s that ought to be mentioned is the prioritisation of the passive labour market policies (social benefits) instead of the large scale active labour market policies (professional reconversion, workers union support, employment schemes) which were secondary in the governmental vision for economic development (see Boeri, 1997; Kluve, 2010).

Given the overburdening of the state budget by the social assistance benefits, the situation became unsustainable by 1995, in spite of the revitalisation of CEE economies. The era of generous income provisions introduced as a compensation for the economic distress came to an end, and "a new wave of social reform took shape with a view to cost-containment and welfare retrenchment" (Hemerijck. 2013, p.208). The second wave of social reform in Romania and Hungary is viewed by Anthony Hemerijck as a "reinforcement of Bismarckian social insurance." In other words, **under the pressure on an increasing number of individuals requesting social benefits, social assistance shifted from flat-rate to means-tested and from overall coverage to targeting poor. The shift was also accompanied by market liberalisation in health and educational services, deep cuts in unemployment benefits and the traditional form of public support for families with children weakened**

considerably during the transformation period" (Ibidem, p.210). The Bismarckian social-insurance model in terms of stratification, infixes a division of class and status in the society. Although a targeting of the vulnerable is desirable to some extent in social policy and means-tested provisions offers a safety net for the poor, "if benefits are low and associated with social stigma, the relief system will compel all but the most desperate to participate to the market" (Andersen, 1990, p.22; see also Messing, 2013, pp.23-36), which is the case of both countries in focus considering the low level of minimal provided income. "This led to a greater differentiation between the social insurance and social assistance tiers of the welfare state, thus sharpening the divide between the more 'deserving' short-term unemployed, older, and regular workforce, receiving more generous benefits, and the more 'undeserving' long-term unemployed, younger and marginal workers on social assistance entitlements" (Hemerick, 2013, pp.209-210). The previous statement ought to be connected with the analysis made in the previous chapter, over the quality of social investment, where the dichotomy between first-hand and second hand welfare citizens was emphasised. Zygmunt Bauman's unequivocal vision regarding the means-testing provision touches a point that has been previously emphasised. In his view, one of the long-term effects of means-testing "is the steady and relentless deterioration of the quality of welfare services. In line with expectations, once they are reserved for those who need them, these services cannot count on the political muscle of those others who (at least thus far) 'need them not', and so they become natural target for economies sought by politicians in order to lower taxes, and thus to curry the favours of those more fortunate others" (Bauman, 2005, p.57).

Since 2000 until present, there were several labour inclusion initiatives in both countries, targeting the poor population in general and additionally the ethnic Romani group. Nonetheless, the outcomes were severely limited by the lack of skill and education of the population on one hand, the scarcity of jobs outside the main economic centres of the countries (big cities) on the other hand. Last but not least, the formal (low skilled) labour market which offers the minimum wage is certainly unattractive for unemployed individuals, since the unemployment benefits summed with the earnings gained in the sizable informal labour market provides more income to the household than the minimum wage would.

After the change of the millennium, and especially in the last years when the crisis hit the economies and implicitly the state budgets, "more activating 'welfare to work' programmes were introduced" (Hemerijck, 2013, p.211). In Hungary, the coming to power of the FIDESZ conservative party led by the wayward character of Viktor Orban, strongly encouraged the "workfare state" instead of the welfare state, arguing that the structures of the latter are "archaic" and "not competitive anymore"[26]

> "So as to enforce 'activation', unemployment insurance and social assistance programmes are curtailed, but the minimum wage was doubled [...] In many Visegrad countries, especially in the Check Republic and Hungary we can observe a strong push towards activation in both the unemployment insurance and social assistance tiers of social security, with tightened behavioural conditions but at the same time with adequate levels of minimum income, to allow for a better targeting of families and especially of child poverty. With EU support, the Public Employment

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[26] The Hungarian Prime Minister's points of view were expressed in a question-answer session during a conference held on the 23rd of July 2013 in Koszeg, Hungary.

Service was reorganised into regional branches responsible for client oriented personalised jobseeker services" (Hemerijck, 2013, p.212).

The better position regarding the poverty rates in Hungary, can be thus attributed to a better management in terms of organisation and administration of the social policy. However, the "adequate levels of minimum income" do not provide a strong shield against poverty and social degradation, being considerably lower than the EU average.

According to the Eurostat database, Hungary also allocates significantly more amounts of money on active labour market measures[27] (Fig.27). However, since September 2011, on the background of disturbing political orientations of the FIDESZ party, Hungary has the most " restrictive requirements making welfare allowances conditional on work" (Messing, 2013, p.15), cutting considerably also the social benefits (from 96 to 75 E) and restricting the provision to one adult per family (ivi). Additionally, the period of unemployment benefit was reduced to 3 months, while the welfare money is to be cut if the children of a receiving family do not attend school. The Hungarian Prime-Minister characterised the measure as "brutal but necessary" under the present conditions, although forgetting that the on household income stability depends the school drop-outs, while the Hungarian economy may not be able to absorb the workforce if not stimulated by efficient active labour market measures that would cover the economically backward regions of the country.[28]

> "Those unemployed who cannot provide a proof of working formally in the last year drop out of the social net and remain without any income. [...] In addition, the law gave the authority to municipalities to demand that further vaguely defined conditions are met in order to receive social benefits, such as nicely kept house and garden, socially acceptable behaviour, etc. As a result, the number of unemployed remaining without any income increased to 340 thousand by January 2013 and has been on the rise ever since." (ivi)

Differently from the Hungarian institution in charge of implementing the employment action plans, the Romanian body is highly centralised, operated by the Ministry of Labour through a main agency that controls the territorial agencies, fact that is most likely to hinder the implementation of training programs or employment action plans (Messing, 2013, p.13). Despite the fact that Romania has a persistent poverty and low employment rate, "minor funds are spent on training and retraining unemployed people under articles 63 and 66 of the 2002 Law on Labour Market (Law Nr.76)" (Ibidem, p.19). In 2001, the minimum wage was increased with 40% in order to discourage early pensioning while it redirected the redistribution towards the underdeveloped regions and fought structural poverty, although the scheme was expensive for the state budget (Hemerijck, 2013; Kluve, 2010). Nonetheless, "minimum wage is set at a very low level in Romania (and high in Slovakia and Hungary), which might provide an explanation for the country specific differences in the existence and the extent of employment incentives. Slovakia, Spain and Hungary implemented significant employment incentives linked to start-up incentives" (Messing, 2013, p.19).

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[27] **Active labour market policies** are measures such as training programs, professional reconversion schemes, direct public employment and alike, while the **passive labour market measures** are represented by the income benefit redistribution schemes either (pensions or social wages).
[28] The Hungarian Prime Minister's points of view were expressed in a question-answer session during a conference held on the 23rd of July 2013 in Koszeg, Hungary.

"In Romania Minimum Income Guarantee is a means-tested benefit which is in line with European social policy legislation. Its purpose is to provide *some* income for marginalised people living in deprivation. Depending on health and family status, a certain number of hours of community work per month is compulsory for recipients of the benefit. The weakness of the system, according to Pop, is that the obligation of doing community work involves a certain stigma and it does not provide sufficient stimulation to find a job on the labour market and may thus trap families in social deprivation" (Messing, 2013, p.15).

Starting from 2008 until 2010, a public employment scheme was set out in Romania to support local municipalities in creating short-term jobs in the public domain for the citizens which had major difficulties in entering the labour market. Although the plan was promising and a considerable number of citizens and local stake-holders participated, the implementation of the scheme did not continue after 2010 (Ibidem, p.19)

From the brief analysis of the blueprints of social spending, several concluding points can be deduced as to the relation of the governmental social spending over time and the high poverty rates, connected with the perpetual cycle of low employment and bearing in mind the macro-economic development of the two countries.

1) Social policy in Romania and Hungary alike, followed a more path-dependent pattern of development. Rather than being an influencing factor in itself, the social policy framework was influenced by the system transformations and by the economic circumstances.

2) Social policy was rather used as an instrument for the creation of a (income) basic safety net rather than an instrument for the creation and promotion of job or training opportunities. Although Hungary has had over time, both in terms of economic development and social inclusion, a better structured vision and implementation of social measures , it did not promoted the granting of social or benefit rights on the basis on sole citizenship but rather on the basis of individual performance, leaving the un-performing citizens at the margins.

3) In Romania, the social policy was centred on remedial, short-term solutions and based merely on redistribution of income while the incentive-programmes for labour market inclusion were few and interrupted by lack of political will (Burnett, 2003).

4) The welfare's state capacity in both countries has been limited in reaching the outskirts of poorness, which remained deeply enclosed in the poverty cycle.

5) The spring of social policy was a layered and inconclusive ad-hoc process. Claus Offe tactfully explains the collateral damages underpinned by the CEE situation: "inconsistent emergency of social policy bricolage comes with policy volatility and a great deal of political instability and ideological polarisation. Moreover, the politics of welfare recalibration mobilised different social groups and fractions, from reconstructed communists to *nouveau-riches* elites, seeking institutional advantage from the new social policies" (Offe, 2009 cited in Hemerijck, 2013, p.215).

III.2 The role of income redistribution in the poverty alleviation in Romania and Hungary

The overriding purpose of the social policies and income redistribution is to avoid the social dumping and support the class upgrade. Efficient investment in solving the social inequalities, by reducing the risk of poverty and improving the capacity to conserve a stable and qualitative labour market, contextualises the role of the welfare state within the vision and philosophy of social policy.

The systems of redistribution in Romania and Hungary display disquieting features in regard to the philosophy of egalitarian and conclusive social measures against poverty. Although both countries do possess (theoretically) the financial means to re-structure an efficient system of redistribution, in which **targeting** and **covering** the **most** in need would be balanced by the **adequacy** of the amounts of income subventions and **quality** of social service (Szocpol Ökopolisz, 2012), not many efforts were directed in this direction. Through the rearrangement of the tax system and the internal redistribution, the objectives would be realisable. Nevertheless, in the post-transition mechanism of redistribution the coverage, target, adequacy and quality factors did not prevail. Simultaneously, the value of the social transfer was dramatically eroded, partly by the inflation and convergence of prices and partly by the historical low level of social income, hence the financial help offered by the state remained precarious over time and it did not provide guarantees against poverty (Szocpol Ökopolisz, 2012).

The state spending on income subvention in Hungary and Romania did not and still does not ensure a decent living for the receivers, but only a precarious subsistence, and with the exception of some higher or medium pensions, the other financial subsidies do not protect the population from poverty. The system of redistribution that should focus on the poor population is deviant in both countries. A large chunk of social spending is distributed for the payment of pensions while the unemployment benefits and funds for incentive-based measures are marginal expenses. Consequently it can be concluded that the state sustains adamantly the passive part of the population while the active part is overlooks (Szocpol Ökopolisz, 2012; Burnet, 2003).

It is estimated that in Hungary 4 million people live below the poverty limit, while the Hungarian middle class is ranked among the poorest when compared to the Western middle classes. Although the social spending as a per cent of GDP in Hungary has increased until 2008 (Fig.27) (in line with the European trend but the level remaining significantly lower), this does not necessarily imply that the poor population had embraced an improvement in their lifestyle, because not all spending counts the same. Hungary (and Romania alike) spends a significant amount of money on pensions. The resources for households with children, unemployment benefits, children allowances and maternity benefits are marginal and reduced in value (Szocpol Ökopolisz, 2012). The sustainability of the model of redistribution in long term is distorted, as the Szocpol Ökopolisz study shows. The study further emphasises that the social system in Hungary is not based on it an elaborate institutional framework that ought to structure the social policies in accordance with the principles of transparency and consistency, questioning the success and professionalism of the future structures. The role of the social

policies was not debated in the political sphere and social policy *per se* did not represent a choice of values and actions in support of the development of human capital, but rather an activity with economic-financial grounds. Although Hungary has seen convergence in the GDP growth and price levels, the wages as well as pensions, social incomes and were not converging to the same extent, remaining considerably below the EU-27 average.

Fig.27 – Social and unemployment spending – Hungary

Source: Szocpol Ökopolisz, 2012

The system of redistribution in Romania shares much of the characteristics with the Hungarian counterpart, however to a different extent, with a more dramatic nuance. The low rate of employment and the high number of pensioners put the trade-off between active and passive population in an unbalanced position. The wages in Romania are among the lowest in the European Union and consequently the wage taxes, although high, that enter in the state budget are insufficient to cover the large pensioner and invalid population putting a considerable pressure on the budget and maintaining a high budget deficit every year. Consequently, the redistribution of social income assistance is low. According to Eurostat data, in 2012 Romania allocated the lowest percentage of the GDP for social protection, namely 17.6 % (while the EU average is approximately 30% of the GDP). 50.7% of it were used for the payment of social insurance for the elder, 34.7 % for disease, health and disabled people, 9.6 % for the needs of families and children and 3.2% for unemployment benefits (eurostat.eu, 2012). In Hungary, from the total of 23% that should be spent for social policies only 7% is being consumed (Fig.27). This means that the preconceptions according to which the poor, the Roma and the unemployed are the parasites of the welfare state are utterly wrong. Much more considerable sums are lost from corruption, off-shore payments and interest payments (Szocpol Ökopolisz, 2012).

Analysing Fig.28 it can be observed that in Romania there "is hardly any funding for active labour market budgets" (Messing, 2013, p.16), much of the available funds being spent on passive labour market policies, while Fig.29 clearly shows that Romania is allocating only approximately 0.1% of the GDP to ALMP, being an underperformer within the European Union in terms of active labour market measures. Romania does not spend much on training either, besides the fact that education is not a main target of attention as it has been shown

previously. "Minor funds are spent on training and retraining unemployed people under articles 63 and 66 of the 2002 Law on Labour Market (Law Nr.76)" (Ibidem, p.19)

Fig.28 – Structure of Labour Market policy spending (% GDP) 2010

Source: Messing, 2013

In the case of Hungary, the above chart discloses that around 0.61% of the GDP is spent on active labour market measures, meaning that the government is more keen on helping the population willing to re-enter the job market. However, Fig.29 shows that Hungary's main instrument of the ALMP are the direct job creation through Public Employment Schemes. The dominance of this trend can be explained by the political ambitions of the FIDESZ party rule in the last year. As it was mentioned previously, the Hungarian government dispatches the welfare state in favour of "workfare state" in which the social benefits are conditioned by the work. In this case however, the core concept of welfare state loses its main objective: "if the benefits are work conditional they do not help the workless" (Andersen, 2002, p.15) which are more likely to be in need of support. "The expansion of public employment started in 2009, and further increased each year, occupying over two-thirds of ALMP budget by 2011, despite the fact that all studies assessing its impact indicated that public employment does not increase the employability of the long term unemployed, on the contrary, it might even reduce the chances for LM inclusion" (Ibidem, p.17).

> "Consequently, public employment programs employ typically low skilled, long-term unemployed for very short-term (1–3 months) part-time jobs, in which the most typical activity is street and park cleaning, forest cleaning, keeping the environment in order and such. In a study on the impact of the three most important active LM interventions – training, wage subsidy, public employment pointed out that in Hungary **"training participants were twice as likely as the control group (unemployed not participating in ALMP) to find a job, while beneficiaries of wage subsidy programs were 20 times more likely. However, participants of public work programs were considerably less likely – one fourth as likely – to find work than the control group"** (ivi)

Another set of general considerations regarding both states ought to be at least touched upon within the discussion. It has been shown in the previous sections that in terms of macro-economic development, the indicators provide evidence of growth in both states, which would

induct the idea that the poverty is being combated. Unfortunately, **the sole GDP growth or convergence does not include social externalities, it does not measure wealth and it does not say anything about inequality or quality of life. It is merely a measure of output although many times it is considered the beacon of development. Both countries subjected to the present study had accomplished the task of macro-economic growth but they failed in structuring simultaneously the social leverages that would make their economies sustainable through time.** The social wellbeing is not tied anymore to the sole economic growth but to the degree of social equality (looking at the Nordic model of welfare state it is obvious that an egalitarian approach creates non only a strong and financially independent middle class but it also ensures a viable democratic system). Considering that Hungary and Romania have considerably a smaller GDP than other western countries for instance, and certainly less state budget, a more efficient redistribution of wealth, more egalitarian and with more perseverant incentives for the poor population are *sine qua non* for the sustainable economic recovery and better social environment of the countries under discussion.

Fig.29 – ALMP expenditure on type of action and by member state (% of GDP) 2010

Source: Eurostat | Labour Market Policies database

The social policy insights and the structure of income redistribution in Romania and Hungary seem to give major priority to the passive measures, focusing less on the pro-active programs for the working-age population, which produce a polarisation of priorities of the welfare state. The transition period had a considerable impact over the mechanism of functioning of the welfare state and the present situation is a manifestation of the lack of vision with regard to social policy. The stability of social policy which definitely determines the functionality of a welfare state, is subjected to a set of variables:

a) time and flexibility – social policy and the system of redistribution should be able to predict the aftertime situations, in order to respond or at least consider the future imbalances and be able to respond flexibly to possible looming blocks;

b) coverage, target and adequacy, in order to sustain and enrich the middle class which is a prerequisite for equitable democracy and societal wellbeing;

c) prevalence of social rights as a philosophical value within the strategy for convergence and economic development – human capital regarded as a commodity in the economic sphere is detrimental for two reasons: one regards the ethics of labour and life. The other regards the practice of trade: all commodities are exploited and dispatched once they are out of use because there will always be a supply. However, in the last decades the supply has shortened and in the years to come the prognosis is that, in the absence of adamant intervention, the human capital will decompose as quality and shrink as quantity.

A concluding remark of the section is that the social state in Romania and Hungary failed up until now in meeting many margin requirements for the creation of a favourable social development scheme.

III.3 Hungary and Romania within the cluster of welfare state models

The theoretical paradigm of welfare state in contemporary times reckons on contextualisation and conceptualisation of the priorities and aims of the welfare state's structures balanced by the resources available for the proper fulfilling of noble aspirations. There are multiple actors and leverages connected to the concept of welfare state and consequently there are multiple opinions on how it should function, whom it should target, in what way, to what extent and to which purpose. There are several mainstream perspectives that ought to be mentioned, considering that they are classical interpretations.

Some studies of the welfare state are focused on social spending, arguing that the amount of expenditures mirrors the commitment of the state to the welfare of the citizens and contributes significantly to the improvement of the life conditions. However, it has been shown that "not all spending count equally" (Andersen, 1990, p.19). As it was shown previously, it cannot be stated that Hungary and Romania allocate outstanding sums in the field of social spending, the amounts are in fact marginal and the distribution of the money between priorities reveals itself to be ominous. The redistribution of wealth in the above mentioned states, does not respond to the needs of the recipients, nor on short-term through protection against poverty neither on long-term through social and economic inclusion. It is true that the welfare state cannot protect all people from poverty, at all times, but the substantial purpose is to avoid long term entrapment, issue that both states, to different extents, have failed to accomplish.

One mainstream opinion "holds that (social and economic) rights do not guarantee that every single citizen is entitled to an outcome, but to an opportunity. This means that the state has the role of creating the preconditions for citizens to achieve these rights insofar as this is possible" (Pogatsa, 2012). Other opinions (T. S. Marshal, Zygmunt Bauman) hold that the concept of welfare state is tied to extended social citizenship, social justice and equality and the *duty* of the state to structure the adequate system of stratification based on a person's status as a citizen. In the two countries studies though we have observed a polarisation of the

social rights according to the economic and social status which embeds different levels of welfare provisions that come into contradiction with the above ideas.

III.3.1 The three models of welfare state frameworks

Numerous definitions and classifications of the welfare state have been formulated during time, perpetuating the debate over its role, principles or functioning. Andersen's classification of welfare state ideologies is considered a classical among the literature in the field. The models constructed by Anderson are based on issues that have been treated during the present study: social rights and the stratification model embedded by the internal and international differences.

In his book, "Work, consumerism and the new poor" (2005) Zygmunt Bauman presents his quasi-utopical vision regarding the welfare state functioning:

> "by proclaiming that decent and dignified life should be assured at all times and to all members of the polity 'as a right', *regardless* of their own contribution to common wealth, the idea of public welfare allowed (explicitly or implicitly) for the possibility of separating livelihood from the 'socially useful', productive contributions deemed to be possible solely in employment, and by the same token sapped the work ethic's most sacrosanct and least questioned premise. It rendered the right to dignified life a matter of political citizenship, rather than economic performance" (Bauman, 2005, p.43).

The welfare state model that is the closest in substance to Bauman's idea is certainly the **NORDIC model** or the "socio-democratic regime type". The model is based on egalitarianism and de-commodification of social rights and according to most of the literature, it is the best positioned in the efficiency ranking. The Scandinavian countries, although with considerable expenditure, managed to develop a system of universal income guarantees focusing on child-targeted policies and developed services for the elderly, the disabled and the poor, providing in the same time generous incomes that are efficient in protecting the vulnerable groups in an at-risk-of poverty situation. Through the de-commodification of the welfare benefits, the state activated the pro-family policies, ensuring "greater individual independence" and minimised the dependence of the household on the market. The state basically consolidated the middle class, making use of the bottom class. The Nordic model gave a spur to preventive measures against poverty balanced by labour market flexibility and maximisation of the population's employability, productivity and self-confidence. (Andersen, 1990, pp.19-32; Andersen, 2002, pp.13-14)

In the **LIBERAL model** (specific for United States, Australia or UK) "the means-tested assistance, modest welfare state transfers or modest social-insurance plan predominate" (Andersen, 1990, p.26). The model encourages the market-based social development, the state intervening to a minimum only when the market failure severely impact on the populations life conditions. "The middle classes have been encouraged to opt into the private welfare market while the government has sought to strengthen income testing" (Andersen, 2002, p.15). Means-tested and work-conditional benefits offer only a basic safety net for those who have fallen into poverty. Social stigma of state income provision is a characteristic of the

mechanism. The model structures "a blend of relative equality of poverty among the welfare state recipients, market-differentiated welfare among the majorities, and a class-political duality between the two". The tendency to minimise the de-commodification of social rights resulted in a dependency of the poor population on the state, and a dependency of the old, crippled and infirm on the family, which certainly hinders the productivity of the household members in the labour market. The Liberal model of welfare state upholds another weakness that is truly relevant within the Hungarian and Romanian societies: "it assumes that all individuals are indeed capable of market participation, something which of course they are not" (Andersen, 1990, p.42).

The thirds and the last model presented by the work of Gosta Esping Andersen is the **CONTINENTAL European welfare model** (encountered in Germany, Italy, France or Austria). The Continental model is frequently referred to as conservatory and traditional because its focus is family biased in term of preservation of traditional "familyhood" in which the male represents the "breadwinner" within the household and consequently the state intervention occurs only when the traditional family pillar fails. Differently from the Liberal model, market and commodification of social rights is not a primordial trait of the Continental model, but the granting of social rights are deeply affixed to class and status. "Employment linked social insurance protect well those with stable, lifelong employment. […] Strong protection for the stably employed combined with huge barriers to labour market entry has, in many countries, nurtured a deepening abyss between privileged 'insiders' and precarious 'outsiders'" (Andersen, 2002, p.16). As Andersen observes:

> "Continental welfare states have either relied on continued family support or they have added as-hoc non-contributory programmes, such as social pensions and various social minima to the system. An overly transfer biased social policy is, arguably, an ineffective response to social exclusion. There is now a clear realisation across Continental Europe that services, especially for small children and for the frail elderly, are an urgent priority. Yet, the fiscal capacity to respond is limited due to a narrow tax base combined with costly pension commitments" (Ibidem, p.17).

As a note on the performance of each model, it was proven that while the Scandinavian model ensures long term unemployment rates, high protection against poverty and de-commodified social right which are propagated on the functional democratic system of governance. The Continental and the Liberal welfare states face numerous difficulties, among which: low levels of female employment, high levels of long term unemployment, high polarisation of income levels, considerable poverty rates and frequent political clashes or imbalances.

Within Anderson's framework of welfare state models, Anton Hemerijck defines the Central and Eastern European as "mixed and 'hybridised' welfare edifices, combining Continental 'Bismarckian' elements in social insurance and 'Anglo' market-based pensions and social services, undergirded by basic 'egalitarian-universalist' safety net provisions" (Hemerijck, 2013, p.212), however being far from the Nordic model which seems to be the most feasible for an efficient combat against poverty and the most fit for the European social and economic aim of becoming the "most competitive knowledge-based economy in the world capable of sustainable economic development with more and better jobs and greater social cohesion" (op. cit.).

The development of the welfare state in Romania and Hungary has been, like many other issues, path-dependent. Firstly, during the communist state, the paternalistic attitude of the socialist regime towards the wellbeing of the citizens was still overwhelmingly present in the first transitional period. Under budget deficit pressure and under the neo-liberal influence of the international organisations (IMF and World Bank) both countries have path-shifted the character of the welfare state according to the benchmarks and margin requirements that would take them as closest as possible to the EU integration. Certainly the implications of these shifts are now seen in the un-sustainability of the system and the numerous pitfalls in the quantity and the quality of social services and social wages on one hand, and in redistribution and efficiency of it in terms of poverty avoidance. In the light of the current crisis, the welfare states were once more hit. Deep cuts were made exactly in the areas which represent the cornerstone of wellbeing and development: education, health, R&D and social insurance, which furthermore contributed to the weakness of the welfare state.

III.4 Final remarks on Poverty, Social policy, Welfare state and the future repercussions

Poverty has been since old times an unremitting attachment inflicted on those unprepared to avail for themselves in a way or another. In the contemporary modern times, deeply committed to human rights and social equality, the public authorities have openly declared their commitment for the eradication of poverty. In spite of all commitments, in the present consumerist world, the poor, the pariah, the Roma, the social outcasts "have no merits which could relieve, let alone counterbalance, their vices. They have nothing to offer in exchange for the taxpayer's outlays. They are a bad investment, unlikely ever to be repaid, let alone bring profit: a black hole sucking in whatever comes near and spitting back nothing, except, perhaps, trouble. Decent and normal members of society – the consumers – want nothing from them and expect nothing. The poor are totally useless." (Bauman, 2005, p.113) With that attitude in mind, it shouldn't strike as a surprise the fact that poverty still has its deep claws into a large part of the society.

Social policy has been and still is only a bleak relief for those that were unfortunate enough to be born at the margins of the society. Nevertheless, making appeal to the mitigated human rights, even marginal poor individual deserve the opportunity to a better life. The time has come now to realise that human capital is also a scarce resource and active social policy intended as the means, regardless of their nature, through which the bottom class is supported in order to achieve what is an ethical prerequisite for a decent life: a start from 0, not from below that benchmark. Making use of Andersen's words once more, he stated that "it should be evident for all that we cannot afford not to be egalitarians in the advanced economies of the twenty first century" (Andersen, 2002, p.3), implying that, in spite of the market oriented world, capitalism, capitalists, the wealthy and the poor do not live in different dimensions of the world. "They must live in the same world that has been contrived for the benefit of those with money. And their poverty is aggravated by economic growth, just as it is intensified by recession and non-growth" (Seabrook cited in Bauman, 2005, p.41). The role of the social policy is to regulate the societal structure in such a way to avoid the aggravation and the

intensification of poverty and to enhance the upgrading to a level of decent life. These are the functions of the social policy that has been neglected during the last decades in Romania and Hungary, Central and Eastern European countries and Europe wholly.

The welfare state has been in the last decades in an erosion process although the nostalgia for a high level of protection remained. If the European states do not take a stand for the unprivileged and undertake responsibility for the disparities within the society, the demographic economic and social turmoil will persist and deepen. Economic development, social inclusion and the welfare state are therefore, cross-purposes. The creation of a hefty middle class is, or better said, should be the core aim of the welfare state, which in long term will determine the stability of the democratic system, the sustainability of economic development and wellbeing for the majority of the population, regardless of race, status, ethnicity, religious belonging or sexual orientation.

Conclusion

The analysis has examined the relevance of the welfare state in the process of poverty alleviation in Romania and Hungary as representative states of the Central and Eastern European ex-communist countries, within the broader framework of the European Union. An unequivocal answer to the research questions in the heading of this study proves difficult. Despite the liberalisation and the economic development of both countries, the recalibration of the welfare state succumbed in path-dependency and un-sustainability, while the capacity of the welfare edifice did not managed to respond to the needs of the vulnerable individuals. In few words little has been done for the eradication of poverty since 1990 in Hungary and Romania.

The initial analysis began with the attempt to study the relationship between the welfare state as the body responsible for the propagation of social and economic integration of the Roma population. However the impossibility of studying the mentioned minority due to the unclear and inconclusive statistical data shifted the analysis towards a broader context, namely general poverty.

Comparing the theoretical contextualisation of welfare state and the findings in the economical, societal and administrative dimensions of the Romanian and Hungarian contemporary development, the result of the scrutiny led to a regrettable conclusion. The role of the welfare state in guaranteeing to its bottom class citizens the survival with dignity through the exit of the poverty cycle, has been residual and peripheral. The social state, although committed by definition to social inclusion and eradication, as far as possible, of the poverty, rather perpetuated the state of vulnerability of the individuals through a polarisation of social rights and the attachment of social stigma. Due to international economic pressures and politico-ideological trends, the welfare state overlooked the target group of poor population in favour of a market-biased approach. The analysis mirrored a polarisation of the society at the level of social and economic rights. The insiders and the outsiders have different

opportunity paths for social and economic progress the first category being privileged while the second consciously ignored.

The high poverty rates, long-term unemployment, precarious social assistance and income insurance, inappropriate redistribution of wealth and lack of focus in the area of personal development, stand as arguments for the confirmation of the initial thesis hypothesis. The human capital has been deteriorating in the absence of pro-active labour inclusion social policies. Social investment in education, training, employment services, that are critical factors for the improvement of social protection in the competitive internationalised labour market, are areas that receive limited funding and therefore the quality of social investment was also deteriorated. In spite of the present economic convergence with the western countries in terms of GDP growth, the income convergence is lagging behind, hindering on one hand the state budged capacity to collect higher income taxes that shall be redistributed, and on the other hand the household economical potency.

Considering that the Hungarian present liberal government led by the controversial character of Viktor Orbán is keen on dismantling the welfare state for the pursuance of a workfare state, the chances of poverty gap closure are reduced to a minimum while the development of future self-regulating, ethical democracy is endangered by the social polarisation embedded by the phenomenon. In present Romania, the government led by the social democrat Victor Ponta, frequently characterised by a deficit of vision regarding political decision, has a bold mission to achieve. On the background of a disquieting political scene, the state's ability to reach a consensus has been limited. Romania is in need of institutional, political, administrative and judicial reconfiguration. The welfare state likewise, and the more delayed the process of reshuffle is the less the chances of success.

<div align="right">QED.</div>

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BUNJEVCI AND CROATS IN SERBIA:
PROBLEM OF DEMOCRATIC SOLUTION
OF AN IGNORED ETHNIC CONFLICT

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Abstract

The conflict inside the ethnic corps of Bunjevci in Bačka in Serbia has been smouldering for more than a half a century, not coming to the attention of relevant democratic factors. This conflict has been manifested in the resistance of Croatian national minority in Serbia against the tendency of Bunjevci to develop as a national minority with Serbia as their country-homeland. Such tendency is motivated by current trends of demographic disappearance, depopulation of Bunjevci in Bačka. The analysis of the nature and effects of the conflict inside the ethnic community of Bunjevci may lead to understanding of democratic solution of this conflict. The authors of this study are striving to determine the roots (finding them in an unfounded ethnic Croatianship of Bunjevci) and the core of the conflict (stating that it disables the national development of Bunjevci), coming to a conclusion that the centre of the conflict is in difficulty to separate the ethnic national identity of Bunjevci from that of Croats. On the basis of these analyses, the authors identify the barriers and chances of democratic way to resolve the conflict between the national minorities of Bunjevci and Croats in Serbia.

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Problem of Bunjevci in Bačka: depopulation and ethnic disappearance

The problem of Bunjevci in Serbia is one of the unresolved conflicts between ethnic and national minorities in south-east Europe that is awaiting a democratic response.

The smouldering conflict between Bunjevci, as a small nation that was autochtonously established during 18th and 19th century, with the current status of a national minority in Serbia as its home country (16,706 people in 2011), and the national minority of Croats in Serbia (57,900 people in total where, it was estimated that there were 15,615 Croats-Bunjevci in 2011[1]) as a sub-ethnic group of Croatian nation, generally jeopardises the existence of the

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[1] The method of calculation may be seen in serbian version of this paper in URL: <http://bunjevackiprigled.wordpress.com>

ethnic community of Bunjevci. Pursuant to the annual depopulation rate of Bunjevci (2.93%) and Croats (1.6%) between the censuses in 2002 and 2011 in Serbia (municipalities of Subotica and Sombor where 95% of all Bunjevci in Serbia live), depopulation of the population of Bunjevci is 3.57 times faster than the average depopulation of the total population in these municipalities (0.82% per annum) and for the Croatian population, it is 1.95 times faster. The continuation of such trends leads to disappearance of both modalities of the ethnicity of Bunjevci in the north of Bačka (bringing down Bunjevci to around 1% and Croats-Bunjevci to around 3% of the total population till the end of 21st century). These expected effects of depopulation shall bring both national modalities of Bunjevci in Bačka in Serbia, to the final stage of natural assimilation with the environment of the state-building nation, which had been achieved in Hungary till 1990 (Feher, 2003).

Historically speaking, main causes of depopulation of Bunjevci in Bačka are splitting their ethnic corps by making a border between Hungary and Serbia in 1921 and the processes which disabled their national development in both countries. The split of the ethnic corps of Bunjevci primarily meant the decrease of the life market, conditions of demographic reproduction and preserving the ethnic compactness of Baja Triangle (Baja-Sombor-Subotica towns) as the homeland and cradle of Bunjevci in Bačka. It happened in the smaller part of the parted Triangle in Hungary (one third of the total population of Bunjevci of Bač-Bodroš area from 1910), where the corps of Bunjevci was also fragmented to a recognised national minority of Croats-Bunjevci and to an unrecognised ethnic group of Bunjevci (in censuses classified as "others"), completely sinking into its social-cultural environment of Hungarian nationality. In censuses after 1944, the trail of Bunjevci in Hungary was completely lost, which may bring an uninformed observer to a confusion and idea of a holocaust of the people (Weaver).

The roots of the conflict: unfounded ethnic Croatianship of Bunjevci

The conflict between two national minorities, within the same Bunjevac ethnicity, is the result of the impact of external factors from the time of creation of the Croatian nation. In the end of 17th century already, two tendencies could be noticed, Bunjevac and Croatian, within the Vlach tribes: pro-Bunjevac orientation of tribes which were politically formed under the Venetian impact (the Bishop from Senj – Sebastijan Glavinić (1630–1690) said that they accept the name "Bunjevci" but that they cannot stand being called "Vlachs") opposite to the pro-Croatian orientation of tribes that were formed in Croatian Banovina (the Bishop from Zagreb Benko Vinković (1581–1642) said that those Bunjevci were Croats and that they wanted to be counted as "Croats"). The tribes that moved from Dalmatia in 1686 (they migrated from Herzegovina) to Bačka, were included in the ethnic moulding as Bunjevci and as such, they developed in Bačka all until the Croatian national renaissance in the end of 19th century. Till then, the ethnic integration of Bunjevci in Bačka reached the phase when their autochtonous national revival began ("Discussion…" Bishop I. Antunović from 1882 is the manifest of this revival). At the same time, after the disappearance of the Republic of Venice, when the whole Triune Kingdom fell under the Austrian Monarchy, the Croatian orientation

of Vlach-Bunjevac tribes living on the territory of the Kingdom prevailed and, after the revolution in 1848, it brought to their integration into the Croatian nation. Contribution of the Croatian south (Dalmatia and Herzegovina as the great-homeland of Bunjevci) to the creation of the Croatian nation (A. Starčević, Ban Jelačić, Croatian-Catholic national fundamentalism), had a response among Bunjevci in Bačka which was a national-ideological source of faltering and, after the World War I, the national split of Bunjevci in Bačka into the authentic Bunjevac and Croatian orientation.

The important aspect of the conflict within the ethnic community of Bunjevci in Bačka is the concept of millennium foundation of the state-legal continuity of Croatian, as ideology of the integration of the Croatian nation (shaped in the ideology of F. Tuđman). The concept of historical rights of the Croatian land (D. Mandić) is the basis of territorial aspirations of Croatian nationalism, including Srem and north-west part of Bačka. This last territorial request deviates from the mentioned state-legal conception because it relies on ethnic argument about Bunjevci as an ethnic group of the Croatian people. The aspiration of the Croatian state-national interest towards north-west Bačka (M. Bara) refers to the ethnic identity of Bunjevci as a "branch of Croatian clan" supporting this argument with the origins of Bunjevci in Bačka – countries of ancient (mythic) Red Croatia (Herzegovina, Dalmatia). Proto-Bunjevac (Vlach) tribes, that were under the rule of Croatian bans and noblemen for centuries (noble family of Nelipić, Mužić 2009), did not arise from the ethno genesis of old Croats (M. Šarić, I. Bidermann). About the Croatianship of Bunjevci, one may only speak on the basis of their falling under the rule of Croatian feudal structures (Fine). The question remains about how much the subjugation of Vlach-Bunjevac tribes (from 17th century) under Venetian and Ottoman political structures (from territories under the rule of Bosnian and Croatian gentry that converted to Islam) may be treated as the source of Croatianship of modern Bunjevci.

