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SECURITY & SOVEREIGNTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY

CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS



Security & sovereignty in the 21st century
International Conference - 4–6 November, 2016

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ICRP INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE



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BUDAPEST, 4–6 NOVEMBER 2016

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FOREWORD

The fourth international conference organised by the Institute for Cultural Relations Policy (ICRP) was hosted by Kodolányi János University of Applied Sciences in November 2016. The keynote speakers of the event included diplomats, academics as well as representatives of the Hungarian Government. During the two days of the conference more than 30 speakers held their presentation.

The lectures and presentations of the “Security & sovereignty in the 21st century” conference have certainly broadened its audience’s knowledge about the current affairs of security and defence policy, various sovereignty-related issues, the roles of state and non-state actors in cooperation and conflict as well as concerns of territorial, political and economic integrity of states and regions.

Among the keynote speakers were Károly Grúber (Head of the Common Foreign and Security Policy department at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade of Hungary), H.E. Liubov Nepop (Ambassador of Ukraine to Hungary), H.E. Éric Fournier (Ambassador of the Republic of France to Hungary) and CSc. Dr. habil. Gyöngyvér Hervainé Szabó (Scientific Director of Kodolányi János University of Applied Sciences).

Through their lectures the participants of the conference were introduced to various approaches, notions and theories as well as practices regarding different researches on international security, while the high quality presentations of guest speakers proved how diverse thoughts are in connection with security policy.

Therefore, we are grateful to all participants for their contributions to the conference, wishing success to the presenters in their future researches, and hoping that the conference proceedings and the interviews made with the keynote speakers will serve as resources for researchers as well as for a wider audience.

Finally, the editor would like to thank the members of ICRP Advisory Board for assistance and the sponsors for supporting the event and the proceedings.

This proceedings is issued on the responsibility of the Chief Operating Officer of Kulturális Kapcsolatokért Alapítvány. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institution or its members.

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IDENTITY BASED FOREIGN POLICIES IN EASTERN EUROPEAN AND CENTRAL ASIAN STATES

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Abstract: *Russia and the former Soviet influenced world became a conflicted area in new Cold and Hybrid War era. The politics of history became a key form of warfare between former hegemons and theirs subjects. The key element of confrontations is the battles of memories, the legacy of Kresy, the former Volhinia, where all overlords made theirs massacre, holocaust-type actions. The new narratives of former's historical imperium's, as Lithuanian Grand Duchy, Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth, the Great Romania, the Ukrainian National republic, the Soviet Union, the Kazakh Kaganate are seeking the answers – can be the identity based foreign policy resolve the unsettled question of CEEC countries, Central Asia. The question is, can these new identity based foreign policies resolve the problems of anarchies in the global order in the region? The most influential answer is the Kazakh, how to deal with the clashes of memories and clashes of Universalist and nationalist identities. All western, eastern, southern European flank of Russia is under pressure, as well as Central Asia and the Caucasus. The banned, the absent, the stolen and the whitewashed histories became the new weapon hybrid wars of de-globalisations and denationalisations, and destructive informational warfare.*

* * *

Introduction

After the collapse of the Soviet Union, in an era of competitive states, nation branding became the most important tool for modify the physical and symbolic dimensions of place and space, as well as the collective identity, as integral component of national policy (Anholt, 2008), and nation brand became an asset from neoliberal perception. Nation branding includes state governmental actors, celebrities, MNCs, NGOs, international media platforms and actors, after the “End of History”, it is a technique, tool selling the nations, especially in case of new countries. While earlier so kind of companies as East India Company, Russia Company, artificial events, international exhibitions, so called commercial nationalism was the main route for exploring modern image of a nation, later national museums, heritage and other visual-informational products. In the Cold War era the US information campaigns, so called cultural diplomacy or public diplomacy as an American concept was connected with different global or regional aims. Nation branding is more than public diplomacy, it was connected with emotional, physical, financial, leadership, cultural and social dimensions. In this index and measurement the western democracies are among the first, because the first indicator is

the governance, the export as popular force, tourism and touristic attractions, investments and immigration, life quality, culture and heritage, tolerance and openness of people. In 2008 Russia ranked 21st in nation branding, and for most of as surprise first appeared on the list of soft power index in 2015.

After the 2008–2013, global financial crisis the neoliberalist political system and trend became questionable in Central and Eastern European countries, mainly by conservative parties. In early nineties, during the political system changes in CEEC countries the political landscape formed mainly the liberal dissidents, who decided the democratic content of political changes and made CEEC countries liberal democratic parliament republics. Among the main political forces, participating in political narrative forming was the conservative upper social strata of former landowners and middle nobility and so called civic middle strata groups tried to form national value system. The main question of the political system's changes was how the new political system have to develop, it is a continuation of former CEEC political systems, or they adapt to the new Western democracies. As from the nineties, the Washington consensus decided the main political narratives; there were no places in CEEC countries for national parties and programmes.

The 2008-13 global financial crisis has led radical changes in CEEC countries and the so-called, populist nationalist politics became strong political force. The CEEC countries after the joining to the EU and NATO, accepted the values of democracy, parliamentary system and rule of law, neoliberal market economy, and together with the EU and NATO actively participated in neoliberal value spreading into Eastern European countries as main actors of the so-called Great Europe programs. During early 2000 years it seemed as an easy democracy export with simple colour revolutions, but suddenly the changes in Russian politics (neoconservative turn, against neoliberal values, reforming the fragmented federative state, turning to state monopolistic capitalist system, with strong military and state apparatus) has caused a new turn in CEEC countries with fear of Russian new imperialism.

The aim of the study to analyse the identity based foreign policies in the context of new events reshaping the neoliberal world order. Our main preconception is, that the Eastern enlargement of the EU/NATO, perceived by large groups of population as a new Versailles system, where the autonomy and sovereignty of countries threatened. New conservative place accent on identity based foreign policies in contrast to former neoliberal identities, based on nation branding and human rights and democracy issue policies. Nation branding and country indicators are central in neoliberal policies (as Goldman Sachs and other rating scales for investment securities), especially in EU community level.

The conservative party policies after the impact of 2008–2013 crisis partly turned from liberal economic and cultural policies to new national, so called patriotic policies. The politics of history became a mainstream policy line in forming the new role of these countries in EU/NATO membership system, the new national interest based policies, questioning the minimalist state doctrine, liberal values in economic policies, in education, in free press, and in foreign policies. In case of the foreign policies, the new member states started a new opening to the Eastern markets and forming their own foreign economic policies.

New EU/NATO member states in the heart of Eastern Foreign policies

The historiographies concerning the differences in case of former COMECON and Warsaw Pact nations are very weak in analyses concerning differences in established socialisms of different states, and cannot understand the differences between conservative communist systems (GDR, SU, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Bulgaria and liberal ones Hungary, Poland and Yugoslav State). The political studies on transition processes focused mostly on abstract political transition theories and missed the individual historical pathways of European nations. The Eastern enlargement of the EU also reflects this view, because the former PHARE project (Poland & Hungary) the Western States reframed for a group accession. The Western experts treated the former Soviet Union states un-differentially as equally Soviets, from the Baltic States with strong German-Nordic culture to the Caucasian States and Central Asia with strong Islamic culture or other Eastern traditions (Russia as one of small nations). The Great Europe foreign policy strategy was limited only because of great geographical distances.

The European part of the former Soviet Union managed the transition in case of new states in three approach. The Baltic States turned sharply to the Western democracy model, Belarus choose the autocracy and prevention the oligarchy-type privatisation model, to maintain state socialism. In case of the other countries, the political turn was a state capitalism, perhaps we can use the old Marxist terminus “monopoly capitalism”, and other experts describe the new states as a model of hybrid regimes or kakistocracy systems. The most experts did not saw any differences between Baltic and Central Asian formers republic, mostly the whole Soviet Union treated as a homogenous state. While Russian and other states went through on oligarchic type of privatisation, destroyed the old structure, but they could not build truly democratic governance. This model of transition could led to the so called kakistocracy, a political and socioeconomic regime, based on plundering of the state and the people’s asset and property through a merger between the political leadership and criminal oligarchic structures. The elements of kakistocracy are: governance under guise of the democratisation of the society, introduction of market relations in economy, the rule of law and priority of human rights and fundamental freedoms. The main features: usurpation of power through unfair and falsified elections, growing polarisation of society, impoverishment of the population, enrichment of the new riches, corruption and rule of lawlessness. The kakistocracy model was maintained by western powers, who were eager to have private monopolies on different concessions, waited Russian aristocrats in banks of western society, purchaser of immobility properties, financier of football clubs, and tourist costumers, so the system maintained by TNCs and MNCs. If there were serious grievances in these states, the new concessions given to western firms resolved the crisis. These states swindled between western and soviet dependencies, and swifts from Russian orientation depended on western types of NGOs and academic elites. The responsibility of the West for the colour revolutions in this case have the function to rearrange the whole state and society, but often these revolutions led only to the changes of oligarchic groups. (Berdiayev, 2010)

The Central European Countries’ new Eastern turns, played crucial role to make Eastern European countries into Borderlands. The new EU member states (from 2004, 2007 and 2013), and NATO members (1999 Czech Republic, Hungary, Poland, 2004 Baltic States,

Slovakia, Slovenia, Romania and Bulgaria, 2009 Albania and Croatia) actively searched possibility of Eastern enlargement and reframing the Euro-Atlantic borders in case of Eastern Europe, too. The Central Asian countries focused Europeanisation on Council of Europe memberships, OSCE membership, but their activities for NATO membership failed with new Russian and CIS security policies, and the NATO's problem with Afghanistan and the war on terror. The Central and Eastern European political landscape is full of changes, full of new narratives, full of new identity type foreign policies. But in case of every countries the identity based foreign policies are unique, path dependent, and without them there are no possibilities for understanding the past and future historical events.

Russia quasi-permanent image as force against freedom, republicanism and political evolution was present in minds of Westerners from early 19th century as hotbed of mongolism, bent on world supremacy, a sort of Oriental power that could masquerade as a Western state. (Saunders, 2016) After the collapse of the SU, Western political circles treated Russia with strong Russophobe accent, as failed imperium. In CEEC countries, the European turn approved by the same attitude, with a Romantic view of European and Western welfare states. The Western memberships seemed as final resolution for CEEC countries escaping from borderline fate and histories. The new Russian foreign policy, the Georgian war, the Ukrainian orange revolution, the Euro-Maidan events and turn have led to the new turn in national policies, renewing the memory policies between the two world war era, when in CEEC countries "strong, military capable force" and "strong states" – mostly members of Entente Cordiale, protected the Western civilization against bolshevism. In case of Poland, the Baltic States, Hungary, Ukraine, Belarus, Russia's the new politics of history became central in political discourses and narratives. The recent Western scholarship recently has a double approach to Russia. First, one, which sees Russia a failed state, with missed modernisation and approves the Russian decline, and Russia weaknesses in winning post-Soviet geopolitical area. The second approach sees the Russian Federation as an extremely modernised state, surprised the Atlantic Alliance being capable for hybrid war in Crimea, corruption of the Western democracies in Europe, capable for turning UK into Brexit pathway, and decide the fate of the US elections. (see all studies published by Jamestown Foundation) It is capable for hacking Western democracies with information influence; capable to turn into ruin the whole European Union project. It has a failed nation branding and it is without soft power, but the EU and some countries have to decide on banning the RT and Sputnik media. This confusion is evidently comes from the Western identity, sees itself as universal, and thinking Russia and its foreign policy from pure Great Power interest based anarchical approaches.