Joint cultural and religious moment in creating the ethnic identity of Bunjevci is undoubtedly the Catholicism. The influence of Franciscans of the Vicariate of Bosna Srebrene (Unyi), who had a support in their Bunjevac body of believers and, all through the half of 19th century, presented the intelligentsia of Bunjevci as a cultural-demographic substratum of Franciscan Vicariate of Bosnia. Only with the integration of Franciscans of Bosna Srebrena into the Croatian national movement, their devotion to Bunjevci developed into the factor of Croatisation of Bunjevci. In Bačka, after the deportation of Franciscans in the beginning of the 19th century, and creation of the Hungarian Salvatorian Franciscan Vicariate, Bunjevci lost their intelligentsia.

From the above said, one may conclude that the Croatianship of Bunjevci in Bačka was initiated by circumstances of creation of the Croatian nation in the end of the 19th century. The Croatianship is the external factor of dissolution of the autochtonous ethnic identity of Bunjevci in Bačka. It did not take a more definite shape as the result of Croatian archetype deeply set in the identity of Bunjevci, or more precisely, their pre-Bunjevac, old-Croatian identity. The primordialistic theory of Bunjevci as a sub ethnic group of Croatian ethnicity is not acceptable as an argument of modern "keepers of the Croatian ethnic territory in Bačka" for the Croatianship of Bunjevci in Bačka. The understanding of this wrong argument is the

root of every dialogue within the Bunjevac corps, oriented towards overcoming the conflict between two Bunjevac national minorities in Serbia.

Initiation of the conflict: making the national development of Bunjevci impossible

The process of making the national development of Bunjevci impossible began with the methods of state intervention in Austro-Hungarian Monarchy after 1867 and has continued in Hungary till present. In the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes/Yugoslavia, this process was running in the confronting relationship between Serbian and Croatian state-national interest in terms of controlling the north-west Bačka (strategies of Croatian Bačka HSS of Radić brothers) and, thanks to the support of the Roman Catholic Church clergy, it displayed itself as an advanced national Croatisation of Bunjevci. The strategy of the "Croatian ethnic territory in Bačka" remained the basis of the conception of the Communist Party of Yugoslavia (KPJ) about the state-territorial delineation between Croatia and Serbia after the World War II (M. Bara, sine anno). Opposite to the mentioned conception of KPJ among Bunjevci in Bačka, were the active tendencies towards Croat-oriented members of KPJ in the ranks of Bunjevac participants of the National Liberation War (NOR). Treating the national tendencies of Bunjevci as a serious challenge, with the appearance of J. B. Tito at the foundation congress of KP Serbia in May 1945, the KPJ initiated the ethnic shock through administrative prohibition for Bunjevci and Šokci in Bačka to express their nationality, including their violent national categorisation as Croats. Since then, Bunjevci normally coexisted only as Croats until the census in Serbia in 1991, i.e. 29th November 2009, when the Parliament of the Republic of Serbia confirmed the Statute of the Autonomous Province of Vojvodina in which the legal subjectivity of Bunjevci was acknowledged treating them as an equal national minority in Serbia.

The conflict within the Bunjevac corps in Bačka was taking a shape and growing in the circumstances of the conflict between Croatian and Serbian nationalism between two wars. As the beginning of this process, one may take the end of the World War I and participation of Bunjevci in making the decision on annexation of South Hungary (later Vojvodina) to the Kingdom of Serbia and Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes founded on 1st December 1918. The participation of Bunjevci on the Great Assembly of Serbs, Bunjevci and other Slovenian People in Bačka, Banat and Baranja on 29th November 1918 in Novi Sad, meant the historic determination of Bunjevci as a state-building entity. The speech of Bunjevac tribune B. Rajić marked the Serbian-Yugoslav (and not Croatian) orientation of Bunjevci in Bačka upon the foundation of the state where the Croats were one of the three state-building nations.

All until the disappearance of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia in April 1941, Croatian national interest gradually, in confrontation with Serbian national interest, managed to form its state-political territory in the state, including also the "territory of the Croatian Bačka" in line with the HSS strategy. Except for the national politicisation of some Bunjevci in Bačka (S. Marković), this strategy did not manage to overpower the equally offensive strategy of Serbian Vojvodina. Croatian crawling colonisation of Bačka (M. Bara) was less successful

than the colonisation of the north of Bačka which relied on forming mass peasant households (N. Gaćeša) and managed to disturb the ethnic Croatian (i.e. the population of Bunjevci and Šokci) continuity of the population of the north-west Bačka (especially the bordering zone towards Hungary). With this fact, after the World War II, thanks to the mass emigration of Germans and big deal of Hungarians from Bačka, as well as mass colonisation of mostly Serbian population, the strategy of Croatian Bačka became impossible but not abandoned by the "keepers of the Croatian ethnic territory in Bačka").

Problem of separation of ethnic Bunjevac and Croatian national identity

The Croatian national approach to Bunjevac ethnicity is burdened by a conjoined twins syndrome. Separation of Bunjevac ethnic and Croatian national identity seems like an impossible mission. That is a more general problem the creation and development of Croatian nation have been facing since its creation. Keeping the Bunjevac ethnic twin in existing condition, without the original development and in the interest of the growth of the national Croatian twin, is the source of double, both ethnic and national conflict between Bunjevci and Croats in Bačka. This conflict shall stay frozen until Bunjevci make a request for drawing a border between their ethnic markers, now also as markers of their special national identity. The unfreezing of the conflict happens upon manifestation of the Croatian national identity on the basis of adopted Bunjevac ethnic markers (examples of holy day "Dužijanca" in Subotica in Croatian, on which Bunjevci lay claims but not in Bunjevac ikavian dialect, provoking performances of church ceremonies for expressing Croatianship – performing the church song "Djevo Marijo kraljice Hrvata" (Virgin Mary, the Queen of Croats) within the mass, as a part of the program of Dužionica in Sombor, nominal labelling of Bunjevac dances and music-vocal creations as Croatian national treasure, example – "Festival of Bunjevac Songs" organised by HKUD from Subotica, presenting Bunjevac pieces of art made of straw as Croatian straw marquetry, performing Bunjevac folklore under the name of Croatian societies, labelling institutions and manifestations-gatherings with the name of Bunjevac Bishop I. Antunović as a Croatian national reformer, subsuming all cultural history of Bunjevci under the "history of Danube Croats", and other).

The mentioned examples show that the separation, drawing borders between ethnic Bunjevacship and national Croatianship is difficult to achieve in a short period of time and is only based on the high culture which the whole creation (homogenisation) of the Croatian nation is based on. Bunjevac ethnicity has a deep foundation that is being replaced by national Croatian culture among the members of intelligentsia educated in Croatia but not by common Bunjevac people. Standard Croatian language with difficulty enters the everyday communication, even among the political and cultural elite of Croats-Bunjevci in Bačka. Efforts to plant the language as a marker of national identity in children and youth by making them learning Croatian language with elements of national culture, is one of the interventions that should be practices contrary to the dying out of the Croatian speaking community in Croatian-Bunjevac environment of the northern Bačka. That is the case with using ikavica by Bunjevci who, just like Croats, in about 60% of population, in everyday communication

within the family and with neighbours, and especially in public, use Serbian language as *lingua franca* of the total Bunjevac population.

Chances to solve the conflict of national minorities of Bunjevci and Croats in Serbia in democratic way

So far, the conflict between two national orientations within the Bunjevac ethnic corps were inspired and supported by external elite states-nations – Croatian and partially Hungarian. Both prohibiting and also giving chances to the national development of Bunjevci, were inspired by the interests of state-building nations, most often in moments of growth of significance to preserve the territories inhabited by Bunjevci inside the borders of certain countries or, in hope to establish a desired control over some parts of Bačka (Weaver). These national interests are inevitable; in most cases restrictive but very encouraging factor for breaking out of the ethnic underground river to the historic scene or its sinking and disappearance from the stage of history. This fact must be taken into consideration while seeking a democratic solution of intra-Bunjevci conflict.

Only in special historic circumstance, Bunjevci get the opportunity of democratic consolidation of their ethnic corps and to establish democratic process of solving their conflict in connection with their own national development. Such special circumstances occurred twice in Vojvodina: the case of party intervention by KPJ in 1945 meant total annihilation of Bunjevac national development but also the engraving of this traumatic event in the collective memory of Bunjevci as an element of shaping the national identity in the future, and the support of Milošević's government in 1990 that gave chance for the beginning of their, till then unfulfilled, tendencies to develop as an equal national community.

The national interest of the Serbian Government at the moment when the last Balkan conflicts started, especial after the independency of Croatia, could count on the support of Bunjevci who lived on the important border area of northern Bačka, as the factor of counterweight to Croatian interests[2]. After democratic changes in 2001 in Serbia, such interest changed, emphasizing the importance of multiculturalism and showing the European approach of Serbian governments to national minorities in Vojvodina as a unique European region. Even during the regime of S. Milošević, Bunjevci managed to establish themselves as a national minority that was able to survive despite Croatian assimilation tendencies, as well as less noticeable tendencies of assimilation with the majority nation. One may also state the tendency of one part of Bunjevac corps towards Belgrade which, partially explains the interest of republic, nationally (Serbian) oriented parties for mentoring Bunjevci. Finally, but not in the last place, the patronage of Serbian governments over Bunjevci after 2001 may be related to the interest of balancing the interstate relations between Serbia and Croatia, especially in

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[2] The promoters of the Croatian national interest in Vojvodina tend to discredit the renewal of Bunjevci as a separate national minority in Serbia by qualifying such act of the government of Mirko Marjanović as "anti-Croatian project for creating an artificial memorandum nation" (an allusion to the Memorandum of SANU that is being interpreted as an ideological basis of the project for national reconstruction of the ex-Yugoslavia, typical for conservative forces of Milošević's Serbia). See Žigmanov, T., 2010. *Conquering the Freedom*. Subotica.

terms of protecting the Serbian national minority in Croatia. This relationship of Serbian country to Bunjevci was not unambiguous. The evidence for this is the restraint of some senior state officials towards aggressive appearances of the elite of Croatian national minority regarding the achievement of important interests of Bunjevci[3].

From the all the above said one may conclude that a promising approach to solving the intra-Bunjevac national conflict is the one that relies on initiatives coming from the base of Bunjevac ethnic corps and rely on institutions controlled by such base. The authoritarian solutions for "fixing" the problem of Bunjevci have not been giving sustainable solutions from the aspect of Bunjevac ethnic corps. On the contrary, they meant bringing the conflict to negation of Bunjevci by nominally categorizing them as Croats or through "natural" assimilation of national minorities in Hungary described by I. Feher. Anyway, what are the possible democratic solutions of the conflict that has been presented on previous pages?

About democratic solution, one may speak under the assumption that there is a democratic and social-political system of legal country, where ethnic groups and national minorities have the chance to exist, develop and participate in social interactions as autonomous entities. The political system in Serbia provides such chance to Bunjevci (possibility to declare themselves as a separate ethnic/national group in the state census; declaration of sufficient number on the list of voters for the National Council election). Here, in this process, there is no arbitration of non-political authority about the "existence" of Bunjevac ethnicity (the opinion of two experts of the Hungarian Science Academy, Dobos and Toth[4], ultimately prevailed when rejecting the national initiative of Bunjevci in Hungarian Parliament in 2006). Although it contains some potential obstacles, process of inclusion of Bunjevci in the political system of

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[3] The statement of B. Tadić, the President of the Republic of Serbia upon the visit of the Croatian President Dr. I. Josipović in Bački Monoštor: "that the minority called only Bunjevac is not familiar to him as an important factor in national communicities of Vojvodina. According to the Constitution, they have the right to create a national communitiy as a minority but in Bački Monoštor he said that he would not receive such delegation as an official visit while he is the President." (According to Matarić, M., 2011. Interview with two signees of the Open Letter from Sombor. 21 March 2011, 08:09. Split Branch Needs to Recognize the Truth. *Croatian Word*. [online] Available at: <http://www.hrvatskarijec.rs/vest/30/Razdijeljena-grana-treba-spoznati-istinu> [Accessed on 29 March 2013]

[4] On 12th May 2009, the President of the Hungarian Academy of Science (MTA) Palinkas Jozsef notified Mija Muić, the President of "Udruženje preživelih Bunjevaca" (the Association of Survived Bunjevci) from Baja and the initiator of the national initiative of Bunjevci in Hungary in 2006 for obtaining the status of a national minority in that country, about the reasons which cannot make such status possible. (We cannot speak about Bunjevac language. Local dialects of Bunjevci differ and are close to Serbian and Croatian languages, … and the vocabulary is, actually, Croatian. If we accept that the national affiliation depends on how the speakers of a certain dialect recognize themselves … here we do not see any reasons for obtaining the status of an independent national minority). The basis of the notification is the report of experts for national minorities – Tóth Ágnes and Dobos Balázs. Tóth Ágnes from MTA Institute for Researching Ethnic-National Minorities said that it is not only about sociology and language, but also about politics when a state decides about recognizing (tekint) someone as a minority. According to Dr. Tóth's explanation, the recognition of an ethnic group as a national minority largely depends on the "approach of the state-forming elite towards nationality" ("milyen az államhatalmi elit nemzetiség-felfogása") and how the Hungarian government treats the homeland of a certain ethnic group. This historian said that the opening of the question of recognizing Bunjevci shall be connected with the relations between Croatia and Hungary that are, after the disintegration of Yugoslavia, better than Serbian-Hungarian relations. (Hence the partiality of Hungarian state-building elite towards Croatian approach – which treats Bunjevci as a sub ethnic group of Croatian people, and not the Serbian approach – where Bunjevci were recognised as a national minority). See <http://www.bunyevac.hu/contra.php#_ftn1>

Serbia is democratically more credible than the process which, on two occasions prevented Bunjevci in Hungary to be recognised as a separate national minority.

Democratic solution of the conflict assumes the mobilisation of the ethnic base, the whole ethnic corps of Bunjevci, in order to get out of the conflict and go towards relationships that shall finally result in cooperation and achievement of common interest of the ethnic survival and national development. Entities, the organizing participants of such development, are political parties as well as non-government organisations (NGO). What kind of evolution could be expected in this process of solving the conflict between Bunjevci and Croats?

According to Bartolini, social relationships of autonomous political participants are being set and are going through four forms of interaction: conflict → competition → agreement → cooperation. The situation of conflict does not accept commonly stated and democratic rules, and in such situation, the participants in political relations have different, mutually exclusive goals, directly or indirectly use force in mutual damage making while achieving them. In negotiations, the participants have different goals but those in which one may not negotiate. Every participant controls a part of the prize, does not use force, but hopes for future advancements and dangers of failure of negotiations. In situations of competition and cooperation/collaboration, participants of interaction have the same goal where, in competition relation, each of them strives for the same goal independently, without exchanging the available assets, financial and information, and in cooperation, they share their assets for common achievement of the same goals, seeing their interests as complementary rather than independent. Regarding competition, although it is a system of interaction between consciously competing participants, it may be seen as unintended outcome of such interaction system (Zuber, p.929). Even in social relations of political competition, one may recognise monopolistic situations (relations among participants of dominant centre/hegemon, cartel majority and weaker outsiders) as opposed to situation of free competition of more or less strong participants (in terms of human, financial and other resources). When the parties cooperate on basic level, they respect common, democratic rulers but they still contest, while on macro level, there is a competition going on between them (Franzmann).

From conflict to competition: overcoming the barriers of democratic solution

The current political scene of the ethnic corps of Bunjevci is characterised by expressing conflicts and competition which reflect the internal inequality, strengths and weaknesses of organised entities of the two national articulations of this corps - Bunjevci and Croats-Bunjevci. The relations between the entities of social-political life of Bunjevci corps are such that they require democratic solution of the conflict between Bunjevci and Croats in Serbia. The understanding of these relations is the first step in creating the real picture of possibilities of such solution.

In the national corps of Croats-Bunjevci which is, in terms of human, financial and information resources, far better equipped than that of Bunjevci, one may notice cooperation relations on a micro level (activities of the Institute for Culture of Croats in Vojvodina). The

elements of competition become prominent between the weaker party of Democratic Association of Croats (DZH) and, undoubtedly dominant, Democratic Union of Croats in Vojvodina (DSHV). On macro level, political entities of this corps show the competition relation which is, from time to time, visible through criticizing disproportionate control of staff positions, allocation of resources, care of the home country of Croatia for Croats-Bunjevci (the area of Subotica and Sombor) compared to other Croats (in Srem etc.). The feeling of inadequate prize and attention of political and media factors for the struggle of Croats-Bunjevci for "the Croatian ethnic territory in Bačka" is the expression of competition relation between "marginal Croatianship" and Croatian home.

In inter-ethnic terms, the leading political entities of Croats-Bunjevci, DSHV and also HNV act as ethnic predators in relation to Bunjevci[5]. Such relation had a full support from political entities, primarily from the state-home, as well as from home universities and NGO's from Croatia. The strategy of conflict with Bunjevci in Serbia was corrected after the announcement that the home country of Croatia shall move on to the strategy of agreement with Bunjevci which was made public by the Croatian President Dr. I. Josipović in his interview in Novi Sad Dnevnik relating to 2012. The signs of moving from the strategy of conflict to the strategy of competition have been noticed in activities of Croats-Bunjevci institutions in Vojvodina, although it is hard to believe that a direct transfer to the strategy of agreement is possible except for as a tactical step of "testing the water" in terms of tendencies of certain currents in Bunjevci corps.

The current events regarding BNS summarise and articulate relevant aspects of social relations, conflicts and competition, agreement and cooperation, within the national corps of Bunjevci. *Personae dramatis* of these relations are Bunjevac political parties and several NGO (BM, UG "Bunjevačko kolo" from Sombor and a few associations of citizens created during the elections for the second composition of BNS in 2010).

The political arena of Bunjevac corps was shaped during the preparations for BNS elections in June 2010. Then, the leading Bunjevac party of Vojvodina (BSV) entered the pre-election coalition with Bunjevačka Matica, Culture and Art Society (KUD) "Bunjevka" from Subotica and the Association of Citizens "Bunjevačko kolo" from Sombor, on the basis of agreement and cooperation with the three mentioned NGO. From this agreement, a list called "Sad i uvik samo Bunjevci" (Now and always Bunjevci) arose, lead by S. Kujundžić Ostojić, who, on the elections for BNS in 2010 won the relative majority (9 out of total of 23 mandates or 39.13%). On town elections for the City Assembly of Subotica, BSV won one councillor mandate, on the basis of which B. Francišković was elected as Deputy President of City

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[5] Commenting the reception of delegation of the National Council of Bunjevac National Minority on 12th July 2011 in the Serbian Parliament by the President of the Parliament Dr. Slavica Đukić Dejanović, Dr. Slaven Bačić the President of the National Council of Croatian National Minority in the Republic of Serbia evaluated this meeting as "an example showing that behind the project of creating the artificial Bunjevac people stands the Republic of Serbia with its most eminent institutions", that it is "obvious that in connection with that, the earlier policy initiated by Slobodan Milošević has been continued. The special element of such policy is the institutionalization of Bunjevci as separate people which is emphasized through standardization of Bunjevac ikavian dialect which, turning into a separate language, tends to de-Croatize itself". Weekly magazine *"Hrvatska riječ"* (Croatian Word), no. 434 as of 15th July 2011, page 6.

Assembly within the coalition led by Democrats Party. In later intra-Bunjevac relations, BSV did not show enough competition strength, especially in the period of the growth of conflict about the execution of the agreement on cooperation among all fractions of BNS as of June 2011 (reason for weakening of BSV was primarily the bad decision to run for other political elections with United Regions of Serbia (URS), and also the illness and death of its President, as well as the maladaptation of the next President).

Shortly before the elections for BNS, the registration of the Association of Bunjevci from Bačka (SBB) was renewed with M. Bajić as its founder and President (founded in 2007). The renewal of the registration of this party was motivated by the interest for entering the election list of "the National Coalition of Bunjevci" (National List of Bunjevci – B. Pokornić, the Association of Bunjevci in Bačka – M. Bajić, Bunjevci for Bunjevci – N. Babić) with M. Bajić as the prominent speaker of the coalition, in BNS as the key democratic authority of Bunjevac national minority which controls significant financial funds and has impact on acting of Bunjevci's Information Center (BIC) and all other NGO of Bunjevci. (M. Bajić became interested in Bunjevac corps in 2003 upon the electoral selection for the first convocation of BNS, when he entered in BNS directly, without collecting signatures, because he had been a republic delegate). The political acting of SBB relies on competition and conflict strategy, both on town and macro level (criticizing decisions of the City Assembly and the like, which is the way how M. Bajić acts as a supporter and member of Provincial Committee of Serbian Renewal Movement [PO SPO]) and on Bunjevac micro level, which was manifested on several "statement wars" with parties and political officials of Croats-Bunjevci, but also with intra-ethnic Bunjevac opponents (BSV and its President – A. Matković, with the Main Board of Bunjevci Foundation [BM] and its President – I. Sedlak). Political experience acquired in the long carrier as a professional politician and affinity for conflict and competition strategy with the support of coalition partners from SPO (lately also from DS), contributed to efforts of SBB to take over the role of hegemon in political relations of the Bunjevac corps, which caused resistance and current escalation of the intra-ethnic conflict in this corps. Dramatic manifestation of internal conflicts within the Bunjevac corps is the recent invitation of M. Bajić, President of SBB, to the national "purge of BNS"[6].

Shortly before the last general elections in Serbia in 2012, with the help of DSS, Bunjevac Party (BS) was founded, with S. Evetović as its President. On the elections, this party obtained one mandate in the City Assembly in Subotica. Counting on this mandate and on the mandate of the current President of BNS – B. Pokornić, who was elected on SPS list, M. Bajić suggested the creation of the delegate's club "Bunjevci zajedno" ("Bunjevci together"), with whom he could have better control over decision making and resources of the City Assembly. This failure caused the "statement war" which again initiated the later (current) conflict within BNS.

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[6] Main statements within Bajić's invitation for the purge in BNS given at the press conference at the seat of SBB on 14th March 2012: "Those who are members of the National Council of Bunjevci and have Croatian papers and declared themselves as Croats need to leave the National Council of Bunjevac National Minority … there are people who came to the Bunjevac National Council with an intention to make the Bunjevac National Council join the Croatian Council, and to make Bunjevci join Croats and become like Šokci today." The whole announcement of M. Bajić may be seen at: <http://www.subotica.info/2013/03/14/bajic-trazi-cistku-u-savetu-bunjevaca>

NGO's in Bunjevac corps comprise Bunjevačka matica, as the highest cultural organisation which cherishes the national identity of Bunjevci, several cultural centres (in Subotica, Bajmok), associations of citizens "Bunjevačko kolo" in Sombor, "Bunjevci" in Novi Sad, in Svetozar Miletić (Lemeš), culture and art societies "Bunjevka" and "Aleksandrovo" in Subotica,… Some of these non-government organisations have agreement and cooperation relations with political parties (UG "Bunjevačko kolo" from Sombor supported BSV on elections in 2012 and has one mandate in the Municipal Assembly of Sombor). Bunjevačka matica had a coalition cooperative relation with BSV during the preparations and realisation of participation of the list "Sad i uvik samo Bunjevci" on elections for BNS, while on general elections in 2012, it established an agreement relation with League of Social democrats of Vojvodina (LSV) (at the time of passivism of BSV). This last relation of BM with LSV, M. Bajić took as a reason to deny the significance of agreement about BNS unity, which brought to the current crisis in acting of this authority of cultural autonomy of Bunjevci.

The last conflict of M. Bajić with a part of BNS is the follow up of deeper ideological divergence among Bunjevci in terms of the source of their national identity (Croatian origins, Serbian origins changed by the acceptance of Catholicism that resulted in insisting on the fact that Bunjevci are Serbian Catholics i.e. autochtonous Bunjevac identity of Bunjevci which has its roots in ancient Buns (M. Mandić) and from the times after their immigration to Bačka in 17th century). The standpoint of M. Bajić shows the affinity towards the other, Serbian-Catholic theory of Bunjevac origins. His critical attitude towards two other theories is primarily directed against the autochtonous theory of Bunjevac origins. From his statement about the possibilities of cooperation of SBB with some of the members of Croatian-Bunjevac orientation in DSHV, one may conclude that he does not reject the strategy of agreement with Croats.[7]

The conflict within BNS, between SBB of M. Bajić and coalition created around BM, expresses deeper difference between pro-Serbian and autochtonous conception of Bunjevac identity. This conflict has been manifested in the competition in connection with the direction of shaping the national identity of Bunjevci i.e. regarding ideological basis of national-political mobilisation of Bunjevac corps. Unexpected success of the coalition "Sad i uvik samo Bunjevci", based on autochtonous concept of Bunjevac identity, caused reactions of both extra-national orientations (pro-Croatian and pro-Serbian), bringing to, also unexpected,

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[7] Reacting on points of view of M. Groznica at "the press conference on the premises of Croatian National Council which tended to present its campaign before the census", Bajić introduced the opinion that "In DSHV there are also people that understand that only common efforts may bring us welfare compared to efforts of the current managing team for whom, it seems, it is most important to deal with problems of Bunjevci and to spend all its energy on extinguishing this national minority recognized by the Constitution" (Announcement of SBB "We shall ask for the prohibition of DSHV" as of 2011, Available at: <http://www.subotica.info/2013/03/14/bajic-trazi-cistku-u-savetu-bunjevaca>

possible synchronisation of denying the autochtonous orientation of the national development of Bunjevci by the state-building grounded currents within their ethnic corps.[8]

Conclusion

From all the above said, one may draw two conclusions important for understanding the current situation in terms of relations between Bunjevci and Croats in Serbia.

1) They are two corps with different national orientations, two orientations in future development, but equally endangered in terms of demographic and ethnic dying out. Already centuries-long conflict in this ethnic corps is the main barrier/obstacle and threat to their existence. The consequence of such conflict is the relation between conjoined twins who may survive if they develop as two nations, without any outside violent interventions. The mutual recognition of their common cultural, historical and symbolic elements of ethnic identity as well as the recognition of differences, elements of national identity that makes the difference between Bunjevci and Croats (everything that, in the past, separated Bunjevac ethnicity in terms of origins, autochtonous culture) are the conditions for releasing the tension and relaxation in their relations, mutual recognition and respecting Bunjevci and Croats in Serbia.

2) Democratic solution of the conflict between Bunjevci and Croats-Bunjevci requires a process of progressing through four stages of social-political, national relations, and not violent abolishment of the weaker national corps, which is not a tenable solution as the case of Bunjevci in Bačka after 1945 shows.

Democratic solution requires development of agreement and cooperation relations, first within the Bunjevac national corps. However, such transfer cannot be achieved without "indulging in ridicule" the competition relation, without which the national base of Bunjevci cannot develop democratic abilities, remove the dangers of conflicting institution management that should provide competent, expertise, scientific and artistic staff capable to create a tenable institutional structure necessary for the national development of Bunjevci. The competition on micro level, between political parties of Bunjevci and NGO (societies, associations), is necessary for accelerating the affirmation of creators, projects and management. The

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[8] Denial from both sides – Croatian and Serbian – was manifested through reactions in connection with tendencies of BNS to provide standardisation of Bunjevac language and its legalisation in Serbia as a separate language – Bunjevac ikavica. Efforts of BNS to provide the standardisation of Bunjevac language was characterized by Dr. S. Bačić, President of the Croatian National Council in Serbia, as de-Croatisation of ikavica ("through standardisation of Bunjevac ikavica speach, which tends to de-Croatize by turning into a separate language"). Opposite to this, the Serbian national orientation qualifies the same tendencies of BNS as "splitting the Serbian language". From the symposium, organized by the Movement for Renewal of Serbian Language and the Government of the Republic of Serbian Krajina about "the Serbian Matter and Serbian Language", comes the announcement about splitting the Serbian language saying that: "It was announced that the Bunjevac National Council shall make efforts to introduce the world with the live Bunjevac language…The plan of Bunjevac National Council is a forgery of forgeries and we shall see whether the European Union shall destroy its reputation by pleading for such acceptance of forgeries in philology. Namely, the language used by Bunjevci in Vojvodina is the Serbian language. Serbian Bunjevac tribe uses a dialect of Serbian language called IKAVSKI…" 20 March 2011. [online] Available at: <http://www.vidovdan.org/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=23741:2012-01-25-20-50-08&catid=48:vesti&Itemid=103>

competition on that level is possible if a democratic (ensured by rules) control over the politically and conflict imposed monopoly is provided at any point of social relations in Bunjevac corps. Such barrier to creation of monopoly within the competition may be the "Bunjevačka matica" (Bunjevci National Foundation) that is well equipped for such task (organizing conferences/ forums of all entities of democratic development of the Bunjevac corps).

When it is about the transfer from conflict relations to those of competition and, in the longer term, on agreement and cooperation between Bunjevci and Croats, it would be wrong if one would at once start with applying the strategy of establishing and developing cooperation relations between these two national corps of ethnic Bunjevci. The condition is to provide national equalities which are impossible without bringing the Bunjevac corps to a state of being appropriately equipped in terms of staff and any other. The parallel development of Bunjevci and Croats, primarily in the north of Bačka (but also in the cross-border belt in Hungary), through competition and agreement, where it is a real and tenable interest of their institutions, creative projects etc. (without monopolistic prevention and forcing, with or without relying on state's intervention), are necessary as an indicator of overcoming the conflict that jeopardises the existence of Bunjevci as the ethnicity at the crossroads between the renewal and disappearance.

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KIN ETHNIC GROUPS' MOBILISATION:
ALBANIANS IN KOSOVO AND MACEDONIA

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Key Words: *ethnic conflict, ethnic group, kinship, kin groups, ethnic mobilisation, factors of ethnic mobilisation*

Abstract

The end of the Cold War signalled an increase in intrastate conflicts throughout the world, and today we are witnessing more intra-state than inter-state conflicts, mainly with ethnic character. Ethnic conflicts continue to be a big challenge in national and international agendas that is why understanding conflict sources and how do ethnic groups get mobilised are important topics to be assessed. The aim of this research is to explore and compare how kin ethnic groups get mobilised around their ethnic identity, in which aspects their ethnic mobilisations change or resemble. This is a qualitative exploratory research to understand the differences and commonalities in ethnic mobilisation of kin ethnic groups, in this case ethnic Albanians in Kosovo and ethnic Albanians in Macedonia. Comparison mainly focuses on historical, economical, psychological, cultural, political and kinship factors. This research shows to us that, even though there can be some similarities, the motives and factors behind ethnic mobilisation of kin ethnic groups change from one conflict case to the other.

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I. Introduction

The end of the Cold War signalled an increase in intrastate conflicts throughout the world, and today we are witnessing more intra-state than inter-state conflicts, mainly with ethnic character. Ethnic conflicts continue to be a big challenge in national and international agendas. Understanding conflict sources and how do ethnic groups get mobilised are important topics to be assessed. In different regions of the world different ethnic groups fight with each other motivated by different reasons. The Balkan is a region characterised by ethnic diversity and ethnic conflicts which are perceived as important sources of "balkanisation". Some ethnic groups are divided among different states and if ethnic identity awareness increases they start to get mobilised either to ask for more rights, for independence, or other goals. While looking at contemporary ethnic conflicts we can see kin ethnic groups fighting in different fronts, for different or same goals, reaching to different ends. How do kin ethnic groups get mobilised around their ethnic identity and in which aspects their mobilisations change or resemble are important issues to be explored.

In this research, firstly, the definitions of ethnic conflict, ethnic group mobilisation and kin groups is presented. Secondly, the literature on the factors leading to ethnic group mobilisation is reviewed, by dividing the factors as internal, external and psychological for the purpose of this study. Thirdly, the methodology and cases used in the research will be presented. In the analysis section, ethnic mobilisation of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia will be compared based on some main factors encouraging their mobilisation, to reach finally at the conclusion.

Definitions

Introducing the definitions of ethnic conflict, ethnic mobilisation, and kin group is the first step to move than to the literature on ethnic group mobilisation. Ethnic Conflicts is defined as "a type of conflict in which the goals of at least one conflict party are defined in ethnic terms, and the primary fault line of confrontation is one of ethnic" (Cordell and Wolff, 2010, p.5). According to Olzak, ethnic mobilisation is "the process by which groups organise around some feature of ethnic identity (for example, skin colour, language, customs) in pursuit of collective ends" (Olzak, 1983, p.355). Murphy (2001) defines kin groups as „social groups whose members define their relationship (or their eligibility for membership) by kinship or common descent" (Murphy, 2001, p.12).

II. Literature review

Ethnic group mobilisation

The literature on ethnic group mobilisation introduces us to a lot of reasons or factors that lead to ethnic group mobilisation and foster interethnic conflicts. For the purpose of this research the most important factors leading to ethnic group mobilisation, are grouped as internal, external, and psychological factors.

A. Internal factors

The literature on internal factors that encourage ethnic groups to get mobilised is focused mainly on identity expression and discrimination, social, economic and political conditions. Size and territorial concentration are some other important elements in ethnic group mobilisation. "Ethnic mobilisation" can easily appear if ethnic differences are translated to political divisions and no measures are taken by the state to accommodate these divisions (Yilmaz, 2007, p.18).

Restriction in ethnic identity and discrimination are important factors that can push ethnic groups to get mobilised against "others" that try impose these restrictions (Gherghina and Jiglau, 2011, p.56). Discrimination happens when the dominant and minority group are not treated equally and when attempts to prevent minority's advancement exists. Discrimination

is present when minority group has lower employment rate and wages relative to dominant group; when minority is not allowed to use its language, customs, traditions and other cultural components; and when minority group has lower social, medical and economic standards relative to dominant one (Yilmaz, 2010; Minorities at Risk project, 2005).

"Economic distress and unjust distribution of national resources in a multi ethnic state is another cause of ethnic groups' mobilisation" (Yilmaz, 2007, p.18). Differences in socioeconomic status encourage the members of an ethnic group to come together and mobilise, and it becomes difficult to distinguish whether mobilisation occurred because of social, political or economic issues (Coakley, 2009, p.466). Also, Collier and Hoeffler (2004) state that groups take in consideration their economic sources, costs and benefits while deciding to get mobilised against the other, so ethnic groups' mobilisation is influenced by economic determinants.

The behaviour of the state can greatly influence ethnic groups' mobilisation and according to Coakley "state behaviour is essential in explaining political and institutional factors of mobilisation" (Coakley, 2009, p.4). An increase in the power of domain ethnic groups leads to the increase of the grievances of the minority ethnic group because of the lack of local autonomy and political power (Gurr, 2000). Lack of power can be a strong reason for ethnic group mobilisation. Along with access to power, regime type is another important political factor that can encourage ethnic mobilisation. Mansfield and Snyder (2005) state that transition to democracy characterised by instability, is the most dangerous period because it can create space for ethnic mobilisation. Similarly, Gurr and Marshall (2003) mention that more space and opportunity for ethnic group mobilisation is provided during the period of transition to democracy.

Posen (1993), looks at ethnic mobilisation from another perspective, through realisms' lens, arguing that in a weak state "security dilemma" appears; groups do not know each other's intentions and they try to defend by attacking the other. In a security dilemma situation ethnic groups get mobilised to protect from „other" groups" attacks (Posen, 1993).

Other scholars argue that ethnic groups can mobilise motivated by population number, territorial concentration and their capacity to articulate a military challenge to the domain group based on existing ethnic networks (Toft, 2003). Also the role of elites, leaders and media are important leading to ethnic group mobilisation.

B. External factors

External factors that can contribute to ethnic groups' mobilisation include the role of kin ethnic groups, kin state, and international actors. According to Huibregtse (2011), recent studies view kinship as an important factor leading to group mobilisation, emergence and internationalisation of ethnic conflicts.

According to Lake and Rothchild (1998) and Lobell and Mauceri (2004), ethnic groups can get mobilised if they are inspired by the activity of their kin ethnic groups in other states

which is called contagion; or if they are influenced by spill-over effect of other conflicts. The existence of interactions among kin ethnic groups increases the likelihood of ethnic mobilisation or spill-over effect (Forsberg, 2005a; 2005b). An ethnic group in one state will support its kin, living in another state not only because of emotional ties but also in order to affect the balance of power and domestic politics. „In general, groups that are tied into networks acquire better techniques for effective mobilisation: plausible appeals, good leadership, and organisational skills' (Yilmaz, 2010, pp.17-18).

External support is an essential factor encouraging ethnic mobilisation and violent conflict. By offering moral, material and political support, "foreign sympathisers can have a significant contribution in the cohesion and mobilisation of ethnic groups, and if support is withdrawn resolution possibilities will appear" (Yilmaz, 2010, p.16). On one hand external support can contribute to separatist groups' mobilisation and violent activities, but on the other hand incentives to settle the conflict can lead to peaceful and legal self-determinations (Coakley, 2009, p.9). In sum, "myriad international actors influence the aspirations, opportunities, and strategies of ethnic groups in conflict" (Yilmaz, 2010, p.18).