Europe or Eurasia: identity based foreign policy of Russian Federation

During the last 25 years, new nations of CEEC and Central Asian countries tried to rearticulate theirs national identity, nation branding, to influence theirs public image pursuing own foreign policy aims. In case of Russian Federation (RF), the state promoted foreign policy aims, a kind of "statist nationalism", a kind of conservative, pragmatist and not ideological means. The western scholars sees a shift from statist nationalism to the

civilizational nationalism from 2008, the Georgian War. (Laurelle, 2014) It means, from former Westerniser model (Russia as a civic, liberal nation, with liberal, democratic, constitutional and multi-ethnic state-rossiiskoe-, integration, networked with the west in 2000, became a statist, civic, illiberal, constitutional, multi-ethnic state – russkoe –, with old fashioned sovereignty claims and great power foreign policy status objectives, as a strong state with military capabilities.. By Laurelle, recent civilizational nationalism is an ethnic origin one, based on Russia, as a unique civilisation, based on culture and values of ethnic Russians – russkie –, with foreign policy aims to build empire, cultural independence, with alliances against the West, with increasing but weak power. (Laurelle, 2014, p.14)

Lavrov, Russian foreign policy actor, questioned the Western liberal's views, as Russia at a unique pathways from Europe, as an underdeveloped, trying to catch up with the West, and unable to find its place in international relations. He make remarks that Christian Russia, as a thousand year state, from the Kievan Rus, from 11th century is part of European IR through dynastic marriages. The Russian spirituality suffered, but did not changed during Mongolian invasion, but emerged a new Russian ethnos. Lavrov gives accent on the role of Alexander Nevsky, who opted the temporary Mongol yoke against the European West attempts to put Russian lands under full control and deprive Russians from their identity. This is a clear signal for understanding the Russian federation behaviour after Western sanctions, new NATO actions along borders, while it is turning into East, the new foreign policy with Chinese and other countries of Asia for cooperation.

Lavrov underlies the importance of historical Russian state's independent role in Asia, regarded by the West and East as a successor of the Byzantine Empire, natural expansion to the Urals and Siberia, absorbing huge territories. In Lavrov theses Russia from the Thirty Years War a “powerful balancing factor” in Europe, and sees the Westphalian system as valid today with principles of sovereignty. He critical concerning the increasing role in European affairs, and constant European aims to isolate Russia from European questions. Lavrov sees Russia as a leading country in Europe after Peter the Great reforms, and declares that from that time, without Russia a single issue in Europe could not be resolved. Lavrov lists the Seven Years' War conflict, saving Prussia from France. Lavrov list Western aggressions against Russia and Westphalian order (1815, Crimean War 1853-56, WW1, WW2. Lavrov gives a progressive role of Russia in case of Vienna Congress, giving 40-year peace to the continent, the role of Alexander I, as with “subordinating national goals to European peace and order, a common policy of sovereigns for common happiness”. Russia positive steps at 1899 and 1907 Hague peace conferences were new with stopping arms race and preparations for war.

The 1917-year, and the Civil War Lavrov sees as terrible tragedy of the nations. However, socialist ideas valued as a push toward the welfare states in Western Europe, the role of Soviet Union in decolonisation. Lavrov rejects the idea of clash of totalitarian regimes during WWII; because Russia did not wanted destroy entire nations. Lavrov sees CEEC countries as subjugated to Brussels and Washington. Finally Lavrov makes remarks: the victory of liberal capitalist model, the end of history, have lost its meaning because of new global economic

development, emergence of new centres of power in the Asia-pacific region, relative reduction of the influence of the so called historical West. (Lavrov, 2016)

Ivan Kurilla, in his study this new Russian historical political language treats as return of Stalin, as a new historical propaganda from 2012-2014. He accuses with historical novelties the Russian governments, with passing a law against rehabilitation of Nazism, evoking memory of Prince Vladimir, commemorating the beginning of the WWI, the 70th victory in WWII. The signs of Russia's new historical language are the new tasks given by Putin and Medvedev to write a unified Russian history with separate histories of Novorossiya and Crimea. The Russian Parliament chairperson Naryshkin attended a ceremony in 2015 February devoted to meeting of Stalin, Churchill and Roosevelt, and unveiling the monument of the Big Three. (Kurilla, 2016)

Lavrov theses had won little attention, and did not have reflections. They did not approve the civilizational turn, did not approve Russia's Eurasian civilizational origins. What is new, it is the reinterpretation of the whole history of the European community of states, because the European historiography tradition viewed the balance of power in Europe without such a dominant power, as Russian Imperium. What is new, that Europe has lost its historical role for Russia, and the Eastern turn in Russian politics is more a global turn.

Central-European conservatives and the new politics of history

The politics of history, is a new conservative world view (in CEEC countries, but may be in other country far right party policies as well), contrast to the liberal view, the "End of History", sees the history, as Westphalian international system, broke away with liberalism and human rights as universal value system and sees national interest as first. The conservative policies in CEEC countries are mostly developed in Hungary, Poland and recently in Croatia.

- First, the politics of history as a new conservative movement sees the EU integration as a transnational radical project, and its aims to return it to a loose confederation instead of EU as a regional state. It denies that the EU model is the only possible democratic model; the transnational liberal EU model is the only democracy. In contrast to this Europe the politics of history is a new national turn to study of national history for understanding the nation's past as an own democracy with nation building contrasting to the multiculturalist transnationalism. This policy hardly criticised by liberal and leftist social parties, and approved by far left and far right parties.
- Second, the politics of history focused on studying the communist past as offences against the nation by local communist parties and the foreign colonial power called Soviet Union. Its main tools establishment of new research institutes, museums, programmes and discourses. This politics of history accepted by the ruling political parties, as natural political course histories. What is new, in the politics of memory of 1989, why to develop new understanding of those year events? In case of conservative parties, this policy is focusing on finishing democratic system changes, rewriting roles

of different national groups in contrast to dissident democratic traditions and post-communist reform parties, to nationalise the political transition processes memories excluding from it reform communist and other transnational actors.

- Third, the resentment, as politics against the west (new colonisation by the EU) and those who caused harm the nation. The resentment in foreign policies connected with national suffering from other nations, and the same time to have a civilizational mission in given area. The politics of resentment is equally present in left and right parties, but main agenda in case of far right movements. (Resentment in case of Poland and Ukraine)
- Fourth, the new conservative turn hallmarked the re-evaluation of historical past before the communist era; study the historical legacy of the nation's whole history, mainly placing on accent on successful historical state forming moments, when the political state and the nation could draw strength from autonomous and sovereign statehood situation. This element in politics of history connected with Central European federative projects, aiming to redraw Central and European history as an equal part of Western Christendom, or renew cooperation among CEEC countries as equals contrasting to Soviet Union or European Union's "imperial" projects.
- Fifth, the new conservative turn to the nation building with new accent on symbolic, charismatic leaders during the two world war era, whose activity the West accepted during the Cold War as quasi-legitimate, mainly after the WWII, whose activity western intelligent services financed, which worked and maintained as legitimate organisations by British, French, and US aids. The rehabilitation process is difficult in CEEC countries, because those, who worked as nation building persons of a country, had a colonial type of repression past, or fascist engagement or radical right activity, are judged as collective war criminals, or made atrocities against other ethnic inhabitants of the countries (Pilsudski, Bandera, Bálint Hóman).
- Sixth, the politics of history connected to memories of 1000 year constitution culture, rewriting constitutions, and the role of Constitutional courts of law, generating new European debates concerning rule of law in new democracies.

All this elements of politics of history have new accent in some CEEC countries foreign policies. The main dividing challenge in some CEEC countries, how to connect new "European democratisation mission with borderland civilizational missions, how to understand the legacy of history, how to reframe the policy of resentment into a new Central-European co-operation system. The recent Western and liberal historiography and political publicist literature has a great amount of studies concerning nationalism, resentment and new nationalism in the regions, as well as foreign policy debates.

Denied histories of past and politics of resentments Poland, Belarus, Russia and Ukraine

1. At the beginning of WW1 more than 1 620 000 Germans lived in Ukraine, 150 000 in Volhynia. The Germans served in Russian Army (250 000), in 1915 under the so called liquidation law, I. Nicolas confiscated properties of Volhynian Germans, gave

lands to Russian veterans 150 000 – 200 000 German settlers were arrested, exiled in Siberia and Central Asia.

2. After the Brest-Litovsk Treaty, the Eastern front of World War I ended and left Ukraine under German sphere of influence. Some part of Ukraine joined the Western Ukrainian People's Republic, the other part with Lvov, to the Second Polish Republic. The Polish forces in the Polish Ukrainian war defeated the Ukrainians and Eastern Galicia annexed by Poland for 25 year by the Paris Peace Conference. After different campaigns through Ukraine, in 1920 Józef Pilsudski and Simon Petlura signed an agreement in Warsaw, recognised Polish annexation of Galicia and agreed to form a Polish led federation in Eastern Europe. After the red army defeat near Warsaw in 1920, Poland signed the Riga Peace Treaty in 1921 and they have gained control over Galicia and western Volhynya.
3. Contested role of Poland in new territories is in the hearth of recent historical debates. Poland as a new state in 1918 was fighting three wars to establish its eastern borders (Polish-Ukrainian war, Polish-Soviet war, Polish-Lithuanian war) and won these wars, so Austrian Eastern Galicia, and Kresy (former Volhynia) became the part of Poland. The huge territories the Pilsudski government gave the Soldiers of the Polish army (45 hectares maximum), with material support from the army and financial support, 2 million Polish marks as credit (it was symbolic because of hyperinflation). The government gave 258 030 hectares to settlers (40 000 planned settlements) from 366,738 newly reintegrated agrarian lands. The colonist's structure was 1.2 % generals, 15.8 % officers, 40.7 enlisted soldiers, 42.3 non-commissioned officers. For preparing settlements, a governmental agency formed "work columns" to work for settlers from local inhabitants. (Siegrist, Müller, 2014)
4. In 1926, the Soviet Census reported about 2,2 million Ukrainians in Soviet Asia, from 3.5 million living in diaspora in the Soviet Union, it means the territories under the Soviet rule suffered more painfully (the Volhynian territories escaped from Holodomor. From 1929–1939 further 2.8 million Ukrainian moved or settlers or deportees. 200 000 Ukrainian moved to Poland, Czechoslovakia, Romania, Austria. In 1923, the Council of Ambassadors confirmed that Eastern Galicia remains part of Poland. Poland declared amnesty for Ukrainians who had engaged in anti-Polish activities. Probably 50 000 Ukrainians returned to Poland to those 40 000 Ukrainians who arrived with Symon Petljura after the Bolsheviks rule. The former UNR army members lived in great number of camps, and formed different anti-Bolshevik alliances. The Czech government was very active in Eastern Galicia with different programmes and aids, trying to form an Ukrainian state in territories given to Poland. From 1920 against Polish repressions in Galicia (several thousand people interned, a lot of UNR soldiers executed), the Ukrainian military organisation burned Polish estates, government buildings, destroyed communication lines, made political assassinations, especially against collaborating Ukrainians with help of German military and Intelligence services. In 1926, the Union of Ukrainian nationalist Youth as an hard political organisation (Stepan Bandera) fought a guerrilla war in Poland, and from 1929 the OUN pursued dual strategy of international lobbying and guerrilla