"The importance of kin states in the mobilisation of ethnic minorities is highlighted in Brubaker's concept of a triadic nexus which is formed by the home state, the ethnic minority, and minority's kin state" (Gherghina and Jiglau, 2011, p.56). "A state may intervene to detach territory populated by its kin from another state, to help them become independent or to end their suffering and improve their status within the other state" (Huibregtse, 2011, p.46). Except official declarations of support, high funding is the most effective way for a kin state to help its co-nationals. Also, the kin state can work with homeland state in improving minority right and policies. According to Austvoll (2006) "The results indicate that ethnic kinship does matter when predicting intervention and that states are more likely to intervene when the government of the intervener has kin with the state it intervenes in." If only affective ties are taken in consideration by the kin state, it will be ready to intervene at any cost. But Huibregtse, states that "power calculations are important and kin states must consider if they are powerful enough to ensure victory and whether the kin minority is large enough to be 'worth' fighting for" (Huibregtse, 2011, p.47).

Most studies support the claim that shared ethnicity increases the likelihood of interstate conflict, especially when talking about an at-risk ethnic minority (Henderson, 1997) According to Saideman (2001; 2002) if one group has ethnic ties with an outside actor than it is expected and more likely that the external actor will support that group. Jenne states that "Once a minority receives some signals that its lobby state might be supportive, it radicalises to obtain concessions from its host state even if the majority guarantees protection to the minority" (Jenne, 2004, pp.729-756 as cited in Koinova, 2008, p.376).

Koinova (2008) argues that kin-states undergoing transition from totalitarian rule are much more likely to facilitate the rise of ethno national conflict in host-states than kin-states experiencing no transition, despite the salience of the minority demands in the host-state (Koinova, 2008, p.373). On the one hand, Ganguli (1998, pp.11-31 as mentioned in Koinova, 2008, p.374) argues that "a kin-state may pursue a strategy of 'inaction' towards its kin ethnic

because of its own lack of capabilities, funds and cost-benefit analyses". On the other hand, Carment and James argue that an autonomous state with strong institutions is more likely to act. "In the absence of such institutionalisation, domestic elites' experiences are highly likely to formulate an aggressive foreign policy using international opportunities to promote their own domestic agendas" (Carment and James, 2000, pp.173-177). Both accounts put their finger on the state strength as a variable important for ethnic conflicts abroad.

C. Psychological factors

Social, economic, political historical events are absorbed in ethnic groups' members' mind and psychology, which makes impossible to understand their mobilisation without looking at the psychological dynamics. Collective historical trauma, leading to enemy image, stereotypes, prejudices, dehumanisation, and victimisation are among the most important dynamics.

When a traumatic experience is shared by a group of people or an entire society it is defined as "collective trauma" and when this collective trauma has its root back in history it can be defined as historical collective trauma. "Collective trauma applies to any society, ethnic group, social category or class which has been exposed to extreme circumstances of traumatisation, such as natural disasters, technological catastrophes, and social, political, cultural, gender, ethnic, or religious persecution" (Veerman, 2001, p.3). Historical trauma is directly linked with the strong feelings of the members of one group which has been victimised or humiliated by members of another group and As Volkan (1997) notes, this collective trauma may remain in people's memories as communal icons of physical and psychological sufferings. The shared basic values, shared environment and the way the community perceives itself and the world are affected by collective trauma. "Members of each new generation share a conscious, and unconscious, wish to repair what has been done to their ancestors to release themselves from the burden of humiliation" (Volkan and Itzkowitz, 1994, p.7). Historical traumas lead to enemy images, stereotypes, prejudices, and "we vs. other" that can contribute to group mobilisation and emergence or escalation of inter group conflict (Yilmaz, 2010, p.11). Because of enemy images, ethnic groups ignore positive aspect and focus on negative aspects of each other which support stereotypes and prejudices they have about each other (Yilmaz, 2010, p.11). The perception of the enemy helps to shape reality and brings on the self-fulfilling prophecy (Yilmaz, 2010, p.13). Polarisation among groups appear, they develop a we vs. the other perspective, according to which they de-individualise the other ethnic group, see it as homogenous, attribute all negative characteristics to them, tend to be aggressive toward them and considers their moves provocative and hostile (Yilmaz, pp.13-14). If the other group behaves different from expectations in becomes just an exception (Yılmaz, 2005, pp.5-6).

Enemy images are also mirrored. That is, "as long as one group possesses certain negative image regarding other group, the other group retaliates in the same way and develops similar images, even if it does not have any in the beginning. Over time, both sides become equal in terms of having polarised images" (Yilmaz, 2010, p.14).

Finally, enemy images may lead to dehumanisation characterised by a decline in empathy for the other and according to Keen psychological need for dehumanisation arises because killing or brutal tactics cannot be easily justified otherwise (Keen, 2005, pp.25-26).

"Other" ethnic group is characterised as "crude, uncivilised, barbarian, greedy, criminal, terrorist, and even non-human, in order to release themselves from the burden of guilt feelings" (Keen, 2005, pp.25-26).

III. Methodology

The literature on kin ethnic groups is not very rich, but very necessary especially when we have examples of kin ethnic group getting mobilised in different places, encouraged by different or similar factors and reaching to different or same outcomes. Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia are kin ethnic groups and Albanian state is the kin state. Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia are mobilised against other ethnic groups. They are kin ethnic groups mobilised for same or different reasons but have reached different ends and even though they are in post conflict stage, clashes among ethnic groups continue. These situations motivated me to explore how ethnic mobilisation of kin ethnic groups differs or resemble?

I am going to make a qualitative exploratory research to understand the difference and commonalities in ethnic mobilisation of kin ethnic groups.

According to Newman (2006, p.33) exploratory research is a "research in which the primary purpose is to examine a little understood issue or phenomenon, to develop preliminary ideas and move toward refined research questions by focusing on 'how and what' question." As I previously mentioned the mobilisation of kin ethnic groups is not explored enough.

Ethnic conflict among ethnic Albanians and ethnic Serbs in Kosovo, and the conflict among ethnic Albanians and ethnic Slav Macedonians in Macedonia are the cases to be studied.

The independent variable is "ethnic groups" and the dependant variable is "ethnic group mobilisation". Comparative case study is the methodology that will be used. Ethnic group's mobilisation factors are the unit of analysis. I have two cases, Macedonian Albanians conflict in Macedonia and Kosovo conflict, and one unit of analysis, so "Type 3" is the comparative case study design of this research which is a "multiple case (holistic) design." (Yin, 2002, pp.44-45; Neuman, 2006)

Conflicts in Kosovo and Macedonia will be the cases on which I will conduct my research. Both conflicts are ethnic conflicts and are located in the Balkans, and in both conflict one of the conflicting party are ethnic Albanians. Both cases are in post-conflict stage, but while Albanians in Kosovo became independent, Albanians in Macedonia are part of Macedonian state. In Kosovo conflict and Macedonian conflict, internal and external factors that influence ethnic group mobilisation are present, and even though they are in post-conflict state still in both cases violent clashes can be noticed. It is a "most similar system design" case selection. (Newman, 2006)

To conduct the research I used secondary resources, almost 20 articles. The main databases that I used include J-Store, EBSCO, Wiley Online Library and Web of Science. I have used article written after 1990s when the ethnic clashes became obvious in this cases and continue until June 2012 because the discourse concerning sources of ethnic group's mobilisation continues.

IV. Cases

A. *Kosovo conflict*

In the 8th century Albanian speakers started to move from Adriatic into Kosovo. Kosovo has been ruled by Bulgaria, Serbs, and Ottoman Empire, and after the fall of Ottoman Empire it passed under Serbia's control and became part of the Yugoslav Federation in 1918. "After World War II, Kosovo became an autonomous region within Serbia, but Serbia's 1989 constitution significantly limited Kosovo's autonomy" (Wolff, 1999). By 1991, Albanians accounted for 90% of Kosovo population. In 1991, Kosovo's Albanian started non-violent resistance for independence but their efforts were defeated by Serbian government, and in 1995 Kosovo's ethnic Albanians formed Kosovo Liberation Army (KLA) and started an armed insurgency. (Wolff, 1999) Serbian security forces started fighting against civilian ethnic Albanians and KLA and in February 1998 more than 900 Kosovars were killed. NATO began launching air strikes against Serbia on March 24, 1999. In June 3, 1999 Serbia finally agreed to sign the UN-approved peace agreement with NATO, peacekeeping forces were deployed in Kosovo, and the UN assumed administration of the province (Wolff, 1999). On Feb. 17, 2008, the prime minister of Kosovo Hashim Thaçi declared independence from Serbia. Serbia and Russia do not recognise the independence, but 92 countries, including the U.S., have recognised Kosovo as independent country which did not violate international law, according to the International Court of Justice.

B. *Albanians in Macedonia*

The tensions between ethnic Albanians and Macedonians have the roots very early in the history but they increased especially after 1991, because ethnic Albanians started to ask for more rights and discrimination of minorities was a problem of Macedonian government. Kosovo crisis in the end of 1990s increased even more the tensions among ethnic Albanians and Macedonian government. A lot of ethnic Albanian refugees from Kosovo flew into Macedonia during this period, but they returned to Kosovo in 2000. Violence between Albanians and Macedonians erupted in March 2001 when National Liberation Army of ethnic Albanians, asking for more rights and autonomy inside Macedonia, started an insurgency against Macedonian government and Macedonian government began a counter insurgency (Kim, 2002). After six month of fighting, in August 2001 Ohrid Framework Agreement was signed between the Macedonian government and ethnic Albanians, and a British-led NATO force entered the country to disarm the guerrillas (Kim, 2002). Broader rights were given to

the Albanian minority with constitutional amendments of November 2001 by Macedonian parliament, and Albanian became one of the country's two official languages. "In Aug. 2004, Parliament approved legislation redrawing internal borders and giving ethnic Albanians more local autonomy in regions where Albanians predominate" Kim, 2002). Despite some changes and improvements the violent clashes and tensions among ethnic groups continue.

C. Analyses

The Kosovo war and Albanians-Macedonians conflict brought into discussion the "Albanian Question" which became a big problem for the Balkan countries (Ackerman, 1998, p.37). After presenting the main literature on the factors leading to ethnic mobilisation, the factors leading to ethnic mobilisation of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia will be compared. Comparison is mainly focus on historical, economical, psychological, cultural, political, and kinship factors.

History is an important factor in ethnic mobilisation of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia. Kosovo Albanians emphasise "their historical ties to the pre-Roman Illryians and claim to be one of the oldest autochthonous nations in the region by rejecting the Serbian argument that the Albanians settled in Kosovo during the 17th and 18th centuries" (Babuna, 2000, p.77). Macedonia Albanians claim that "their ancestors had lived in Western Macedonia for centuries before the coming of the Slavs" (Babuna, 2000, p.83). Also Kosovo Albanians claim that they constitute almost 90% of the population in Kosovo which makes them not a minority but a majority and gives to them self-determination right and encourages them to get mobilised to achieve independence. On the other hand ethnic Albanians in Macedonia claim that they have demographic superiority to other ethnic groups and this encouraged them to get mobilised not for independence but to improve their status (Babuna, 2000, p.77). Dissolution of Yugoslavia provided space and opportunity for ethnic mobilisation in both cases. While ethnic mobilisation of Kosovo Albanians is focused on independence, mobilisation of Macedonian Albanians aims improving their minority status. For both groups, history and population number are important mobilisation factors.

Psychological factors encouraging ethnic mobilisation of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia are almost the same. Relations between ethnic Albanians and other ethnic groups for a long time have been characterised by fear, suspicion and demonisation of the "other", which have been strong reasons for ethnic Albanians to get mobilised as a way of protection from the "other" (Koppa, 2001, pp.39-40). Victimisation is a common characteristic for both Kosovo and Macedonian Albanians. Ethnic Albanians in the Balkans use arguments from the past victimisation in order to justify their present claims and mobilisation. One of the most important concerns ethnic Albanians is that they are separated into different states. On the other hand, "Albanians often claim that they are portrayed as 'foreign occupiers' who have a secret agenda to create 'Greater Albania' through secession which leads to 'satanisation' of this ethnic group" (Koppa, 2001, p.46). Victimisation, humiliation, dehumanisation encourages ethnic Albanians to get mobilised.

Political Behaviour is an important difference among Kosovo Albanians and Macedonian Albanians. While Kosovo Albanians created a parallel state in opposition to the Serbian authorities, Macedonian Albanians participated in the political life of the country. Even though both groups were restricted concerning their political participation, Macedonian Albanians were allowed participate in the political life of Macedonia different from Albanians in Kosovo that were deprived of political power or activity (Babuna, 2000, pp.81-82).

Economic conditions have been a strong factor pushing ethnic Albanians to ethnic mobilisation. "Transition to a market economy and the external economic shocks highlighted the ethnicisation of economic and social differences" (Ragaru, 2008, p.7). Even though ethnic Albanians "participated in economic activity, they were not fully integrated in the economy" (Koppa, 2001, p.47). Albanians dealt with agricultural sector and they were not living in prosperity, they claimed that responsibility for their high unemployment rate or low wages was because of Macedonians. Toward the end of 1990s further economic deterioration encouraged Macedonian Albanians ethnic mobilisation (Ragaru, 2007).

"Kosovo has been for a long lime the least developed and most backward region during the existence of Socialist Federation of Yugoslavia." (Murati et. al, 2007, p.50) An economic discrimination toward ethnic Albanians happened in Kosovo leading to very low employment rate, low wages and low living standards. These economic conditions had a crucial effect on ethnic mobilisation of Kosovo Albanians (Murati et. al, 2007, p.54)

While for Macedonian Albanians religion and language has been important factors encouraging ethnic group mobilisation, for Kosovo Albanians these factors have not been essential. The influence of Islam among ethnic mobilisation of Albanians is more obvious in Macedonia than Kosovo (Koppa, 2001) because Kosovo Albanians were allowed to express their cultural identity during Tito's rule, but the expression of ethnic identity of Macedonian Albanians in Socialist Federative Republic of Macedonia was restricted leading them to turn to religion in order to protect their cultural identity. In Macedonia "Islam is considered as Albanian irredentism and a tool to assimilate other smaller groups" (Koppa, 2001, p.41). On the other hand the "discontent leading to mobilisation of Albanians in Kosovo was ethnic rather than religious in essence" (Babuna, 2000, p.72)

Similarly language discrimination has an important influence in Macedonian Albanians" mobilisation. "Macedonian is the language of the state, power, industry, while Albanian is the language of the countryside and agriculture" (Koppa, 2001, p.41). In Kosovo different form Macedonia, Albanian language has been official language for a long time (Babuna, 2000, pp.71-72). Language discrimination is a factor influencing Macedonian Albanians ethnic mobilisation more than Kosovo Albanians which have had more linguistic rights.

Kinship relations have an important influence in ethnic group mobilisations. According to Babuna (2000) Macedonian Albanians have strongly supported the independence of Kosovo and they have "have been largely sympathetic to the Kosovo Liberation Army" (Brown, 1998, p.7) .Ethnic mobilisation of Albanians in Macedonia is influenced by contagion and diffusion effect of ethnic mobilisation of Kosovo Albanians. Spill-over effect of Kosovo conflict had an impact on 2011 Macedonian crisis and the activity of ethnic Albanians in Macedonia was

encouraged by the activity of Kosovo Albanians which were struggling to achieve the independence (Mincheva, 2009, p.222).

While the activity of ethnic Macedonians is encouraged by the successful ethnic mobilisation in Kosovo, Kosovo Albanians' ethnic mobilisation had the support of kin ethnic groups in the Balkan and kin state in Albania The support of Albania, as a kin state, is an important factor encouraging ethnic mobilisation of Macedonian and Kosovo Albanians, but this support was higher in ethnic mobilisation of Albanians in Kosovo than in Macedonia. (Koinova, 2008, p.373). According to the literature, states in transition period are more likely to support their kin ethnic groups' mobilisation which leads us to understood that, except the affection relations, transition can be another important reason for the moral and economic support from Albanian state to its kin ethic groups (Koinova, 2008, p.374). In Macedonia "the strategy of the Albanian community has been influenced by ethnic segmentarisation, by the continuous division of the Albanian parties due to their radicalisation, and by the role and policies of the Albanian state and the Kosovo kin elite". (Koppa, 2001, p.41)

In Albanian ethno-mobilisation in Kosovo the state of Albania itself is a very strong actor. Not only the direct involvement of Albanian state, but just its existence was enough to increase the ethnic conscience of Albanians in Kosovo and "this involvement was not seen as foreign interference, but always as the patriotic duty of the Albanian state toward Albanians that were left outside Albania proper" (Murati et. al, 2007, p.13). During the '80s, but more particularly after the '90s, a strong Albanian Diaspora in the West became a crucial external actor, providing significant financial support for the Albanian political movement and resistance in Kosova and Macedonia (Murati et. al, 2007, p.15).

So as we can see from this analysis both Kosovo Albanians and Macedonian Albanians have strong factors leading to their ethnic mobilisation, but these factors can be different or similar based on the nature of the factor. So even though they are kin ethnic groups, the way that they mobilise can change in some aspect and can be similar in some other aspects.

D. Conclusion

During this research paper the factors influencing ethnic mobilisation of kin ethnic groups were presented. After giving the definitions of ethnic conflict, group mobilisation and kin group, the existing literature on the factors grouped in internal, external and psychological factors was presented. After presenting the cases that were examined the analysis based on a comparison of the factors affecting ethnic mobilisation of Albanians in Kosovo and Macedonia was done. The analysis was based on historical, psychological, economic, political and kinship factors.

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PREJUDICES AS A POTENTIAL SOURCE OF ETHNIC CONFLICTS AMONG THE YOUNG: STRATEGIES FOR DEALING WITH CONFLICT IN THE SCHOOL ENVIRONMENT

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Key Words: *multiculturalism, prejudices and stereotypes, social identity, strategies for reducing prejudice, cognitive theory, equal pedagogy*

Abstract

Ordinary people, very frequently, build their opinions about other people based on information which they do not have or information which has little real ground. An example of this tendency are the human prejudices – convictions which we are always considered to be accurate, without approaching them in a critical manner and as such we receive them as finished products, in the way they have been served to us by the education, the family, the media, culture, etc.

In this paper the subject of analysis are the prejudices and the strategies for reducing them with a special attention to the population of children and young people in the context of the multicultural school. In the introductory part we unveil the nature of prejudices through the prism of the theoretical views of the social psychology: a) The theory of behaviour modelling; b) The theory of social identity; and c) The cognitive theory. Based on these views we place an emphasis on the limiting influence of the negative prejudices on the logical interpretation of the events and the people, as a potential source for multi-ethnic conflicts among the young.

In accordance with the theoretical concepts, we finalise the contents of the paper, emphasizing the basic strategies for dealing with, i.e. reducing the prejudices in the students, with a special attention to: a) Intensifying the cooperation among the ones who are the subject of prejudices and the ones who have prejudices; b) Creating conditions for integrated education; c) Amendments of the educational and other institutional policies which render legitimate the division among the students; d) Providing information about the subjects of stereotypes as the most direct way of changing patterns through education; e) Creating conditions for equal pedagogy and f) Building a school – open culture towards diversity.

* * *

Introduction

The consequences of the last two world wars raised the awareness of the international community for the need of promotion of battle against discrimination of all kinds, in the function of consolidation of the human rights. In recent years, all around the world on a global and local level, in and out of the institutions, strategies are being implemented to increase the collaboration among people with the primary goal to decrease the intolerance and prejudices. The existence of hot spots in different regions as a result of conflicts of religious, ethnic and racial character represents a serious warning for civilisation, especially at a time when we discuss the growth of the population on Earth, and the crisis resulting from the decrease of the natural resources.

In the communication among people, many times, certain unpleasant aspects of this behaviour are being manifested. Primarily, we have in mind the cases when the feelings and behaviours towards the others are negative, and in fact, these are the prejudices. It is a fact that the existence of prejudices towards other groups does not only render difficult the life of the groups towards which they are addressed, but this is also a rigid basis which encourages and leads towards conflicts among people.

1. The nature of the prejudices

According to Myers (2003), the prejudice is *"a negative judgment of a group and its individual members. The prejudice leads us against other individuals only because we identify them with a particular group"* (p.305). This means, that we are discussing assessments which are primarily based on the whole group (membership), rather than the one of the individual members of the group (Feldman, 1997).

The very nature of prejudices is treated from different points of view, as separated parts of the spectrum of human behaviour. We consider that the highlighting of some important characteristics of the prejudices contributes to their deeper understanding, and all this is in the function of a better description and the reduction of their effect. Hence, in this paper, we will discuss their nature from a theoretical point of view, and we will pay special attention to the strategies for their reduction, especially the ethnic ones which represent a constant challenge to peace.

2. Theoretical views

Regardless if they are racial, religious, gender etc., prejudices as negative attitudes against the ones who are unlike us, mainly in their background have a personal (feelings, attitudes, experience and behaviour) and social context.

2.1 Prejudices as a result of the imitation of models. A great number of prejudices are transferred to children by their parents, relatives, peers, the media etc. The small children have no national or racial prejudices (Allport, 1961). Children build their own attitudes and opinions, and also prejudices by imitating the adults (the models). People are not born with prejudices against others. One way for their forming is when the children imitate their parents and other close adults (Zinberg, 1976; Kryzanowski and Stewin, 1985). Consequently, the parents, teachers and the other adults who manifest prejudices against the others different from them, are not aware of the indoctrination of their children. The teaching of prejudices through the model of the adults starts from the earliest years, around the third year (Katz, according to Feldman, 1997).

2.2 Theory of social identity.

According to this theory, the group is being used as a source for pride and self-appraisal (Tajfel, 1982; Turner, 1987). The consciousness for the personal "I" consists of the personal "I" and the social identity. Our identity is built by categorizing others, identifying with them – "our people" and comparing with them – "the other people", during which we root for our group. Hence, it is clear why people can easily fall for the prejudices of others.

2.3 Cognitive point of view.

In the relations among people of different cultures, races and other groups, prejudices often eclipse the rational judgment on the account of mutual intolerance and aggression. According to the cognitive theories, the prejudices (and stereotypes) exist not only as the result of the social conditions, but occur because of the processes of thinking i.e. their natural tendency for categorisation of the occurrences with the goal to simplify them.

The stereotypes are the cognitive platform of prejudices, which means general conclusions without arguments for the other groups, i.e. their members. Encouraged by the tendency to justify the stereotypes, especially in situations when the ego of the individual is endangered by internal dilemmas and conflicts we resort to prejudices as defensive mechanisms.

3. Managing prejudices.

People find it difficult to free themselves from the prejudices, it is much like breaking a habit. Although we try to free ourselves from the bad thoughts about other people, they defy our intentions (Devain, etc., according to Myers, 2003). Subsequently it is not unusual for one to be tempted by prejudices, yet one should be able to control them in order not to fall hostage to such ideas, yet to compensate them with positive behaviour in the future. Therefore, the question is, can we reduce prejudices? The very nature of prejudices is quite complex, as we have already emphasised in the above text, as a result of a great number of factors which

sometimes are not related to their influence. Nevertheless several strategies are recommended as a way to reduce prejudices (Banks, 1993, 1995; Slavin, 2006; Cook, 1984, Brewer and Miller, 1984):

a) Intensifying the cooperation among the ones who are the subject of prejudices and the ones who have prejudices;

b) Creating conditions for integrated education;

c) Amendments of the educational and other institutional policies which render legitimate the division among the students;

d) Providing information about the subjects of stereotypes as the most direct way of changing patterns through education, and

e) Building a school – open culture towards the diversities.

Conclusion

In order to reduce prejudices it is absolutely necessary to intensify the cooperation between the people who are the subject of prejudices and the people who have prejudices. In the course of doing this, situations of equality and direction towards the fulfilment of the shared goal should be created in this cooperation. Conditions should be created in the school environment not only for competition but also for cooperation among the students.

It is evident that prejudices do not have deep roots in the personality of the human being, therefore they can be reduced by changing the time and the norms of a society, in terms of their managing.

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"CLASH OF MEMORIES":
ETHIC IDENTITIES AND INTERETHNIC RELATIONS IN CRIMEA

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Abstract

This research aims to define the influence of politics of memory on the ethnic identity and interethnic relations of the Russians, the Ukrainians and the Crimean Tatars in Crimea.

Historical myths of the dominant ethnic groups in Crimea are influenced by several historiographies that can be considered as mutually exclusive. There is a kind of "battle for the past" in Crimea when history estimated by certain way becomes a valuable symbolic resource that has mobilizing potential and can be considered as an ideological tool. Promoting historical and religious myths by one ethnic group leads to the resistance of other ethnic groups.

Referring to the correspondent historiography and the historical myths, each of the dominant groups in Crimea claims their rights on the territory of peninsula. Their politics of memory aims to establish a connection of each community with the peninsula. Crimean Tatars cultivate the myth of ethnogenesis on the territory of Crimea what makes them an "indigenous people" of Crimea, Russians and Ukrainians - the myth of their early appearance in Crimea.

Historical memory always has the material embodiment in the particular territory. Political elites try to incorporate certain historical myths into the "political landscape" in the form of monuments, historical and religious buildings, toponyms, and etc. By other words they try to fill the landscape with the features of their presence.

Political landscape in Crimea can be characterised by transitional period. Preserving a lot of Soviet symbols, it includes the embodiments of the Russian, the Crimean Tatar and the official Ukrainian historical myths. There is some kind of the struggle for historical memory between the Slavic and the Crimean Tatar communities, Russians and the Ukrainians, Russians and Communists. Attempts to incorporate certain historical myth into the political landscape provoke sharp discussions that sometimes develop into so-called "war of monuments".

Religion is serves to be an additional component of ethnic identity, which could also increase the level of social distance ("we-they") between ethnic and/or religious groups in Crimea. Marking of Crimean political landscape by certain religious symbols helps to show the connection of correspondent ethnic (and religious) community with the territory of Crimea, and to justify their territorial claims. Historical myths about ethnogenesis (in the case of

Crimean Tatars) or early appearance in the region (in case the Slavs) are accomplished by the myth of historical roots of Islam and Orthodoxy in Crimea.

The development of peaceful interethnic relations in Crimea requires the understanding that there is no objective historical interpretation, and the historical truth is always a relative construct within the boundaries of certain ethnic group. Due to school historiography is a basis for understanding ethnic relations among younger generation, the focus of history has to be changed from conflict to more peaceful one.

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NATIONALITY (CITIZENSHIP) VS. ETHNICITY: CLASH OF IDENTITIES IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Abstract

In the spring of 1992 Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), one of the six former republics of the Socialist Yugoslavia (SFRY) and the most multi-ethnic republic in the federation, was caught in flames of war. Destruction of the joint Yugoslav state was unfortunately followed by rather slow and inefficient international intervention, for it took more than three years to stop the conflict at hand. With the signing of the Dayton Peace Agreement (DPA) in November 1995 the conflict was successfully brought to a halt, but unfortunately the state of BiH has remained a divided country. According to provisions of the DPA, BiH was recreated as a joint state consisting of two entities: Republic of Srpska (RS) and Federation of BiH (FBiH), three constitutive nations: Bosniaks (mostly Muslim), Serbs (mostly Orthodox Christian) and Croats (mostly Catholic Christian), and with a relatively weak central government. This rather ambitious and complex project of state-building on the part of the international community has often been criticised and a number of changes to the structure of the state, especially the central government, introduced over the years. However, it has to be pointed out that, in spite of sovereignty, territorial integrity, and international subjectivity of BiH being confirmed by the international community, the division of the country has persisted as a major problem and has continuously threatened to break the joint state apart. This specific division has largely been reflected in, among other issues, the problems of identity.

In that respect, main concern of this article is to present a concise analysis of identity issues in BiH and point out towards possible solutions. After providing short theoretical background related to identity and nation-building matters, the article will shed light on this specific problem in BiH from the current perspective of 18 years after the end of the conflict and will therefore examine if identity issues are still "impenetrable boundaries" for future of the common state and if these boundaries can be removed. The authors' position is that the state of BIH may still be considered as very illustrative example of clash of identities from at least three vantage points which this paper will analyse. First, speaking from societal point of

view, identities in BiH are mostly ethnic and religion-based and thus mutually excluding. On the other hand, speaking in political terms, and this comes as the second point, only Bosniaks (Bosnian Muslims) associate their identity with the joint state, the two other constitutive nations feel "imprisoned" in BiH, connecting their respective identities (and thus loyalties) to neighbouring states, considered as their mother-countries, of Croatia and Serbia respectively. Last but not least, ethno-centric politics is fundamentally involved in education, being in itself a major socialisation agent, and therefore inherently reproducing and reinforcing clash of identities. Hence, although there have been considerable state and nation-building efforts since the end of the war in late 1995, deep identity divisions in BiH still persist. Opposite to respective "Western" model, difference between state and nation in BiH is truly remarkable, highlighting the difference between citizenship and nationality, which are terms used almost synonymously in the West. Within BiH nationality is primarily associated with ethnicity and consequently serves as cornerstone of identity. Instead of identifying numerous similarities between the three constitutive nations, differences have been highlighted by respective political elites, thus generating "Us" vs. "Them" discourse. This discourse is then supported and reproduced, thus becoming essentially institutionalised in the society.

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Introduction: on state-building failure and identity issues

Following the end of the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina in the end of 1995 when the Dayton Agreement was signed, the international community engaged in the most ambitious project of post-conflict stabilisation and state-building. Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH), former Yugoslav republic where ethnic mix proved a disadvantage for the future of the country, was supposed to be "reincarnated" after a conflict that took heavy toll in human lives and inflicted substantial material and psychological damage. Despite considerable international community's involvement, it seems that BiH has unfortunately remained a particularly unsuccessful project. Speaking from a perspective of 18 years after the end of the conflict, lack of consensus of key international actors at the start of the state-building campaign and a number of changes introduced over the years, pointing to an overall lack of the international strategy, have actually brought BiH into a very complicated position where future of the state is uncertain. Unfortunately, the international community's involvement in BiH gradually became synonymous with *ad hoc* implementation of policies and what started as "mere electoralism,"[1] when nationalist forces were de facto given political power immediately after the war, eventually developed towards Office of the High Representative (OHR) and more aggressive attempts, especially during mandates of Wolfgang Petritsch and Paddy Ashdown, at correcting the international approach by making it more coherent and coordinated. However, despite wishful thinking, what the international community created and reinforced, unintentionally of course, became embodied in "resulting gridlock" between three different

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[1] Sarajlić, E. and Marko, D. eds. 2011. *State or Nation: The Challenges of Political Transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Sarajevo: Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies, University of Sarajevo, p.82.

ethnic groups, as Schear argued,[2] and introduced *de facto* ethnic separation in BiH. To make the situation even more cumbersome, yet another international community's change of policy, this time aiming at development of civil society, showed serious lack of direction within the major international players and a belief that, once democratisation process was initiated externally, BiH would somehow "guide itself" independently through the whole process. Thus, as Carothers argued in 2007[3] when discussing perils of untimely democratisation, the international community made a poor choice in BiH because properly functioning state and rule of law, in themselves a product of post-conflict stabilisation process, are necessary precursors of successful democratisation. Lastly, to complicate an already intricate state of affairs in BiH, the international engagement seems to have shifted yet again in recent years, but now taking a turn towards finding a quick "way out," therefore being more of a "cosmetic cover" and a "quick fix" rather than a permanent solution for a deeply divided country "in state of arrested development."[4]

For that matter, certainly one of the most problematic issues BiH has been facing for years is the lack of common identity created as by-product of a very complex Dayton institutional framework relying heavily on ethnicity. This issue has produced a situation in which political and social discourse are still today heavily ethno-centric, being Bosnian Muslim, Croat, or Serb, and largely aimed at excluding minorities living in BiH. Thus, as Brljavac pointed out, citizens of BiH "are in a position of homo duplex, or a divided humanity, since they are in a struggle, torn between being a genuine human being and a loyal ethnic being."[5] Very little has actually changed in the past several years, although attempts at alleviating the country's ethnic conflict heritage through constitutional changes, especially towards inclusion of minorities, have been made in this particular direction.[6] Therefore, one's identity is still overwhelmingly associated with one's ethnicity, and feeling of belonging not to one, but rather to three different nations, prevails. Consequently, it becomes clear that identity issue in BiH is to be seen through lens of ethno-centric politics that has created and reinforced divisions in the country. This being said, there is obviously a need for an updated solution that would guarantee future of BiH as one state. However, in order for BiH to survive, identity issue needs to be tackled seriously, for true reconciliation and removal of roots of the past conflict is possible *only* and *only* if the existing problems are overcome. Thus, one cannot speak of a post-conflict society merely from the point of view of cessation of hostilities between ex-warring parties, but primarily from the perspective of "core matters," one of them being identity issue here, settled permanently. As seen in the case of domestic politics in BiH, prolongation of war by peaceful means has remained to plague the country and respective "ethnic pillarisation" has held the country captive ever since. The analysis of the clash of

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[2] Schear, J. A., 1996. Bosnia's Post-Dayton Traumas. *Foreign Policy* 104, pp.86-101.
[3] Carothers, T., 2007. How Democracies Emerge: The Sequencing Fallacy. *Journal of Democracy* 18, No. 1, pp.12-27.
[4] Sarajlić, E. and Marko D. eds., 2011. *State or Nation: The Challenges of Political Transition in Bosnia and Herzegovina.* Sarajevo: Center for Interdisciplinary Postgraduate Studies, University of Sarajevo, p.78.
[5] Brljavac, B., 2012. *Bosnia and Herzegovina and Europeanization: Between Ethnic-National and European Identities.* OpenDemocracy [online] Available at: <http://www.opendemocracy.net/bedrudin-brljavac/bosnia-and-herzegovina-and-europeanization-between-ethnic-national-and-european-id>
[6] See, for example, "Sejdić-Finci case" details at Council of Europe (Office in Belgrade) webpage: <http://www.coe.org.rs/eng/news_sr_eng/?conid=1545>

identities from three different vantage points that follows will serve as an illustration of gravity of problems the state of BiH has been facing for many years now.

Clash of identities revisited: three vantage points considered

First of all, identities within BiH are predominantly ethnic and religion-based, and thus mutually excluding. Thus, as Velikonja argued in his book, the identities are formulated in a specific religious and cultural matrix rather than linguistic one (as was/is, actually, the case with establishment of nation-states in Europe in the 19th and the 20th century).[7] Consequently, as Eriksen underscored, borderlines "between the groups may seem arbitrary. However, the large, 'national' groups are clearly embedded in smaller, local networks based on kinship and informal interaction, as well as being culturally founded in religious schisms, collective myths or memories of treason and resistance under Ottoman rule, massacres, deception and humiliations."[8] For that matter, BiH is certainly a textbook example of how three different ethnic groups eventually came to view their neighbours coming from different ethnic background and belonging to different religious affiliation as "foreign" and thus "different than us." This is definitely the result, on the one hand, of the 1990s' hostilities that accentuated what is thought by nationalists to be "insurmountable" differences (in spite of sharing hundreds of years of common history and heritage) between three warring sides, but also, on the other hand, of inherently erroneous policies employed by the international community in its state-building project. Therefore, the principle of ethnic separation, influencing the creation and recreation of respective identity, devised BiH as a state shared between Muslims, Croats, and Serbs, and, in addition, also worked towards removal of other ethnic groups (minorities or, put in the wording of BiH Constitution, "others") out of the societal arena.[9] The EU has, for that matter, underlined that BiH accession is very much dependent on reforms tackling the problem of inclusion of minorities, but very little has been done on this particular issues both by BiH politicians, largely due to overpowering nationalist agenda, and the EU, chiefly due to internal problems and wrong belief that some superficial changes may actually help BiH. Therefore, Bosnian citizens continue to pay high price of "identity being vested in ethnicity" politics which is highly partisan.

Second, mostly Bosnian Muslims (Bosniaks) associate their identity with the joint state, the two other constitutive nations feel "imprisoned" in BiH, connecting their identities (and thus loyalties) to neighbouring states, considered as their mother-countries, of Croatia and Serbia respectively. Therefore, it is only the Bosniaks who have actually clearly opted for the common state, while the other two ethnic groups have reluctantly accepted this idea, partly due to the international pressure and partly due to "domestic" pressures coming out of both

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[7] Velikonja, M., 2003. *Religious Separation and Political Intolerance in Bosnia-Herzegovina.* College Station: Texas A&M University Press, p.91.

[8] Eriksen, T. H., 2001. Ethnic Identity, National Identity and Intergroup Conflict: The Significance of Personal Experiences. In: R. D. Ashmore, L. Jussim and D. Wilder, eds. *Social Identity, Intergroup Conflict, and Conflict Reduction.* Oxford: Oxford University Press, p.50.