- war (60 assassinations, several hundreds of sabotage acts). In 1940, the revolutionary branch of the OUN formed a new faction led by Bandera (OUN B). (Satzewich, 2003)
5. In 1929 in Vienna the OUN group was formed, to prevent the strong Polonisation, the so-called campaign for Pacification of Ukrainians. In Eastern Galicia, parallel to Western part, the NKVD operation against Polish people (resettling Poles in Kazakhstan) made the territory ethnically homogenous. The Polish policies against the ethnic Ukrainians were constant agenda in League of Nations forums (as well as atrocities against Germans in Western territories). In 1930, the United Ukrainian organisations of the United States American published a 500 page book about Polish atrocities in Ukraine, based on report of John Elliott, New York Herald Tribune reporter. In case of Eastern Galicia, West Belarus, Southern Lithuania the strong Polonisation with atrocities to Ukrainian, Belarusian and Lithuanians focused on “inferior type of Poles”. (Mironowicz, 2007). During the era of the 30s in the 21st century, the Polish political class ruled Kresy by ideology and military means, with a colonisation mission, settlement of former soldiers, distributing property rights for them. This Polonisation program had its limits: the soldiers could not behave as peaceful peasants, and later the Soviets deported them as symbols of representative of Polish oppressive attitude toward Kresy.
 6. The German-Soviet Treaty of Friendship Accord (Ribentropp-Molotov pact in 1938) gave 201 015 km² to the USSR with 15 million people, the so-called Kresy, with largest Polish population. Stalin invaded the territory only after the Polish state collapse from Germany attack. First group of NKVD deportees were refugees from Poland after Nazi invasion, the second group was the Polish soldiers (250 000 captives), and 22 000 officers in three camps (Kozielsk, Ostaszków, Starobielsk) who suddenly disappeared in spring of 1940. The third category of “social criminals” 400 000 people the civil servants, teachers, politicians, rail-way men, doctors, lawyers, bankers, engineers, academics, architects and aristocrats, private firm owners, philatelists, esperantists, linguists for spying sabotage. The fourth group was the relatives of deportees and peoples participating with membership roles in different associations, the NKVD sent to Central Asia. In summary probably 1.2 to 1.7 million Polish nationals were deported and 210 000 young Polish men were conscripted in Kresy to serve in Red Army.
 7. The most important debates concerning history and memory are between Polish and Ukrainian politicians and historians. Poland, before a year of the EU joining first started memorial programs for those, 30 000 – 70 000 Polish people, whom from July of 1943 to 1944 were killed by UPA and OUN activists. (The Polish Home Army killed in 1944 10-20 000 Ukrainian civilians, and relocated 150 000 Ukrainians from South-Eastern Poland, to former German populated area (Operation Vistula). The Polish president Aleksander Kasnewski and Ukrainian president Leonid Kuchma made a common memorial speech in Pavlivka, but the differences were clear.¹ From that year, the history writing focused on “solidarity with Ukraine, the westernisation of Ukrainian society”. Henryk Litwin, ‘Ukraine in European History: Central European

¹ <http://www.tol.org/client/article/10068-volhynia-the-reckoning-begins.html>

Superpower⁷ writes about the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as the first Central-European multinational, multi-ethnic superpower as an important instrument in Ukrainian and Belorussian nation building processes, with incorporation of many regions of Ukraine (Kyiv, Volyn, Braclav).² In 2013, the Polish Sejm passed a resolution calling the Volhynia massacre as ethnic cleansing with elements of genocides. Reaction to this event, in 2015, the Ukrainian Verkhovna Rada passed a law on OUN-UPA activity as a struggle for independent Ukraine. In 2016 the former Moscow Avenue was renamed Bandera Avenue, in response to the Polish Parliament passed a law concerning Volhynia massacre as a genocide. (Motyl, 2016)

8. The next question of contested history is the role of Home army in Poland and Eastern Poland. 40 000 Home army partisans the soviets executed, 60 000 Poles arrested 50 000 deported to gulags, 300 000 people arrested by others 2 000 000). The Armija Krajowa as a partisan movement during the communist era was a theme of silent. The role of of Armija Krajowa in case of former Kresy, in countries as Belarus, Lithuania and Poland is different. In case of Belarus, all partisan movements connected to the soviet and communist pact. The resistance against the Soviet occupation and presence lasted long years after the end of WW2. In Belarus, recently lives 400 000 Poles, with vivid civic life, the ZPB (Union of Poles in Belarus) has 75 registered grassroots organisation, 17 Polish centres and 25 000 members. From 2005, half of them recognised by Belarus state, and half of them are in oppositions. After the introduction of the Karta Polaka, the latter's can access to Polish visa, and found themselves as targets of repression, and targeted with Polish media and diplomacy. This group tries to preserve the memories of the AK, while the official site treats them as a nationalist force aiming to give back the Western Belarus to the Polish state, those who want rehabilitate them, denies Polonisation and crimes against Belarusians. (KGB archives speaks about 35 000 collaborators, 250 German intelligence station and 20 000 members of AK, 12 000 members of OUN-UPA, 1000 members of Lithuanian anti soviet underground movements. Polish official propaganda speaks about multinational AK, where Polish, Belarussian and Jewish people fought. In 2013, the Polish parliament declared the year the "Year of Remembrance for Ak soldiers. The ZPB very successfully builds memorial places in Hrodna and other places.

In summary from close to 6 million Polish citizens died during 1939–1945, approximately 1 million from Soviet forces, 100 000 – 500 000 from Ukrainian ethnic cleansing. The greatest problem that the 50 years of communist rules –the politics of silence made problematic the true history of suffering these territories. The common denominator for Poles, Lithuanians and Ukrainians declaring an illegitimate act the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact, so they passed a solidarity act in Ukrainian Rada and Polish Sejm in 2016.

² Business Ukraine <http://bunews.com.ua/opinion/item/central-european-superpower>

Ukraine's history stolen by Russia

In case of foreign policies of the new states, national identities are playing important roles, and often they are swing between Russian and Western poles. In case of Russia and Ukraine not only the common history, but also common memory is crucial. In case of Russian memories from the Kievan Russia treated as a core of a common past. Those historical eras, when Ukraine belonged to other states treated as Western national and religious oppressions, and reunification of Ukraine with Russia in 1654, 1793, 1939, 1944 accepted as important dates for Russian nation building. In case of Ukraine, Kievan Rus is a Ukrainian state, Cossack Hetmanate in 17th century, 1917-20 Ukrainian People Republic as independent nation state. Ukrainians treats themselves as Central-Europeans, who belonged for four century to Poland-Lithuania, to Western culture, to renaissance, humanism, reformation, German law of local governments. Kiev Academy played a Westernisation role for Russia, and the Ukrainian Cossack tradition made Ukraine more European. As Putin stated at Valdai Club meeting in 2013, Kievan Rus is the foundation of the future Russian state, they have common traditions, common mentality, common history and culture. By Ukrainians, Russian state neither a thousand year old, nor Russian. The rehabilitation of the OUN and UPA –as Nazi collaborator organisations (extermination of East European Jews, Polish population of Volhynia are treated as national liberation war against the Soviet Union) makes reasons for Putin law against rehabilitation of fascism and Nazis. However, in case of Ukraine, because of different historical traditions of the different parts of the country, the divided memory divides parts inside Ukraine, too. (Kappeler, 2014)

In Ukraine the national memory in the centre of political battles. The Ukrainian Institute of National Memory was founded by president Yuschenko, has 30 young historians, and the new young director, Viatrovych, the former head of Ukrainian secret police archive in 2008-2010 is busy with rewriting Ukrainian past, with 2015 year acts of Ukraine's parliament. His historiography methods and culture cannot be accepted by scientific community of historians either in Ukraine either in Western countries. Vyatrovych sees his mission not only to write history liberated memory from communists, Austrian, Russian and Polish historiography influence, but from recent nation with historical presence, Russians, Jews, Poles, and to explore commonalities with other nationalists movement as Croatian Ustashas.

Ukrainian historians recently share the views that their country is part of East central Europe and part of Russian dominated Eurasia. The new society, Society of Historians of East Central Europe connected to political bottles: in the Ukrainian parliament in February 2006, Yuschenko expressed Ukraine's historical destiny to serve as the basis for integration processes in the Central and East European region. Recent historical narratives are speaking about Ukraine as a borderland among civilizations, but it is very difficult to study Polish, Russian and ottoman dominated lands and territories, at different stages in its development.

War of Lukashenka on the Russian World

After the Ukrainian turn in 2014, the Russian expert groups started a campaign against Lukashenka, who stopped former dialogues concerning integration of Russia and Belarus, because the president started a war against Russian World. Lukashenka leads an anti-Russian nationalism, putting the first place the Belarussian language, culture and literature, silencing news about Eastern Ukraine, behaves as friend of Poroshenko, refused to accept the annexation of the Crimea. The Belarus government use national colours instead of ribbon of Saint George on ninth of May celebrations, making accent on free and European Belarus in contrast to Asian Imperial Russia, calling the Belarussian nationalism provincial. Among the critical themes the Russian experts list the new historiography in Belarus, originating the Belarussian statehood from the traditions of Grand Duchy of Lithuania, distinct from Russian legal-political culture and sovereignty, reinventing new national heroes as Kalinowski, and victories of Grand Duchy of Lithuania as symbols of Belarussian military triumphs, and creating negative image of Russia and Soviet period. The accusations of Russian experts lists the rejection of rebuild monuments of Tsar Alexander II, while giving monument to Lithuanian king Algirdas in Vitebsk, what poses a serious threat to the Russian World idea. Lukashenka tries to emancipate Belarussian Orthodox Church from supremacy of Moscow Patriarchate. The most radical groups are football fans – FC Dynamo and FC Volna Pink, who are pro-Bandera oriented, and many volunteers' fights in Ukraine on the Ukrainian side. In case of Belarus, Vitebsk, Mogilev and Gomel have to proclaim to Russia, in case of a potential independence of Belarus. Belarussian nation is artificial product, played by Stalin, Belarus part of the triune nation, the grand ethnos, consisting of three components: Great Russians, Little Russians (Ukraine) and Western Russians (Belarussians), connected with Orthodox Christianity. (Ikynski, Zochowski, 2016)

Memories of holocaust, memories of fascist pasts

In case of Poland, the most important debates are recently around the responsibility for holocaust. There are new films and books concerning the role of Polish people for holocaust before the German troops arrived. As a part of hybrid war, there are new internet contents concerning role of Poland as 'Greedy hyena of Europe' (remark of Churchill speaking about the international guarantees for Poland against Germany, during partition of Czechoslovakia). By Rubtsov, Poland built the first concentration camps in Bereza Kartuska in recent Belarus, where anti-state activists the local officials imprisoned, with all inhumane conditions. The Polish Law enforcement officers officially trained in Germany, Józef Kamala-Kurhanski the leader of the camp was trained in Germany by SS methods. For Germany, the Polish ethnic cleansing was important, because they freed the land from aliens (Ukrainians, Belarussians and Jews). Hitler used Stepan Bandera and Roman Shukhevych to cleanse the Volhynia-Podolia region with paramilitary operation. Neither Poland, nor Ukraine did not to deal with these historical questions in official historiography. The PiS party passed a law in Poland, introducing legislation to punish the use of the term 'Polish Death Camps', and the use of the phrase is punishable with up of to five years in prison in September 2016 . Denying the

Holocaust (speaking about crimes committed by Poles) can earn three years of deprivation of liberty. Poland was an occupied country, which suffered terribly under Nazi Germany, and there are no other narratives. This is against Jan Gross (Princeton University) concerning Polish massacre of Jews in Jedwabne, and the task of historians, and politicians to brake ‘with pedagogy of shame’. It is banned to call Auschwitz Museum as “Polish concentration map, the descriptions in museum had to be changed “German concentration camp”. (McChrytsal, 2016)

New Central Europe in historical context: competing Imperial ideas and future plans

- Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian and Romanian Civilising Missions are the newest narratives. The Polish and Lithuanian Commonwealth, the two states, Romania as a part of EU’s Eastern Partnership program developed their new attitude concerning a new civilisational role for Ukraine, Belarus. The civilising mission is connected to spreading European values, the right to alter post-Soviet values, and cultures, to establish governance and protection through NGOs and paramilitary organisations for working in controlled territories. The main features of political Anglo-Saxon-ism are good government, neoliberal political thought, neoliberal human rights based on multiculturalism and fragmented group interests, the uncontrolled free of press, historicism of settlers and pressings to take as true the historic narratives of the “civilised nation”. All these countries’ political elites see the former Soviet relationship as a special expertise, institutional and historic knowledge of “transition” as high skills with specialist knowledge of former “quasi colonialist territories”. The EU, as a specific framework system can play a role as a wider forum, but for development policy, it needs a narrower action framework. In case of Lithuania, it is the Nordic regional network, in case of Poland, it can be the ABB region (Adria-Baltic-Black sees triangles).
- Modernisation and democratisation of Belarus is part of the EU and US backed public diplomacy programmes with “regional role of Lithuania”. Poland’s aim to renew Intermarium program with Prometheus operation – a federative rebuilding of CEEC area and civilisation of Ukraine and reinforce the Catholic civilizational mission against uncivilised and Asian Russia. Poland civilizational role is present in Belarus, with Polis-Belarus minorities and memories of Polish past, especially with memories of Army Homeland (Armija Krajova). Poland has exclusive rights to deal with Russia; Poland civilizational mission derived from 17th century. Lithuania’s task only to deal with Kaliningrad, to rebuild in Konigsberg the Baltic Culture. Romania’s civilizational mission focused on Moldavia, especially for Transnistria, and Bukovina in Ukraine. However, the problem is that the Polish nationalism gave signal to Ukrainian nationalism. They are thinking about Ukraine as heroic state, where the Kiev battle against Germany longed for more time than the whole annexation of Kiev. The civilizational role belongs to Ukraine and the Polish Intermarium project is not more, than a new colonisation attempt.