[9] Gall, L., 2012. Too little to Celebrate – Dayton Continues to Fail Bosnia's Minorities. *Human Rights Watch* [online] Available at: <http://www.hrw.org/news/2012/11/21/too-little-celebrate-dayton-continues-fail-bosnia-s-minorities>

Croatia and Serbia (Federal Republic of Yugoslavia) at the time. However, this does not mean that respective political elites of both Bosnian Serbs and Croats have truly relinquished their nationalist claims, but just that they had to put them on backburner. Thus, domestic politics in the post-war BiH, after initial empowerment of nationalist forces by imprudent "electoralism" of the international community and a number of failed attempts to introduce effective changes to the system of "ethnic pillarisation," became confined to the realm of genuine ethnic separation where, all things being equal, most political mobilisation took place at the level where political claims and initiatives of one ethnic group are initiated so as to counter, challenge, and usually reject initiatives by the other ethnic groups.[10] Consequently, the fact remains that BiH functioning as one state continues to be tested by nationalist calls for ethnic separation due to supposed historical, cultural, and religious differences, and therefore it is competing nationalisms in BiH, if one examines political parties and their programs, for example, that are actually mirroring each other to a high degree. These calls, primarily of Bosnian Serbs and, especially in recent years, Bosnian Croats, have aimed at *de facto* (physical) separation that is supposed to make BiH "function better" for, as nationalist forces like to emphasise, differences between three ethnic groups are inherently "irrefutable." These calls, of course, have no intention of making the state function better, but rather are aimed at setting the state on a collision course towards eventual dissolution. Especially with the recent EU crisis, process of joining the Union, that some see as a possible hope for tackling the identity problems (and other issues as well) in BiH, has considerably stalled, offering Bosnian citizens little hope of solving the problems at hand and gaining membership in the EU in a timely manner.

Last but not least, ethno-centric politics is fundamentally involved in education, being in itself a major socialisation agent, and therefore inherently reproducing and reinforcing current identity structures. It is the respective nationalist discourse, primarily based either on supposed insurmountability of differences between the three different ethnic groups and/or on false presentation of these differences, that has remained dominant, specifically in field of education, in BiH. Knowing that education represents one of key institution in constructing national identity in what Anderson termed "imagined community,"[11] it becomes apparent that systems of norms and beliefs of any society are produced and reproduced in a respective education matrix.[12] Therefore, if BiH is to remain one state, education system has to be reformulated, for multi-national states with lack of common institutions as important as education certainly face considerable obstacles in functioning normally. In that respect, this is to highlight that competing and mutually excluding views on, for example, history taught in BiH schools are continuing to reproduce nationalist discourse of "Us vs. Them," and, as highlighted previously, reflect wider social and political problems in the state where no common identity is thought to exist. As a consequence, young generations of Bosnians are

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[10] Andjelić, N., 2012. Bosnia and Herzegovina: Citizenship versus Nationality. In: R. Hudson and G. Bowman, eds. *After Yugoslavia: Identities and Politics within Successor States.* Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.

[11] Anderson, B., 1983. *Imagined Communities.* London and New York: Verso.

[12] Eastmond, M. and Cukur, M., 2004. Education and the Relevance of National Identities: Responses to Post-war Curricula in Two Local Settings in Bosnia-Herzegovina. *Göteburg University Legacy of Violence and War Project Working Paper 12,* Socialantropologiska institutionen, GU [pdf] Available at: <http://www.globalstudies.gu.se/digitalAssets/809/809977_WP12EastmondCukur.pdf>

usually presented with one version of what is socially accepted as the "truth" in the ethnic community they belong to, and thus it is hard to imagine that these young individuals are expected to mature into personalities oriented towards agreeing with their fellow citizens of different ethnic or religious background posited as their equals. In the words of Eastmond and Cukur, BiH is the example of a state where the "education so far appears to remain hijacked as the affair of separate national interests."[13] Obviously, what BiH seems to be seriously lacking is a more civic-oriented approach to education that is not going to be paying a price to ethnic politicizing and daily blunders of domestic politics. However, in order for this breakthrough towards a civic-oriented education to happen, there needs to be a political and social consensus on moving away from the ethno-centric system towards civic culture as societal basis of any liberal democratic state.

Present Identity Controversies

For the purpose of having a better understanding of contemporary situation in BiH, it would be useful to shortly reflect on the pre-war identity-related situation. At that time, abreast of overwhelming feeling of being Yugoslav, identity in BiH was mostly connected with ethnicity. According to 1991 census in BiH, when asked about nationality, 43.4% of population claimed to be Muslims, 31.2% Serbs, 17.4% Croats, and 5.5% Yugoslavs. Other categories, although numerous, took only negligible share. It is important to mention that share of declared Bosnians was only 0.24%, which shows that even before the war in BiH identity was primarily ethnically based and thus not associated with the republic (later on state) of BiH (at that time Socialist Republic of BiH). Position of Muslims, in this respect, should be further elaborated here. As Katz argued,[14] it was not before 1974 Constitution that the Muslims were constitutionally recognised as an equal nationality in BiH, although before this act, which entailed formal and constitutional recognition of their status, the political subjectivity and constituency of Muslims were respected in practice. Furthermore, it was in the 1971 census that Muslims were able to declare themselves as "Muslims in a national sense," while in the previous census of 1961 the nationality-related markings also included a column "Muslim (ethnicity)." Since 1993, for example, the term Bosniaks has been officially used instead of the term Muslims. In addition, when it comes to the issue of language, for example, 1991 census stated that 37.2% of population claimed to speak, as their mother tongue, Bosnian, 26.5% Serbo-Croatian, 18.8% Serbian, and 13.4% Croatian. Therefore, analysing the figures previously presented, it should not be surprising that, when referring to nature of the consequent Bosnian war, already pronounced ethnic and linguistic differences were intentionally seized by nationalist agenda of the sides involved and accordingly projected in their respective war aims. Once political elites, largely on Croatian and Serbian sides, opted for relying heavily on nationalist agendas in pursuit of their political goals, the discourse of hatred and separation was born.

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[13] Ibid.

[14] Katz, V., 2010. History of Parliamentarism in BiH. In: *Monographs of the Parliamentary Assembly of Bosnia and Herzegovina* [online] Available at: <https://www.parlament.ba/istorija/Default.aspx?id=27881&template_id =5&langTag=en-US>

It is safe to claim, speaking from the current perspective, that BiH is the only country in Europe using old demographic data since, as it has been mentioned before, previous census in BiH was held in 1991. New census was initially planned for the end of 2012, but due to political disagreements it was postponed for 2013. Disagreements over this particular issue of census and how the question about nationality/religion/language should be posed in it have grown exponentially in the meantime. According to the latest presented results[15] of public research, if asked about nationality without suggesting possible answers, 19% of population would not have declared themselves as a member of any of the three constitutive nations. This therefore means that on the state level around 700,000 people would come under the category of "others." That would put a question mark over the legitimacy of the whole state structure of BiH because such a considerable number of citizens who feel themselves as, for example, Bosnians (which would be linguistically and logically correct) jeopardise privileged positions of political elite of the three constitutive nations. It is very interesting that abreast of the fact that Bosniaks strongly affiliate themselves to the state of BiH, Bosnian identity is not acceptable for their cultural, political, and religious elite. Moreover, main discourse of aforementioned elite is that declaring oneself as Bosnian in the forthcoming census would be disastrous for ethnical corpus of Bosniaks, endangering their position of the constitutive nation. In the same time, the official name of the language claimed to be spoken by Bosniaks is Bosnian, not Bosniakian, which is one more paradox of everyday life in BiH. In that respect, the official proclamation of the Islamic Community in/of BiH on the issue of the planned census is worthy of mentioning because it shows the influence of religion on Bosniak identity matters. This proclamation[16] is not just an official opinion of the Community's leadership, but a kind of an instruction for declaring oneself in the census. Thus, the Community "appeals to state institutions, as well as all Bosniaks' cultural and national associations to take active participation in activities of national affirmation of Bosniaks in order to remove all fake dilemmas related to religious, national and language identity of Bosniaks."[17] Moreover, this announcement argues that "Bosnian is everyone who holds the passport of BiH, but Bosniak is just the one who is aware of his Bosniaks ethnical and national origin and specific spiritual and cultural Bosniaks identity."[18] The announcement gives clear instructions for declaring oneself in the forthcoming census, which is as follows: nationality/ethnicity – Bosniak; religion – Islam; mother tongue – Bosnian. It also provides a very rigorous qualification that "all those who suggest Bosniaks to declare themselves as Muslim, Bosnian or Herzegovian work directly or indirectly in favour of ethnical cleansing of Bosniaks."[19] This position is in all probability highly supported by some external factors, namely Turkey. Turkey has strong influence on the Muslims in the whole Balkans, but especially in BiH, and existence of a European country in which majority of population connect (or equalise) their national identity with Islam (as Bosniaks in Bosnia do) is a clear interest of Turkish foreign policy. In Albania, for example, being Albanian is not determined

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[15] Full text available at: http://www.ostali.org/?q=vijesti/u-bih-%C5%BEivi-bar-700000-nekonstitutivnih-gra%C4%91ana

[16] Full text available at: http://www.rijaset.ba/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=15316:proglas-rijaseta-islamske-zajednice-o-popisu-stanovistva&catid=203&Itemid=459

[17] Ibid. (translated to English by the authors).

[18] Ibid.

[19] Ibid.

by religion, thus one Albanian can be Muslim, Catholic, or Orthodox without jeopardizing his/her national identity of being Albanian.

To make the situation even more cumbersome, speaking of the domestic politics of BiH, identity issues are reflected in effectively reproduced in the political discourse. Take joint state institutions of BiH, for example: although the Constitution begins with the statement that it is "based on respect for human dignity, liberty, and equality,"[20] equality of citizens is merely an illusion. In that respect, according to constitutional provisions, The House of Peoples of the Parliamentary Assembly (the second chamber) and the Presidency are to be composed only of persons belonging to one of the three constitutive nations. This hence leads to a confusing situation in which certain prominent public figures[21] are not given a chance to run for state office. If one did not identify oneself as Bosniak, Serb, or Croat in BiH then this person was really nobody, as Doris Pack had previously stated,[22] and this statement of hers sounds disappointingly true.

Furthermore, constitutional provisions related to election of the Presidency open some additional doubts. This can be illustrated via example of electing Mr. Željko Komšić as member of the Presidency. Mr. Komšić was elected for this position in 2006, and then re-elected in 2010, as a candidate of the Social Democratic Party of BiH. Although this party is civic-orientated, considerable majority of its voters are Bosniaks rather than Croats who, as the least numerous constitutive nation, cast votes in favour of chiefly nationalist party agendas. This turn of events has led to a situation in which Mr. Komšić is often described as ethnical rather than a "political" Croat in the Presidency. Having in mind that most Mr. Komšić's votes did not come from the Croatian but rather Bosniak side, one should not wonder why many Croats refuse to acknowledge Mr. Komšić as their legitimate representative.

Last of all, it seems that Bosnian Croats begrudge Bosnian Serbs for having "their own" entity, the Republic of Srpska. Although the Republic of Srpska, according to its constitution, is comprised of three equal constitutive nations (and "others") as well, it is commonly referred to as "Serb entity." This is not surprising because meaning of the term "Srpska" could be translated as "owned by" or "belonging to Serbs." The fact that Serbs are having their "own" entity therefore fuels ambitions of Bosnian Croats for creation of their own federal unit (the third entity) within the state of BiH. This issue has been largely present on the domestic political agenda of Bosnian Croats, although it has been certainly less referred to, chiefly due to lack of the international community's support for any such changes in BiH. Political slogans such as, for example, "no identity without entity," often heard in political discourse of Bosnian Croats, actually shows that many Croats in BiH see restructuring of BiH as the most appropriate way for preservation of Croat identity within the common state. In that respect, the notion of the third entity has found full support of Bosnian Serb political elite, above all

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[20] See Constitutional Court of BiH available at: http://www.ccbh.ba/eng/p_stream.php?kat=518

[21] For example, Mr. Jakob Finci, prominent leader of Jewish community of BiH and ambassador of BiH in Switzerland. See "Sejdić-Finci case" details at Council of Europe (Office in Belgrade) webpage: http://www.coe.org.rs/eng/news_sr_eng/?conid=1545

[22] See Gradjanski Front Ostalih available at: http://www.ostali.org/?q=mediji/doris-pack-u-bih-ako-niste-bo%C5%A1njak-srbin-ili-hrvat-onda-ste-niko

the president of the Republic of Srpska Milorad Dodik. This support is largely understood in scope that does not jeopardise the territorial integrity of the Republic of Srpska, and is thus used as an effective tool for domestic political bargaining, and thus winning cheap political points, at the state level.

Last but not least, speaking education-wise, a more civic-oriented approach to education is necessary and as soon as possible at that. It is truly hard to believe that discourse of ethnic separation has been instituted in the educational system of the country so deeply that, for example, there are areas of BiH, especially in the central part of the country, where educational concept called "two schools under one roof" has been implemented. The point of the concept is physical separation of students coming from different ethnic backgrounds in elementary, and, in some cases, even in high schools. The fact that these children are discriminated against and segregated based on their respective ethnic background and religious affiliation may to some seem unreal for a European country in the 21st century, but this has unfortunately been the part of the current Bosnian reality. Therefore, not only that this reality has to be changed, but curricula taught at schools with it as well, since it is these curricula that (re)produce values upholding the physical separation of students from different ethnic backgrounds. One is to expect, unless no changes in this respect are introduced sooner rather than later, that future of BiH will essentially remain contested by new generations of citizens taught in "good ol' nationalist ways."

Conclusion

Eighteen years after the war and after considerable efforts of the international community being Bosnian is definitely not easy. Unfortunate as it is, being Bosnian is really a matter of geography much more than belonging to/having one identity. Therefore, as discussed in this article, it is clear that identity issues in BiH are deep and cannot be easily overcome. However, this does not in any way mean that a step in this direction should and could not be made. This step should certainly be in direction of an increasingly civic-oriented culture: the culture opposite to the ethno-centric system of rather cheap domestic politicizing that exists in present-day BiH. This, however, depends on wider political and social consensus and, therefore, will to move into this specific direction. In that respect, a very good example of such a civic-oriented move has been made by one initiative from Mostar, a town which saw one of the fiercest fighting in the whole Bosnian conflict. Thus, in order to oppose this mainstream social discourse, an initiative was launched in 2011 when Gradjanski Front Ostalih (Civic Front of the Others) was established. It is described as an "attempt of organised resistance to the constitutional terror which has been conducted over citizens of BiH who do not feel themselves as Bosniaks, Serbs, or Croats."[23] This initiative, if followed by others, may actually be a pattern for overcoming the current issues and, in addition, could open ways, thus certainly influencing change in domestic politics, towards establishing a more civic and thus less ethnic BiH. If this does not happen it seems highly unlikely that BiH would in future survive as one state.

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[23] See the official website: www.ostali.org

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THE NATIONAL QUESTION IN WESTERN HUNGARY AROUND THE FIRST WORLD WAR, OR HOW PEOPLE START TO QUESTION THEIR IDENTITY

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Key Words: *national identity question, multinational region (Germans, Croats, Hungarians, Jews, Roma), changing borders, nation building*

Abstract

In my presentation I aim to discuss how the national question started to influence the life of the inhabitations of Western Hungary. As a starting point, I will describe the situation during the Magyarisation, which had its peak between 1890 and 1910. Then I will discuss the questions of how people dealt with the borders (old and new) between Austria and Hungary. How was the new border established? How did the switch of identity work? What happened after the peace treaty of Trianon in Western Hungary?

Therefore, I will focus on the different regimes after the first World War in Hungary and try to combine their influences of the daily life of the inhabitants of the people in Western Hungary. The goal of this comparison is to show the differences between the different nationalities living within the region and how it was possible to establish a new identity in this nation building process.

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SERBIAN NATIONAL AWAKENING AND ENLIGHTENMENT AS INSPIRED BY THE WEST UKRAINIAN CULTURAL CENTRES – TRANSMITTED THROUGH THE HUNGARIAN KINGDOM IN THE 18TH CENTURY[*]

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Abstract

It is a false commonplace that the ideas of enlightenment and national awakening in the 18th century came to the Slavic peoples of the Habsburg Empire as a result of the impact on the cultural life made by the thinkers, artists and scientists in Vienna, whose activities were inspired and provided by the royal court, too. This statement is only partly true but not wholly. Though the West European cultural influences also political ideas came across Vienna, this was one of the ways of transmission but not the only one. In contrary, the role and importance of the contacts between the various Slavic peoples and those living in the Habsburg Empire could not be studied in the shadows of the overvaluation was given to the impacts of Vienna. Researches made by the Institute of Ukrainian Studies named Krypiakevich in Lviv in the last two-three decades, mainly the findings of Isaievich, Iaroslav Dmitrovich, member of the Academy of Sciences, who had headed this institute for fourteen years, lead to new results in the history of the typographies and book-trade as the belles-lettres as well, therefore it became necessary to rethink the contacts between the Western territories of the recent Ukraine and the Slavic peoples of the Hungarian Kingdom. On the other hand, investigations made by the author of this paper and his predecessors and masters on the old printed liturgical books of the Byzantine rite, gave enough matter to came to the conclusions the book-trade was an important factor in the transmission of the impacts of early enlightenment came from Poland across Ukraine to the Serbs living in Hungary and on the Balkans, too. Finally, the Serbian Orthodox Church as a determining factor in the national awakening was not taken into consideration as a different from the other ones, that is, the Orthodoxy was wholly regarded but not distinguishing between the Greek and Serb churches, nor the Russian and Balkan Orthodoxy as well. Consequently, the aim of this paper is to demonstrate the contacts between the Serbs and Ukrainian territories, to evidence the book-trade between these peoples and areas, and to give some new insides into the church and national relations on the Balkans.

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Ways of acquiring the ideas of Enlightenment to the Slavic Peoples living in the Habsburg Empire

An axiom in the literature in the field of the history of culture of the eighteenth century that the contemporary West European culture, the national awakening and the enlightenment as well, the new thought of the "siècle de Lumière" came through Vienne. It is true partly but not entirely. Well, the capital of the Habsburg Empire was the main but not the only centre for transmitting the cultural development. As for Hungarians, the Hungarian Guards of Empress Maria Theresa was founded in 1760, and the Guardsmen-writers as György Bessenyei, the most prominent of them, also Ábrahám Barcsay, Sándor Báróczi, József Naláczi and others elaborated the programmes of change the society to an enlightened one. (For the guardsmen cf. Czigány, 1986, pp.82-83; for the comparison with Czech enlightenment and for further bibliography cf. Orosz, 1983, pp.123-125) Similarly, the Slavic elite living in Vienna as Dositej Obradović for Serbs, Jernej Kopitar for Slovenes, Jozef Dobrovský for Czech and almost all Slavic people, spent periods of their lives, respectively, in Vienna. (For Obradović in Vienna cf. Markovich, 2011; for Kopitar cf. Pogaćnik, 1977 and its corrected German version, 1978; for Dobrovký and Kopitar's contacts Jagić, 1885, 1897; for Dobrovský's activity in Vienna Brandl, 1883; for literature on him Krbec and Laiske, 1970) However, it is to be taken into consideration the "national awakening" (the very peculiar phenomenon for this epoch, the Czech "národní obrození", German "nationale Wiedergebuhrt") was not a part of the enlightenment but a different process from that. (Pražák, 1983) While the West European nations faced the problems such as absolutism, clerical reaction, inequality in society, and famous members of the cultural elite completed the philosophical, political and sociological works, the Central and more the East European nations faced to the task of evolving the national elite. Therefore, the early enlightenment in East-Central Europe (as Winter devoted a monograph to this epoch) was the time of the birth of nations, therefore, the shaping the national elite. (Niederhauser, 1965, 1982) Thus the late baroque though being a church-determined style and thought, was a great step toward the development of the national elite at the Slavic People. Since the late baroque came more lately to these peoples, due to the Turkish occupation, the study of the liturgical books and their provenance gives some contributions of great value to the early stage of unfolding the Slavic People as the Serbs. The most important way of bringing the Slavic liturgical books was the trade with the West Ukrainian territories, were that time parts of then-Polish Kingdom. This way was another canal for the transmitting the West European culture, too, parallel to the role played by the Vienna-elite.

Differences between situations of the Serbian Church cultures in the Balkans and the Habsburg Empire

For clear understanding the problem, it is inevitable to highlight the fact the Serbs of the Habsburg Empire could far better get Slavic liturgical books and use their own language in the liturgy and church schools (that is, Church Slavonic in the mass and later Slaveno-Serb in the schools) than their brothers remained on the Balkans. As Temperley, who followed

Jireček, pointed out it already in the first decades of the last century, the dominance of the Greek phanariote elite in the Church was enough strong to oppress the Slavic national culture, the usage of Slavic languages in the schools and church, too. Consequently, the Serbian church was ruled by Greek priests and the low stratum remained for Serbian ones. (Temperley, 1917, p.123, pp.163-166; Jireček, 1876, pp.466-467) Therefore, the memories of the great past, the tradition of the independent Serbian church in Middle Ages, became a determining factor in the Serbian thought. In a result, the Serbian Orthodox Church was not so God-centred but Nation-focused and it was logical. Sorry for the literature in the field, the Serbian Orthodox Church was criticised by such great authors, too, as Ladislaus Hadrović and some his followers, as the roman catholic Antal Molnár. (Hadrovics, 1947; Molnár, 2008) Hadrovics and those shared this one-track approach, stated the Serbian Church lost its former shine for the 17–18 centuries, in contrary to the flourishing in 12–15 cc. The popes were undereducated, analphabetic, drinking, immoral people. The church was full of superstitions and without even elementary knowledge of the axial dogmas as the Saint Trinity, the Salvation, the sanctity of the marriage, the discipline in the church, even the service. For it was a terrene of the national pride but not the Christian devotion. And so one. These statements were based mainly on the records by Franciscan monks who came from Rome and looked down the Balkan cultures not knowing the roots and circumstances of the Serbian people. Yes, the level of the church culture was not so high and the national spirit seemed to be more than it required, if one did not take into consideration the Greek oppress and the reaction for the phanariote system. The phanariots were, as well, those who served in the administration of the Ottoman Empire but remained Christians, i.e. Orthodox, and were of Greek origin, to which the name referred: Phanar/iots (the district of Constantinople, inhabited by the Greek, was named "Phanar" which meant "lighthouse" in Greek). They get even high positions, as the dragoman of the Porte, who served as a secretary for foreign affairs, and the dragoman of the fleet, who administered the Greek costs and islands as inhabitants of these were obliged to provide the fleet by seamen. (Schevill, 1991, p.305) Therefore the diplomacy and the forces were managed by non-Muslims and non-Turkish people. (For the structure of the Ottoman administration and phanariots' role in that cf. Gibb and Bowen, 1957, I/ii, pp.207-261, and classical manual on the topic: Runciman, 1968, pp.165-207) In my opinion, it was not only a peculiarity of the Ottoman Empire as an Islam state but, and more, a specificity of every Turkish and nomadic empire, too, for they were conglomerate of miscellaneous tribes. It was not devoted enough attention to the fact, that the power concentrated in the hands of Non-Muslims in Ottoman Empire, it was a remnant of the non-Muslim epoch of the Ottomans. It was quite strange for the original Islam states, i.e. the Arab Caliphates. It was a structure of a strong state which required hard-handed rulers. Let us take for example the Mongol Empire found by Khan Dshingiz (Temudshin). While the Ottoman sultans were enough strong, as Suleiman The Great, or his father Selim, also Mehmed The Conqueror, the semi-Muslim also semi-Nomadic regime functioned well. As the sultans became more and weaker in the 17th and 18th centuries, the Balkans turned into the field of struggles between Slavs and Greeks for their respective national power and culture, under the umbrella of the Ottoman Empire. Thus the Turkish yoke was the main danger in the 15–16th cc. but not in the 17–18th ones when the national awakening was beginning among the East European peoples. As The Greek had better chances due to the

phanariote system they gained more national power than The Serb who had no position in the political administration also in the church one, which was the same since the Turkish Islam state regarded church leaders for the political representatives of the dhimmies (Christians and Jews), regardless the differences between Christian peoples. Therefore it was logical the Greek phanariots destroyed everything and everyone on their way for developing the national Greek culture and Greek Orthodox Church-dominated culture. Though it was clear, the literature in the field was not going along with Temperley and Jireček for the mechanism and evolving the phanariote system had not been enough investigated for a long time. (For the phanariote rule in Bulgaria cf. Voillery, 1986; for evolving the phanariots in the Ottoman Empire Gibb and Bowen, 1957, I/ii, pp.207-261; and the classical manual in the topic: Runciman, 1968, pp.165-207) The Orthodox Greek phanariots were in so closely bond to the Ottoman elite as they often stepped on the way of assimilation. (Sloane, 1908, p.308)

Thus the Western, mostly Roman Catholic authors often forgot the Orthodox Church lived in peaceful connections with the Ottomans while the great enemy for the peoples in the Balkans it was the Roman Catholic Church. (Sherrard, 1959, pp.96-107; Ware, 1964) The Islam rule did not force to convert the Christians in whole (except for the assimilation of phanariots and the devshirme (collecting boys for janissaries), but these were not the way of destroying the Christians), as they served as a good soil for the benefits as taxes, the spahi-lands and alive-taxes. The Christians were able to keep and preserve their customs, way of life, as the Orthodoxy did not mean a mere religion but and rather the framework of the life entirely and the "Pax Ottomanica" provided the safety of the orthodox way of life far more than it would be destroyed by the Catholics. (Cvijić, 1918, p.281; Kitromilides, 1999) The phanariots were extremely well-educated (as extremely rich as well), as they sons studied at universities of Italy and Western Europe; partly thanks to the Greek communities had been living in numerous cities since they settled there in the Antiquity. (Jelavich, 1983, pp.53-55) Thus it was real elite in contrary the "folk-cultured" Orthodoxy characterised the Serbs and Bulgarians. The schools of phanariots in the Balkans were of higher level than those of Armenians even Jews. No wonder the phanariots replaced Jews in the trade, too. (For education of the phanariots abroad and the prominent ones of them cf. Strauss, 1995, pp.191-194, with extremely rich bibliographical notes).

The phanariots kept in their hands the patriarch, too, supporting him by large sums of money, as the positions of church leaders, as bishops, archbishops and even the patriarch became subjects for sale by the turn of 17/18 cc. As it was pointed out by Roucek (1946, p.370) the Patriarchate fell into the power of the phanariots, the wealthy Greeks, who kept the Orthodox Church in their pocket. However, I cannot agree with Roucek when he falsely states out the phanariots persuaded the Sultan to put the whole of the Balkan Church under the power of the Patriarchate of Constantinople. This was a different process and went earlier. The church had already organised the lands into dioceses and subdioceses when the Turks conquered the Balkans. Then the well-organised church system was accepted by the Ottoman conquerors as for their administrative and tax-collecting tool. The patriarch was appointed by the new rulers as the head of the Christian millet, he became the millet-basi, had right to use flag with two horsetails (Jelavich, 1983, pp.52-53). Thus the church had full jurisdiction over Christians,

relating to marriage, court and commercial cases, too. It was in a consequence of the role played by the church already in the Byzantine epoch and in the independent Serbian state. The conflict raised when the Greek patriarch had rule over the Slavs and when the Greek phanariots gained the rule over all the Christians even the patriarch as well. It was more than a century later the Balkan was conquered by the Turks. Then, as Roucek was already right, writing that "Slavs who wanted to become priests had to play traitors to their own blood and, if they displeased their masters, they were beaten, as the servants of the Greek clergy, during divine service before silent congregations of their own people. There was also a ruthless campaign against the speaking of the Serbian and Bulgarian languages, and an attempt was made to enforce the use of Greek over the whole of Macedonia, instead of the small southern district to which it had long been limited." (Roucek, 1946, p.370; cf. Temperley, 1917, pp.111-113, pp.123-124)

Since the Ottoman Sultan appointed the patriarch of Constantinople in Istanbul the head of all the Christians, and, the phanariots kept the church and secular power and church leaders in their hands, the Greek clergy became the only Christian also secular establishment for the Bulgarian, Serbian and Macedonian peoples. This brought sad situation for the Serbs. The language of the church was Greek, the higher positions in the church were filled by the Greek, and these were subject for sale, too. Serbian monasteries had to use the Greek language even the monks were Serbs, and the Slavic liturgical books in Serbian monasteries were destroyed. That is, fired by the Greeks, too, not only by the Muslim Turks. In a result, any monk had to learn to read and write in Greek and did not have any chance to acquire the elements of the Slavic church culture even the Cyrillic letters. For the lower stratum of the clergy remained Serbian, it was not a miracle the villains and popes in villages remained under-cultured in Christian dogmas but full of national pride. This poor church kept the Serbian national consciousness even being not so perfect in the beliefs. It must be taken into consideration as it was done by Temperley and a lot of other authors but forgotten by some later historians who wrote their works approaching the topic within too narrow thus false views. The Serbian Church for the Serbs was the only way and place for surviving while the Ottoman Empire gave all the rule to the Greek clergy above the Christians lived on the Balkans. The Serbian nation faced the double oppression, from the one hand by the Ottomans and from the other hand by the Greeks. Therefore those Serbs moved to the Hungarian Kingdom could rid of Greek oppression and had chances to use and develop their Slavic liturgy and Cyrillic letters. (Temperley, 1917, pp.111-113, pp.123-124)

Serbian book-import into Hungary from the Ukrainian Typographies

In contrary to the sad situation on the Balkans, the Serb refugees moved into the Hungarian Kingdom (then part of the Habsburg Empire), had right for free usage their Serbian language, Cyrillic letters and Church Slavic liturgical books in their communities, in which the secular and church local authorities were the same. The constantly complaining Serbs in the Habsburg territories were right as they wrote they had no equal position with the Hungarians mainly the Catholics (Picot, 1873), although they had far better circumstances as those

remained to live on the Balkans. (Schwicker, 1880; Palić, 1995) It was reflected by the provenance of the liturgical books, too. The Serbian parishes in Hungary bought books in the 17–18 cc. from the East Slavic territories, while they did it earlier from the Western typographies. Editions from 16 century are held in the Serbian collections up to nowadays as books from Parish, Tübingen and mostly Venice, but no record about buying books after beginning of the 17 century. (Földvári, 2011) Since the situation on the Balkans became true for the Slavic book-trade. The larger part of books in Serbian parishes, edited in 17 and 18 cc. were printed in West-Ukrainian and Belorussian typographies and, according to the data of provenance, the marginalia, these were bought by Serbs here in Hungary in the 17–18th cc. While the Serbs on the Balkans did not have much chance to get these books in the 17 c, their relatives in the Hungarian Kingdom did. Therefore, the books from East Slavic typographies determined the spiritual and cultural life of the Serbs in Hungary.

Let us take for example the little but important collection of liturgical books being now held in the Archbishopric Library of Veszprém (Centre of the West Hungary). It was not taken into attention of researchers until I went there and described them. (Földvári, 1994; Földvári and Ojtozi, 1995) These books belonged to the Serbian parish in Sóskút, next to Buda (then independent part of Budapest). Some books were printed in Venice but in the 15th c. The predominant parts of them were editions of West Ukrainian typographies (Lviv, Pochaev, Unev, Kyiv, etc.) According to the marginalia, those were printed in the West Ukraine were bought here by local Serbs. One of the marginal writings shows to Nikolas Milovanivić as a possessor (Földvári and Ojtozi, 1995, No.8, with the photocopy marginal handwriting of this possessor) and another book of him (evidenced by marginalia) is held in the Serbian Orthodox Museum and Library in Szentendre (Saint-Andrew), according to Sindik, Grozdanović-Pajić and Mano-Zisi, 1991. No. 90. (On this possessor cf. Grozdanović Pajić, 1982) The authors of studies on the Szentendre collection and its monograph are of the opinion the Serbs brought by his immigration all the books were printed in South Slav and Italian typographies and, on the other hand, they bought here, in Hungary, all those were printings of the West Ukrainian Typographies. (Sindik, Grozdanović-Pajić and Mano-Zisi, 1991) Therefore the data of possessors evidenced all those were said above that one had to distinguish between the situations of the Serbs in Hungary and the Balkans. What is yet important, Serbs settled in Hungary bought Cyrillic books from the West Ukrainian typographies but not from the Russian ones. Tsarist help as donations of books characterised the Serbian culture in from the end (at least the third quarter) of the 18th century but not earlier.

Although the previous literature in the field maintained the Cyrillic liturgical book were imported from the "Moscovia" i.e. the Tsarist Russia, it seemed to be false. Anton Hodinka was of the opinion that the Russian (in his terminology "Moscovian") booksellers provided the Slavic peoples in the Habsburg Empire with liturgical books until 1772, when their activity was prohibited by Empress Maria Theresa. (Hodinka, 1890, 1909, 1925) It was criticised by Esther Ojtozi, the master of the study of old printed Cyrillic books held in recent church collections in Hungary. (Ojtozi, 1977-79, 1984) Her follower Sándor Földvári found new data about the Serbs imported liturgical books from the West Ukraine, then part or the Polish Kingdom, according the marginal data on possessors and provenance (Földvári, 1995,

1996, 2000-2001; Földvári-Ojtozi, 1995). Moreover it was evidenced by the archival data on the Serbian community in Eger (North Hungary), held in the Archivum Vetus of the Archbishopric Library of Eger, newly found by Földvári, that even the Orthodox Serbs in Eger bought books from the West Ukrainian typographies though the Carpathian Greek Catholic Ruthenes as transmitters, though being in struggles with the Catholics in Eger, too. (Földvári, 1996, 1997) Although Empress Maria Theresa established the typography of Joseph Kurzböck in Vienna, it did not print so many books as would required for the service, moreover, the Serbs were not likely to purchase these instead of the product of East Slavic typographies. The import of the books printed in West Ukrainian territories remained the main source (Kostić, 1912). The printing Serbian books become important only by the end of 18th and mostly in the first half of the 19th cc, when the Royal Typography in Buda provided Serbs also every Slavic people with books of secular content, thus the late Slavic national awakening centred in Buda but not the early one, which is the subject of this paper (Gavrilović, 1974) However, it is worth to mention the Buda Typography played axial role in evolving of the Slavic national cultures as Peter Király devoted numerous papers and books, too, to this topic (Király, 1973, 1980, 1983, 1985, 1993). The flourishing period of the Serbian national awakening was the 18/19th cc, thus in the 17th c. it was quite enough to provide the liturgy by Slavic books which was entirely impossible on the Balkans (Adler, 1979). It was not only possible but carried out far well, and these books were not only of liturgical items but even tools for transmitting the contemporary secular culture, too. Let us see how it was done.

The circumstances of the West Ukrainian and Belorussian book-printing in the 17–18th cc

As we have seen the predominant part of the Cyrillic books used by the Serbs in the Hungarian Kingdom was of West Ukrainian origin, it is necessary to look through the situation of the book printing in that territories. It would be the best to follow the new investigations by Isaevich, Yaroslav Dmitrovich, who just passed away and whose findings made to rethink all we knew about the topic. (Kasinec, 1974) As for the typographies in Ukraine, they were owned and managed by the civil societies, the so-called brotherhoods (confraternities) and it was the main difference between the Tsarist Pechatnyj dvor in Moscow and the Belarusian and Ukrainian ones. (Isaevich, 1966) These were more market-oriented and flexible, though having more risk, too, moreover, closer to the Polish territories and culture in both geographical and spiritual sense. The enormously large Tsarist typography served for the huge number of churches being as the only one in the Empire, thus not depending on the demands of the market but the requests of the centralised administration of The Emperor. Profit was guaranteed and big, according to the data sources remained in good condition. In a consequence, there was no need to change the shape and inner form of the service books or any will to do it. (Isaevich, 1992, 1996, pp.214-239) Although the content of the liturgical books was strictly determined in the Byzantine rite, the prefaces and afterwards, even the illustrations were subjects to change and good tools for acquiring more costumers, at least to attract their attention. As for the illustrations, the 18th century baroque was

undoubtedly acquainted for the illustrators of liturgical books issued in the Western Ukraine (Zapasko, 1971; Stepovik, 1982). As for the prefaces, it was a remarkable way to use liturgical books for publishing text of a bit more secular character in Moscow, too. The ratio of the civil books was very small, almost zero before the time of reign of Peter the Great. The circles of readers of the civil books were far narrower than the number of users –and listeners– of the liturgical books. Far different was the situation in Western Ukraine and Belorussia, then-parts of the Polish Kingdom. The printings were published in Moscow in enormously large number as commercial products were issued with paying less attention to the requirements of the readers as their expectations were not too great. On contrary, the items printed in Ukrainian and Belarusian typographies were far smaller and more market-oriented. These worked for a bit more educated even enlightened audience than those printed for the believers were living on the large Russian steppe or Siberia (Isaevich, 1978). Therefore, prefaces and afterwards were added to the western printings far more than to those books issued in Moscow. If it was done, the products of the huge Moscow typography were accompanied by such commentary texts in order to give some explanations from or on the initiative of the Holy Synod but not with purposes of acquiring the interest of the audience. Since the audience was given and guarantied in a large number of parishes along the huge empire, while the liturgical books were only printed in the Petsatnyj Dvor in Moscow. On contrary, the small but flexible western typographies had to gain costumers and printed far more accompanying text than the central typography in Moscow. Moreover, these texts were of higher level, and accompanied by texts as it was likely the Protestant commentaries on the Saint Scripture, therefore it was the way on which the humanism and baroque could influence the literary texts were written with purposes to enlighten the holy ones. (For prefaces and afterwords cf. Demin, 1981; for the texts Titov, 1924, especially p.57, etc, for the western influence.) Last but not least, it was evidenced by records of the Brotherhoods the Serbs gained and purchased their books in significant number. (Isaevich, 2006, pp.200-236) As for the Habsburg Empire, the Serbs did not accept with good will the books printed by Kurzböck in Vienna, moreover, they often refused to use them, and imported books from East Slav territories, mostly from West-Ukraine (then East Poland), through semi-legal or illegal ways. Even Greek merchants works for Serbs as booksellers in the Hungarian Kingdom, while the Greek establishment on the Balkans did not permit such activities. (Kostić, 1923) The further migration of the Serbs and the foundation of the "Nova Srbia" (New Serbia) at the heart of Ukraine in the middle of the 18th century provided the trade and cultural contacts even in the time when Empress Maria Theresa denied the activity of the Slavic booksellers. (For this micro-state of Serbs in Ukrainian territories of Russia cf. the monograph and its further notes: Kostić, 2001, first published 1923.)

Conclusions: the double way of the Serbian national awakening

It was the subject of great debates at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences if the nations were already formed in the 17th century or not. Emil Niederhauser was of the opinion that yes, at least in embryonic forms (Niederhauser, 1977, 1982) If so, the Serbian national consciousness was provided by the books were imported from the West-Ukrainian territories in the 17–18th

cc. It was great to support the Serbian Orthodox culture which had to be regarded not only as a church but a whole atmosphere of preserving the national spirit and heritage (Mylonas, 2003, mainly the Chapter 2, "Orthodoxy and Serbian National Identity", pp.35-72). Though the Greek-oriented authors often forget the Serbs were oppressed by the Greek elite from the time the system of Phanariots evolved. Although it seemed good for Christians the Patriarch became not only the religious but even the secular leader of them, as a head of the millet (Ursinus, 1989), later the unified millet for both Slavic and Greek Christians became a terrene of Greek national awakening and oppressing Serbian and Bulgarian cultures (the Rumanian history is not the subject of this paper, however, the phanariot system was there very strong and ambiguous, too). Serb moved into Hungarian Kingdom by a few waves during the 15–17 cc. They often complained for hurting their rights although their position was far better than that in the Balkans, however, not equal with the Hungarians. They can use the Cyrillic letters and imported books from the East Slav territories, even their popes and teachers were educated there. According to the new investigations in the field, the book-import and personal cultural relations were far stronger with places in then-polish territories, Western Ukraine, than with Russia. The Russian influence got stronger from the end of the 18th century and mostly in the 19th but it is not the subject of this paper. Therefore the early Serbian cultural awakening was provided by books and contacts from Western Ukraine. These books although of liturgical character, contained numerous text commenting the holy liturgy and these commentaries reflected the influences of late renaissance and early baroque, too. The same is true for the illustrations, which took more influence for the users of books. This was the way the Polish culture as transmitter of the Western ideas and styles, influenced the West-Ukrainian books and cultural centres, and though them, the Serbs settled in Hungary, too. Consequently, the way of West-European ideas and culture went not only through Vienna, but curving to Poland, Ukraine and from there to the Slavic People of the Habsburg Empire, as well. This was not so well-seen and remained understudied although this scrambling way of the western culture was more important to the Serbs than the role of Vienna, regarding the early phase of their national awakening. New contributions to this question were made by the author with investigations on the book-collections, and further steps on this way, together with Ukrainian colleagues, seem to be prolific works to evidence the Serbian-Ukrainian contacts as well.[*]

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NATIONAL QUESTION OF LATVIAN ELECTORAL POLITICS AFTER REGAINING INDEPENDENCE

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Abstract

The only post-Soviet states within the European Union and NATO are Latvia, Estonia and Lithuania. In contrast to the Western Europe, the above mentioned northern European republics, after regaining independence, entail a sometimes awkward legacy of political culture; in this particular case, focusing on the phenomenon of Latvian political parties on the basis of ideological differences on the national question. In general it can be said that Latvia as a post-Soviet state theoretically accepts the principles of Western democracy, but is struggling with moral consequences of the Soviet political culture. Political parties are one of the main attractions of democracy that can determine national goals both, externally and internally. The struggle of political parties for their supporters on the national principle, cannot provide the stability neither in Parliament nor in the public desire. Internal policy of Latvia prevents to take advantage of its location logically. Parliamentary elections are the interaction between voters and those who want to be elected. In the case of Latvia, this interaction does not develop, because the parties do not reveal their potential course of actions to the voters, but rather are looking for the negative, in actions of political rivals. Development and formation of party structures are explored by scientists with the help of the core values of institutionalism. The most commonly used Alan Ware's guidelines marks that the political struggle is the mediator of the institutional environment and an important factor in this approach is the rivalry. So, first of all, this approach refers to the democratic-liberal regimes. In Latvia, the division of political parties on the right and on the left is based on national principles - namely, right wing political parties are considered to be Latvian ones, and, accordingly, the left wing are Russian parties (26.6% of the population of Latvia are Russians). This national gap offers an interesting question in particular on the Latvian political scene – pre-electoral tendencies of the Latvian politics. This aspect may require both, positive and negative hypothesis - the political struggle of this kind leads to political stability, or, on the contrary, destroys and prevents the decision-making processes, both, internal and external policies.

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COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS OF THE LEGAL ASPECTS OF NAGORNO KARABAKH REPUBLIC INDEPENDENCE AND THE INDEPENDENCE OF REPUBLIC OF KOSOVA

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Key Words: *conflict, Karabakh, Kosovo, International Law, International Court of Justice, South Caucasus*

Abstract

After the fall of Berlin wall a wave of hope raised that the existing conflicts will be solved and the situation of permanent deterrence will end. But with the collapse of USSR and SFRY new frontiers and lines of allocation arisen. The world met many instability hearts which are still persistent in most part. The conflicts overwhelmed both Eastern Europe and South Caucasus approximately simultaneously and approximately in the same conditions. Thus the developments in the two regions became mostly intertwined here why it is common to compare them with each other.

Furthermore, the conflicts in Karabakh and Kosovo have been and are being discussed on the same context trying to use the same political, geopolitical, economic, ethnic, legal, economic and other approach. This has both its supporters and opponents who correspondingly insist that the conflicts are similar and the approach must be the same and that the conflicts are different and in different situation and in different geopolitical, political, economic, legal and military environment so the approach must be diversified and coinciding. Anyway each conflict is a special case that demands special individual approach.

Since 2010 as the International Courte of Justice determined that the declaration of independence by Kosovo does not violate International Law activated speculations on the Karabakh conflict on the context of the ICJ advisory opinion. Besides the discussed geopolitical, political, military and other differences the legal approach should be similar as the International Law is a unique system in the world that should be the same for all parties and its mission is to provide general solutions. Another delicacy of the international legal system is that it has to apply all the similar situations in the same way as the principle is one of its main pillars.

So to discuss the international legal aspect of the Karabakh future status it is first of all necessary to discuss the legal aspect of the process of declaration of independence in the frames of the positive law of the former USSR. Second it is necessary to compare the legal situation of the Karabakh situation with the principles of the International Law and UN resolutions taking into consideration the ICJ advisory opinion of 2010.

After the clarification of the legal aspect and context we may discuss the provisions of the ICJ advisory opinion of 2010 and decide whether they are general for all the coinciding situations or private for a certain situation in Kosovo.

These three steps allow to look into the root of Karabakh issue from the legal aspect and to see a solution based on general legal provisions and principles.

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Introduction

Republic of Kosova[1] declared independence on 17th February, 2008. Since then 98 UN Member states recognised the independence of Kosovo of which 22 are European Union (EU) Member states[2]. It was a long and painful road for the Kosovo people that came to a questionable mid-term resolution. It is a questionable mid-term resolution as not all UN member states recognise it and not all the parties and interesting sides are satisfied with the existing status quo. Anyway, the satisfaction in this case has more a political than a legal nature. Anyway, the case of Kosova is one of the still unresolved and unfinished processes the symbolically have been launched after the fall of Berlin wall.

With the collapse of the USSR and the FRY new frontiers and lines of allocation arisen. The world met many instability hearts which are still persistent in their most part. The conflicts overwhelmed both Eastern Europe and South Caucasus approximately simultaneously and approximately in the same conditions. Thus the developments in the two regions became mostly intertwined. Here why it is common to compare them with each other. Examples of such comparison are cases of Karabakh in the South Caucasus and Kosova in the South-Eastern Europe. The conflicts have been and are being discussed on the same context trying to use the same political, geopolitical, economic, ethnic, legal, economic and other approach. This has both its supporters and opponents who correspondingly insist that the conflicts are similar and the approach must be the same and that the conflicts are different and in different situation and in different geopolitical, political, economic, legal and military environment so the approach must be diversified and coinciding. Anyway each conflict is a special case that demands special individual approach[3]. Nevertheless, besides the discussed historical, geopolitical, political, military and other differences the legal approach should be similar as the International Law is a unique system that should be the same for all parties and its mission is to provide general solutions. Another delicacy of the international legal system is that it has to apply all the similar situations in the same way as the principle is one of its main pillars. So, herein we will try to discuss the background of the Declaration of independence of Nagorno Karabakh Republic on the 2nd September 1991 in the contexts of both International Law and the USSR positive law of the time as they were the only legal frames and basis for

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[1] In the paper we use the name of the Republic of Kosovo as it is in official version – Kosova.
[2] http://www.kosovothanksyou.com/?order=a#recognitions
[3] In this paper we do not refer to the development of historical background of the cases as the aim of the paper is discussion and comparison of the legal framework of the declarations of independence of the Republic of Kosova and the Nagorno Karabakh Republic.

any such declaration. We will do this taking into consideration the ICJ advisory opinion of 2010 on the legality under international law of Kosova's independence declaration that was sought by Serbia rejecting Kosova's independence[4].

The advisory opinion of the 22nd July 2010

In accordance with Resolution 63/3 of 8 October 2008, the United Nations General Assembly tasked the International Court of Justice, the principal judicial organ of the United Nations, to render an Advisory Opinion on the question "Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the Provisional Institutions of Self-Government of Kosovo in accordance with international law?"[5]. As a result of the examination the Court has concluded that the adoption of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 did not violate general international law, Security Council resolution 1244 (1999) or the Constitutional Framework. Consequently the adoption of that declaration did not violate any applicable rule of international law[6].

Despite its advisory nature of the opinion raised many discussions in different societies where formally or informally it was announced the importance of the conclusion and the consequences that it may cause. One of the most frequently debated issues was "whether this opinion has a universal or a particular character?" It is not accidental that we've used to hear and now hear opinions both for and against the ICJ opinion not only for this certain case but also referring the generalisation of this opinion on similar unfinished cases. Even the US and the EU expressed their opinion against generalisation though they were for the adoption of the ICJ opinion in the form it is[7]. Thus, it's obvious, that if the Opinion did not complicate particularly the situation of Kosova and, in general, the solution of similar cases, anyway from the expressed viewpoints we may conclude that the Opinion did not clarify the whole context[8].

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[4] http://www.mfa-ks.net/?page=2,121
[5] UN ICJ Advisory opinion, paragraph 49.
[6] Ibid., par. 122.
[7] Hague's Decision on Kosovo Doesn't Create Precedent, Gordon Says, July 27th, 2010, [online] Available at: <http://www.yerevanreport.com/20100727/13531/hague-doesnt-create-precedent-gordon>; Semneby, P., 2010. *The fact that Kosovo, South Ossetia and Abkhazia declared independence, does not make them the same* (Russian), 26 July 2010 [online] Available at: <http://www.interfax.ru/txt.asp?id=146766&sec=1483&sw=%EF%E5%F2%E5%F0+%F1%E5%EC%ED%E5%E1%E8&bd=30&bm=6&by=2010&ed=30&em=7&ey=201&secid=0&mp=0&p=1>
[8] The same complicated position (it is called double standards policy) is displayed in the field of practical politics: the US and a number of its allies recognised the unilaterally proclaimed independence of Kosova while in respects of other cases (NKR, Abkhazia, South Ossetia, Transnistria, etc.) they either do not support right to self-determination (not emphasizing their support for territorial integrity, but do not even raise their adherence to the law of self-determination), or express support for the territorial integrity not generalizing their stance (clearly state that they are in favour of this or that certain country's territorial integrity), or vice versa, Russia recognised the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia but opposes the independence of Kosova. By the way, in the unity of all this contrasts the Karabakh issue is a kind of exception as the both world power centres avoid to express clear stances for or against one of the disputed principles. Meanwhile they have clearly expressed their positions regarding to the cases of Kosova, Abkhazia and South Ossetia. It's obvious that the reason of such reality is based on the different geopolitical interests and politicised approaches. Here why the parties contradistinguish the principle of International Law on "equal rights and self-determination of peoples" and a political concept about "territorial integrity".

Universal or Particular?

The opponents of the ICJ advisory opinion generalisation point out that the UN General Assembly's quest to the ICJ had a certain target and case that is the Kosova case not the declaration of independence in general. So, to answer the question "Whether the Opinion has a universal or particular nature?" we have to look into the document.

First of all the court in its opinion refers to the question discussing the issue of relationship between the International Law and the declaration of independence (whether there are any provisions in the International Law forbidding the declaration of independence) and, on the other hand, whether the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity are contradicting and mutually excluding each other.

On the first question the Opinion states that "State practice during this period (18th, 19th centuries and the 1st half of the 20th century – G. G.) points clearly to the conclusion that international law contained no prohibition of declarations of independence. During the second half of the twentieth century, the international law of self-determination developed in such a way as to create a right to independence for the peoples of non-self-governing territories and peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination and exploitation.… A great many new States have come into existence as a result of the exercise of this right"[9]. Furthermore, referring to the attempts during the proceedings to contradict the principles of self-determination and territorial integrity the Court answers to the second question stating: "… the scope of the principle of territorial integrity is confined to the sphere of relations between States"[10]. Thus we may conclude that the abovementioned principles are not in a contradiction with each other as they have different objects: the principle of territorial integrity is to regulate the issues and relations between States while the principle of self-determination is to regulate the relations between nations in spite of state borders.

By the way, in this paragraph of its Opinion the ICJ also mentions the Helsinki Final Act of 1975 in the 4th article of which there is a reference to the principle of territorial integrity. So we may sum up that this conclusion of the Court gives an official answer to the political juggling of legal provisions about "supremacy" of one principle over the other especially the tales that "territorial integrity" has supremacy over the principle of self-determination.

Summing up its opinion the International Court of Justice refers also to the issue of UN Security Council resolutions condemning some declarations of independence (216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning Southern Rhodesia; Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning northern Cyprus; and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning the Republika Srpska) that were mentioned during the proceedings: "The Court notes, however, that in all of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been,

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[9] UN ICJ Advisory opinion, paragraph 79.
[10] Ibid., par. 80.

connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (jus cogens). ... The exceptional character of the resolutions enumerated above appears to the Court to confirm that no general prohibition against unilateral declarations of independence may be inferred from the practice of the Security Council"[11]. Therefore, the court, analysing the existing norms of international law and the facts, once again confirms that illegality cannot have legal consequences *(Ex injuria non oritur jus)*, and that unilateral declaration itself is not illegal, even more it is a common practice and correct procedure if it is not connected with unlawful use of force or with a violation of law.

Thus, the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice does not apply only the Kosova case but it discusses general norms and provisions of the International Law with which the Kosova case is being compared. So it, first of all, has a universal nature and may be applied to other similar cases and, secondly, it contains several statements on legal provisions and principles of the International Law that are used to be manipulated. Hereby, the advisory opinion may play a role of a turning point in the history of nation building and, on the other hand, become an important source for commenting the provisions of the International Law. In general, this and similar decisions and conclusions of the Court have an important place in the system of international law, since they become a source of international law "as an auxiliary tool for the establishment of legal norms"[12].

Is this a precedent?

Hereby, to understand whether the ICJ Advisory opinion and its main provision may be applied to the Karabakh case we should, first of all, observe the legal aspect of the declaration of independence of the Nagorno Karabakh Republic and, secondly, compare the results with the provisions and statements of the Opinion as it is done in the Kosova case. As the Advisory opinion states: "The declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 must be considered within the factual context which led to its adoption"[13]. So we will do the same in the Karabakh case.

The legal context of the NKR independence

On the 2nd September, 1991 the joint session of the people's deputies of the Nagorno Karabakh region and the Shahumyan region was adopted the declaration of independence. On the 10th December the same year the question of NKR independence was put to a referendum. All the time this process was going on the USSR was still existing with its political and constitutional system until the 25th December 1991. So, the only constitutional and legal context on which we may and have to discuss the legal background of the

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[11] UN ICJ Advisory opinion, paragraph 81.
[12] Statute of the International Court of Justice, Article 38.
[13] UN ICJ Advisory opinion, paragraph 57.

declaration of NKR independence consists of the USSR Constitution and the law of April 3, 1990 on "Law on the Procedures of the Resolution of Problems of Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR".

In the USSR Constitution the article 72 referred to the right of secession stating "each union republic has the right to freely withdraw from the USSR"[14]. On the basis of this constitutional provision raises and develops the above mentioned law on the procedures of secession that solves the problems with a union republic, autonomy or a region withdrawal from the Union in details.

So the Article 3 of the law states: "In case the Soviet Republic has autonomous republics, autonomous regions or autonomous territories within its borders, referendums are to be conducted separately in each of the autonomies. The people residing in the autonomies are given a right to independently decide whether to remain in the Soviet Union or in the seceding Republic as well as to decide on their state legal status"[15]. So according to the referendum of September 2 Nagorno Karabakh withdrew not only from the Union Republic of Azerbaijan (SSR of Azerbaijan) but also the USSR itself.

The opponents of this statement may point out both the "Declaration on Restoration of the State Independence of the Republic" and the Constitutional act "On the state independence of the Azerbaijan Republic" adopted at the extraordinary session of the Supreme Council of Azerbaijani SSR, correspondingly, on 30th August and 18th October 1991 according to which the newly independent Azerbaijan declared itself a successor of the Democratic Republic of Azerbaijan of 1918–1920[16]. With this step the new authorities of Azerbaijan announced that the restoration of the republic of 1918–1920 exempts them from the jurisdiction Soviet law and Constitution. Besides this the National Assembly of Azerbaijan passed the resolution No. 279-XII on November 23, 1991, that was signed into law by Ayaz Mutalibov on 26 November, 1991 under the name "Law on Abolishment of Nagorno-Karabakh Autonomous Oblast". This was an attempt to eliminate the right of the people of the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast to use the abovementioned provisions of the law from April 3, 1990. Though this has two main counterarguments:

1. When the Azerbaijani Supreme Council attempted to adopt "Declaration on Restoration of the State Independence of the Republic" and the Constitutional act "On the state independence of the Azerbaijan Republic" and declared itself a successor of the Azerbaijani Democratic Republic of 1918–1920 it automatically refused all its legal claims over the de-jure territory of the Azerbaijani Soviet Socialistic Republic of 1920–1991 claiming its rights over the territory of the Azerbaijani Republic of 1918–1920 which never included the territory of Nagorno

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[14] USSR Constitution, adopted October 7, 1977, article 72.
[15] Law on the Procedures of the Resolution of Problems of Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR, April 3, 1990, Article 3.
[16] Constitutional act "On the state independence of the Azerbaijan Republic", 18 October 1991, Baku, Article 2.

Karabakh[17]. Even more, the territory of the Nagorno Karabakh was attached to the territory of the Azerbaijani SSR according to a questionable and illegal decision of the Caucasian Bureau of the Communist party from the 5th July, 1921. So, the territory of Nagorno Karabakh have been included in the frames of the Azerbaijani SSR administrative borders according to the Soviet legal and constitutional system.

2. With the law on Abolishment of the Nagorno Karabakh autonomous Oblast the Azerbaijani authorities tried to prevent the realisation of their right by the people of the Oblast stated in the Law from the 3rd April, 1990. But they may be did not pay attention or tried not to notice the second paragraph of the same 3rd Article of the Law that stated "Referendum results are to be considered separately for the territory of a Soviet Republic with a compactly settled ethnic minority population, which constitutes majority on that particular territory of the Republic"[18]. So the people of the Nagorno Karabakh both as an autonomous unit and a compactly settled by an ethnic minority territory had the right to decide its status itself. Meanwhile the Azerbaijani authorities had no right to abolish the autonomous oblast of the Nagorno Karabakh as the solution of such questions was under the jurisdiction of the highest authorities of the USSR[19].

Thus we may conclude that the appropriate legal and constitutional background of the declaration of independence by the people of Nagorno Karabakh is fully adequate and corresponds to the requirements highlighted in the Advisory opinion of the ICJ from 22nd July, 2010.

On the other hand the Court discusses whether the provisional authorities in Kosovo's autonomy have acted in constitutional framework. Especially the Court pays attention to the question if all the bodies of Kosovo have acted jointly and whether the declaration of independence is the result of one of them or not[20]. In the Karabakh issue we see that on this case a classic example of a joint action of the all bodies of the autonomy is the joint session of people's deputies of the Nagorno Karabakh region and the Shahumyan region on the 2nd September of 1991. Afterwards, the decision of the session (the Declaration) was put on a referendum that is the highest index of democratic way of decision making. So, we may state that the actions of the authorities of the Nagorno Karabakh also totally coincide with the requirements of the ICJ stated in the Opinion on the Kosova independence. Herein, we may conclude that both legal frames and the very actions of the declaration of Nagorno Karabakh

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[17] According to the article 2 of the Gulistan Russian-Iranian contract of 12th October, 1813 Karabakh became a part of Russia. After the abolishment of Karabakh Khanate in 1822 it ceded to Yelizavetpoli with tsarist authorities. After the October Revolution of 1917 the Azerbaijani (then-Tatar) government just announced its claims over the Nagorno-Karabakh and tried to realise its "right" by force of arms. In this case also, the claims of the National Council of Caucasian Tatars in Baku, and afterwards of the Azerbaijani authorities were unreasonable and unlawful, because they were based solely on simple territorial claims which were not coinciding with the free expression of the will of the people of Nagorno-Karabakh. Finally, after the sovietisation of Azerbaijan and the South Caucasus the issue has been resolved at a session of Caucasian Bureau with an illegal decision.

[18] Law on the Procedures of the Resolution of Problems of Secession of a Union Republic from the USSR, April 3, 1990, Article 3.

[19] USSR Constitution, adopted October 7, 1977, article 73, point 1.

[20] UN ICJ Advisory opinion, paragraph 109.

independence by its people is totally consistent with the nature and the logic of the provisions of the International Law.

The case of the UN Security Council resolutions

Another topic often manipulated in the cases both of the Kosova and Karabakh is the question connected with the UN Security Council resolutions. In the Kosova case a such important document is resolution 1244 (1999) adopted on the 10th June 1999. On the Karabakh case the Security Council adopted 4 resolutions: 822(1993) (30th April, 1993), 853(1993) (29th July, 1993), 874(1993) (14th October, 1993), 884(1993) (12th November, 1993). The General Assembly also adopted 4 resolutions: 48/114 (20th December, 1993), 60/285 (7th September, 2006), 62/28 (5th December, 2007), 62/243 (14th March, 2008). In the frames of discussions on Karabakh conflict the Azerbaijani side often refers to the resolutions the first 4 of which refer to the wartime developments on the Karabakh frontline until 1994 ceasefire and the second 4 do not have binding force.

Anyway, even from a short look at the resolutions it becomes obvious that they are incomparable with the resolution 1244 (1999) as this is something like a road map of the Kosova issue solution and states the actions of the parties. By the way, in this resolution we have FRY and the international community as parties the latter of which recognises the territorial integrity of the first and its superiority over Kosova[21]. Even more, the international community takes obligations in the resolution to act as a peacemaker until a long-lasting peace and rule of law will be established in Kosova. It was also set in the Resolution that the Kosova case should be solved in the frames of the territorial integrity of FRY on a level of autonomy[22]. For this purpose there have been established international civil and police provisional administrations in Kosova.

The reality is that all the process ended up in a different result: the provisional administration declared independence in fact extending its mandate received from UN Security Council and the ICJ stated that the "Resolution 1244 (1999) thus does not preclude the issuance of the declaration of independence of 17 February 2008 because the two instruments operate on a different level: unlike resolution 1244 (1999), the declaration of independence is an attempt to determine finally the status of Kosovo"[23].

Hereby, if the Resolution 1244 (1999), much more powerful and fundamental in its nature, does not preclude the declaration of independence in the very case of Kosova, the resolutions on the Karabakh case do not have potential even for being discussed on the context of the conflict resolution as they refer to the reality of wartime calling the sides not to go forward. This is a fact that these resolutions also operate on a different level than is the final determination of the status of Nagorno Karabakh Republic. So the final word is up to the

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[21] Resolution 1244 (1999), adopted by the Security Council at the 4011th session, 10th June, 1999, Preamble, point 10.
[22] Ibid., point 11.
[23] UN ICJ Advisory opinion, paragraph 114.

declaration of Independence of the republic of Nagorno Karabakh adopted by the people of Karabakh on a referendum on the 2nd September, 1991.

Thus, both from the point of view of international legality and constitutional framework and the legality of the actions of the authorities the Advisory opinion of the International Courte of Justice from the 22nd July 2010 may be fully applied to the Karabakh. As a result it may be stated that the declaration of independence by the people of Karabakh fully coincides the provisions of the International law.

Conclusions

In the official letter of Australia recognizing the independence of Kosova it is written: "The United Nations and NATO have worked tirelessly since 1999 to assist in setting up self-governing institutions and to help the people of Kosovo rebuild their lives. Much remains to be done, and it is important that the international community, in particular the United Nations and European Community, continue efforts to bring about a lasting peaceful future for Kosovo and the region"[24].

Meanwhile, after the declaration of independence in Nagorno Karabakh Republic there have been formed all the state bodies that are realizing an effective government. The bodies form on the basis of the Constitution of the NKR that is adopted on a nationwide referendum. The authorities are being formed by the local political parties and politicians via periodical elections that receive high remarks from international monitors. It should be mentioned once more that the state bodies and the governing structure in NKR is established and formed by its people without any international interference. This shows that the ability of self-determination and self-organisation of the people of NKR is on an appropriate level and high enough to build a nation in a legal and democratic way that may be an example for many countries with internationally recognised independence. At the same time, NKR is a stabilizing factor in the South Caucasus which is not a minor issue in the context of the security and stability issues of the region.

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[24] Australia Recognises the Republic of Kosovo, 19 February 2008 [online] Available at: <http://www.foreign minister.gov.au/releases/2008/fa-s034_08.html>

THE REMEDIAL SECESSION THEORY:
IS IT A DEMOCRATIC RESPONSE TO UNRESOLVED
NATIONAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS?

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Abstract

In international law, the National and ethnics conflicts are analysed in three categories without the situation of colonialism. First, the problem of the rights of minorities in the State; secondly, the reconnaissance of the right to the self-determination intern to the "peoples" who are minorities in the State, but live in a region where they are majorities, third, the reconnaissance of the right to secession unilateral. For the first situation, in the texts of international law, we can find lots of regulation in the context of the human rights and rights of peoples, just like the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Pacts of 1966, and Helsinki Final Act etc.). In the context of the self-determination intern, it is generally accepted that the minorities who qualified like a "people" have the right to choose its political, economic, social and cultural system in the context of the self-governing. The last category is related to the notion of secession that is prohibited by international law. But, since the Kosovo war, the doctrine of international law is discussing the legality and legitimacy of a new concept: "remedial secession".

The question of the right to secession made a comeback very noticed in the writings of the internationalist doctrine in response to the declaration of independence of Kosovo. In fact, it is the failure of the constitutional right of a State to provide a place and status acceptable to minorities. Withal, the situations are internationalised by the effect of massive campaigns of repression of minorities conducted by the authorities of the State.

International law protects the territorial integrity of states, but it also recognises the right of peoples to self-determination. A people must exercise their right to self-determination in respect of the territorial integrity of the state and its borders. However, according to the theory of remedial-secession, in special circumstances, the principle of self-determination must override the antagonistic territorial integrity. This theory, which is "remedial-secession" or "corrective-secession" consists in activation of the external self-determination; the right of a people to secede and become independent. In this perspective, the idea of "remedial secession" refers not only to the idea of redress, ultimate solution for solving a problem, but also "corrective", treatment prescribed to the infra-state entity that suffers from being marginalised or repressed with violence.

In the Balkans, it is not ignorable that there is lots of ethnicity living in the same state. The democratic response to unresolved National and ethnics conflicts must research first of all in

the democratic systems which respect the difference of the entities, then in the reconnaissance to the right of self-determination intern, and if the problem cannot be resolved, it will be adequate to accept the right of remedial-secession. In this article, we aimed to find the legal dimension of this concept and then, the applicability and the results of this concept to the national and ethnics conflicts in Balkans.

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DID ETHNIC CLEANSING SUCCEED? THE CONSTRAINTS ON THE INTERNATIONAL ATTEMPT TO REVERSE ETHNO-TERRITORIALISATION AND STIMULATE MINORITY RETURN IN BOSNIA AND HERZEGOVINA

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Key Words: *Bosnia and Herzegovina, international intervention, ethnic cleansing, minority return*

Abstract

International interventions have had long-term consequences on the formation of ethno-national relations in the Balkans since the 19th century. Imposing new boundaries, population exchanges or peace plans in the framework of the idealised nation-state have contributed to "ethnic unmixing" and the break-up of heterogeneous societies which were capable of accommodating ethnic, linguistic and religious differences. International and national attempts to organise people into a matrix of collective identities and fix human relations within the frontiers of nation-states both challenged and were challenged by varieties of lived, local, human experience. In the case of Bosnia and Herzegovina, international negotiators misinterpreted the complex chain of events in 1992 as an "ethnic conflict" among ethnically distinct "warring factions" which could be solved with an ethnographic map by drawing borders around places that had never been partitioned and separating people who had never been segregated before. They failed to realise that by sanctioning "ethnic reality" they were in fact empowering "representatives" of ethnic collectivities and inducing them to create new ethnic realities on the ground. The strategic use of violence activated processes of social homogenisation and ethnic polarisation, while various local and international actors interacted to navigate toward a more coherent map. The transformation of group solidarity and loyalties helped the false conceptualisation of the Bosnian conflict as "ethnic" become a self-fulfilling prophecy.

The Dayton Agreement kept multiple state-building projects in play. On the one hand, it institutionalised the link between ethnicity, territory and political authority and legitimised Republika Srpska and ten cantons within the Federation. On the other hand, it emphasised the unified and multi-ethnic character of the Bosnian state and guaranteed the right of all refugees and internally displaced persons to return to their pre-war homes. Refugee return became a central element of post-war reconstruction and the international actors prioritised minority returns as a vehicle of undoing the territorialisation of ethnic belonging. Property repossession has been used as a measurement of success by international organisations which is understandable given the fact that violent expropriation of property was a most important strategy of war profiteering and consolidation of local rule. Nevertheless, data focusing on properties are misleading. In a lot of cases and places refugees and IDPs have not returned

permanently and the territorialisation of ethnicity has proved to be successful to a large degree. The aim of this paper is to illuminate the constraints on the international efforts to reverse the consequences of ethnic cleansing, investigate the impediments to sustainable return and compare differing experiences in various localities. Based on multiple sources and interviews from the field I would like to underline that international actors have not adequately addressed the challenges of the complicated and interlinked post-war and post socialist transformation and have not dismantled the structures that in many ways replicate the logic of war in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

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20 YEARS OF POLISH-SLOVAK NEIGHBOURHOOD (1993–2013): CONDITIONS, PROBLEMS AND IMPLICATIONS

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Key Words: *Poland, Slovakia, Visegrad Group, interstate relations, transfrontier cooperation*

Abstract

Polish-Slovak interstate relations have been established only about two decades ago, however, the connections between the two nations have been already lasting for centuries. Geographical, cultural and lingual closeness have made that just after the dissolution of Czechoslovakia Poland have expressed favourable attention in setting good-neighbourly relations with Slovakia. Since Slovakia was recognised as a sovereign state on the international stage, Polish-Slovak relations have been described as a "strategic partnership". From the very beginning, Polish political elite have agreed that independent, democratic and stable Slovakia, as well as establishment of solid Polish-Slovak relations, are of the highest importance in Polish reason of state. Polish authorities have been consistently supporting Slovakia's both European and Transatlantic aspirations, especially during the times when it was excluded from abovementioned integration processes due to internal issues.

Contemporary Polish-Slovak relations could be described as good, but not specific. However, well-developing transfrontier cooperation between Poland and Slovakia was undoubtedly a success. It gained a significant social and economic importance. Between 1993 and 2000 a few euroregions were settled in the borderland. What is one of the crucial factors, which influence the transfrontier cooperation, is the Slovak minority in Poland. Moreover, the insufficiently developed communication infrastructure, including the lack of railway connections, is a pressing problem in Polish-Slovak relations. Furthermore, some discrepancies between both countries are visible in the approach to particular and essential issues regarding the functioning of the EU and relation with Russia and within NATO. On the upside, the regional collaboration of both states within the Visegrad Group, as well as jointly addresses at the EU forums, are worth of attention. Concluding, despite certain cooling of bilateral relations, the ties preserved and are foresighted to maintain their friendly and good-neighbourly nature.

The aim of my presentation is to analyse the contemporary Polish-Slovak relations in a multidimensional matter. The analysis will address the post-cold war era, including historical conditions of the relations and European integration processes. The implementation of this assumption is an answer to a need of constant observation and interpretation of mutual relations, which have always been carrying a baggage of historical experiences. It seems to be necessary to initiate research in view of common interests in the scope of Polish-Slovak

cooperation within the Visegrad Group, the EU and NATO. The subject of research include: (a) historical conditions of Polish-Slovak relations; (b) contemporary Polish-Slovak relations on political, economic and cultural levels; (c) factors which are integrating and disintegrating Polish-Slovak cooperation; (d) the influence of European integration on the essence of contemporary Polish-Slovak relations; (e) possible and desirable directions of Polish-Slovak relations' development.

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LEGAL ASPECTS IN ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION (INTERNATIONAL LAW AND STATE LAW)

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Abstract

The Final Paper seeks to explore the contemporary state of International Law and its practical usage in the beginning, during and after the ethnic conflict. Of course, rules of international humanitarian Law run and are fundamental (essential) for such issues. But, in the situation when the leading powers of the state are not available to react ant to regulate somehow the "situation", so the question is how to prevent legally ethnic violence. UN Charter doesn't contain an exact determination of "ethnic conflict". We can find such terms as "situation" and "disputes" (see: Chapter VI of the UN Charter – Pacific Settlements of Disputes), which makes it unable to clearly identify the subject of regulation, especially as the major part of the ethnic conflicts based on economic, political, social reasons. Complexity of substantive Governing Law enforcement and public Law enforcement applies according to clarity of sense of the terminology. International Humanitarian Law and International Organisation's acts towards interethnic conflicts take place and influence somehow to ease destructive effects among peaceful population.

The paper presents preliminary report and analysis of a survey study carried out on ethnic conflict in Kyrgyzstan.

The final paper's main argument is that if an ethnic group which is involved in armed conflict (especially if it takes place near the boarders of their state), if there is a situation when the Government itself cannot react and ease the conflict without well-known techniques what procedures will be taken by the international community. The paper is organised as follows: it starts by underlining the characteristics of current (contemporary) International Public Law towards the ethnic groups' rights and ethnic conflict determination, and also the role and significance of such determination in prevention and investigating armed conflicts. Then follows the main approach and argument, which specifies the context and processes through which International Law react and prevent ethnic conflicts just to be more closer to ordinary people's life and guarantee safety. The next section describes as an example the Kyrgyz-Uzbek clashes in Kyrgyz Republic in 2010. The results from the theoretical analysis are then presented and the final section offers some conclusions.

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THE IMPACT OF EUROPEAN ACCESSION ON REGIONAL POLICY REFORM IN CROATIA

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Abstract

The paper presents the basic issues of regional and cohesion policy in Croatia with an emphasis on general administrative reforms and decentralisation process as well as the effects of Croatia's EU accession on regional policy. To start with, one of the main characteristics features of Croatia's regional policy is extreme fragmentation of territorial and administrative units. The country is characterised by huge spatial inequalities and more than a half of local self-government units have a development index below 75% of Croatian average and differences in socio-economic development between the most and least developed counties are nearly sevenfold. On the bases above the issue of systematic care for underdeveloped areas of the country was the main issue of Croatian regional policy based on several pieces of legislation. On one hand it seems that in the modern approach of the regional development shaped through the aid to undeveloped and war affected lagging areas, without any regional strategies resulted in a number of deficiencies such as, fragmented territorial and administrative structure, insufficient institutional capacity, lacking of horizontal and vertical cooperation and partnership, weak fiscal power. The adequate regional policy and strategy planning had been missing for a long time, and it was just in December 2009, when the Law on Regional Development was passed and in summer 2010 year when Regional Strategy was adopted.