European-Eurasian identity with nation branding: multi-nationalism, multi regionalism and multilingualism

As we could see from above mentioned massive population deportation into Central Asia, Kazakhstan, the country has an Eastern European and -Soviet type of enlightenment culture, developed by deportees. In American and Western scholarship, as in case of Columbia University, Central Asia a former territory of Soviet Union, to this category belongs all the CIS countries. The Central Asia term in Europe has a meaning, a sub-region of the former Turkestan countries. Former Soviet Republics and Afghanistan. (Sometimes Azerbaijan listed to them) In case of this countries the eastern legacies (Mongol empire, Genghis ruling house legacy), the Islamic legacy and the European –mainly Russian presence are the main civilization forming factors. The most developed country of the region is Kazakhstan, with strong nation branding activities, and strong Europeanisation and westernisation aims.

Nursultan Nazarbaev sees the country as part of the Western world from cultural, scientific and economic perspective. For Kazakhstan, the ideological paradigm of Eurasianism is a nation building theory, a theory for state of ethnic Kazakhs, tolerating other groups as ethnic Russians, who are “guests in the Kazakh House, who should learn Kazakh language for their carrier advancement. In North Kazakhstan, there is a strong ethnic movement to detached northern part of the country from Kazakhstan to Russia. The so-called Pugachev incident in 1999 in Ust’-Kamenogorsk, ended with 22 arrested individuals, 11 Russian citizens among them, for creating an autonomous Russian Altai Republic in the East Kazakhstan County. Viktor Kazamirchuk, the leader of the group called himself as Pugachev (as a Polish descent)., lived in Novosibirsk and financed the movement. Nazarbayev - who treated by the West as an moderate and enlightened authoritarian leader tried to lessen the linguistic pressure and prevent emigration of ethnic Russians and sink the country as a postcolonial one, after the Russian annexation of Crimea placed accent on English language as a politically neutral to both Kazakh and Russians. The English language open the doors for all, and as a trans ethnic language can help to create a new identity based on citizenship and not race or ethnicity. (Shlapentokh, 2015)

After the annexing of Crimea and Ukrainian crisis, Kazakhstan became cautious concerning Russia, limiting the framework of EEU, and became worried concerning 1994 Budapest Accord. After the Ukraine Maidan events, the nationalist Zhirinovskiy called for the creation of Central Asian Federal Regions, and the communist Limonov called for annex regions in Northern Kazakhstan.

Kazakhstan gained new reputation by winning the seat on UN Security Council, remaining neutral during Ukrainian and Syrian conflicts, giving place for mediation negotiations between conflicting sides. Kazakhstan’s turn to the western world connected with growing Russian nationalism, the strong Chinese presence in the country’s economy, to go as far as they can from Russian influence, dancing in the framework of Russian security system as the Kazakhstan based Edinstvo movement and Slavic Movement of Kazakhstan. As Russian Cossacks were active in all armed conflicts of Eurasia, the Kazakhstan’s Cossacks refused to joint to defenders of Donbass. Cossacks wants the recognition of genocide against the

Cossacks in revolutionary Russia, and Nazarbaev treated them by great honour, as Supreme Ataman of Kazakhstan Cossacks. Kazakhstan could reject the two threats: the federalisation and autonomisation of the country and the second, the double citizenship system. Putin speech in 2014 Seliger Youth Forum: Nazarbaev “created a state on a territory where no state had never existed. The Kazakh had never statehood, he created it.”

Nazarbayev and Kazakhstan in response of it launched a nationwide campaign to celebrate 550 years of statehood, the Kazakh Kaganate. The Kazakh foreign affairs minister, Erlan Idrissov, the 550th year anniversary of foundation of Kazakh Khanate called as starting point for nationhood, as heir of Great Steppe Empires (Turkic Kaganate (6–8th centuries), and Eke Mongol Ulus (the Great Empire of Genghis Khan). He mentioned ancient history of the Great Eurasian steppe zone, the Saka, Kangly, Usuns. The Huns, Scythia, Turan, Kangha, the country of Saka people in 5th century BC (bordering with Ancient Greeks, China, Iran as early civilisations of the Ancient Silk Road). The speech is recalling the book “The First Turkic Empire (552-603) written by Nazarbayev, as the empire of the world system (Byzantium, Iran and China), as a first Eurasian Empire as successor of Hun Empire. The civilizational values based on Orkhon-Yenisei culture (runic script), crossroads of Tengrism, Christianity, Buddhism, the successor states of Khimacs (8th c.), the Kypchak confederation. In the history of Kazakh state, the 1206 year of Kurultai Supreme congress listed as important event, after the partition of the Golden Horde the Kazakh Kaganate, and theirs affect world civilisations, among them on Russia and the countries of Eastern Europe. The Kazakh Khanate was a “Steppe Democracy” with early diplomatic relations with Russia, and the Steppe diplomacy was a successful activity, Kazakh Kaganate became and emerged as “independent force” in international relations. After the voluntary and partly conquered lands by Russia (1731-1965), the 19th and early 20th centuries are valued “controversial”, the short-lived Alash Orda era, president Nazarbayev sees as recreation of nationhood, and the 1920 year the establishment of Kazakh Autonomous Soviet republic, the 1936 year of Kazakh Soviet Socialistic Republic as a formal but not real statehood. (Erlan Idrissov, 2012)

The foreign policy confrontations between Russia and the West caused a lot of harm to Kazakh economy, and problems for multi-vector foreign policy. While earlier the choice between the West and Russia would be the latter, after the Crimea step, it became risky. Kazakhstan refused to implement counteractions against the West, maintained good relations and cooperation with Ukraine, signed a new agreement on partnership with the EU, refused to boycott Turkey after shooting the Russian jet. Erlan Idrissov stated in 2015 “Kazakhstan does not adopt the position of silent detached observer in the implementation of someone else’s strategy. Our country is successful in making its own independent way in the world. We purposefully build good relationships and establish strong economic contacts with large and small states in the East and West, North and South. We work closely with Russia and China. Europe is our largest trading partner, and the US is the second largest foreign investor after Europe.” Nazarbayev for gaining this aim controls the Russian ethnic card, the Cossack nationalism, the Kazakh nationalism (whose main concern is to maintain the independent statehood after Nazarbaev) and Islam radicalism, with Chinese economic threats.

The identity based foreign policies by some recent Western scholarship framed by Russia's hybrid war and aids given to nationalist policies and different groups hostile to the neoliberalism. We think the nationalism-universalism antinomies are not fixed and unalterable, nor wholly fluid and amenable, they can be altered. The recent conflicts of memories is more deep than for the first sight it seems, the propaganda of Russia could not bring so deep cleavages, if the pre-communist, and two world war memories would be written with more emphasis on truth. The 1989's year turn brought insight only some light of historical past: without the full 21st century history, without blaming one or another nations for historical facts and processes we cannot to shape our future with better securities of nations in CEEC countries or in Central Asia. Without exploring more deep histories of two world war era, outer and inner colonial and racist practices in CEEC area we cannot bring peace to the region. Without understanding western influence (in case of counterrevolutionary movements and paramilitary organisations in the 20th century, the real deep processes and new information warfare concerning history politics without the West old Cold war, and 'new public diplomacy practices' and the old cold war cultural propaganda of the Soviet Union, or new identity based foreign policy practices of Russian Federation.

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**THE STRUCTURING OF THE MODERN
CROATIAN IDENTITY AND SOVEREIGN NATION**

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Key Words: *state-building, nation-building, historical and statehood traditions, national reconciliation, europeanization*

Abstract: *Croatia was confronted with difficult challenges during the 20th century concerning the major processes of social and political change, among which nation- and state-building and the establishment of national identity was given the highest priority. During this time Croatia passed through a period of reinterpretation of its history and strong nationalist reawakening. This nationalist project became a major guide in the creation of state procedure. Moreover, new internal and external conflicts appeared and they had potentially important consequences for definitions and formations of Croatian identity. The most significant factor shaping modern Croatian nationalist ideology has been the concept of historical rights and claims to self-rule. Based on this historical statehood narrative the creating independent Croatian state was the necessary outcome of a “millennial struggle” of the Croats, the “one of the oldest European nations” (Tuđman). On 22 December 1991 Croatian Parliament ratified a new constitution which asserted Croatia’s rights as a sovereign state and declared the official language of the republic to be Croatian. One of the most important aims of newly born state was to reconcile and synthesize Croats’ divided and competing memories which was represented and reinterpreted by symbols and rhetoric in the 1990s and manifested through the renaming of academies, institutes, streets. The revival of memory occurred in the context of Croatia’s war of independence from 1991 to 1995 as the remarkable unity within national ranks against the threat of Great Serbian expansionism. The Croatian identity was based not only on the nationalism, but also on its Central European dichotomy which led the country’s Europeanization mainly in post-Tuđman area.*

* * *

Introduction

The rapid disintegration of former Yugoslavia – started on 25th June 1991, with the declaration of independence by Croatia and Slovenia and ended on 17th February 2008, when the Parliament in Kosovo declared the independence of the former autonomous province – has forced a redefinition of national identity across the former republics of ex-Yugoslavia including Croatia. Croatia was confronted with difficult challenges at the end of the 20th century concerning the major processes of social and political change, such as establishing new, democratic institutions that are able to guarantee the rule of law and fundamental rights, the protection of minorities, introducing the market economy, an independent foreign policy oriented on Euro-Atlantic interests. (Ördögh, 2012; Lőrinczné, 2015) Parallel processes of state- and nation-building and the establishment of national identity ran alongside and it was given the highest priority. (Vizi, 2014) During this time Croatia passed through a period of reinterpretation of its history and strong nationalist reawakening. This nationalist project and identity-building became a major guide in the creation of state procedure. Moreover, new internal and external conflicts appeared such as the four-year inter-state civil war and they had potentially important consequences for the formation of the state and the definitions of Croatian identity.