On the other hand process of accession of Croatia to the European Union also bears important effects for regional development, such as the obligation of defining statistical planning regions at NUTS 2 level, through which cohesion policy is implemented or preparing the necessary national institutional framework in order to meet the EU accession criteria and to access the structural and cohesion funds, after obtaining the member state status.

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1. Historic, cultural and administrative traditions of country's diversity

The Republic of Croatia consists of three large natural-geographic areas namely the lowland territory called Pannonian and Peripannonian region, the littoral called the Adriatic coastal region, and the 3rd is the highland-alpine Mountainous region, which is located between the previous two. (Nejašmić, 2001) The northern, primarily lowland area, is part of the Pannonian Basin, the Adriatic coastal belt belongs to the Mediterranean, while the highland-mountainous area is a part of the Dinaric Alps. (Klemenac, 1994) Out of a total 4.4 million residents (2011), 64% lived in the Pannonian Region (of which 31% lived in the Eastern and 69% in the Western part), 30.2% in the Adriatic Region while only 5.8% was living in the mountain region. (Državni, 2011)

In addition, the complexity of Croatia's position, determined by its contact with and the influence of diverse ethnic, cultural, economic and political European entities. Croatian statehood can be dated back very far into history, to the 852, which was interrupted by Hungarian Kingdom in 1102, and Croatia was first established as an administrative unit in the current shape just in 20th century. The country was influenced not only by Hungarian Kingdom, later by Austria and Austro-Hungarian Empire but also for long periods by Venice, resulting in Central European character and Mediterranean as well as Islamic/Balkan civilisation features. From the geographical point of view, the mixture of continental European, Alpine and Mediterranean influences in Croatia results in diversified landscape, climate and unique geological features contribute to a diversity of regional system.

All of this, in turn, is reflected in its social, economic and cultural variety of the country. Long-term territorial fragmentation and divergent rulers, different cultural traditions, as well as late unification resulted in very distinct patterns of historical and cultural regional identities. As the territory of the Republic of Croatia has been re-tailored several times during its history, a longer-lasting division which could serve as the basis for regional development policy has never been established. It is revealed that Croatia is exceptionally heterogeneous country, its regional differences in economic and social development are great so to form proper, EU-conform regional units, as well as to define clear regional policy has been one of the most important agenda of the country since declaring its independence. (Fisher, 1966; Jordan, 2011)

2. Regional development and regional policy in Croatia after declaring its independence

Even since the declaration of independence, and especially after the end of the war, Croatia has to face number of unfavourable features in the regional development field, such as huge socio-economic disparities between different regions, depopulation, large number of refugees, deterioration and regression of many parts of the country, poor and neglected transport and technological infrastructure, lack of funds and qualified personnel for reform and modernisation. Croatia inherited the division of the 1980s of Former Yugoslavia, where no intermediary authorities existed between the federal republics and the local units of self-government, so the country lacked the intermediate tier of government. It was just in 1993,

when counties, as a form of mid-tier governance where re-established still under the strong control of the central state. Now Croatia can be defined as a unitary, highly centralised and politicised country, with three tiers of government: national, county or regional, and local.

During the past twenty years, one of the major problems was that no single policy and normative act, no general law of regional development has existed in Croatia and the main instruments of regional policy have been several pieces of legislation and policy documents directly or indirectly affecting issues of regional development. Croatia has begun to develop its regional policy just few years ago, mostly under the external pressure, in order to fulfil requirements for EU accession and obtain EU funds.

On the legal bases it could be distinguished three main stages in the development of Croatia's regional policy. The first covers the longish period, spanning from the Croatian independence to the serious commitments to reform after the elections in 2000. During the second stage (2000–2009) administrative and fiscal decentralisation began. It turned out only in the third period when the unified policy and legal framework for regional development with adequate capacity to direct have been introduced.

In the 1990s the regional policy was not a priority on the national political agenda because they were exceeded in importance by matters such as the war and post-war problems, nation building, making political stability, starting the economic development process and creating market economy. The local and regional reform started with 1990 Constitution which guaranteed the right to local self-government, and followed some other administrative regulations in 1992–93, such as Law on Local and Regional Self-Government and Law on Financing Units of Local Self-governance and Governance. (Ustav, 1990; Zakon, 1992; Zakon, 1993a; Zakon, 1993b) In 1997 Law on Territories, Counties, Cities and Communes was introduced. (Zakon, 1997)

The year 2000 represented a turnover point for Croatia's regional policy. The revision of the Constitution marks the beginning of decentralisation process as well as the second stage of regional policy. The reform was introduced by amendments to the Constitution in 2000 and 2001 and enactment of the new Law on Local and Regional Self-government through which the principles of subsidiarity and solidarity have been accepted, competences have been widened as well as counties have been redesigned as units of regional self-government. (Ivan, 2010; Constitution, 2000; Law, 2001)

The decentralisation reforms have been directed in two areas. One of them was gradual transfer of attributions and professional tasks from central government (ministries) to local and regional government units. The other one considered as the fiscal decentralisation where part of financing public needs was transferred from the state government budget to regional and local government budgets. (Alibegović, 2012)

Through these changes administrative and fiscal decentralisation begun, together with the redistribution of authority, responsibility and financial resources for providing public services among different levels of government in fields such as education, health, social protection and infrastructure. The reform meant a radical turn in regional policy, the power of the central

government was delegated to local and regional self-government, by accepting the concept of local self-government as a counterbalance to the central government. (Koprić 2007a, 2007b) During 2000s regional policy has become a significant priority of the government and the integral part of the overall strategy for national sustainable development and competitiveness.

In 2001 the Office for the Development Strategy of the Government of the Republic of Croatia was set up, which implemented the project for the "Strategy for the Development of Croatia in the 21st century". The document covers 19 different areas relating to economic and social life and names the developmental priorities of the country's regional policy. The strategy contains the most important tasks and measures which have to be undertaken in order to reduce regional disparities while maintaining Croatia's diversity. (Hrvatska, 2001)

During this period the main objectives of regional policy were to diminish the disparities among regions and revitalise the under developed areas; to integrate the sectorial policies at a regional level and stimulate the interregional cooperation, as well as to prepare the necessary national institutional framework in order to meet the EU accession criteria and to access the structural and cohesion funds. (Ivan, 2010)

In the third phase – started in 2009 – new regional policy has emerged as the result of the fulfilment of EU accession requirements. Several years of debate led to the passing of the Law on Regional Development in December 2009, creating a separate regional policy based upon modern, EU conform principles. In addition after the first draft strategy in summer 2010 Croatian National Strategy of Regional Development was adopted along with all by-laws (Decree on Establishment of the Partnership Councils of Statistical Regions; Decree on the Development Index; Rulebook on Establishment and Running of the Central Electronic Base of Development Projects; Rulebook on Obligatory Content, Methodology and Evaluation of County Development Strategies; Rulebook on the Register of Administrative Units of the Counties, Agencies and Other Legal Entities for Better Coordination of Regional Policy).(Ministry, 2010a) The Strategy established Croatia's new framework for regional policy, and the first time the development priorities and objectives with institutional capacity have been defined clearly in all territorial level. (Đulabić, 2011; Maleković, 2011)

The process of decentralisation was followed by Guidelines and Principles for Functional Decentralisation and Territorial Reorganisation issued by 2010. (Ministry, 2010b) The document set up three basic and interconnected components of regional policy, such as functional decentralisation, fiscal decentralisation and territorial reorganisation. The later represents the major problem as Croatia is highly fragmented country, having numerous subnational units. The Guidelines suggests two possible solutions for the territorial reorganisation. One of them is the Monotypic model, which means huge changes in territorial organisation as all the units at the same level have equal status, equal functions and equal monitoring by the central authorities. The Polytypic model suggests preserving the differentiation among the units at the same level. In order to prepare the territorial reorganisation the Ministry of Administration established a Working Group for Decentralisation and Territorial Reorganisation including representatives from professional and academic institutions, the business sector as well as civil sphere. (Maleković, 2011)

Croatian Government with implementing these documents clearly stated that reform of local and regional self-government and is ranked among its priorities, and the decentralisation one of the key government tasks in next several years. Yet, in spite of reforms Croatia is even now a highly centralised country and the initiated decentralisation process in Croatia should be continued by involving all the participants at the central, regional and local level of government with active participation of scientific institutions, NGOs and civil society. (Alibegović, 2012)

3. Local self-government units

From 1967 onwards, the communes [općina] functioned as the only administrative units below the republican level, but they were too small to function as the regions, so after independence the country should introduce a new territorial structure. Croatia has today a two-tier system of sub-national government. Municipalities, towns and cities represent the local level of government (LG), while counties [županija] referred to as regional self-government units (RG). The municipality is a unit of local self-government, consisting of the territories of several inhabited places representing a natural, economic and social entity, and which is connected by the common interests of its inhabitants. (Sumpor, 2004) The capital city of Zagreb, having double, local and regional status, so in total, there are 21 units of regional self-government.

In 1991 Croatia was divided into 102 large općinas, but due to legislation of 1992 the number of units at the municipal level has increased significantly. 418 općinas were established as predominantly rural units. On the bases of 1992 reform there were 68 towns, but their number reached 122 in 1997 and 127 in 2011 (86.7 % increase). (Koprić, 2007b; Jordan, 2011) The new laws allowed that communities i.e. parts of municipalities, groups of villages or even single villages can claim municipal status or even a township because of historical, economic or geographic reasons even if they do not meet the criteria. On the bases above one of the major characteristic features of Croatian regional changes is the consistent growing number of local self-government units – towns and municipalities – with a fivefold increase since 1990. According to the Census 2011 Croatia consists of 556 local self-governments and 21 regional self-governments, and they are further subdivided into 6,756 settlements [naselje]. (Državni, 2011)

More than a 60% of municipalities (276) are too small with population between 1,000 and 3,000 people, and having too little capacity and financial resources for good governance and efficient management, for mobilisation and using their resources to achieve further development, their finances, staff and organisation are not capable to provide local public services. According to Census 2011, there are 38 municipalities having population under 1,000, and in 36.7% of them live just 2,000 inhabitants or less, while seven have more than 10,000 inhabitants and could become cities according to law. The average population of the municipalities is 2,958, including 10 settlements and 86 km^2 territories. In spite of huge differences they all have the same responsibilities and functions. (Državni, 2011)

Table 1 – Municipalities by population

population	municipalities No	municipalities %	population %
under 1,000	37	8.62	2.15
1,001 – 1,500	49	11.42	4.90
1,501 – 2,000	71	16.55	9.90
2,001 – 2,500	63	14.69	10.99
2,501 – 3,000	56	13.05	12.24
3,001 – 3,500	29	6.76	7.52
3,501 – 4,000	35	8.16	10.34
4,001 – 4,500	15	3.50	4.99
4,501 – 5,000	21	4.90	7.79
5,001 – 6,000	24	5.59	10.29
6,001 – 7,000	13	3.03	6.75
7,001 – 8,000	4	0.93	2.32
8,001 – 9,000	4	0.93	2.60
9,001 – 10,000	1	0.23	0.72
10,001 – 11,000	1	0.23	0.79
11,001 – 12,000	5	1.17	4.56
12,001 – 13,000	-	-	-
13,001 – 14,000	-	-	-
14,001 – 15,000	1	0.23	1.14
total	429	100.00%	100.00%

Source: Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske (2011) Popis 2011. Zagreb

The Article 5 of the Law on Local and Regional Self-government defines the city (or town) as a unit of local self-government with more than 10,000 inhabitants, plus all the county centres have this status. However there are some exceptions with some towns or cities having fewer inhabitants can also be declared towns for specific historical and economic reasons. (Jordan, 2011) As the number of the towns has increased significantly there are huge differences among them. The population size of cities varies widely. According to the Census 2011, only four cities have more than 100,000 inhabitants, on the other hand there are 18 that have less than 5,000.The share of inhabitants living in urban areas has increased from 54.3% to 70% during the period of 1992–2011, although many of these cities are too small with 60 cities having population below 10,000. Most cities (their number is 58) are medium sized from 10,000 to 50,000 inhabitants, for one third of urban population. Many of these urban settlements are not capable either of financing their expenditure or of providing the basic services. (Državni, 2011) That is the reason why do they depend on direct transfers from the national budget and national authorities as well as the law level of decentralisation. (Konjhodžić, 2009)

Table 2 – Towns by population

population	towns No	towns %	population %
under 5,000	18	14.17	1.98
5,001 – 10,000	42	33.07	9.84
10,001 – 15,000	30	23.62	12.35
15,001 – 20,000	8	6.30	4.39
20,001 – 30,000	11	8.66	9.04
30,001 – 40,000	4	3.15	4.72
40,001 – 50,000	5	3.94	7.42
50,001 – 60,000	3	2.36	5.71
60,001 – 70,000	1	0.79	2.11
70,001 – 80,000	1	0.79	2.49
80,001 – 90,000	-	-	-
90,001 – 100,000	-	-	-
100,001 – 200,000	3	2.36	13.75
200,001 and over	1	0.79	26.19
total	127	100.00	100.00

Source: Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske (2011) Popis 2011. Zagreb

Croatia is characterised by a significant population concentration in several regional and macro-regional centres and economic activities are mainly concentrated in these urban areas and in the surroundings. Croatia misses the bigger cities, and the country's urban development is based on four growth poles: Zagreb, Split, Rijeka, and Osijek. According to the Census 2011 only these four cities have more than 100,000 inhabitants: Zagreb 790,017, Split 178,102, Rijeka 128,624 and Osijek 108,048, and 40% of whole urban population, one third of total population lives in these centres. (Državni, 2011)

Regional centres have important role, however there are essential differences among them, owing to the geographical position, traditional circumstances, number of inhabitants, socio-economic development. Looked geographically, most of the cities on a coastal zone are smaller but they have a long history and they have played important role in a country development. Such examples are Pula, Dubrovnik (has a specific and world important heritage of long lasting autonomous republic), Zadar (was old capital of Dalmatia) or Šibenik. The continental part of the country based on the capital – according to Central Bureau of Statistics data – which accounts almost 18% of total population, but also 31.5% of GDP. From this it is evident that one of the most relevant features of Croatia's regional development is strong metropolisation and monocentric structure. In the central continental areas cities – Sisak, Vukovar, Karlovac, Slavonski Brod, Varaždin – mainly developed on riversides. Between costal and continental parts there is a vast space where no towns of local or regional significance are settled. Not to talk about certain number of Croatian cities which faces structural problems and their revitalisation is an urgent task of Croatian development and regional policy. (Šišinački)

Map 1 – Regional centres in Croatia

Source: Magaš, D., 2003. Contemporary aspects of the geographical regionalization and administrative-territorial organization of Croatia. *Geoadria*, vol. 8/1, pp.127-147.

The four big cities show real macroregional character (A), while some of the regional centres (B) in certain functions moves towards some macroregional characteristics (such as Zadar, Varaždin, Slavonski Brod, Pula, Karlovac, Dubrovnik), there are cities functioning as regional centres (C) (Šibenik, Bjelovar-Koprivnica, Virovitica, Vinkovci-Vukovar). Finally there are regional centres with insufficient influences (D) (Belovar, Gospić). A trend of rural-urban divide has continued in the country, which is characterised by a growing concentration of population in Zagreb and a few other macro regional and regional centres and narrow coastal areas, while other regions are being depopulated.

One of the major problems of Croatian administrative system is that all the local units – municipalities and cities – have the same functions, responsibilities is defined without any distinctions of the size, population, development, financial strength. The first step of the decentralisation process was the introducing of the new category of large towns having more than 35,000 inhabitants. Implementation of decentralisation was made to strengthen the role of cities, as all countries and 32 large towns have bigger and stronger fiscal and administrative capacity, as well as more responsibilities.

The rapid increase in number of local units has resulted with existence of too many local units with limited financial and organisational resources which are insufficient to effectively manage local unit's functions. In addition almost five-fold increase the number of local units led to enlarged bureaucracy and to reduced and weak capacity. (Ott, 2001) Changes in the number of local government units are inevitable. Solutions to fragmentation problem can be:

amalgamation (merging smaller units into a bigger one), contracting out services between government units and cooperation through the creation of specific organisations (such as associations of municipalities). (Konjhodžić, 2009)

4. Regional self-government

Changes in regional system are one of the most important aspects of post-1990 political changes with considerable impact on regional development. As there were no regional administrative units in former Yugoslavia, introducing counties as the intermediate tier of government in 1992 has been a positive step in regional policy and decentralisation. Still, under the strong control of the central government, with restricted financial and administrative powers and weak organisational capabilities. (Puljiz)

Map 2 – Regional self-government units

Source: Statističke informacije (2008).

Between 1992 and 2001 the counties were supposed to serve as the middle tier of government and in spite of having dual functions as they were intended to be administrative and self-government units they were primarily responsible for solving delegated tasks from the national level, while neglecting their own self-government role. They were rearranged as units of regional self-government by the Law on Local and Regional Self-Government of 2001, strictly separated from the state administrative task and getting wider self-government competences. (Law, 2001; Sumpor, 2004; Koprić, 2007b)

Table 3 – Basic development indicators of the counties

County name	surface km^2	Population	Population density km^2	Towns	Municipalities	Unemployment rate	GDP per capita (Eur)
Republic of Croatia	**56,594**	**4,284,889**	**75.71**	**127**	**429**	**19.1**	**10,111**
Zagreb	3,060	317,606	103.79	9	25	18.0	7,803
Krapina-Zagorje	1,229	132,892	108.13	7	25	18.2	6,576
Sisak-Moslavina	4,468	172,439	38.59	6	13	30.9	8,325
Karlovac	3,626	128,899	35.55	5	17	25.0	7,634
Varaždin	1,262	175,951	139.42	6	22	15.0	8,834
Koprivnica-Križevci	1,748	115,584	66.12	3	22	18.7	9,371
Bjelovar-Bilogora	2,640	119,764	45.37	5	18	28.8	7,677
Primorje-Gorski kotar	3,588	296,195	82.55	14	22	15.7	12,305
Lika-Senj	5,353	50,927	9.51	4	8	22.3	8,707
Virovitica-Podravina	2,024	84,836	41.92	3	13	32.5	6,399
Požega-Slavonia	1,823	78,034	42.81	5	5	26.2	6,229
Slavonski Brod-Posavina	2,030	158,575	78.12	2	26	33.8	5,606
Zadar	3,646	170,017	46.63	6	28	21.0	8,388
Osijek-Baranja	4,155	305,032	73.41	7	35	28.5	8,112
Šibenik-Knin	2,984	109,375	36.65	5	15	23.3	7,239
Vukovar-Sirmium	2,454	179,521	73.15	5	26	32.2	5,974
Split-Dalmatia	4,540	454,798	100.18	16	39	24.0	7,952
Istria	2,813	208,055	73.96	10	31	11.5	12,810
Dubrovnik-Neretva	1,781	122,568	68.82	5	17	18.8	9,990
Međimurje	729	113,804	156.11	3	22	16.8	8,349
City of Zagreb	641	790,017	1232.48	1	-	9.4	17,814

Source: Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske (2011) Popis 2011. Zagreb; Državni zavod za statistiku Republike Hrvatske (2009) Gross domestic product for Republic Croatia, statistical regions at level 2 and counties 2009. Retrieved 24 May 2012. Retrieved 9 June 2012.

However counties were organised as classical regions with the function of a mid-tier of government, this concept was a failure due to fact that they have neither financial resources, nor technical and organisational capacity to fulfil such a function. It is considered that regions according to the EU have to cover areas between 0.8 to 1.5 million inhabitants in order to function properly as the real middle level of governance, so counties are far too small to be as the real middle level of governance. Even the biggest county (except the City of Zagreb)

Split-Dalmatia have less than a half million inhabitants. Latest population census 2011 results show that first five counties in terms of population (Zagreb city, Split-Dalmatia, Zagreb, Osijek-Baranja, Primorje-Gorski kotar) encompass half of the total population, while other sixteen cover the other half. The highest population density is registered in Zagreb (1232.48 inhabitants /km^2), that has a population almost 8 times higher than the county in the second place – Medimurje (156.11 inhabitants /km^2) – and 16 times higher than the Croatian average (75.71 inhabitants/ km^2). (Državni, 2011)

Not to take into account Zagreb the ratio of population density of the least populated county (Lika-Senj) to the most populated county (Međimurje) is very high 1:16.4. Besides the differences generated by the number of inhabitants, there are other differences among the regions generated by the geographic position and by land areas they cover. Average size of the counties is 2,700 sq.km, but there are huge differences among the regional self-government units. The most extreme example is the Lika-Senj County (5,353 sq.km) having twice bigger territory as the average, but the lowest demographic index (9.51 inhabitants /km^2). Lika-Senj County covers more than seven folded bigger land, than the smallest Medimurje county (729 sq.km) with its 156 population density. These differences of the fragmented system of territorial division make more unequal regional units. (Državni, 2011)

Significant regional discrepancies are also noticed in economic and social development of the countries are usually defined in terms of unemployment rate and GDP/capita in a region, and are aggravated by structural changes, which have social and economic consequences.

According to the 2009 data, only three out of 21 Croatian counties had GDP/capita above the national level. The GDP of the City of Zagreb (17,814) in 2009 was 77 % above the national level, in Istria it was 27% above, and in the County of Primorje-Gorski kotar 21.9% above, later centering on the third largest city, Rijeka. In all the other counties estimated GDP/capita was below the national level. Three following counties, ranked by the GDP, are Koprivnica-Križevci, Dubrovnik-Neretva, Varaždin, two of them are in the most developed Western part of the country. The least developed counties are Slavonski Brod-Posavina (5,606) and Vukovar-Sirmium (5,974), where the GDP/capita levels are less than 60% of the national average, and both of them situated in Eastern, war affected areas, in Slavonia. In 2009 the most developed county had a GDP/capita 3.9 times higher than did the least developed one. (Državni, 2009; Croatian, 2009)

The other indicator of regional development and regional disparities is the regional unemployment rate, and there are significant discrepancies in the unemployment rate at regional units' level. The unemployment rate at national level according to 2011census was 19.1%. At county level, there were some remarkable deviations from the national average, and high dispersion of unemployment rate between Croatian counties occurs. The lowest unemployment rate was in the City of Zagreb (9.4 %) and in the County of Istria (11.5 %). There are altogether 8 counties where the unemployment rate is below the national level. Regarding regional disparities, the counties with GDP/capita above national level also have lower unemployment rates (City of Zagreb, County of Istria). On the other hand counties demonstrate the lower GDP/capita, recorded the highest unemployment rates. There are many

counties that have very high unemployment rates while they face with very deep structural problems as well. The lowest value is registered in Slavonski Brod-Posavina (33.8%), Virovitica-Podravina (32.5%), Vukovar-Sirmium (32.2%), Sisak-Moslavina (30.9%) situated the most underdeveloped Eastern area of the country, and in two of them the lowest GDP/capita is registered. (Državni, 2009; Croatian, 2009)

It can be concluded that the heterogeneity of the natural, territorial, social, historical, economic and political factors of the country, it is very difficult to offer clear solutions for identifying the optimal size for the local or regional territorial units. With respect to the relation between disparities and regional policy, the size of the disparities and their negative dynamics would take more into account existing regional differences.

5. Nomenclature of territorial units for statistics in Croatia

One of the enlargement requirements Croatia has to fulfil is to divide its territory according to the Nomenclature of Territorial units for Statistics, a hierarchical system which encompasses the hierarchical division of the entire EU territory in national, regional and administrative territories. The Republic of Croatia is encompassed by the NUTS system on three levels. The first level (NUTS-1) covers the entire national territory, the second level (NUTS-2) encompasses the division of the country into regions, while the counties represent the third level (NUTS-3) of the system.

According to the population census taken in 2011, the population size of Croatia is 4,284,889 inhabitants. The criterion according to which the statistical regions of the first level must count is between 3,000,000 and 7,000,000 inhabitants does not allow the division of Croatia into more than one NUTS I level region. So Croatia as a whole needs to be considered a NUTS I level region.

The 21 counties of Croatia correspond to the EU statistical nomenclature at the NUTS III. The average population size of Croatian counties is 204,042 inhabitants, so counties do not really fulfil the criteria (800,000 to 300,000 inhabitants). In spite of this fact counties, as the traditional local units introduced as the statistical regions of the third level. In EU there is no obligation to introduce the NUTS IV and V level (LAU I and II), this level should not be included in the Nomenclature. Croatian cities and municipalities represent the territorial units of the fifth level, which is the smallest administrative unit in EU.

However the biggest problem was how to define the NUTS II level, as there were no administrative territorial units that correspond to this level. The main point was to form regions by combining the existing counties. The question aroused what additional criteria should be taken into account. Besides the criteria of population size (population between 3 million to 800,000) the other ruling factors governing the NUTS II system are: suitable size, homogeneity of economic development of a given region, maximal financial effect for structural fund in a long term period, similarities in natural and geopolitical situation, regional identity, common mentality, customs, social conveniences and historical tradition. As result

came thirteen versions for the establishment of statistical regions of the second NUTS level and there were proposals of division into five, four, three or two NUTS II statistical regions. After a long debate in March 2007 Croatia was divided into three NUTS II regions:

- North-West – with 6 countries, covering the smallest territories (15.3%) of the country but counting the biggest population (1,645,845), having 78.3% GDP of EU average level of development.
- Central and East (Pannonian) Croatia – with 8 counties, with almost three times bigger land (40.5%) than North-West area, but with the smallest number of the inhabitants (1,227,100) and the lowest GDP /capita (45.5% EU 27).
- Adriatic Croatia – includes all the 7 coastal counties, covering the biggest territories (44.2%), having 1,411,935 inhabitants, and 62.1% GDP of EU 27 average.

It is seen that three-region system has the huge disparities.

Map 3 – NUTS II regions in 2007

Source: Ministarstvo regionalnoga razvoja i fondova Europske unije: Nova statistička klasifikacija prostornih jedinica RH - NUTS 2.

In the three-region-system introduced in 2007, the criteria of population size was proportionately distributed, however considering the economic homogeneity there were disparities of each regions. The Adriatic region is considered as the most stable regarding of its economic development. This region had common historic and cultural heritage, geopolitical character, which results in unified and common way of thinking among the inhabitants of this part of the country.

The area of the Pannonian Croatia was determined by a greater degree of differentiation than that of the Adriatic Croatia, whereby the Eastern part of the region is characterised by weaker

development and industry than the Western one. Despite these differences, in the broad sense, there were no major differences in the Pannonian region, which is characterised by similar economic – mainly rural – structure and therefore this area can be qualified as a relatively stable one considering the factor of economic homogeneity. On the consequence, there were no major oscillations in the Adriatic and Pannonian regions.

The region of North-West Croatia had a much larger disparities than the two other areas. The key problem of this region lies that the City of Zagreb asserted itself not only as the administrative and political centre, but also as an economic, financial, educational and cultural centre of power. Due to the economic superiority of the capital, the whole region came above of 75% of EU average level of development. It means that the region would not be a convergence one, having much less EU structural funds under the competiveness and employment objective. This is opposite the criteria according to the NUTS II regions in the Republic of Croatia should be organised in such a way as to enable them to receive the maximum amount of financial resources for the implementation of planned projects.

On the consequence the country passed a decision to change the three NUTS II region system and from the 1 January 2013 on Croatia has been divided into two statistical regions – Continental and Adriatic – Croatia. In the new model the North-West region was joined with the Pannonian one and the newly founded region was named Continental Croatia, while the Adriatic region remained a separate entity and virtually the same as the previous Coastal region covering seven counties.

Map 4 – NUT II regions since 1 January 2013

Source: Ministarstvo regionalnoga razvoja i fondova Europske unije: Nova statistička klasifikacija prostornih jedinica RH - NUTS 2.

Both 2 regions fulfil the criteria of population size, whereby there are huge disparity between them. The Adriatic region has 1,411,935 inhabitants, while the newly created Continental region population is twice bigger, it is counted 2,872,954 population. Same as the old structure, the new model also has a problem with unequal development in the Continental region. The newly created region covers a much greater territory 55.8% of the whole Croatia. On one hand this larger area now has an overall lower development level and should participate with a lower share of own financial resources, but on the other hand it will receive greater amount EU funds. The joining of the two previous regions has led to increased heterogeneity of the level of economic development in the Continental region, which is in the long term, could eventually result in disruption and partial inability of implementation of the envisaged regional policy. (Political, 2013)

6. Areas of special state concern

In the second half of the 1990s regional policy was based on support for war-torn areas through the Law on Areas of Special State Concern (ASSC) adopted by the government after the war, in 1996. (Zakon, 1996) The Law has introduced three basic types of incentives for war-torn areas. The first group consisted areas occupied in the Croatian war of independence, and located next to (not more than 15 km air distance) state boundaries, with up to 5,000 inhabitants. Towns, municipalities and settlements occupied in the Croatian war of independence, excluding areas in group I. belonged to the second category. In both cases focus has been primarily on the reconstruction of infrastructure and housing stock, on targeting the economic growth, and on the improvement of life conditions. The third group of ASSC meant the economically underdeveloped areas, with criterion law economy, having structural and demographic problems as well as territories with some special criterion such as borderland or mine areas. (Council, 2010)

Concentration of support on war-torn areas has led to neglect of the other parts of the country. This has been partially corrected by the adoption of the Islands Act in 1999, Act on Hilly and Mountainous Areas (HMA). Finally, in 2002 special Act on Reconstruction and Development of City of Vukovar was passed. The same year the government has changed the criteria of Areas of Special State Concern, exciding the status to all the other areas affected by war. Despite the fact, that in 2009 the Law on Regional Development on the bases of development index introduced new system of regional and local units, the ASSC and HMA areas are still exists.

The ASSC areas encompass 180 local self-government units (municipalities and towns), amounting 15.3% of Croatia's total population. The population of hilly and mountainous areas counts 4.8% of the total population, while 131,000 inhabitants live on islands make up 2.9 % of Croatia's total population. According to existing criteria, altogether 23% of the total population of Croatia falls under the category of areas receiving aid, covering 64.3% of the total surface of the country.

Map 5 – Areas with special developmental problems

Table 4 – Areas of Special State Concern, Hilly and mountainous areas, Islands

	Local units	Inhabitants	Surface (km^2)
ASSC	180	15.3 % = 680,000	48.5 % = 27,400
HMA	45	4.8 % = 212,000	10.5 % = 5,920
ISLANDS	50	2.9 % = 131,000	5.3 % = 3,000
TOTAL	275	23.0 % = 1,023,000	64.3 % = 36,320

Source: Regional Competitiveness Operational Programme 2007–2013. 2007HR16IPO001, Instrument for Pre-accession Assistance. Republic of Croatia. September 2007.

7. Conclusion

On one hand the Croatian regional diversity from economic, social, cultural and geographic point of view represents an extremely valuable treasure for the country and its economic development, but on the other hand it also generates series of disadvantages and problems to solve. In spite of decentralisation process resulted in the increasing number of local self-government units in 1990s, Croatia has remained a highly centralised country and this centralised approach is combined with an insufficient institutional capacity at local and regional level. The problem of Croatian decentralisation, that the transfer of responsibilities has not been followed by an adequate allocation.

However some negative consequences of decentralisation for local government may also occur, in particular decentralisation widened spatial disparities and the growing number of municipalities and towns led to the territorial fragmentation. The Croatian territorial structure is too complicated and the extreme fragmentation of territorial and administrative structure

has the serious drawback. The small size of counties and local self-governments, as well as existence of too many local units with limited and inadequate administrative, institutional and fiscal capacity for developed programming is one of the crucial problems of Croatian territorial and administrative structure. Considering the heterogeneity of the natural, social, historical, economic and political factors, it is very difficult to offer clear solutions for identifying the optimal size and number for the local or regional territorial units.

Furthermore, there is no clear division of functions among the different levels of government and the scope of responsibilities is defined without any distinction of the size, population, achieved development and financial strength.

Further, the lack of political will for introducing a modern and coherent regional policy and establishing a new institutional framework for its implementation as well as the strategic dimension has been missing for a long time. Modern regional policy was not on the policy agenda in Croatia for the most part of the 1990s and the real decentralisation process started too late, only in 2001. Coherent regional development policy that would take care of all parts of the country was missing and needless to say, effective monitoring process and evaluation of on-going and implemented development projects demonstrates severe weaknesses.

Since 1991 there have been different authorities responsible for regional development. The Ministry of Regional Development, Forestry and Water Management was created in 2007 and regional development policy became a prime focus of the newly established ministry however even now several central administrative bodies and authorities play an important role in regional development.

Among other characteristics of the recent regional policy it can also be mentioned that there is poor horizontal and vertical coordination between central state as well as other bodies and institutions dealing with regional development. The main instruments of regional policy have been several pieces of legislation. There has been no single normative act and legal framework which would, at the level of a general law, address the basic principles, set the basis for the policy of regional development. (Maleković, et al., 2011; Maleković et al., 2010)

The above mentioned considerations are some of the main reasons why the regional development has been a hot topic in Croatia. The Croatian regional structure needs territorial reorganisation and re-conceptualisation for both decentralisation process and as well as for the implementation more effective regional policy. It needs to pay special attention to create larger units of regional and local self-governments which could be more efficient. The regional development policy measures should be more proactive (rather than reactive), they should be focused on the future development and not just ponder about the past. Institutional framework for regional policy management has to be more clear and simple.

It is evident that Croatian regional policy is in transition, however the adopted legal and policy frameworks could serve as a tool for modern regional policy. (Maleković et al., 2011; Đulabić, 2011)

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EUROPEAN IDENTITY IN FLUX:
IDENTITY PATTERNS IN A MULTI-SPEED EUROPE WITH SPECIAL FOCUS ON THE CENTRAL-, EASTERN EUROPEANS' COLLECTIVE ATTACHMENTS

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Key Words: *EU, European identity, differentiated integration, Central-, Eastern Europe*

Abstract

The project of the common Europe has recently arrived to a turning point. It seems that the self-definition and the future of the EU became uncertain. An increasing majority of the EU citizens feel that the EU is mostly dealing with non-salient issues that are far away from their everyday problems. Further, the challenges facing the European Union internally and globally would require a more unified Europe. Nevertheless, the latest developments of European integration indicate that the EU lacks many of its citizens' support. The necessity of bottom-up processes and the activation of European citizens have never been so timely as today.

This paper discusses the current dilemmas of European identity with a special focus on the East-Central Europeans' attachments. The author builds on the constructivist and functionalist theoretical model of identity-net - which demonstrates the dynamic co-existence of individuals' collective attachments – when explaining the prospects of the common identity. The following questions are raised in the paper: What could be the cultural and the civic poles of the European identity? Is the civic component of European identity fading away? Do Europeans trust their European and national institutions? What is the effect of the crisis of European economic governance on the identities of Europeans? What challenges the EU is currently facing due to the spread of differentiated integration? Who are "the others" for Europeans inside and outside its borders? And at last, but not least what are the possible means to establish European identity? In order to be able to answer these questions, an interdisciplinary approach is taken. These themes are foremost explored through reviewing and synthesizing the major theoretical contributions of nations and nationalism discourse and identity formation theories. The current dilemmas of European identity are analysed by applying the approach of political science and within that the European integration studies. The arguments presented in this paper are supported by the data of the opinion poll surveys. The author argues that the European identity has recently been undergoing significant changes due to the crisis of the common Europe project as well as the spread of differentiation integration modes.

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CORPORATE TAX RATE AS AN INSTRUMENT OF FISCAL POLICY IN EU COUNTRIES IN INNOVATION DEVELOPMENT ENHANCING

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Key Words: *corporate tax, fiscal policy, research and development, innovation development*

Abstract

The article analyses the corporate tax changing as an instrument of fiscal policy of the EU countries in stimulating the innovation development. The authors of this article try to find out the role of innovations as a key factor of economic development in post-crisis reviving.

* * *

An important task of government regulation is economic development enhancing in post crisis period, where fiscal and monetary policies always played central role. Governments and central banks use wide range of instruments and its effectiveness were scientifically and practically proved.

Here, in this article, we are going to discuss fiscal policy and one of its important instruments – tax rates regulation. We will try to find out, could it be really positive impact on business environment and, as a result, on a dynamics of macroeconomic development, while the government decreases the rate of corporate tax in a period of economic depression. P. Samuelson and W. Nordhaus (1999) mentioned that tax regulation could be an effective instrument in case of economic stimulation, and also to avoid economic "overhiting" (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1999, p.391).

Such economists as P. Drucker, A. Hargadon, A. Kleinknecht, T. Müller-Prothman, M. Votersan etc. investigated that a tax rate decreasing is a proper way to stimulate innovations in business environment. In such a way, entrepreneurs get "free money" to make investments in innovations. Government innovation policy, in order to stimulate innovation development of economics, must include such measure in order to be effective in mid or long-term period. German economist A. Kleinknecht (2010) mentioned that among important tasks of policymakers in crisis are: 1) to create healthy economic environment for new businesses; 2)

to stimulate activity of entrepreneurs in implementing innovative products in its businesses; and 3) to increase its income using the financial and credit mechanisms. So, in times of crisis the main task of government is to promote investment activity of entrepreneurs and individuals, to create healthy conditions for new businesses and enhance cash income with the help of financial and credit markets (Kleinknecht, 2010, p.27-30).

The majority of economists agreed that the investments in innovations have to ensure the economic development of the country, and the taxes as a source of future investments related to the fiscal policy of the government.

We believe it looks necessary continuing to study the questions of international experience of tax rates regulation and its impact on innovation processes, also to mention the possibilities of using the experience of developed countries in post-Soviet states.

Different countries use different ways to stimulate research and development (R&D) in the enterprises, such as lowering tax rates, liquidating tariff and non-tariff barriers, government procurement, loans and grants. Such indirect methods are aimed to enhance a favourable investment climate and stimulate innovations.

The tax systems in the EU countries are highly unified and consist of using corporate taxes, individual income taxes, VATs, social payments. Such elements of the tax system as the procedures of tax payments, tax remissions, and control system for the taxpayers are also identical.

Corporate tax in the EU countries calculates for the calendar year or the financial year of the company. The object of taxation in most EU countries is the profit received by the company from its businesses.

Investment tax credit is another important part in the procedure of corporate tax collection in the EU countries. Such tax credit is generally provided in the form of accelerated depreciation of fixed assets, or deducting it by companies from the amount of expenses for research or innovation activities.

During more than 20 years most European countries use tax rate regulation, as an instrument of fiscal policy, with the goal to stimulate innovations in private enterprises. (Owens, 2011, p.54-67; Watterson, 2011, p.13-14)

However, not in all European countries tax rate regulation became a crucial instrument of government innovation policy. For such countries, as Spain, Portugal, tax credit is traditional instrument, which is using for stimulation R&D activity in companies; such countries as Italy, Belgium, Ireland, prefer to use direct subsidies for companies, than tax credits.

And, finally, such countries as Germany, Sweden, and Finland have rather high level of innovation activity in the enterprises, so tax regulation in order to stimulate innovations in private enterprises use rather seldom. For these countries, special measures to stimulate R&D activities of companies are less important compared with the goals of general budgetary

policy. Usually the governments arguing that improving current tax regime for businesses lead to the positive dynamics of businesses, which directly effect on its R&D activities.

Finally, there are countries (France, UK), which paid almost the same attention to the development of mechanisms of both direct and indirect tax compensations for innovators.

Nevertheless, since 2007 to 2012 the average corporate tax rate in EU countries decreased to 22.19% from 24.22% (table 1), also even in such conservative countries as Germany (from 38.36% to 30.00%) and Italy (from 37.25% to 27.50%). (Tax rates around the world)

Despite the common trend in developed countries to reduce corporate tax rates in order to increase R&D activities, at the same period, the reducing of corporate tax rates influences on revenue increase from this tax. This paradox could be explained by the fact that, in order to increase budget revenues, while reducing tax rates, was provided broader tax base, including reducing the number of tax benefits.

Table 1 – The change in corporate tax rate in the EU countries in 2007 and 2012

Country	Corporate tax rate, established since 01.01.2007, %	Corporate tax rate, established since 01.01.2012, %	Change in tax rate for 5 years, %
Germany	38.36	30.00	-27.87
Italy	37.25	27.50	-35.45
Spain	32.50	30.00	-8.33
Great Britain	30.00	24.00	-25.00
Luxembourg	29.63	21.00	-41.09
Denmark	28.00	25.00	-12.00
Sweden	28.00	26.30	-6.46
Finland	26.00	24.50	-6.12
Netherlands	25.50	25.00	-2.00
Greece	25.00	20.00	-25.00
Czech Republic	24.00	19.00	-26.32
Slovenia	23.00	18.00	-27.78
Estonia	22.00	21.00	-4.76
Hungary	16.00	19.00	18.75

Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of www.worldwide-tax.com.

Change in corporate tax rates leads to the change in the net profit of the company; also it allows spending temporarily free funds for extra needs of this company or R&D investments in the nearest future. Therefore, reducing the rate of corporate tax, the government gives possibility to spend some part of profit, and thus makes it possible to increase the company's spendings on innovation development. Of course, it is not the fact that profits will be used in such a way. To encourage such profits usage, the government due to the interest of innovation development, proposes special tax incentives.

Low corporate tax rates are the most common in the countries of Central and Eastern Europe due to the existing competitive environment of these economics – the competition between these economics are for raising investments, so the governments create the most favourable tax treatment (Fig. 1). However, the low nominal corporate tax rate does not automatically lead to the most competitive fiscal space. The competitiveness of the fiscal system in these countries is more dependent on the effective tax rate and the transparency of its administration.

Fig.1 – Corporate tax rates in some EU countries in 2012

Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of Eurostat (2012).

Some scientists argued that only tax credit, as a deduction from the EBIT, the tax credit for R&D activities and the special depreciation regimes are the most effective instruments of fiscal policy with the goal of innovative development. (Ivanova, 2010, p.53-79) Table 2 shows the experience of different countries that used mentioned tax measures to encourage companies for innovative development.

Table 2 – Some tax incentives that may encourage innovative development

	Labour costs of the research staff	Other operating expenses	Capital expenditures
1. Additional tax credit (a deduction from the tax base)			
A. Full version	Great Britain (150%, Small and Medium Business (further – SMB) –125%); Malta (150%); Austria (125%); Czech Republic (200%); Hungary (200%, limit 200 TEUR).	Great Britain (150%, SMB - 125%); Malta (150%); Austria (125%); Czech Republic (200%); Hungary (200%, limit 200 TEUR).	Belgium (additional depreciation 14.5%); Finland (depreciation); Great Britain (depreciation); Netherlands (depreciation on a number of assets); Austria (25%); Portugal (additional depreciation 50%).
B. Marginal	Greece (150%);	Greece (150%);	

version	Austria (135%).	Austria (135%).	
2. Tax credit			
A. Full version	Belgium (25%, research staff); France (10%, limit 10 mln. euro); Netherlands (42%/14%, research staff); Italy (10%, SMB); Portugal (20%); Slovenia (20%); Spain (20%, 35%/50%, limit).	France (10%, limit 10 mln. euro); Italy (10%, SMB); Portugal (20%); Slovenia (20%); Spain (30%, 35%/50%, limit)	Portugal (20%); Slovenia (20%); Spain (10%, 35%/50%, limit).
B. Marginal version	France (40%); Ireland (20%); Portugal (50%).	France (40%); Ireland (20%); Portugal (50%); Spain (50%).	France (40%); Ireland (20%); Portugal (50%); Spain (50%).

Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of Cassley (2009).

The tax credit defines as the interest rate on the sum of investments on innovations, which allows business to deduct from the EBIT the costs invested on R&D.

Governments of different European countries propose different ways to define the amount of tax credit, but the main difference lays in the way of its calculation – set the interest rate of the tax credit or define the amount of the costs of the company on innovative development, which is taken for the year, or as an increase in spending on innovation related to the basic costs.

The first type is called a full-fledged research tax credit, and the second type is called an R&D tax incremental credit. (Innovbusiness.ru, n.d.; Müller-Prothmann and Dörr, p.76-87) Each of these forms has its advantages and disadvantages.

The advantage of the full-fledged research tax credit is the easiest way to design and it is less expensive one. Large companies with a large amount of expenditures on R&D projects prefer such form of tax credit. However, such form of tax credit is rather expensive for the government, because among the companies that apply the application for the tax credit could invest in innovations any way. In this case the government losses its future tax revenues.

R&D tax incremental credit looks more oriented on innovative development of the companies, government encourages growth of expenditures on innovations, but it is more difficult to calculate and design its growth for the entrepreneurs and the fiscal authorities both. It is hard to find out, what part of costs stimulated innovative development. In this case, R&D tax incremental credit is more appropriate for financing special investment projects.

In France, the innovation policy is an important element of state economic regulation. French government accumulated rich experience and developed wide range of measures, most of which became effective instruments of government influence on the innovative development of private enterprises.

France has chosen the way of special tax regimes, but keeps providing tight fiscal policy. Nowadays, there are over 20 special tax measures for different types of businesses: industrial enterprises, venture and investment funds, non-profit research organisations, individual entrepreneurs, etc.). (Drucker, 2007, p.112-113; Eurostat, 2012)

As international experience shows, tax benefits are the main type of fiscal incentives for the development of science and innovations in companies. Due to the tax structure (the object of taxation, the taxation period, the tax base, the tax rate, the order of calculation of the tax, the order and the period of payment of the tax), there are tax discounts and tax credits. The tax credits allow companies that invest on R&D, to receive payments from their taxable income in the amount that could be even higher than the costs invested on R&D. (Hoffman, 2009, p.153-156; Rymanov, 2009, p.214-220)

There is also R&D tax incremental credit in France, which is equal to 30% of the first € 100 million invested in research and development. The new entrepreneurs could even receive to 50%, which invested in R&D. (www.worldwide-tax.com)

Table 3 – Comparison of the main EU countries to the value of research tax credits received by enterprises in 2011

Country	The value of the research tax credit, bn euro
Austria	2,5
Belgium	0
Great Britain	0,75
Germany	0
Ireland	2
Spain	0,9
France	5

Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of Cassley (2009) and www.wikipedia.org.

Except for common reducing corporate tax in France, it is actively being implemented a system of tax support in the form of tax research credit, which now account for more than 80% of the total amount of the tax support allotted in the country for innovations. In recent years France has become among the leaders of the tax research credit among the countries of Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) (Table 3).

The French government has always paid attention to the allocation of tax research credit. Its mechanism of action is constantly adjusted and improved. From 2004 till 2008 France has changed calculation scheme of tax research credit and began to implement a combined approach. One part of the appropriations allocated to this measure is calculated on the basis of the total annual costs of the enterprise, directed in innovation, another one – on the basis of the increased company's innovation expenditures in the current year compared with the average annual costs for this purpose in previous years. Since 2008, the calculation of the tax research credit depends only on the amount of funds allocated by the enterprises for the development of innovations.

Tax credits for innovation for small and medium enterprises (SME) had been introduced in the UK in 2000, and in 2007 the scheme was extended to large companies. According to experts, tax credits allow reducing the costs of innovation for SMEs to 15.75% max., and for large companies – 8.4% max., the companies without profit can receive 24.50 pounds for each 100 pounds spent on innovations. In 2010–2011 more than six thousand companies used this scheme, which gave them 670 million pounds of additional funds. (Samuelson and Nordhaus, 1999)

Indirect tax credit allows reducing the overall tax burden and the tightness of regulation, particularly tax credits for innovation for large companies were introduced simultaneously with the increase of contributions to the National Insurance system. Tax credits attract foreign capital in the innovation sphere directly and this is one of the reasons for the largest share of foreign capital in the private sector.

More than 70% of the surveyed companies used the tax credit scheme for large companies and SME (many of them were unprofitable) – mainly the mechanism of direct reimbursement (Fig. 2).

Fig.2 – The share of companies in the UK that have used different types of tax credit, %.

Source: calculated by the authors on the basis of Cassley (2009) and Eurostat (2012).

Assessment of efficiency of the national innovation system in Finland and measures, which were used for its development are particularly interesting, since the country was able to counter the challenges, it faced in the last decade of the twentieth century. This policy was a response to the loss of markets of the former Soviet Union. Unless it purposeful implementation the consequences of the crisis in 1991–1993 might cause much more damage both to the national economy of the country and the social welfare. Moreover, the experience of Finland became the subject matter of economists during current crisis as an example of successful anticrisis government regulation. By the mid-2000s, Finland was one of the three leaders of the European Innovation Scoreboard along with Sweden and Switzerland. (Gershman, 2008, p.126-132; Stiglitz, 2007) This is the result of active innovation policy, which this country carried out since the early '90s. The absence of methods of tax stimulation in Finland was the specificity of the government innovation development incentives until

nowadays. As Germany, for a long time this country abandoned tax breaks in the tax law, as long as this step complicates the tax calculation for private companies.

Government support of strategic industries in other countries of Western Europe is both at the national and at the international levels.

In order to counter the increased competition from the U.S., Japanese and other developed countries, Western European countries' governments are joining forces to increase scientific, technical and technological level of domestic enterprises. Research funds are allocated on the basis of the quality of projects despite the degree of a country's participation in the project or national quotas. Information and research results are available to all project participants in spite of their financial contribution; each participant is given a free license.

The basic principle of the EU is the principle of subsidiarity (supplement) that is the EU governments take measures only when the member states cannot achieve certain goals on their own or when these goals can only be solved together, due to their importance and scope. (Dernberg, 2010, p.168-173; Gershman, 2008, p.89-92)

Issues of stimulation of innovative activities increasingly transcend national boundaries. The governments of EU countries provide research policies, which are determined by the so-called five-year framework programs. They include joint researches in such areas: health care, food, agriculture, information, communications and biotechnology, environment and climate change, socio-economic sciences and humanities, transport, including aeronautics, security and space, etc.

Thus, while studying the experience of European countries to stimulate innovative development by reducing the corporate tax in the conditions of post-crisis economic recovery, it is necessary to take into account the possible impact of these reforms on the further economic growth. This research, based on the experience of the EU member states, showed that reducing the overall tax burden on few per cents may not significantly affect the value of fiscal fees, but certainly has a positive effect, which occurs in the process of releasing the funds of the company and directing them to the company's innovative development. Therefore, the reform of the tax system should cover all aspects of taxation; ensure transparency and rigorous regimentation of the fiscal measures. The government should encourage enterprises to invest the earned money in the technological modernisation of manufacturing process, using modern and considered approach to the implementation of tax measures.

Summing up, there are four main characteristics that each program of tax incentives should include: 1) the significant amounts of funding to influence the investment decisions; 2) simplicity to provide an understanding of the program by companies; 3) low administrative burden to enable even small companies to claim to resources; 4) a clear target profile to concentrate resources where they will have the greatest effect.

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MEDIATION IN REGIONAL ETHNIC CONFLICTS:
THE ROLE OF EU IN KOSOVO

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Key Words: *mediation, Kosovo, Serbia, European Union, power, identity, reconciliation*

Abstract

The post war reconstruction of Kosovo has been one of the most challenging international peace-building endeavours. Most mediation efforts have been undertaken by European Union as the leading regional organisation. The goal of this study is to contribute to the on-going debate on the power of European Union to resolve regional conflicts in respect to territorial integration and interstate regional cooperation. More specifically, this paper identifies EU membership as its greatest and most powerful tool in shaping national politics. However, it notes that conflict resolution occurs when basic needs are addressed and all parties are satisfied. Therefore, EU mediation attempt in the context of resolving the ethnic conflict in Kosovo cannot be successful if based on its power to impose solutions but on its ability to facilitate communication; establish trust and help the parties have a more cooperative motivational orientation.

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MODERNISING NATIONALISM.
THE CASE OF JÖRG HAIDER

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Key Words: nationalism, populism, Jörg Haider, Austria

Abstract

The year 2008 spurred an economic crisis on a scale unknown to the post war generations. While in 2013 the United States are coming out of the recession this cannot be said about the countries of the European Union. The economic troubles are fertile ground for development of radical movements. It seems that the radical right-wing politicians are taking the upper hand. In the countries ranging from Finland, through the Netherlands and Austria to the Italian peninsula radical right-winged parties are on the rise mainly through implementing nationalist and xenophobic topic to their agenda. In their actions those parties become populist and use a language that was till now associated with so called postpolitics. A holistic approach to the rising phenomenon would be required but to do so one should look to the beginnings of this type of politics. As it happens the sources of a modern use nationalism can be traced in the late '80s in Austria. It was the time when a young and promising politician Jörg Haider took over the Freedom Party of Austria. He managed to level the party up from popularity of less than 5% to the third force in Austrian politics. At some point he managed to form a ruling coalition with the Austrian People's Party which brought diplomatic sanctions on Austria in the year 2000. The reaction of the European Union was arguably undemocratic and caused massive unrest in Austria angering both Haider's supporters and opponents.

Haider presented a new type of politics. Living a life of a celebrity he was constantly present in mass media especially tabloids. He understood the necessity of entertainment in the society and provided it with a political performance. However the content of his political message was not new. He used forms of nationalism and made them part of Austrian political discourse. Touching complex issues like the Austrian national identity and the responsibility of Austrians for the atrocities of the Second World War Haider proposed a collective Entschuldung. He also antagonised the Slovenian minority living in the land of Carinthia. It is most interesting how the democratic structures of Austria responded to Haider's actions.

In my presentation I would like to highlight both the nationalistic content of Haider's political actions and at the same time focus on the form and image of the Austrian politician. His way of communication with the society was innovative at the time and created a base for other radical populists and nationalist. I would also like to focus on the pivotal year 2000 and analyse the democratic and undemocratic reactions to Haiders coming to power. A mention of EU politics would be necessary to understand the whole process. Symptomatically Haider died in a car accident in 2008. In was the year that stared an era when nationalist voices

could be heard all across Europe. It is crucial that this process receives recognition and analysis from academic circles.

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Introduction

The year 2008 introduced an economic crisis to a scale comparable only to the great depression of 1929. The lowering quality of life and uncertainty of the future caused many people to protest. The Occupy Wall Street movement met its European counterpart in the form of the Spanish *Indignados*. While in the year 2013 it seems that the place of the origin of the crisis, the United States of America, show signs of recovery this cannot be said about Europe[1]. Social unrest is on the rise in Europe and the moods of the societies are becoming more and more radical. Radicalism is a fertile ground for all sorts of populists and nationalist. It is no surprise then that in almost every European country a rise in popularity of nationalist movements can be noted. The situation is far from stable and the nationalists do not contribute to the stability. Both countries of Western Europe like Finland (with the True Finns Party) or the Netherlands (with Geert Wilders' Freedom Party) and the former members of the Soviet Block like Poland (with the re-emerging national movement) experience this phenomenon. It is legitimate to say that growing popularity of national and nationalistic thinking is a European problem. It would be an omission not to mention that the radical attitudes are indigenous to the right side of the political spectrum. The examples of the German Pirate Party and Palikot's Movement Poland show otherwise. They are however in the minority and it seems that the popular, tabloid like language of populism is still harnessed with much success by the (radical) right.

Why is it so? Populism is not inseparable to the right-wing movements, but it looks like a right-wingers natural habitat. To answer this question the author would like to take a few steps back in time and see the origins of right-winged and nationalistic populism and the first reactions to the emergence of this phenomenon. One of the first and most prominent examples of European politicians was the Austrian governor of Carinthia Jörg Haider.

Should Europe fear this man?

It was a title of one of the issues of The Times newspaper that followed the elections in Austria in the year 2000[2]. Haider's right-winged party the FPÖ with 26% of votes became the second strength in the parliament and soon after a coalition government with the leading People's Party was formed.

This spurred an international boycott of Austria and thousands of unfavourable comments in the press.

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[1] As far as 20.03.2013 after Ireland, Spain, Italy, Portugal and Greece the crisis spreads to Cyprus and Slovenia.
[2] This issue of the Times can be found here: http://www.time.com/time/europe/magazine/2000/214/index.html.

Fourteen EU member states halted their bilateral contacts with Austria and planned to exclude the official and unofficial representatives from meetings, talks and engagements. Israel's reaction was most interesting. Israel has recalled its ambassador and has announced that Jörg Haider, the party's figurehead, will not be allowed into the country. A foreign ministry spokesman told the press: *"Israel cannot remain silent in the face of the rise of extremist right-wing parties, in particular in those countries which played a role in the events which brought about the eradication of a third of the Jewish people in the Holocaust."*[3] Jörg Haider was also banned from entering the country of Israel. Other sanctions from different countries (Belgium for instance) included the boycott of Austrian ski tourist resorts, cancellation of travel bookings and cancellation of events that were due to happen in Vienna. Also the institutions of the European Union were planning to isolate the new Austrian government. So many international actions aimed at Austria caused some social unrest and protests against the new government. The signs of the protesters said: we are the 75% that did not vote for Haider.

The history of the diplomatic sanctions imposed by the EU members was and is controversial. All in all the ÖVP-FPÖ government proved to be much less radical than the media had envisaged. So why did the EU members decided to break diplomatic ties with Austria even before the new government was formed and before any disputable reform was even planned? This situation has many layers and needs to be properly analysed.

In 1999 the European Union was preparing itself to enlarge and invite the countries from Central Europe to the political family. Confronting themselves with the future members the countries of the "old EU" were emphasizing the common ideas that bound Europe together. Those ideas were fully expressed in the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European Union[4], which was passed by the European Council in Nice in 2000. One of the ideological arguments supporting the enlargement to the East was promoting the rights of man and democratic ideas. The ÖVP-FPÖ government did not even start to question these ideas and break the norms but the European leaders concluded that the ideological background of the Austrian Freedom Party is contradictory to the ideas of United Europe. The fight against xenophobia and racism was one of the bases of the foundation of the European Communities.

At first the European Union did not speak unisono. Not all countries were convinced that imposing such sanctions was justified (especially Sweden and Denmark, Denmark was the first country to lift the sanctions). It could present itself as a martyr and the last man standing fighting for "the cause". France and Belgium were the countries that were the strongest lobbyists in favour of sanctioning Austria. It was not a coincidence, as they had a particular interest in that. To be more specific it was an interest of two politicians Jacques Chirac and Guy Verhofstad[5]. They were the leaders of the anti-Austrian crusade. What were their motifs?

In both cases, the French and Belgian one the issue was the similarity of the internal politics stage to the Austrian one. Both France and Belgium had radical and right-winged parties that

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[3] Quoting after BBC News report: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/631376.stm
[4] The Charter focuses on the rights of man and citizen, but also adds social rights. Those rights only have legal force when it comes to the European law.
[5] Merlingen, M., Mudde, C. and Sedelmeier, U., 2001. The right and the righteous. European Norms, Domestic Politics and the Sanctions against Austria. *Journal of Common Market Studies,* March 2001, p.71-72.

were on the rise. But it is not just the sole presence of the National Front and the Flemish Block. Almost every European country had a party of this type. In this case it was all about creating a precedent in case a radical right-winged party became too strong. As will be shown later the Austrian Freedom Party had changed its approach and had modernised itself. It was not only a party of constant opposition; it also had a new, fresh reformatory approach and wanted a change. Step by step the right winged movements in Austria, France and Belgium crept up the polls using the dissatisfaction of the political system and highlighting its weaknesses. The rise of the National Front and the Flemish Block meant that they could become potential partner for a coalition government for the mainstream right-winged parties. So they were a direct danger for the leftist parties represented by the aforementioned Jacques Chirac and Guy Verhofstadt. It was their own interest that the Austrian case would not be replicated in France and Belgium. These two politicians used the common European values to "ideologically blackmail" other members of the European Union. They could not say no to the values and ideas that were their own.

The sanctions were lifted a couple of months later in September 2000 when the ministers of the Austrian Freedom Party and the Austrian People Party signed a pledge to respect the rules and norms of a democratic state. The government states quickly and quietly withdrew their support towards the sanctions. On the European level imposing them backfired. The sanctions were criticised more and more because they were considered undemocratic in spirit. If one would take into account that the lack of democratic procedures is one of the biggest subjects of criticism regarding the EU. But on the national level of France and Belgium the sanctions served its purpose and undermined the popularity of the radical right-winged parties. At least till the times of the economic crisis.

Modernising nationalism

Jörg Haider was born on the 26th of January 1950 in a small Austrian town called Bad Goisern. Both Haider's parents Robert and Dorothea were members of either the NSDAP or the Bund Deutscher Mädl. Robert Haider a supporter of the NSDAP even before the Anschluss of Austria in 1938. In his school-time young Jörg was already active in the pupils associations. It was also the time when he developed his nationalistic views. First planning to become an actor, Haider decided to study law in Vienna, where he was a member of the conservative students' corporation *Silvania* Wien. During his studies he also joined the Freedom Party and became an active supporter. Step by step he climbed the ladder until the day of his triumph in 1986 when he became the leader of the FPÖ. At that time this party had barely got into the Parliament with only 5% of votes. As mentioned before 14 years later the FPÖ became the second popular party in Austria with 26% of support. The credit for this success had to go to Haider who changed and modernised the party.

FPÖ was founded in 1949 as a national liberal party and a political refuge for former Nazis. It was never the dominant political force. The scene was dominated by the Peoples Party ÖVP and the Socialists (SPÖ). The Freedom movement, also called the Third Camp, oscillated between 7 and 10% of public support. Its political program emphasised the need for more

liberalism and the importance of a national community. It also stood on the position that on the contrary to the post war narrative Austria belongs to the German culture, and is in fact a German country.

Serving as a small opposition party it formed a ruling coalition only once in the 70s. The further in time from the World War the less popular the party got. It took shelter in its conservative and unchanging image of a German nationalist party that became less and less attractive to the younger generations. That situation lasted until 1986 when Haider changed the style of politics not only in FPÖ but also in the whole country. Even as a young associate, Haider understood the importance of the media. He was one of the first FPÖ politicians who appeared on TV on debates, and who was constantly present in the press.

The mass media need to follow the logic of the masses, which was described in 1930 by Jose Ortega y Gasset in his work *The Revolt of the Masses*. The Spanish philosopher emphasised the declining importance of quality. This process can also be traced in the history of mass media. The newspapers with the biggest issue circulation are tabloids. So all media that want to compete, need to adjust to the tabloid style and content. The media exist not only to inform but also to entertain. We could be called the infotainment society[6]. Haider knew about this process and used it to his advantage. He did all to become a media celebrity. He measured his popularity according to the amount of media coverage he could achieve. He managed to model the image of a show-man with the image of the politician.

Haider understood the logic of television and programs like reality shows, which present an enhanced version of an everyman's life. That is why the Governor of Carinthia tried to make a hero of the popular culture out of himself. Haider treated elections similarly to the Big Brother program where the viewers can vote for their favourite participant. Through his constant media activity Haider became an agenda-setter. It means that he was the one who dictates the topics covered by the media. The Austrian politician created a new narrative for him and his party. He presented himself as a self-made man who came from a small town and climbed the social ladder. It is no coincidence that Haider's life resembled an American movie narrative. The 80s when Haider took over the leadership in FPÖ was the time of the revival of the macho stereotype in the popular culture. Movies like Rambo were incredibly popular (not to mention productions with an Austrian actor Arnold Schwarzenegger). Haider created his image as a sporty, fit and adventurous man. He rode fast and expensive cars to meetings and was fond of extreme sports like bungee jumping[7]. The Austrian politician often published photos of him during sport activities with his torso naked. He also used sport terminology to describe his party co-workers as a team. The sporty macho was however not the only mask he put on.

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[6] Hipfl, B., 2005. Politics of Media Celebrities: The case of Jörg Haider. In: B. Ociepka, ed. 2005. *Populism and media democracy.* Wrocław, pp.55-56.
[7] Elfride Jelinek a Nobel Prize winner and writer described Haider as a leader of a homoerotic community, who sexualises the language of politics. She thought that it was the sexual background of Haider's sporty image that drawn crowds to him. Other Haider's critics also emphasised that.

Haider during a bungee jump. The Austrian politician
wanted to be depicted as someone who is brave and fit.
Source: Authors private photo made in Jörg Haider Museum in Klagenfurt.

Haider's biographer Christa Zöchling mentions that he always prepared not only the content of his speeches but also the form of it. In the trunk of his car he had four types of uniforms and clothing to change depending on the situation[8]. In his political life he also assumed four roles, according to prof. Klaus Ottomeyer, who analysed Haider's political image[9]. The roles are: the mentioned macho, the Robin Hood, the beer tent socialist and the heir to the World War II legacy.

The macho identity has already been described as it was connected with the celebrity lifestyle of Haider. The assumed role of Robin Hood needs more explanation though.

The Carinthian Governor did not need to wear green tights and carry a bow and arrow to become Robin Hood. Haider's idea was to create a narrative similar to the story of the famous outlaw. In his case the role of the Sherwood Forest was assumed by the conservative land of Carinthia. The villains of this story are politicians from the two mainstream parties the ÖVP and SPÖ. Forming constant coalitions and dividing the administration to themselves through so called *Proporzsystem*, they have burdened Austrian citizens through new taxes and complex legislation. With the support of bureaucratic Brussels and the EU spendings just made it worse. In that way Haider transformed the traditional trait of the FPÖ – liberalism and freedom into a much more attractive message. With populist actions like the *Kinderschek*, he promised to give financial support to poorer families. These populist actions were to ensure the image of the person who wants to transfer the money from the rich to the poor.

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[8] Zöchling, Ch., 2000. *Haider, kim jest?* Kraków, p.93.
[9] Ottomeyer, K., 2000. *Die Haider Show. Zur Psychopolitik der FPÖ*. Klagenfurt, pp.10-18.

Haider dressed as Robin Hood.
During carnival festivities.
Source: http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/programmes/correspondent/990373.stm

The third identity, as described by Klaus Ottomeyer, was the beer tent socialist. The habit of gathering in beer tents after a hard working day is an old and common one in Austrian. Haider was a regular in those tents. He appeared there not dressed in a suit but rather in jeans and a leather jacket where he listened to the problems of workers. Symbolically Haider dissolved the differences between classes. In that tent Haider was not a lawyer and a politician. He was just a common man, who achieved success thanks to his hard work. He created the image of someone like a "better buddy"[10]. It was not a coincidence that Haider devoted so much time to workers. Not only they were the potential voters of the SPÖ, but they created the backbone of the FPÖ supporters. Workers without higher education compose about two thirds of the Freedom Party's electorate[11]. It has to be noted that Haider, who did not come from Carinthia presented himself as a local. He not only learned the indigenous accent and dialect. During celebrations he wore the traditional Carinthian jacket *(Trachtenanzug)* and a hat. At the same time he looked after all the traditional celebrations in Carinthia. He emphasised the difference of Carinthia. It did not matter if this land bordered Italy, Slovenia or Styria (which is a different Land in the same country!). The governor decided to mark the borders with Carinthian flags[12].

Haider with his family, wearing a traditional outfit and waving Carinthian flags.
Source: Authors private photo taken in Jörg Haider Museum in Klagenfurt.

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[10] Ibidem, p.59.
[11] Bailer-Galanda, B. and Neugebauer, W., 1997. *Haider und die Freiheitlichen in Österreich*. Berlin, p.118.
[12] Ottomeyer, K., 2009. *Jörg Haider. Mythenbildung und Erbschaft*. Klagenfurt. p.55, p.57, p.77.

The last role of Haider was strongly connected to Austrian history and problems with national identity. It was also the most personal one for Haider as his parents were involved in the national socialist movement. In the infamous speech in Urlichsberg Haider praised the former members of Waffen SS saying that the generation of soldiers has nothing to be accused of. He said they have done their duty with honour. *The soldiers were not murders. The murderers sat elsewhere and send the soldiers to the front, where they had to show their bravery. They say that there is something called collective guilt. There is no such thing as collective guilt.*[13] It is true that Haider often omitted or ridiculed the Austrian problem of participation in the World War II crimes.[14]

But there was something at stake. When Haider spoke in Urlichsberg he did not really address the former Nazis. He spoke to the generations that did not experience war and instead of guilt *(kollektive Schuld)* he proposed something I would call *kollektive Unschuld* – it is not innocence, it is a generational pardon. By being controversial Haider took the whole guilt on himself and became a quasi-messianic figure. He took symbolical responsibility for the crimes of the past.

It is not a coincidence that the religious note is mentioned here. After Haider's death in a car accident he got two new identities, those of a hero and a saint. The biggest bridge in Carinthia was named after Jörg Haider and in the capital of that region, Klagenfurt, a museum was erected in his name.

The paradox of a modern form

When Haider became the leader of the FPÖ it was still a national liberal party like it was during its foundation in the 1949. Under the new leadership the traditional values were still the core of political message. Haider emphasised the need of strengthening the bonds between the national community and tried to exclude the ones who did not belong to it. In the early 90s he launched an anti-immigrant campaign aimed at people coming from former Yugoslavia and more generally people from Central and Eastern Europe. He said that the Polish president Lech Wałęsa was more wide than high *(mehr breit als hoch)* to show that Poles are lazy even on the highest positions. In the 1993 election campaign he portrayed the immigrants as gangsters and members of mafias. He used a political motto that "Vienna will not become Chicago".[15]

On the regional level as the Governor of Carinthia he antagonised the Slovenian minority in Carinthia. Despite losing several lawsuits he removed bilingual road signs and replaced them only with the German equivalents. As strongly as he could Haider always tried to emphasise that Austria belonged to the German cultural region and that Austrians are in fact Germans. He contradicted the official and mainstream national identity that was formed after 1945 in the opposition to the German and WWII legacy.

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[13] Ottomeyer, K., 2009. *Jörg Haider. Mythenbildung und Erbschaft*. Klagenfurt, p.78.

[14] Ibidem, pp.66-67.

[15] Bailer-Galanda, B. and Neugebauer, W., 1997. *Haider und die Freiheitlichen in Österreich*. Berlin, p.223.

Organising political performances and being controversial helped Haider to be constantly present in the mass media and with this presence rose his popularity. Eventually though Haider became a hostage of his own success. Not only the popularity of FPÖ surged after the elections in 1999/2000. The way of showing politics also forced the governor of Carinthia to look for topics outside of the traditional national and liberal box. After the year 2000 there are more and more actions undertaken that are simply taken out of programmes of other parties. The enriched program contained features that adhered to the Green Party. The environment became a "national good" that had to be taken care of. Also the FPÖ organised a huge action of petition signing against the use of nuclear energy in Austria. Furthermore becoming more and more populist his party started shifting towards socialism and social welfare state. FPÖ program resembled more the ideas of the Third Way introduced by Anthony Giddens for Tony Blair[16]. Those changes were so grave that the party broke up in two in 2005. The modern Haider left FPÖ and created his own movement called and Alliance for the Future of Austria (BZÖ). It is symptomatic that the new party focused on the future and not on the national past. Instead of a nationalist Haider became a full time populist.

In fact the author could argue that when Haider used the logic of mass media and infotainment it caused him to change not only his image but also the content of his message. He became a truly post-political actor. Haider's last book was called *Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links und rechts*, which means a "free future beyond the left and right". There are no more distinctions on the political stage only the needs and desires of the people. Therefore a political party does not need a traditional, holistic program that tries to be universal and governing becomes more like management[17]. To keep up with the expectations of the people and the interest of the audience Haider needed to make the political performance the more interesting. This kind of policy-making could be named pop-politics. It is a source of entertainment for the political audience – the voters.

In this case the nationalistic content of the political message cannot be used constantly but only in the times when it could harness more popularity for the political party. A good example of a period like this is the economic crisis.

However Haider could never see the outcome of his actions. He died in a car crash in 2008. In the elections to the regional parliament of Carinthia, that happened shortly after Haider's death, his party the BZÖ received an astonishing number 49% of votes. Four years later in 2013 the BZÖ dropped dramatically to 6.5%. This is the result similar to the one that happened shortly before Haider became the leader of the Freedom Party. This shows that post-politics and pop-politics require a charismatic actor and a leader figure to survive.

Jörg Haider would never have achieved such a success only thanks to flexible politics regarding the party program and thanks to populism. An aware use of mass media and pop-cultural codes made Haider a celebrity. His constant presence in the media and the creation of various images and identities helped Haider to become extremely popular. It is beyond doubt that people voting for the BZÖ or FPÖ were really voting Jörg Haider. In the fight for every

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[16] Žižek, S., *Why we all love to hate Haider*. [online] Available at: <http://www.newleftreview.org/?view=2228>

[17] Haider, J., 2001. *Befreite Zukunft jenseits von links und rechts*. Wien, pp.91-92.

vote he brought politics to the level of entertainment and popular culture. Strong ideological programme were not required and actually considered an obstacle in gaining popularity. Politics became a show making business and a performance. It may be so that Haider's performance showed how politics will look like in the future. Jörg Haider wanted to see the future of politics beyond left and right. However this kind of future is most likely to resemble a low budged Hollywood movie.

TOEING THE LINE?
POLITICAL PARTICIPATION OF ETHNIC
MINORITIES IN CENTRAL EUROPE

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Key Words: *ethnic minority issues, interethnic relations, participation, state- and nation-building*

Abstract

Research on majority-minority integration in liberal democracies across Europe points to the crucial impact institutional legacies and external pressures have on domestic policy-making. These studies explain interethnic integration by the functional imperatives of the liberal state and the allaying impact of democratisation and minority protection norms on nation-state building. Other contributions to the debate place minorities at the centre of enquiry, emphasizing the salience of the perceptions and motivations of minority actors involved in interethnic bargaining and ethnic mobilisation. Overall, despite wide acknowledgement of the idea that integration is a "two-way process", studies of interethnic integration often portray minorities as a problem to integration, security and regional stability rather than part of the solution for such challenges. These contributions either over- or under-emphasise minorities' potential to induce social and institutional change and leave out of the debate some of the institutional and structural contexts most crucial to the political participation of minorities. Building on these contributions, my paper asks how non-dominant groups, such as ethnic minorities, can shape the very institutional settings that constitute their minority status. Embedded in a structurationist theory of agency I distinguish two mutually constitutive processes of minority integration: First, how do the institutional dynamics of ethnic diversity management impact minorities' perceptions of their own opportunities to participate in the political process; second, what are the converse effects this has on minority political actor formation as well as on institutions. By the example of minorities in Estonia and Slovakia the argument is made that minority participation is constrained by the resilience of the essentialist system of group relations and its "self-reinforcing" potential; this is expressed in dominant minority agendas calling for participation based on territorial strength, community self-rule, or group distinctiveness. These agendas mirror, as well as reinforce, the emphases of institutions regulating group relations. Consequently, my study suggests that minority participation plays an important role in state- and nation-building. At the same time, minority policies shape minorities' political agendas, effectively constraining minority groups' attempts to establish themselves as autonomous political actors.