The most significant factor shaping modern Croatian nationalist ideology was the concept of historical rights based on historical statehood traditions and claims to self-rule. Based on this historical statehood narrative the creating independent Croatian state was the necessary outcome of a “millennial struggle” of the Croats, the “one of the oldest European nations” (Zakošek 2008). On 22 December 1991 Croatian Parliament ratified a new constitution which asserted Croatia’s rights as a sovereign state and declared the official language of the republic to be Croatian. One of the most important aims of newly born state was to reconcile and synthesize Croats’ divided and competing memories which was represented and reinterpreted by symbols and rhetoric in the 1990s and manifested through the renaming of academies, institutes, streets. The revival of memory occurred in the context of Croatia’s war of independence from 1991 to 1995 as the remarkable unity within national ranks against the threat of Great Serbian expansionism. This national reconciliation of all Croats became the second pillar of the modern Croatian identity. The third major element was affiliation to the West, so the Croatian identity was based not only on the nationalism, but also on its Central European dichotomy which led the country’s Europeanization mainly in post-Tuđman area. (Kevo, 2013)

1. Historical statehood traditions

Croatian national identity in the 1990s is constituted by the narrative of historical statehood with its claim that Croatia has enjoyed continuous statehood since the time of the medieval kingdom. On this base nationalist interpretation of Croatian history was created during the nation-building and self-identification process. The story started with arriving of Croats in territory what is today Croatia in the early 7th century and in 879 Croatia obtained the pope’s recognition as an independent principality. The Christianization of the Croats began in this

period, in addition it was the beginning of the written word among Croats. Under the King Tomislav Croatia became an independent kingdom and this medieval kingdom lasted from 924 to 1102, when the struggle for Croatian throne ended with unifying Hungary and Croatia in a personal union under the Arpad dynasty. Croatia had a great deal of autonomy under Hungarian rule, preserving its own viceroy (ban), privileged landowning nobility and an assembly of nobles, the diet (Sabor). Regardless of the fact that both institutions lacked real power to rule, they would remain a powerful symbol of the idea of continuity of Croatian statehood for the future generations. This union remained in place until 1918. During the medieval period the concepts of “state” and “nation” referred to the monarchy and nobility and the peasants were not integrated into society until appearing Croatian Peasant party in early 20th century. (Biondich, 2005; Pusich, 1996; Goldstein, 2001; Uzelak, 1997)

The national awakening of the Croats started in 19th century and was represented by five most dominant nationalist ideologies all of them operating within a framework of historic state rights. These are: Illyrism (Illyrianism), Yugoslavism, the Party of Right, the peasant movement and social democrats. (Gross, 1980)

The Illyrian movement represents the beginning of the Croatian national awakening. It was created in the 1830s and 1840s by Ljudevit Gaj (1809-72) and based on unity of all South Slavs within the Habsburg Monarchy. The movement characterized by three major features. It was not only a cultural renaissance introducing modern Croatian literary language as a counter-weight to Hungarian, but also acted as a political movement based on traditional privileges of Croatia within the Hungarian Kingdom. The Illyrian movement was an attempt to establish cultural unity among all South Slavs. (Despalatovic, 1975; Vizi, 2011; Koudela 2015)

A continuation of this nationalist ideology by adopting South Slavic common culture (language, folk customs, etc.) kept alive an idea of the Illyrianism and resulted in Yugoslavism in 1860s. It tended to create the South Slav political alliance and while it was used as a tool for getting Croatian national political emancipation against contemporaneous expansive German and Hungarian national movements. Yugoslavism as a political concept was developed by two catholic priests, by Josip Juraj Štrossmajer (1815-1905) and Franjo Rački (1828-94). They believed that Croats were able to resist Hungarian nationalism if they united with other South Slavic peoples, which was to be a heart of a future Yugoslavia. Bishop Josip Juraj Štrossmajer wanted to introduce this South Slav unity within a federated Habsburg state as the basis for an independent Balkan state. Štrossmajer and Rački Yugoslavist ideas were politically implemented by the People’s Party (a new name for the old Illyrian Party). Štrossmajer inspired the founding of the Yugoslav Academy of Sciences and Arts in 1867, whose first president was Rački (its name was changed to Croatian Academy between 1941-45, and it has the same name since 1991). Since then science and culture gained more and more importance, more books were printed. (Goldstein, 2001; Uzelak, 1997; Lampe, 2000; Rusinow, 2003)

At the end of the nineteenth century the idea of Croatian “state rights” emerged and aspired to create an independent Great Croatia. It was the ideology of *the Party of (State) Right* led by

Ante Starčević (1823-96) – often called the father of the nation, a father of Croatian exclusive nationalism. The Ustaše movement considered Starčević as a direct ideological predecessor.

Starčević rejected Yugoslavism and he attempted to define the Croats, not only in opposition to Austrian-Germans and Hungarians, but first and foremost to Serbs. Instead, Starčević claimed that Croatia has a potential to gain independence on its own, and rejected the framework of the Habsburg Monarchy. Starčević argued that the Croats and Bulgarians were the only state-creating nations among the South Slavs. He strongly opposed to the existence of Serbs, arguing that they, like the Slovenes, were simply Croats. (Gross, 1980) He described the Croatian nation as “the most glorious nation among the Slavs”, “once a ruling nation”, a “chosen people”, believed that all South Slavs were in fact Croats, and enforced spiritual Croatism, which means that everyone who has a so called Croatian spirit is Croat. (Banac, 1984, p.100) This idea was reawakened between 1941-1945 when a collaborationist puppet-state was put in place, and renewed again in the early 1990s, when the dissolution of Yugoslavia began. (Banac, 1984; Gross, 1980; Lampe, 2000)

The next stage of Croatian national ideologies was represented by Croatian Peoples' Peasant Party (HPSS) founded on December 22, 1904 by Antun and Stjepan Radić. HPSS incorporated four priorities into its programme. These are: statehood, people – namely peasants – were as the majority political force, political liberalism and Slavism. They believed in the doctrine of Croatia's state-right and the continuation of the Habsburg Monarchy as the federal state divided into three equal parts – Austria, Hungary and Croatia. Slavism meant cooperation Slavic people in Croatia within the Habsburg Empire. This new statehood was based on freedom for all people, where peasant who had majority of the population should have the ruling majority as well. The ideal type of the state was republic, based on equality and democracy. (Banac, 1984; Lampe, 2000, Bartulin, 2006)

The range of national ideologies in Croatia appeared in the nineteenth and early twentieth century. However they had great variety in their political programme and ideas, they shared some common features. The first one that Triune Kingdom needed to be united, which means they demanded the unification of Croatia, Dalmatia, Slavonia and Istria. It was considered as a heart of future state. According to the second common issue, all of them wanted to extent of role of the Sabor over Croatia. Finally they applied for a constitution that acknowledged Croatia's historic right to statehood. (Bellamy, 2003)

These different ideologies remained alive after Croatia entered the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918 and they reawakened during the second war and in the homeland war. On the bases of statehood ideologies majority as Croats welcomed a federal Yugoslav state based on the principle of self-determination later enunciated by Woodrow Wilson in his “fourteen points”. (Gulyás, 2005) But the reality was somewhat different as by entering new South Slavic State Croatia had lost all the state elements and symbols it had preserved for centuries while being part of Austria-Hungary. Miroslav Krleža, one of Croatia's most prominent writers said: *“As a nation, within the framework of the 1918 unification, the Croats have lost all the attributes of their statehood. These attributes, to be sure, were falsely decorative, but nevertheless, in spite of centuries, they were preserved as relics and symbols*

of a certain liberty, which, through a negation of every democratic liberty, was not entirely devoid of political reality: the crown as the mark of sovereignty, banners, arms, army, autonomy.” (Banac, 1980, p.260)

The Yugoslav Kingdom did not make any concession to Croatia until 1939, when it granted limited autonomy to the Croats. But in 1941 due to the connections with Italy and Germany the opportunity for establishing a viable state had passed. The Croatian statehood became reality by an emerging Independent State of Croatia after 900 years, which lasted only for four years from 1941 to 1945. The Independent State of Croatia was seen by Croatian fascists as the rebirth of Tomislav's Kingdom which paid back historical debt to Croats. The state itself was illegitimate, it depended upon the Axis powers for its existence. The actions the Croatian extremists (known as Ustaše) carried out in the name of Croatia poisoned that name for generations to follow. Concentration and work camps were formed, the largest Jasenovac on the river Sava was set up in September 1941. Only in this camp 80,000-100,000 people – Jews, Serbs, Gypsies, Croats – were killed between 1941-1945. (Goldstein, 2001; Pusich, 1996; Bartulin, 2006; Gulyás, 2013) It is estimated that they killed around 300,000 Serbs, most of Croatia's 36,000 Jews and a large portion of the 200,000 Croats. The genocidal anti-Serb actions ensured future suspicion of an independent Croatia and desire for revenge among many Serbs.

The current example of Croatian statehood is the Republic of Croatia, which proclaimed its sovereignty in May 1990, shortly after the Croatian Democratic Community came into power in the first multi-party election. When it became clear that Serbia would not negotiate about loose confederation, both Slovenia and Croatia declared their independence on 25 June 1991, which led to a bloody war. Official Croatian name for this war is the “Homeland War” (Domovinski rat), which implies that it was an act of outside aggression on the homeland (domovina), rather than an internal conflict and clearly denoting its importance in the process of Croatian nation building Franjo Tuđman addressed the Croatian nation at the moment of the start of Serbian aggression against Croatia, 16 October 1991: *“They could not, nor will they ever be able to kill our passion and our need to live in human dignity, in peace with ourselves and with the free nations of Europe. We have carved out that right at our first democratic elections. For this right and for our sacred land we are even ready to die.”* (Vukic, 2016)

The conservative Croatian nationalism has achieved three major objectives with the war. It succeeded in taking Croatia out of Yugoslavia, it secured territorial integrity for the newly independent Republic of Croatia, and it made Croatia more ethnically homogeneous than ever before. The Croatian nationalists do not allow the “Homeland War” to be forgotten, it occurs in the context of Croatia's war of independence from 1991 to 1995 which even now can mobilize voters. (Jović, 2012) Unlike the Second World War, the “Homeland War” was able to unite national ranks against the perceived threat of Great Serbian expansionism. All Croats were on the same side, regardless of the political histories of their fathers and grandfathers. (Biondich, 2006)

According to the Croatian Parliament Declaration on the Homeland War from 2000, it was a “*just and legitimate, defensive and liberating, and not an aggressive and conquering war*” (Deklaracija, 2000) while its final Operation Storm, carried out by Croatian troops in 1995 that liberated the Serb-occupied territories of Knin and surroundings, was enshrined in a special declaration (2006) stating that it was a “*legitimate, victor, antiterrorist, final and unforgettable battle*” and that the task of the scientific and educational institutions is to transform the battle into an event that will “*become part of Croatian useful past for the future generations*” (Deklaracija, 2006) Historical victimhood narrative was created about innocence of Croats in the war since the Croats were merely forced to defend the country’s territory, so Croats were victims of Serbian aggression and they rejected the idea that the Croatian side also committed war crimes. In the Croatian nation building process, the myth of collective victimhood played decisive role in creating national identity. The memory of the homeland war was used as a legitimizing instrument for Tuđman political goals. The past became manipulated in order to serve the current political needs.

Croatian national identity in the 1990s was framed by the historical statehood narrative with its claim that Croatia has enjoyed continuous statehood since the time of the medieval kingdom. The first Croatian President, Franjo Tuđman, who, won the first free elections in Croatia and was able to preserve its power until 1999 with his programme based on nationalist interpretation of Croatian history. Tuđman established a unified narrative of the “centuries-old dream” of Croatian statehood in which he unified without any problems the Illyrian ideas of Gaj and Štrossmajer with the socialist-confederalist ideology of Radić, the nationalism of Starčević and the fascism of Pavelić. In each, he simply saw a desire for Croatian statehood.

In president’s nationalist ideology, history became an actor in itself and the source of national rights. The nationalist ideologists selected a proper historical moments in Croatian history which could serve as the basis for the historical right to self-determination. They therefore manipulated history and built myths around certain historical events to suit their political objectives. (Uzelak, 2002)

Tuđman described Croats as “one of the oldest European nations” and independent Croatian state as the necessary outcome of a “millennial struggle” of the Croatian people. Croats shared a “centuries-old dream” to have their own national state which came true after the political changes in Eastern and South Europe. (Zakošek, 2008)

2. All Croats national reconciliation and franjoism

Franjo Tuđman in his book, *Nacionalno pitanje u suvremenoj Europi* [National question in Contemporary Europe] published in 1981 developed his theory of Croatian national emancipation, whose central concept was the idea of national reconciliation. In order to affirm the Croatian nation and reinforce its unity, the president used the idea of national reconciliation or pan-Croatian reconciliation, aiming to overcome the historical split between parts of the Croatian nation ideologically fractioned in the Second World War. He wanted to

unite and incorporate into Croatian national corpus fascist and antifascist (communist-led Partisan movement) forces, communists, pro-fascists and supporters of the Kingdom of Yugoslavia. Tuđman wanted to stop deep division in Croatian society – so called red and black division (communist red star and the black uniforms of the Ustaše) –, he believed that he could personally bridge the gap this ideological cleavage. The tool of solve this major division in society were on one hand the national reconciliation process consisted in uniting all Croats, no matter their political background, on the other hand nationalization of the antifascist struggle. (Seventh, 2009; Kevo, 2013)

The opening step of the reconciliation was Tuđman famous speech at the first HDZ convention in February 1990. At that convention, Tuđman defended the 1941-45 Independent State of Croatia as being not merely a “*quisling creation*,” but also “*an expression of the historical aspirations of the Croatian people for an independent state of their own*”. (Uzelak 1997, p.496) The first attempt to realize the reconciliation was made at Jasenovac camp, the biggest and the most terrible of the Ustaše’s concentration camp: “*Jasenovac was the consequence of an ideological division of Europe and the world between two major opposing ideas – fascism and communism. Those two ideas were fighting for the lives and spirit of the people and they caused terrible evils.....let’s find out the historical truth. A place like that can be a place of reconciliation, of bringing together, an appeal to overcome similar evils in the future.*” (Uzelak, 2002, p.241)

Through combination of traumatic collective memory he wanted to rehabilitate the Independent State of Croatia, because controversies about the Second World War are vitally important to the historical statehood narrative and there are several questions aroused. It is debated whether the Independent State of Croatia was a legitimate appearance of Croatian statehood. If it was, Croatian national identity has fascist connotations. Denying its legitimacy brings the claim of continual statehood into question. It is questionable the level of support enjoyed by the Ustaša, whether it was supported by Croats and their social institutions (e.g. the Catholic Church) or was there widespread resistance. These debates caused problems for Tuđman in 1990s while tried to unite the different strands of national thinking into a single national movement. (Bellamy, 2003)

Tuđman based on the memory of history and reconciliation established a political movement in which he embodied the Croatian nation, through the ideology of “Franjoism”. Not only did “Franjoism” include a commitment to unite the “bright and dark chapters of Croatia’s past” it also sought to bring Croats living in Croatia together with those living abroad. Franjoism meant that he was “the president of all Croats”. In this sense the HDZ looked more like a national movement than a regular political party, which was a tool in Tuđman’s hands to solve national reconciliation. Tuđman said on the 7th anniversary of the first convention of the HDZ, 23 February 1997: “*Unlike all the political parties before, based on neither class or ideological-political differences, the HDZ appeared as a nation-wide democratic party focused on bringing together all nation building forces in all layers and classes of society, from the radical right through the moderate position to the revolutionary left.*” (Zambelli, 2011, p.22)

Tuđman himself stood in the centre of franjoism as “the Father of the Nation”, “the Creator of the Independent State of Croatia”, “the Saviour of the Nation”. (Uzelak, 1997, p.235)

Tuđman proclaimed the Croatian nation as “one of the oldest nations in Europe” and a shared history, historical events, battles and kings, religion and customs serve as a base for the Croatian nation. Tuđman rhetoric was based on historical “fact”: “*here the Croatian people had their statehood 1300 years ago, and (...) it was a support for other non-Serb people to achieve their national constitution and their statehood*”. He emphasized that “*Croatian state – the national state of the Croatian nation*” Even though, Croatia from 1102 till 1941 was not an independent state, the Croatian nation “*preserved the elements of both national and state self-essence*”. (Uzelak, 1997, p.238)

Tuđman “Franjoist” narrative claimed to statehood during 1990s and he wanted to create a continuous line in Croatian right to nationalist interpretation of Croatian history. The Preamble of the Croatian Constitution written by Tuđman himself strengthens this idea. There are some quotations from the document:

- The *millennial national identity* of the Croatian nation and the *continuity of its statehood*, confirmed by the course of its *entire historical experience* in various political forms and by the perpetuation and development of the state-building idea grounded in *the historical right of the Croatian nation to full sovereignty*, has manifested itself:
- “in the formation of the Croatian principalities in the seventh century; – in the *independent medieval state* of Croatia established in the ninth century...”
- “in the first democratic elections (1990), the *Croatian nation* reaffirmed, by its freely expressed will, its *millennial statehood*...”
- “from these *historical facts*... non-transferable and perpetual right of the *Croatian nation to self-determination and state sovereignty*”
- the Republic of Croatia is hereby established as the *nation state of the Croatian nation* and the state of the members of its national minorities (Constitution 1990)

The Croatian nationalism and national identity narratives were ethnically based. Tuđman attempted to unify the Croatian people by situating them alongside an “other”, the Serbs. He contended that this otherness was constituted on three characteristic features – cultural, historical, and geographical. (Bellamy, 2003, p.66) He argued that Croats had different culture, they belong to the different civilization. While Croats are part of Western, or Central-Europe as well as they have some Mediterranean traditions, Serbia belongs to the East, to the Byzantine culture, “*like Turks and Albanians that belong to the Byzantine culture*.” (Cohen, 1995, p.211) Croats have the civilised entity versus the uncivilised Serbs being the part of Balkan. This is the reason that Tuđman desired a state for ethnic Croats exclusively on order to protect Croatia from the East. (Zambelli, 2011) In addition the red and black division was not only a simple historical issue, but also understanding of Croatian identity, interethnic relations between Serbs and Croats, the interpretation of the recent past.

Two nations are diverged in their history since the east–west schism of AD 395 resulted in huge differences in general historical, state-political and religious tradition. Only the “Versailles powers” forced together two nations in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats and Slovenes in 1918. Croatia and Serbia were also geopolitically separate, as Croatia was always at the heart of Europe which resulted in east-west dichotomy. (Bellami, 2003, p.68)

Tuđman to strengthen his power used consensus which was reached among Croats and Croatian political elites on the question of state independence, but the Serb minority living in Croatia was excluded from this consensus. In addition, the Croatian nationalist government encouraged hostilities toward the Serb minority in Croatia, which resulted in a rapid change of attitudes towards the Serbs and increased ethnic distance in the state. As a consequence, from the war-affected territories many Serb citizens left the county. (Zakosek, 2008)

In the Constitution of Republic of Croatia issued in December 1990 the country was defined as the nation state of the Croatian nation and Serbs (12.2% of the total population of Croatia according to 1991 Cenzus) they were named as one of the national minorities. The Constitution downgraded their status as citizens from “constitutional nation” to “national minority”. The new Government introduced discriminatory policies against the Serbian population and defined the new state as belonging to the ethnic Croats. In Eastern Slavonia where the Serbian population had a provisional majority, many did not recognise the new government and started establishing their own institutions. On 18 May 1991 Croatia held a referendum for independence. The result was an 84 % turnout and 93 % in favour. However, 600,000 Serbs in Croatia boycotted the vote. A month later, independence was declared with the “Proclamation of the Sovereign and Independent Republic of Croatia”. All of these events added fuel to the fire and Milošević wanted to incorporate areas with Serbian majority into a new “Greater Serbian” state, so in August the homeland war irrupted. (Zambelli, 2011)

At the level of symbols, the newly proclaimed state required notions of self-identification. The flag the coat-of-arms and the anthem of the Republic of Croatia are important symbols through which Croatia proclaimed its independence and sovereignty to the world. According to the Constitution “*the description of the historical Croatian coat-of-arms and flag, the lyrics to the anthem, and the use of these and other state symbols shall be regulated by law*”. (Constitution 1990) The coat-of-arms of the Republic of Croatia is the historical Croatian coat-of-arms in the shape of a shield. The checked pattern has twenty-five alternating red and white (argent) fields. The traditional red and white chequered pattern, known as the “Šahovnica” (translation: chessboard) became both the symbol of the HDZ and the state’s flag. Above the shield there is a crown with five peaks containing five small heraldic shields symbolize historical regions within Croatia (from left to right): the oldest known Croatian coat-of-arms, Dubrovnik, Dalmatia, Istria, and Slavonia. (Zakon, 1990)

The tricolour flag of red, white and blue (with a combined shield) was first used in 1848 in the Kingdom of Croatia, Slavonia and Dalmatia during the fight for independence from Austro-Hungarian rule. When the Independent State of Croatia was proclaimed (1941-45) they added the Ustaše party emblem and the shield of Croatia (chequerboard of white and red) to the flag. In 1945 these emblems were replaced by a red star (1945) and a yellow-bordered

star (1947). The flag of Croatia demonstrates two meanings: its political origin related to the tricolour and its roots as a kingdom associated with the coat of arms and the crown of shields above it. (Elgenius, 2005) Now *“The flag of the Republic of Croatia shall consist of a tricolour of red, white and blue, with the historical Croatian coat-of-arms in the centre”*. (Constitution 1990) *“The length is twice the width. Its colours are in the order red, white, and blue, are laid horizontally, each one third the width of the flag. The Croatian coat of arms is placed in the centre of the flag so that the upper part of the coat of arms (the crown) overlaps the red field of the flag, and the bottom part of the coat of arms overlaps the flag's blue field. The centre of the coat of arms is placed at the point where the diagonals of the flag meet.”* (Zakon, 1990) This flag was newly designed after the first one which was criticised as it was too similar to that of the Ustašes’ regime. Flag politically was an affirmation of Croatia’s right to self-determination and a Croatian homeland independent from Yugoslavia. The flag has cultural connotations as was a confirmation that this was “home” – the native land where Croats “belong” and Croatian is spoken, the place where other Croats understand not only what is said but also what is meant. The anthem of the Republic of Croatia is *Lijepa naša domovino*. (Constitution, 1990)

The Croatian government began to revive old Croatian national symbols many of them have the medieval heritage. The chequerboard coat of arms, the Šahovnica goes back to the tenth century as it was created by one of Tomislav’s predecessors. Similarly, the Kuna was developed as a form of currency in Middle Ages, its first known use was on the Island of Cres. The Kuna reappeared as the currency in the 1990s when the Yugoslav Dinar was abandoned.

The establishment of the new state required not only new national symbols, but also at the same time the eradication of previous symbols. The communists’ red star disappeared soon after the first elections. The “revival of historical memory” was visible through the renaming of academies, institutes, schools, other public buildings and streets. Monuments erected in the time of communism, which often glorified second world war and its heroes and anti-fascism, were demolished or removed by Croatian government. One of the first actions was to restore the statue of king Tomislav. At the same time, monuments that glorified Croatian history that had been removed by the communist regime were solemnly re-erected. (Uzelak, 2002)

The new rule changed the name of the streets and places that commemorated the period of Tito’s Yugoslavia and they were reassigned the names of ancient kings and other nobles. For example 90 percent supported changes the Socialist Revolution Street to king Zvonimir Street, 74 percent wanted Zagreb’s main square to be called ban Jelačić Square instead of socialist era Square of the Republic and Tuđman oversaw the restoration of the ban’s statue. One of the most shocking moments in this revival came in September 1990, when Zagreb’s city council, renamed the city’s “Square of the Victims of Fascism” as the “Square of Great Croats.” The original name was restored just after Tuđman’s death and the electoral defeat of HDZ. The President introduced a new “presidential flag” as well and surrounded himself by guards dressed in “historical” Croatian uniforms. Medvegrad, the old medieval fortress was renovated on a hill above Zagreb, where so-called “Altar of the Homeland” was erected

serving as a commemorative place for nearly all important holidays and memory days (after the death of Tuđman it was abandoned). (Pavlaković, 2016)

Religion is probably the most powerful symbol of national identity today. Most Croats consider themselves Roman Catholic whether they practice their religion or not. The Croatian Catholic Church was one of the key institutions in the nation-building process. The church functioned as a living institution of national consciousness stretching back to the 9th century. In addition Catholicism differentiates Croats from Serbs and Bosnians. Membership of Croatian Catholic Church connected the nation beyond the border, especially important in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Kosovo, which Catholic population was invited to settle in parts Croatia left by Serbs during the Homeland War. Jadranka Kosor, the leader of HDZ said in 2012, that *“without the church we would not have been able to preserve our national identity. The Church has the right to express its opinions concerning issues which are important for the nation and the state”*. (Pavlaković, 2016)

The new nation-state also required a “pure” national culture. With collapsing of Yugoslavia the assertion to create Croatian language in its own right distinct from Serbian gained high priority. Miro Kačić, the director of the Institute for Croatian Language and Linguistic said that *“The Croatian language, along with Croatian army, is guarantee of Croatian existence and identity”*. Among some other controversial changes, one of the first tasks of the new regime was the declaring official language of the republic to be Croatian and the purification of the Croatian language. The only orthography that was taught in schools was the Latin script, as Cyrillic was banned in 1992. New words were invented, and a new version of grammar introduced. This was accompanied by purification of the Croatian libraries when many books in Cyrillic disappeared together with Serbian and other South Slav authors. The popular culture became increasingly national. Numerous historians undertook the task of redefining national history. (Uzelak, 2002)

The national holidays strongly connected to historical narrative. One of the most important holidays is Statehood Day, which was celebrated on 30 of May until 2002, in memory of the first constitutional multiparty session in Zagreb. Since 2003 Statehood Day has been commemorating the Croatian Parliament’s declaration of sovereignty and independence on 25th of June 1991. Two other related national holidays are Independence Day celebrated 8th October and the Day of Victory and Homeland Thanksgiving. Later commemorates the end of Serbian occupation held every year on 5 August to commemorate Operation Storm, which was carried out by Croatian armed forces on the same day in 1995 marked a new beginning and rebirth of the Croatian nation. International Labour Day (1 May) and the Anti-Fascism Resistance Day (22 June) remembers the rebellion against Nazi Germany in 1941. (Elgenius, 2005)

3. The affiliation to the West

One of the central aspects of nation-building process is the affiliation to the west, to solve the problem how Croatia can leave the Balkans and move closer to the Western world. Croatia

has unique position on the crossroads of Europe, between Eastern and Western Christendom, between Central-Europe, the Mediterranean, and the Balkans and between the old Habsburg and Ottoman Empires. Croatia's location has made it the target of many empires over the centuries, and the Romans, Turks, Slavs, and others have all fought over the territory.

Croatian national rhetoric holds that Croatia is not a Balkan country but a Western, precisely Central-European one. Catholic religiosity also associated with Western Europe and serves as a national identifier. Any suggestion to include Croatia in the cultural space of Balkans is commonly received as an insult by the Croats. (Winland, 2007)

Samuel Huntington thoughts about the clash of civilization and a struggle between Catholic and Orthodox civilization on one side and on the other side between Christian and Islamic civilization became a Bible among Croatian nationalists. The author says that the Balkans always had to face external conflicts due to its mix of cultures and religions. In this way, the Balkans is not only a geographical region, but also a civilization notion that stands in opposition to the west. (Huntington, 1993)

All these worsened when the European Union introduced new term and called the whole entire region Western Balkans (former Yugoslavia minus Slovenia plus Albania). Belonging to the Western Balkans has had a negative connotation especially in Croatia since the term was introduced. The idea of belonging to the Balkans in general and to the Western Balkan states in particular, has always been rejected in Croatia. (Bechev, 2011) Croats bristle at being called Balkan country, preferring instead to be labelled South Eastern European or even more it is preferred Central European notion. In Croatian view belonging to the Balkans means association with backwardness, lacking modernization, it has a negative connotation as Maria Todorova said "*the Balkans has served as a repository of negative characteristics against which a positive and self-congratulatory image of the European and the west has been constructed*". (Todorova, 1997, p.188) For Croats Balkan was associated with something they wanted to escape from. Croatia wanted to separate from the Balkan by claiming their Europeanness. When the EU referendum was passed in 2012 the county stressed that "the most important thing that we said Balkan goodbye".

The concept of the Western Balkan and the EU Regional Approach was unacceptable to Croatia as it linked the country with its former Yugoslav neighbours and Albania rather with East and Central European states which had begun the accession talks with EU. Tuđman was confident that the EU was trying to force Croatia back some form of Balkan while he insisted on that Zagreb belonged to Central Europe. In 1997, when the Regional Approach was introduced new amendment to Croatian constitution was settled. Article 141 of Croatian constitution forbids "to initiate any process of association of the Republic of Croatia with other states, if such an association would or could lead to restoration of the Yugoslav state community or any new Balkan state union in any form". (Jović, 2006, p.92)

In 2001 Croatia signed the Stabilisation and Association Agreement with the aim to "formalise and strengthen the existing relationship with the European Union". (Stabilisation, 2001) Bartlett said that "*in that way Croatia became the last country of the former Austro-Hungarian Empire apart from Bosnia-Herzegovina to formally announce its intention to*

return to Europe through integration with EU". (Bartlett, 2003, p.84) The "return to Europe" idea based on geopolitical and historical legacy of Croatia represented the 1990s, and the idea was supposed to legitimize international recognition of the independent nation state and stop the war.

The idea of Europe was modified after the president death. The Europeanization of the country symbolized that Croatia turned from backwardness to a modern state with the values of democracy, rule of law. European narrative has changed but the negative connotation towards Balkan remained the same. Jadranka Kosor, who signed the association treaty said: *"Croatia with her history, culture and traditions of Christianity belongs to Europe and today we have to confirm it on the referendum..."* Even Ante Gotovina, one of the heroes of the War of Independence, former general of Croatian Army, who was in Hague during the referendum stated: *"I want to state that I will tomorrow vote for Croatia to become the a member of the EU where Croatia historically belongs to and with the referendum it will just formally affirm that Croatia's place in the EU."* (Sljivar, 2012, pp.50–52) Ivo Josipovic stated that with the EU accession *"Croatia will not lose its sovereignty and wealth on natural resources. Croatian name, language and culture cannot be forgotten; it would be even more important part of European Heritage"*. (Sljivar, 2012, p.48)

Conclusion

According to Geoffrey Pridham Croatia such as other post-communist countries had to face multiple pressures. Tasks such as dealing with the historical heritage, modernization, establishment of an independent and democratic state, security, economic transformation procedures were presented and the country had to cope with all them at the very same time. State- and nation-building measures, identification as part of the political democratization were parallel processes and Croatia had to solve all these issues. Due to the extent and complexity of transformation the consolidation took more than two decades. (Pridham, 2002)

The collapse of Yugoslavia brought a need to redefine Croatia. My approach is that the formation of Croatian national identity in the 1990s was broken into three parts. The first and most abstract level is derived from the Croatian historical narrative and in particular from the claim to historic statehood. This is the claim that Croatia was formed as a nation by centuries of continuous statehood. Franjo Tuđman understood the power of the past and by using historical memory he was able to construct a suitable memory for the whole Croatian society.

The second pillar of Croatian identity was national reconciliation which became a basic issue of Tuđmanism representing an exclusivist Croatian ethnic nationalism. In the centre of the whole concept stands the forgetting of the (Second World War) past with the goal of reconciling the descendants of the Ustaše and the Partisans in order to unify around all the Croats in struggle for an independent state. (Đurašković, 2014) The challenge for having an independent state and a stable democracy in Croatia resulted in a consensus regarding the past, or at least creating an atmosphere of open dialogue rather than the violence seen throughout the twentieth century.

The third part of Croatian identity was the affiliation to the West which was mainly the civilizational question, the country positions to the West against the Balkans together with Serbia. The discourse of an idealised West embodied in the European Union and was promoted as the only option for a modern Croatia. Croatian identity as a western European country thus had to be made legitimate through acceptance of the western world, which was achieved by embracing Western European norms and putting them into practice. This was embedded in Croatian identity and was a widely shared belief among the population

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**THE MENTALITY OF “US” AND “OTHERS”:
THE PERCEPTION OF IDENTITY IN ACEH**

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Key Words: *Aceh, Sharia law, rebel group, conflict, Islam, identity, Indonesia*

Abstract: *The perception of Acehnese identity is crucial for understanding both the conflict between the rebel group of Aceh and the Indonesian government, and also the implementation of Sharia law as a result of peace agreement between both parties. Many papers have discussed the causes of conflict in Aceh as a combination of political grievances, economic grievances, and human rights violations the Acehnese society has endured during the three-decades long of conflict. This paper, however, seeks to highlight the role of identity as the main struggle in the conflict. The conflict between the rebel group of Aceh and the Indonesian government revolved around the conception of nation-building and identity. The differences in understanding what a nation should be led to the growth of grievances and conflict between both parties. It also affected on how identity is perceived by the Acehnese society. Before the peace agreement was reached in 2005, a strong sense of Acehnese identity was being threatened by the Indonesian government’s programs which fed the tensions between both parties leading to conflict. After the peace agreement was reached and Aceh was then allowed to implement Sharia law, the perception of identity in Aceh became more Islamic and created restrictions for people with different identities, specifically in terms of religion. Since the peace agreement was reached in 2005, Aceh has been used as an example by some provinces to impose Sharia-based ordinances in their regions. As there is also a growth of Islamic nationalism in Indonesia, the perception of “Us” and “Others” becomes more divided and it challenges Indonesia’s secularism.*

* * *

Introduction

Aceh is a province in the most western part of Indonesia and is known as the only province in Indonesia where Sharia law is used as its legal system. The implementation of Sharia law is a result of a long period of conflict between the rebel group in Aceh, called Gerakan Aceh Merdeka/Free Aceh Movement (GAM) and the Indonesian government. GAM was born in 1976 to demand Aceh’s independence from Indonesia. The reasoning behind the push for independence came from a long-standing belief that Aceh is “distinct” from the rest of the country historically and culturally. Tensions also grew over the spoils of the province’s

immense natural resources (Shah and Cardozo, 2014, p.2). The political actions taken by the Indonesian government were believed to be a detriment to the welfare and development of Aceh and the Acehnese people.

The conflict escalated and the grievances of both parties increased due to the non-cooperative behaviour between both parties and the hostile nature of both parties' perception towards each other. GAM perceived the Indonesian government and the Javanese people as threats towards the Acehnese identity. On the other hand, the Indonesian government saw the Acehnese people as a part of the Indonesian diverse nature of identity while at the same time perceived GAM as a threat to the stability of Indonesian identity. Social and political transformation were needed, as the Acehnese society felt the lack of access and control on both matters, but, unfortunately, it led to a deepening of the exclusionary nature of the two sides. Many actions had been taken by Indonesian government in order to reduce the insurgency from the rebel group and to stop the conflict. However, there had been mishaps during the negotiations which led to more insurgency from both sides. After the dictatorship era ended in 1998, Indonesia was in a very unstable political condition. This can be seen from the secession of East Timor which gave the rebel group in Aceh a momentum to work even more aggressively on their demand for independence from Indonesia.

This paper will focus on the role of the “Us” versus “Others” mentality that was central in the conflict and how the mentality still plays a role in Aceh to establish its identity through the implementation of Sharia law. There will also be a discussion on how the increasing of Islamic nationalism in Indonesia, which is currently happening, to show that such mentality is growing and becoming a nation-wide issue.

Debates on ethnic identity: primordial or constructed?

In order to understand the “Us” and “Others” mentality within the discourse of Aceh, it is important to understand the academic discussions that revolve around it. The “Us” and “Others” mentality stems from how one sees the origin of ethnic identity. One may argue that ethnic identity is something fixed, that one is born with. Others may argue that it is a result of social construction. Both perceptions have different ways of understanding what ethnic identity is, how one belongs to certain ethnic identity groups and how one has to act based on their ethnic identity.

There is a tension in understanding ethnic identity in whether it is as something primordial or something constructed. It is important to understand that identity is very critical in the construction of war and conflict due to two reasons: (1) war and conflict require a clearly identifiable enemy of “Others” against “Us”; and (2) identity plays a central role in defining and structuring both the interests and the norms of the behaviour of actors (Jackson 2009, p.177). The perceptions of identity, both primordialist and constructivist, point out how to understand who is “Us” and who is “Others”.

Ethnic identity is, based on the primordial view, something “given” from a history of kinship and connections which makes ethnic identity “fixed” and “natural”. It stems from the fact that someone is being born into a particular religious community, having a particular racial feature, and speaking a particular language (Geertz 1973, pp.259–260). Primordialists believe that particular social categories are fixed by human nature rather than by social convention and practice. These beliefs in the naturalness of a social category might be rooted in beliefs about alleged implications of biology, for example gender, sexuality, and ethnicity, or about theology and morality (Fearon and Laitin 2000, p.848). Conflict between two or more ethnic groups, therefore, is inevitable because of unchanging, essential characteristics of the members of these categories (Fearon and Laitin 2000, p.849). Primordialists argue that ethnic conflict is inevitable due to the differences of ethnic identities within society. The frictions between ethnic identities occur due to the naturally-given differences they have, and conflict or violence is seen as a form of interactions between those groups.

Primordialists see identity as a “historically developed givenness” of which membership of a primordial community is assigned to an individual and is considered to be hereditary, like a caste but also a religion, reflexive, universal and also eternal (Bačová 1998, p.32). It means that we, as individuals, are assigned to certain identity characteristics from the day we were born and we naturally belong to the groups with similar characteristics to those we possess. The primordialist argument suggests that ethnic identity is collectively exclusive; there are different groups with different ethnic identities who exclusively group themselves with characteristically-similar people. This implies the creation of “Us-Others” perceptions in the society. It suggests that due to the differences between ethnic groups, and that every individual is bound to their ethnic group, intolerance and hatred toward “Others” are natural. Clifford Geertz argues that these lifelong relations can, under particular conditions, lead to conflicts with other human loyalties, and especially that they can destroy civic society (Bačová 1998, p.32). It is believed, by primordialists, that it is an obligation for every individual to protect their ethnic group, who share the common interests and common characteristics, from threats of “others”.

The perception of identity as socially constructed has been growing stronger in academic discussions more so than the primordialist view of identity. Constructivists argue that identity is neither fixed nor given, but it is context-dependent, highly malleable, constructed and constantly evolving in response to external events and processes, such as immigration and globalisation (Jackson 2005, pp.147–171; 2009, pp.1721–190; Chandra 2012, pp.2–44; Brubaker 2000, pp.1–47; Fearon and Laitin 2000, pp.845–877; Bačová 1998, pp.29–43). Brubaker (Brubaker and Cooper 2000, p.21) argues that ethnic groups are the products of historical processes. For example, one mode that is a staple of African Studies is the reifying of cultural differences through imposed colonial identifications. One’s membership into certain group identities will evolve and change over time due to the fact that it is a product of human actions. Brass (1991) gives an explanation that someone’s ethnic identities can also evolve due to some conditions. In order to support Brass's proposal that ethnic identities can evolve, we can see that through the phenomenon of interracial marriage a person can change their ethnic identity, or come to possess multiple ethnic identities.

Brass (1991, p.16) argues that ethnic identity formation is seen as a process created in the dynamics of elite competition within the boundaries determined by political and economic realities. This argument has been discussed in many counter-arguments by constructivists on the ethnic conflict debates, that conflict occurs due to the competition over political power or economic resources, not necessarily about differences of cultural values. Ethnic conflicts arise due to one group's interpretation of the other competing parties as a threat for them to achieve their goals.

Chandra (2012, p.17) sums up the debates between both perceptions by highlighting three propositions and counter-propositions. Perception of identity as primordial is defined by, at least, three propositions: that individuals have a single ethnic identity, that this ethnic identity is by its nature fixed, and that this ethnic identity is exogenous to human processes. While the counter-propositions from the constructivists are: that individuals have multiple, not single, ethnic identities, that these identities can change, and that such change, when it occurs, is the product of human process.

Pre-2004: GAM insurgency

The three decades-long of conflict between the Indonesian government and GAM was a result of the government's failure to set up one common perception on nation-building. As a country consists of different ethnic identities, Indonesia is fragile to ethnic frictions which can lead to a more severe conflicts, as it happened with Aceh and East Timor.

Before GAM started their movement, there was a movement in 1953 led by Teuku Daud Beureuh in Aceh. The movement was initiated because of the dissolution of Aceh's province and its incorporation into the North Sumatra province (Wandi and Patria 2015, p.4). The action to dissolve Aceh and incorporate it into another province was seen as a problem. Despite the closeness in culture with the neighbouring province of North Sumatra, Aceh believed that the Acehnese society is different than the North Sumatran society. The incorporation was also perceived as taking away Aceh's sovereignty as its own "provincial identity". It is known in the history that Aceh had contributed to the fight against colonisers and helped Indonesia get its independence. By incorporating Aceh to North Sumatra, the Acehnese society felt that the Indonesian government did not recognise the support Acehnese society gave during the fight against colonisers. Later, President Soekarno, the first president of Indonesia, established a special status for Aceh in recognition to its contribution of the process of seeking for independence from the colonisers (Schulze 2004, pp.1–2). The special status gives Aceh the autonomy to design their own customary law (*adat*), religion, and education.

Following the insurgency led by Teuku Daud Beureuh, GAM started their movement in 1976 with the main goals of independence from the Indonesian government building their own nation. Hasan di Tiro was the leader of the movement. He was a descendant of a prominent Acehnese *ulama* family of Muslim clergy and the grandson of Teuku Cik di Tiro, a hero of the anti colonial struggle against the Dutch colony (Schulze 2004, p.4). The demand for

independence was rooted in the disappointment of the Acehese society towards the Indonesian government who did not turn Indonesia into a country centred on Islamic values. However, as the movement grew, the emphasis on Islam as the base of the movement slowly faded and the focus shifted more on the political aspect of secession from Indonesia (Aspinall 2007, p.10).

The implementation of the special status of Aceh faced two challenges: President Soekarno's view on nation-building and President Soeharto's developmentalist programs. These challenges then contributed to the growth of GAM's grievances towards the Indonesian government. These grievances affected the Acehese society's perception of the Indonesian government and the Javanese people as threats towards Acehese identity. The first challenge was that Soekarno's view on nation-building, as mentioned before, did not put Islam in the centre, as he was attempting to build Indonesia as a secular nation by considering the diversity it has in terms of religion and ethnocultural backgrounds (Huszka 2014, p.165). It created doubts in the mind of Acehese people because it was never properly implemented.

One thing can be taken into account that in this case, identity is seen within the primordial context rooted from the history of ancestry and Islam as a part of Acehese identity. There were many issues that served as causes of the conflict between Aceh and Indonesian government. As mentioned earlier, the exploitation of natural resources and limitation to political access tremendously affected the dynamic of the conflict. However, the grievances started first with the different points of view of "nation" between Acehese society, specifically the GAM movement, who wanted to build Indonesia with Islamic values and Indonesian first President Soekarno who wanted to turn Indonesia into a secular country to accommodate the differences in Indonesia. One could argue that the initial reason for the movement was to be able to have the liberty and control over their society based on their belief system.

The second challenge was the highly centralised developmentalist ideology of Soeharto, Indonesia's second president, who focused the development of Indonesia mainly in the Java island (Schulze 2004, p.1). During his presidency, Soeharto revoked the special status of Aceh which added to the resentment of Acehese people towards the Indonesian government. The developmentalist ideology by President Soeharto at that time was marked by the massive transmigration program with the purpose of assimilation all around the Indonesian archipelago (Nielsen 2002, p.12). However, the problem occurred after the so-called "assimilation" turned into the educated Javanese people taking over regional administrations in most provinces, including Aceh. As Lindorf Nielsen puts it, the increase of mono-ethnic character of Indonesian government at the time may have been a necessary legacy from the Dutch which only favoured Javanese people who could get access to Dutch education system (Nielsen 2002, pp.12–13). The program, however, worked against Acehese people and local politicians which gave them a limited chance to be involved as important stakeholders (Heiduk 2006, p.9). Another problem which also added to the grievances was the finding of oil and gas in Arun fields in Aceh by the government's oil company Pertamina and foreign oil company Exxon-Mobil Oil (Heiduk 2006, pp.8–9). Under the leadership of President

Soeharto, the natural resources were exploited and Acehese people did not get a lot of benefits since all of the resources were handled by the central government.

As the movement grew stronger, it got a lot of attention and support nationally and internationally. The support given to the movement was caused by the Indonesian government's action towards resolving the conflict with only military measures. During the period of 1989-1998, Indonesian government declared Aceh as *Daerah Operasi Militer* (DOM) or military operation zone. It was to repress the GAM movement by targeting not only the members of the movement but also civilians who were suspected as supporters of the movement (Heiduk 2006, p.7). The counterinsurgency by the military and the government resulted into a more severe grievances as it was called as one of the biggest human rights violations in Indonesia due to the fact that by the first three years of the DOM implementation, there were more than 3,000 civilians killed by the military (Heiduk 2006, p.8). Throughout the DOM period, extra-judicial killings, arbitrary arrest, rape and torture were committed by the military towards Acehese people which escalated the rage against the central government and also increased the grievances which fuelled their insurgency.

The Acehese society's demand for independence was initially rooted in the intention to stand as its own nation with its own values. Therefore, the Acehese could have full control on politics and economy, and also to be able to have social values based on Islam. The special status on autonomy given to Aceh by President Soekarno was an opportunity to have the social values they expected. However the revoking of that status by the second president, Soeharto, was seen as the government taking their liberty to exercise their values. Also, the exploitation of natural resources became the economic, but also political, reason on why they strongly demanded for independence for Aceh. This issue also affected the perception of identity within the conflict since Acehese people perceived Javanese people as the ones taking their prosperity and resources away. As mentioned earlier, the decisions over the natural resources in Aceh were under the control of the central government and businessmen in Java. The fact that Acehese people did not have, and could not have, control over their own resources instigated more rage towards the Javanese people. Discrimination against Javanese people who moved to Aceh due to the transmigration policy was caused by the perception that Javanese people were a threat towards Acehese society. Aceh rebel groups constructed the identity of Indonesian people, especially Javanese people, as having different goals with the Acehese society in terms of nation-building (Huszka 2014, p.165). Therefore, they believed that the Javanese people who migrated to Aceh, due to the national migration policy, were bringing secular ideas to infiltrate those ideas into the society.

Post-2004: tsunami, peace, and sharia law

After the falling of President Soeharto in 1998, the Indonesian government started to approach the conflict with different measures to reach a peace agreement with the GAM fighters. In 2004, Indonesia held its first democratic election after the authoritarian regime fell down and President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono was elected at that time. He started to do peace negotiations by having a negotiating team specifically made to discuss peace with

GAM, with Vice President Jusuf Kalla as the leader of the negotiating team. After the disengagement of East Timor from Indonesia in 1999, the central government was focusing on diminishing the chance of state break-up during that period of transition, nationally, locally, or provincially (Smith, 2012). It is believed that Indonesia, as a nation-state, was trying to prioritise meaningful inclusion of its diverse identity groups to create stability and relative peace, but its effect is that other aspects of a country's development could be hampered if the diversity could not be maintained by the government (Marquette and Beswick 2011, p.1709).

Before President Yudhoyono took position