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PRECONDITIONS FOR EFFICIENT PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONIA

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Key Words: *public administration, effectiveness and efficiency, procedure*

Abstract

*The purpose of the paper is to observe the placement of the administration in the Republic of Macedonia during the period of reform of the public administration, to confirm the current situation in relation to the effective working of the administration as well as to locate the possible preconditions for enlargement of the effectiveness of the administration. **The latest public management** is a theoretical model contrived on new ethic principles based on the principle of public and responsibility. In the developed democratic systems there was determination for steadily formation of worthy country and administration that will enable quality public sector. As a result this paper will accomplish analysis and obtain information for the placement of the public administration in the Republic of Macedonia, as well as explore whether the reform of the public administration achieves the purpose and the principles of modern public administration. In other words to accomplish whether there is law that regulates the authorisation and the responsibility of the employees in the public administration and whether there are preconditions for effective and efficient public administration.*

*The results in the paper are based on an empirical research with using of the **qualitative methodology**. With qualitative methodology, I realised deep interview and analyses of the content. The deep interview I realised on target sample, which covered the bearers of management public authorisations (state secretaries, managers of sections and managers of departments in organs of state management and public officers from the organs of the state management and the state authority.*

The results of the research are:

1. The current way of tracking the working of the public administration is accomplished without written procedure. The public institutions according to their own views are placing unwritten rules that will assist them in tracking the working of the public administration that

are not based on précised and clear indicators. These types of forms are the analysis for strategic plans, preparation of monthly reports, associations and presenting of the subject matter throughout the book of the archives of the organ.

2. The inexistence of procedures and built systems that could follow the working of the public institutions manifests an indicative occurrence of unbalanced scheduling of the working assignments and disrespect of the hierarchy of allocating of the working assignments. This results with subjectivism and unreal marking of the quantity and the quality of the public servants in realisation of the working assignments.

3. The inexistence of the system for following the working of the employees has an influence on the success of the public institutions in the realisation of project activities. Often, the mistakes could not be witnessed and the responsibility could not be determined since there is not completion of the activities for successful realisation of the project and that has an impact on the effectiveness of the administration.

4. The systems for following the working of the employees are important for clear and precise measurement of the accomplished work and accurate value that will result with the increase of the effectiveness and efficiency of the administration.

From this research it could be concluded that throughout establishment of a system that follows the working of the employees based on certain indicators will effect in simple and precise control of the working. This will result with quality achievement of the working obligations, it will also have an impact on the motivation and will enable realistic rewards or punishments of the public administration excluding bias and improvisations.

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Introduction

Main basis at the establishment of the management systems is founded on the effort to establish efficient state management. The process of changing and redefinition of the role of the state in the society is especially emphasised in the countries in transition, where the pre-dimensioned, but mainly the commanding and controlling functions of the state should be replaced with the regulation functions for monitoring which are more consistent in the market economy.

For that purpose the state administration in Republic of Macedonia is in constant process of transformation in the direction of creation of efficient state administration. Through analyses of the legal and sub legal acts, their practical applicability by the state staff, as direct participants in the administrative legal system, the condition for effectiveness and liability of the state administration will be observed.

The strategic determination for professional, depoliticised, efficient, liable and service oriented state service in Republic of Macedonia is upgraded in the Law of state administration

passed in 2000[1] into the direction of continuous and subsistent application of the established principles and standards in the sphere of selection, employment liability and evaluation of the state administration. The Law of State Administration confirms that state administration performs works connected to the functions of the state pursuant to the Constitution and Law professionally, politically, neutral and unbiased. The Law of State Administration contains special regulations for the liability of the state administration as discipline as well as material liability. If we make deeper analyses of the legal determination of the liability of the state administration, we will notice that there are clear procedures for the behaviour of the state administration and through this law we will obtain clear image of the circle closure of the liability of the state administration from one side and if this law obtains clear directions for monitoring of the work, setting of the authorisation and liabilities and other working procedures which will enable simultaneous effective and efficient working from the other side. In the theoretical analyses it is frequently emphasised that each from the field of the state management can be liable and certain penalty can be given and it must be confirmed and it should be known 1) which are the tasks in his working area 2) what are his authorisations and the level of independence in his performance of those works and authorisations 3) type of the liability, 4) penalties 5) organ in front which he is liable.

It is more than clear that all these things should be precisely confirmed in corresponding legal regulations

Condition analyses

For persistent conduction of the reforms of the state administration, the Government is devoted to enable increased transparency and promotion of the participation in the citizen's society and to promote the instruments of the strategic planning and analyses and coordination of the policies. With the development of the strategic planning as well as integration of the process for determination of the priorities with budget process, it has been considerably increased the Government capability for achievement of their functions and distribution of the available resources for their conduction. The legal frame that regulates the system for planning and creation of the policies is consisted of The Law for the Government[2] of Republic of Macedonia[3] and the Rule book for work of the Government of Republic of Macedonia, where the bases for the processes of the strategic planning, the analyses of the policies and coordination. The Methodology for analyses of policies and coordination

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[1] Such setting of the state administration has been defined in article 2 and 3 of the Law of State Administration, (Official Gazette of Republic of Macedonia number 59/2000 112/2000, 34/2000,34/2001,103/2001 43/2002,98/2002,17/2003 40/2003 85/2003 17/2004 69/2004 81/2005 61/2006 36/2007 161/2008 06/2009 114/2009).

[2] In article 4 of the Law for the Government (Official Gazette of RM 59/2000,12/2003 55/2005 and 37/2006 The Government confirms the economic and development policy, confirms measures for its accomplishment and proposes measures to the Assembly for achievement of the policy which under its authority, confirms the policy for performance of the laws and other regulations of the Assembly, monitors their performance and performs other works confirmed by law in the frames of its rights and duties confirmed by Constitution and Law; Government and each member for its work report in front of the Assembly.

[3] Rule book for work of the Government of RM passed on 18 April 2001 clear text (Official text of RM number 36/08).

confirms the basic principles for policy creation and together with the published Manual for policy creation represent bases for continuous trainings of the state administration.[4]

Supplying of the overall consistency of the established mechanisms to the strategic planning including the budget process with the mechanism and the instruments is one of the crucial aims which have been set by the Government. This means coordination and consistent conduction of the confirmed administrative procedures supported by the electronic system of working of the Government as well as strengthening of the capacities on central level of the Government as well as in the organs of the state management.

In the part of the strengthening of the central coordinative mechanism it has been trying to contribute for the changed position and the functionality of the Secretary General as professional service of the Government.[5]

The system of evaluation and monitoring in the policies of conduction of the Government should be developed in the direction of the establishment of the circle of liability, where it can be correctly seen the process from the setting of the policies to their realisation, the reasons for withdrawal of the same and who are to be blamed for the withdrawal. If we take into consideration that the policy of the Government is founded on individual policies of the organs of the state management the same is necessary to be supported by the corresponding scientific analyses. It all means that it should be confirmed who is liable for the policy election, the strategic aim of the state organ on what scientific analyses it is based, who are the experts who gave the support of that policy, if during the long-term realisation it was confirmed that it has been unreal chosen. So, we are talking for the predictability of the Government policy as the highest act in the hierarchy of liability. When we go lower in the chart of authority there we should have indicators and clearly set rules for lower ranks who are lengthened hand in the realisation of the policy of the Government through which we will easily confirm the liability of the state administration, when beside ideally set policy negative result came to public. It means if the state clerk participant in the conduction of the policy clearly knows his authorisation and liabilities as well as how he should act at the execution of the working tasks, especially when the same are connected to security of services to the citizens and though which their professionalism, competency, confidentiality and liability are reflected. In other words it should be clearly set so that we can easily confirm liability and that will reflect to effectiveness of the working of the state administration. That is why it is necessary to establish clear system for monitoring of the work of all participants in the conduction of the set aims.

The participation of the citizen's organisation in the process of creation of the policies is one of the strategic aims which are contained in the Strategy for cooperation of the Government

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[4] Manual for creation of policies issued by Secretary General of the Government developed and financed by NORMAK project Norwegian support of Republic of Macedonia in the field of European integration and reform of state administration with contribution by SIGMA Skopje 1997.

[5] With the change of the Law of Government article 40-a (Official Gazette of RM number 55/05) the Secretary General has been founded as professional department of the Government to secure coordination and professional support for the necessities of the Government, the president of the Government, its deputes as well as the members of the Government in the accomplishment of their authorisations.

with the civil section. Beside that the Government confirmed three basic principles of its working: honesty, transparency and liability.[6] In the direction of the achievement of the transparency and service improvement in 2007 the Civil diary as innovative and efficient instrument was introduced for improvement of the public services and fight against bureaucracy and corruption A form for evaluation of the services by the users is a simple questionnaire by which the citizens, users of certain services are asked for the way, speed, term for obtaining the service and at the same time it represents possibility for giving a proposal for promotion of the way of the services giving. As information tool of the Government there are monthly reports for the result gained from the files, forms have been planned on basis of which measures will be proposed for the organs where the conditions are not improved during two subsequent three months periods and it will take corresponding measures for liable people in the organs.

In the part of strengthening and monitoring of the liability in the public sections important tool is the strengthening of the information, technologies and establishment of electronic systems for electronic administrative archives working known as e-government. The Government of Republic of Macedonia has made the initial steps in that direction. The foundation of the Ministry of Information, Society and Administration represents state organ which takes projects in the direction of enabling complete mutual communication between the citizens and the Government.

In the context of operationalisation of the principles of openness and transparency and participation in the processes of reaching of the decision, the regulations of the Law for organisation and work of the organs of the state management are also here which manage the information of public for their work and security of consultations with the citizens at the preparation of the laws and other regulations. The transparency of the state administration has been largely strengthened by the implementation of the Law for free information approach of public character.

Monitoring of the working indicator of the administration effectiveness

Monitoring of the work of the state administration through clear forms and indicators in the division of the achievements, represents base for motivated, liable and effective state administration. In order to check the monitoring system for the working of the state administration in the frames of the interview, I have put my review to issues which refer to the way and the form of monitoring of the work of the state administration as an indicator and distinction of the achieved.

From the respondents (21) all stated that in the state organs there is no written procedure or sub legal act which will clearly and precisely refer to the establishment of a monitoring system of the working of the state administration which means unified form whether electronic or written which will give indicators for the results of the made for each state clerk

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[6] Pursuant to the Program for work of the Government for the period between 2006–2010 in the part of good governance and fight against the Corruption.

individually or organisational units in the state institutions. Largely, they think that it is owned to the fact that there is no legal direction which will precisely and clearly refer to that and it will represent even obligatory principles for establishment of the unified monitoring system as clear indicator for achievement of the individual organisational units and the state organ as a whole.

So, the interviewed considered that the control would be much easier if there was a procedure by which it would be worked on, especially if we talk about organisational units where there are a lot of employees and that procedure will be supported by a software. It will contribute for the quality of the performance, motivation and upgrading according to advanced confirmed indicators. Then, it will give primate to the factor regulation and not the factor human and in that way all improvisations will be avoided.

Large numbers of the respondents have stated that as a basic indicator for the monitoring of the activities realisation in the state organ they take the annual strategic plans which later are transferred into annual working programs. These operational plans contain set aims, terms of relation and organisational units authorised for the realisation of the concrete activity of the strategic plan. Such way of monitoring refers only to the general consideration of the work of the organisational organ units through realisation of the strategic plan.

Another monitoring mechanism of the management clerks in state organs such as managers of sectors and state counsellors are the collegiums. According to some respondents such form they consider a good way for monitoring of the highest level referring to the realisation of emergent and pressing organ activities Such way of monitoring is again left to the organ itself to think off and it is not imagined as compulsory obligation in the descriptions of the working posts, so it is left as a form which everyone thinks of in his own way.

About the work monitoring of the individuals beside division of the subjects though the registry pursuant to the Law of archives[7] through which registration is made where the subject arrived from, what it is about, who has been given to work on, date of obtaining of the subject and date of the ending of the subject, there is no other monitoring system.

Some state organs have introduced independent monitoring system expressed through preparation of monthly reports for all regular and extra time realised activities and all documents. The reports are made by the managers of the organisational units, departments. Such monitoring is conducted through a form made by the section manager. On monthly level these reports have been discussed on a level of a section, so that each of them can see what the other employees in the departments worked on.

Precise indicators in this direction have not been clearly expressed in the state organs. One part of the respondents stated that for certain activities commission have been formed by the authorised person and the same have been obliged by relation terms. There are very frequent cases, where the employees are authorised to realise certain activity through decision of the authorised person.

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[7] Law of Archives (Official Gazette of RM number 36/90 36/95 86/08).

All respondents think that in the state organs there has been seen the necessity for existence of the electronic monitoring system though electronic movement of the documents. One third of the respondents are in the phase of implementation of software for electronic monitoring of the working processes, document management system.

As an indicative problem which has been emphasised by all respondents is the irregular distribution of the works, very frequent appearance at all state organs is the work to be set on only one number of employees. So, one and same people are included to work in more organisational units.

Also, the interviewed pointed out to the existence of the possibility of subjective approach at the work monitoring by the management staff due to non-existence of indictors and measurable mechanism for the evaluation of the quality of the realised working tasks. In order to avoid the subjectiveness, the interviewed pointed out the necessity of procedures existence for work monitoring which with clear indicators direct how much someone has worked in which term and in what way.

From the respondents 18 pointed to the fact that at the allocation of the working tasks very frequently the hierarchy of authorisation is not respected pursuant to the Law of state administration. The employees very frequently get direct working tasks by the Ministry or State Secretary and not by the direct department manager or a section or the department managers get tasks directly by the authorised people in the organs or by other managers of sections which are not direct supervisors. The statement is interesting that the state secretaries are skipped, that is the Ministries directly allocate the working tasks to the employees and that is why a system for introduction which will enable people with managers skills to be set on liable functions. One respondent pointed that the non-existence of monitoring mechanism in the work performance negatively imposes to the realisation of the project activities Also, it is significant the statement that the frequent changes of the Regulative for systematisation of the working posts in organ directly reflects to the possibility for continuous monitoring of the working and then it is difficult to locate the liability as well. Regarding this, a proposal in the Law of state administration has been presented, so that regulations to be put which will protect the state organ from the frequent changes of the regulation books and for the systematisation of the working posts in the organs. From that reason The Law of State Administration should decidedly specify what represents structural change of state organ and in which cases complete redefinition of the function of one organ is allowed.

Conclusion

The process of reform of the state administration is a continuous process which has no ending and it always longs towards creation of larger result that is increased effectiveness of the state administration. That is why, all relevant factors should be taken into consideration which will contribute to achieve the drawn aim. The analyses in this paper point to the necessity of changing of the legal and sub legal acts into the direction of circling of the liability and establishment of monitoring public systems of the results of the state administration in

Republic of Macedonia. All this cannot be achieved unless procedures for work are not being set, which will be supported by measurable indicators contained in application software. Such regulations should refer to the way of distribution of the working tasks, clear and precise authorisation and responsibilities of all employees and clear rules of the work processes. The monitoring of the working operation is made especially on the central problems and that can be made continuously in long term or with certain breaks, that is to say from time to time in different periods and in different situations. One of the main problems in the content of the state review are the methods of the labour measurement as a final aim, that is the state administration should point at is to establish a measurement system of work expressed in numbers through charts for work distribution, graphs of working procedures and measure of working participation.

Through the chart of work distribution of the state administration it is shown which post performs certain working operation. Such chart will present the burdening or unused parts as well as doubling of the works of certain state administration, the graphs of the working processes presented correctly, operation by operation will present the timetable of the activities from one to another working post, overlapping where there is one, a break or waiting for a certain activity.

Such graphs of the working process will show in pictures where there are unnecessary burdens, where there is a jam, unnecessary formalities, clumsy work organisation and at the same time will point to the ways how these disadvantages to be removed. The measurement of work covers all procedures if they can be quantitatively expressed, though numbers or measurement of duration of certain projects or other standardised units for such action.

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CITIZENS PARTICIPATION AT LOCAL LEVEL
IN THE REPUBLIC OF MACEDONA

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Abstract

This paper is an analysis on the forms of citizen participation in decision-making process including citizen initiative, council of citizens and models of consultancy with civil society. Also, it analyses the satisfaction of the citizens from the forms and intensity of citizen participation in decision process and models of information and capacity of media system. The paper shows relation between political culture and citizen participation, the role of local self-government in promotion and providing of the concept of citizen participation and power of the civil society to articulate citizens interests.

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1. Civil society and local government

In the period to date, there has been full freedom in terms of citizens' association and about 6,000 civic associations have been registered in the country. Still, the figure does not reflect the real number of active associations. Most of them do not perform any activity and the greatest number of non-governmental organisations (both active and inactive) has a very small membership and presents "one group – one institution". There are few Decisions initiated by the civil society and its active collaboration in the policy-making process is small.

The European Commission, in its 2009 Report, regarding the Government openness to civil society in the policy-making and decision-making processes, underlines:

> *There is no systematic and transparent mechanism for civil society consultations regarding the National Development Policies, Laws, Programmes or other strategic documents.*

Because NGOs in the country have a very small role of mediators between the Municipalities and citizens, the trust among citizens that they will emerge as important factors in the decision-making process is also small. More precisely, according to the results of the Survey performed for the needs of 2010 National Human Development Report (unpublished document), only **one-third** of the respondents deem that participation in associations is *one of the best ways to influence the decision-making process on both national and local levels.* This trust is even smaller in the North-East Region and amounts to 20%, and the same percentage accounts for positive answers by respondents aged 15 to 18 years, as well as those above 65 years of age and people with primary education.

Below, a description is given of **the type and level of citizens' activity in the civil society in the last six months[1]**.

In sports, arts, music, youth or other recreation groups, **84%** are neither members nor participants, however, men are slightly more active in this field than women (men 78%, women 86%), **7%** *are not members, but participate,* **2.7%** *are members, but do not participate,* **5.3%** *are both members and active participants,* of whom 10% men and 4% women, and 34% respondents at the age of 15 to 18 years.

Organisation in Unions - Last years have also seen greater pluralism in Union organizing. It is necessary for the Unions to represent a certain percentage of employees in a particular branch so that they can become authorised employee representatives in the negotiation processes with employers and the Government. **90.2%** of the respondents declared that they *are neither Union members nor participants in Unions' activities*, of whom 86% are employed, 94% have primary education and 86% have higher education degrees.

3% of the total number of respondents *are members, but do not participate in Unions' activities*, and those with higher education are twice as many.

2.5% of the respondents are *both members and participants in the activities*, of whom 3% among Macedonians and 1.3% among Albanians where young people of up to 24 years of age are below 1% and people over 55 are 4.5%. People without and with primary education account for less than 1% and people with higher education account for 4.3%.

About **1.8%** *are active members of professional, business or entrepreneurial associations* while the employed account for 3.6%. Around **93%** of the respondents *are neither member nor participate in activities*. **94%** *do not participate at all in religious Charities*, and this number is higher in Macedonians (95.6%) compared to Albanians (87.7%). **88%** *do not participate at all in women's associations, civic or student associations, associations of pensioners or environment protection associations*, and this percentage is the lowest in the Eastern Region (78%). **2.5%** *are inactive members* and among respondents over 65 years of age, this percentage is 5%, which is due to pensioners' organisation tradition that exists. **4%** *are active members*. In the Eastern Region, they are most numerous (10.5%), women are not very actively organised (3.4%), Macedonians are more active (4.8%) compared to Albanians

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[1] The Survey was implemented in November–December period in 2009.

(2%), while 65-year-olds are twice as the average (8%), which is again due to the said pensioners' organisation tradition, where people with higher education are three times more involved (7.5) as compared to the respondents with primary education. **95%** of the respondents *do not participate at all in groups of people experiencing similar problems (disabled people, single people, alcoholics etc.)*, and this percentage is lower by 10% among youth aged 15–18 years, while **96%** of the population *do not participate at all in immigrant or refugee associations,* which is understandable because the country is not an immigrant destination and since the Kosovo crisis, there has been no wave of refugees.

Membership in *Internet networks (Facebook and the other)* is a special type of social networking, which has been experiencing huge expansion in the last decade. **22%** of the respondents are *active members* on Internet networks, of whom least numerous are in the South-East Region – 11%, 21.7% among Macedonians, 26% among Albanians, 67% in youth of 15 to18 years of age, 59% among 19 to 24-year-olds, 48% among 25 to 27-year-olds, 15% among 35 to 44 year-olds, 5% among 45 to 54-year-olds, 3% among 55 to 64-year-olds and 1% in people over 65 years of age. Of the respondents with primary education, 10% are active members, while in respondents with higher education the percentage is four times higher. About **70%** of the respondents *are not members at all*, and in urban areas this per cent is slightly lower (68%) unlike rural areas. Based on these Survey data, one can conclude that most excluded from social networks are senior people who live in rural areas and who have the lowest education. This is due not so much to the lack of participatory culture, but to the need for internet connection accessibility, basic computer skills and topicality of electronic networks among the younger population. Compared to all other forms of association, it can be concluded that **electronic social networks are most visited** and this can indicate that this model of association will be even further advanced in the future. It is a result of efficiency, globality and accessibility of electronic networking. **It is desirable that the Municipalities use social networks.**

Membership in *other clubs or groups that regularly meet* is extremely low, i.e. **91%** of the respondents *are not members at all*, and **3.6%** are *active participants*, where men are twice as active (5%) compared to women.

There are a high number of non-governmental organisations, but only a small part of them is really active in their field of action. There is no systematic and transparent mechanism for consultations with the civil society regarding National Development Policies, Laws, Programmes or other strategic documents. It is evident from the Survey that the number of citizens who are members in any type of civic association is very small and the number of active members is even smaller. It is understandable that youth aged 15 to 18 years are most often members of sports, arts, music, youth or other recreation groups. Only 15% of the employed have declared that they are members of Unions. The percentage is very low of the people who are members of Charities, student or environment organisations, and the number of those who are members of women's or pensioners' organisations is also small.

From the interviews performed with the Mayors and Council Members it can be concluded that NGOs are relatively quite active in the process of providing initiatives and implementing

particular solutions. They emphasise NGO's high willingness to act as partners in implementing particular projects, first of all, in the areas of sports, environment, culture and social protection. Both the Municipality and NGOs may initiate such projects. However, not in all cases are the criteria clear that the Municipality uses to select the NGOs. **Precise and clear criteria are necessary for selection of NGOs to become partners in particular project implementation, especially where such funds are at Municipality disposal and obtained from Municipal source revenues, State Budget or some donation. It is also necessary to define the procedure for selection of partner NGOs that will tend to involve a greater number of people.** Otherwise, process transparency is brought into question and room for suspected corrupt activities is created.

All the Municipalities underlined the assistance they provide as Local Government Units to NGOs by providing some of them with free premises to use. These premises are allocated by a Municipal Council Decision, but **not every NGO submitting a request and active with its own membership may get such premises. The criteria that Municipal Councils use to identify which NGO will get some office space and where and what size this space will have are not clear.**

2. Public information by local government units

Free access to information, guaranteed by Article 16 Paragraph 3 of the Constitution, is further elaborated in the Law on Free Access to Information of Public Character[2].

> *Information List*
> *Article 9*
> *Information Holders shall regularly maintain and update the Information List they dispose of and publish such information in a manner accessible to the public (web-site, bulletin board etc.).*
>
> *Oral or Written Request*
> *Article 12*
> *(1) The Requesting Party may request access to information orally, in writing or electronically.*
> *(2) Each Requesting Party shall, on the basis of a Request, be entitled to access the information disposed of by the Information Holder by receiving an insight, copy, photo-copy or electronic record thereof.*

With regard to free access to information of public character, some Mayors pointed out that there were some understatements in this area. Namely, it is insufficiently clear what costs are to be covered by the Requesting Party seeking the information. *It is not only about copying costs. Here, costs incurred with regard to human resources should be taken into account as well. Namely*, as they emphasise, *there are situations where such information is requested that makes an officer work overtime for several days, so due to that, current activities remain unfinished,* the respondents say.

The Law on Local Self-Government regulates the right to information on issues of local character as follows:

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[2] "Official Gazette of RM" No 13/06.

(1) Municipal Bodies, Council Commissions and Public Services founded by the Municipality shall, for no compensation, inform their citizens on their work, as well as their Plans and Programmes important for Municipality development in a manner defined by the Municipality Charter.

(2) The Municipality shall enable its citizens access to basic information on the services it provides, in a manner and under conditions regulated by the Municipality Charter.[3]

From the interviews performed, it can be concluded that Municipalities use various forms of *citizens' information*:

- Annual Reports in electronic and printed formats;

- Public hearings;

- Press conferences by the Mayor and Council Members

- Municipal newsletter;

- Web-site;

- Statements and information programmes on local TV and Radio stations;

- Public sessions of the Municipal Council and Commissions; and

- Mandatory once a week meetings with the Mayor.

There are 74 *television stations (both national and local) and the same number of radio stations* in the Republic of Macedonia[4]. This is a high number of broadcasting companies compared to the population number in the country. At the same time, this guarantees that access to information of local importance will be greater. Nevertheless, *the existence of a number of local TV stations is brought into question due to the small market and insufficient TV commercials.* "Regarding the commercial media sector whose main source of funding are its advertising means, the main barrier to its successful commercial operation and development is the small advertising industry potential in the Republic of Macedonia, and primarily this is the case at the local level. In order to achieve greater media sector consolidation, it is planned to regionalise this sector (see the Graphic Illustration below), which is in line with the strategic priorities of the Broadcasting Council.

At present, the regionalisation provides an opportunity for some of the local TV stations that will meet the appropriate criteria to climb up to the level of regional TV stations. This is the first step on a medium and long term. The Broadcasting Council is also expecting for some local broadcasters to start the process of merging and consolidating their capital that will enable them to rise to a regional level and offer better quality programmes and productions of audio-visual contents"[5].

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[3] Article 8 of the Law on Local Self-Government.
[4] Information from the official web-site of the Broadcasting Council [online] Available at: <http://www.srd. org.mk> [Accessed in February 2011].
[5] Information from the official web-site of the Broadcasting Council [online] Available at: <http://www.srd. org.mk> [Accessed in February 2011].

(Graphic Illustration of Broadcasting Regions in Macedonia)

In the Opinion Poll performed for the needs of *2008 Decentralisation Overview* of OSCE Observer Mission in Skopje the following questions were also asked:

How do you get informed on your Municipality's work?

> Other 68.28%
> Municipal newsletter 17.97%
> Municipality web-site 11.70%

What form of communication do you think is most efficient between Municipal Authorities and citizens?

> 1 Regular admission hours for the citizens   52.4 %
> 2 Citizen Information Centres   24.1 %
> 3 Presentations at citizens' meetings   32.2 %
> 4 Local media   35.6 %

3. Satisfaction of citizens with the decentralisation process and services they receive from the Municipality

The 2002 Law on Local Self-Government started the decentralisation process, which, among other things, is aimed at increasing Municipality competencies, making public services more accessible to the citizens and enabling greater citizen participation in the process of local decision-making.   However, according to the results from the Survey[6] implemented two years after the Local Self-Government Law entered into force, 42.2% of the respondents evaluate Local Government Units' work with the lowest mark (poor), while 13.4% put "satisfactory" to it, which proves the low level of trust in Local Governments. This indicates that even from the very beginning of the decentralisation process, the Local Government Units did not enjoy their citizens' trust and that it will take a longer period of time for them to start increasing that

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[6] From the Report on the telephone opinion poll carried out by Stratum Agency in June 2004 for the needs of the Republic of Macedonia's Government.

trust. The latest research[7] shows slight progress, i.e. almost a half (45%) of the respondents are average satisfied, over one-third (35%) are somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their local services. Only one-fifth of the people (20%) are somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with the services offered by their Municipality. In the research, people were asked if they thought that the decentralisation process would improve the situation in their local community.

More than one-third of the respondents found that the decentralisation would improve their local community situation, compared to almost one-tenth who thought that the situation would deteriorate, reaching the net balance of 25% of the respondents assessing the decentralisation impact in favour of enhancing the situation.

The question **Do you think that your interests are represented in the Local Government** for the needs of UNDP Project *2010 National Human Development Report*, the answer *To some extent* was given by around **one-fourth** of the respondents. The most positive answers to this question were given by Polog respondents (40%), and the percentage was the lowest on the basis of age structure (27%), while employed people account for 36% and unemployed account for 22%. The difference is drastic based on their education level. Namely, respondents without primary education account for 17.4% while respondents with graduate school account for 53.2%. By the research covered in 2009 Civic-based Analyses, where a similar question was asked, it was shown that four-fifths of the people deemed that they have no influence over their Local Government's decision-making process. This is similar to the result as in the 2008 March issue of this edition.

To some extent yes	**One-fourth**
Polog	40%
Vardar Region	22%
Male	34%
Female	27%
Roma	17.5%
Respondents aged 15–24 years	27%
Employed	36%
Unemployed	22%
Total	25%

In the last local Elections in 84 Municipalities *not one female Mayor was elected*, and in the previous Local Elections, three female Mayors were elected. This means regression in terms of politics gender representation although the number of female Council Members is going up thanks to the Election Code that envisages a proportionate model in distribution of Council Members' mandates using a gender equality quota.

According to the 2009 Decentralisation Process Study performed by OSCE Observer Mission in Skopje, it can be seen that citizens reckon that *decentralisation improved services the most in the area of utilities (55%), and the least in the area of local economic development (33%),*

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[7] According to Civic-based Analyses, UNDP 2009 issue.

which resembles the perception of decentralisation effects on the part of Municipal Authorities as well.

According to the focus group participants' statements taken for the needs of preparing the *Study on Rural Community Situation*, "there is agreement that this process primarily has great significance for smaller rural Municipalities whose interests and specifics have been losing their authenticity within large Municipalities. In this case, taking a comparative perspective, one can identify some divergence in the responses given by citizen focus groups and leader focus groups. A greater degree of restraint can be registered in citizen focus groups. Namely, for some of the disputant citizens, changes took place only formally and such citizens mainly manifest dissatisfaction with what has been accomplished in their Municipalities. They identify the problem in the amount of funds available to the Municipality, which directly affects its possibility to efficiently implement its competencies."[8]

According to *2008 Decentralisation Process Overview* prepared by OSCE Observer Mission in Skopje, "the citizens were asked *if there were more cultural events than before* (i.e. prior to the decentralisation process) and 52.8% think that decentralisation has brought more cultural events than before as opposed to 23.7% who deem that prior to decentralisation, culture was more present in their Municipalities".[9] In the area of education, 50% stated that education management at the local level was improved, 14% said that it was not improved and 29% that it remained the same as before.

It can be seen from citizens' replies that high Municipal taxes could be the possible reason for illegal building for 39.5 per cent of the interviewees, while the poor quality of Detailed Urban Plan is the second most frequently mentioned reason for it (27.9 per cent). The method of calculating Municipal taxes accounts for only 4.7 per cent. As expected, one-fifth of the interviewees answered that all previous responses confirm the reasons for illegal building.

According to the results contained in *2008 Civic-based Analyses*, and taking into account all public services together, the Study examined people's satisfaction with the services offered by the Municipality. Almost a half (45%) of the respondents are average satisfied, over one-third (35%) are somewhat dissatisfied or very dissatisfied with their local services. Only one-fifth of the people (20%) are either somewhat satisfied or very satisfied with the services offered in their Municipality.

As a whole, relatively few respondents deemed that the local Council made efforts to enhance the conditions in the Municipality. The area where least satisfaction was displayed related to the efforts of the Council to get the citizens involved in the decision-making, while Councils are not well off, either, in terms of their efforts to take action with regard to local population concerns or promotion of local population interests.

Next on the bottom of the opinion scale regarding Council's performance is if the Council is trustworthy, if it spends the money prudently and if it provides good value for money. The

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[8] Gaber-Damjanovska, N., Babunski, K., Joveva, A., 2007. *Study on Rural Community Situation*. MCMS, pp.23-27.
[9] 2008 Decentralization Process Overview. *OSCE Observation Mission in Skopje*. p.10 (Macedonian version).

respondents were significantly more satisfied with Council's performance regarding healthy environment issues. The greatest support to Council's efforts was given by the respondents who deemed that their Council was making significant efforts to make their area cleaner and greener, while a relatively large proportion also thought that the Council acts well in relation to Town Centres enhancement making their area safer and their location a better place to live and that the Council is neither distant nor unfriendly.

In accordance with the last public opinion survey provided by MCIC 70.8% know for ZELS and 30.8% know what it does.[10]

An indicator of satisfaction with services provided by the Municipality is also the number of petitions filed with the Ombudsman.

> *"The Ombudsman shall defend constitutional and legal rights of citizens and all other persons when they are violated by acts, actions and omissions of actions by organs of State Administration and by other organs and organisations that have public authority, and shall undertake measures and actions to protect the principles of non-discrimination and appropriate equitable representation of community members in State Government, Local Government Units and public institutions and services."[11]*

From the 2009 Ombudsman's Annual Report it can be concluded that 4,456 applications arrived at this institution, of which 3,672 are completed where in 944 cases a violation was noted and for 787 of them, Ombudsman's interventions were accepted and in 157 cases all legal possibilities were used.

Most applications were filed in the area of: justice, 744 or 20.48%; Employment, 389 or 10.71%; property relations, 361 or 9.94%; correctional institutions and facilities, 347 or 9.55%; consumers' rights **(utility and other fees), 277 or 7.63%**; protection of rights in police procedures, 252 or 6.94%; pension and disability insurance, 181 or 4.98%; **urban planning and construction, 170 or 4.68%; protection of children's rights, 157 or 4.32%;** civil situation and other home affairs, 154 or 4.24%; Social Protection, 95 or 2.62%; Health Care, 72 or 1.98%; Housing, 57 or 1.57%; finances and financial operation, 50 or 1.38%; **education, science, culture and sports, 49 or 1.35%; environment, 21 or 0.58%**; non-discrimination and appropriate equitable representation, 20 or 0.55%; as well as other areas where 234 or 6.44% applications were filed.[12]

The situations where the Municipality is, or could be subject to citizens' rights violation are marked with bolded letters in the above paragraph. If the percentages are summarised, it will be noted that the word goes about spheres where there is a distinct violation of civil rights.

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[10] Project "Trust in Institution and Civil Society", Macedonian Center for International Cooperation, 2010. Official website of ZELS, accessed in February 2011.
[11] Article 2 of the Law on Ombudsman, published in the "Official Gazette of RM" No 60/03.
[12] Ombudsman's Annual Report, p.16.

4. Conclusions and recommendations

- *It is recommended* that the Ministry of Local Self-Government in collaboration with ZELS implement activities to educate Municipal officials on the need for and manner of using social networks, which should also be used by Municipalities, since research shows that such social networks are the most powerful way of people association and at the same time, the most efficient information means

- *It is recommended* that recommendations on precise and clear criteria be prepared with regard to selecting partner NGOs in particular project implementation, especially when the funds are disposed of by the Municipality and obtained from its own sources, State Budget or some donations. It is necessary to also define the procedure of selecting partner NGOs that will tend to include a greater number of people

- *It is recommended* that recommendations be prepared regarding what criteria the Municipal Councils will use to identify NGOs that will be allocated office space, what size this office space will have and where it will be.

- Municipalities use various forms of public information:
  - Annual Reports in both electronic and printed formats;
  - Public hearings;
  - Press conferences by both the Mayor and Council Members;
  - Municipal newsletter;
  - Web-site;
  - Statements and information programmes on local TV and radio stations;
  - Public sessions of the Municipal Council and Commissions; and

- the survival of a number of local TV stations is brought into question due to the small market and insufficient number of TV commercials;

- only ¼ of the citizens deem that to some extent their interests are represented in the Local Government.

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POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY AS CONCEIVED BY VISEGRAD GENERATIONS

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Abstract

The purpose of this project is to investigate the system of values and political views of representatives of the Visegrad generation, youth born in (or shortly after) 1989 in the Visegrad Group countries. It seems that the political consciousness of young people born and raised in the new geopolitical conditions is both interesting for research as well as important in terms of shaping the future political vision in the V4 countries.

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NATIONAL QUESTION IN CENTRAL EUROPE:

DEMOCRATIC RESPONSES TO UNRESOLVED
NATIONAL AND ETHNIC CONFLICTS

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CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS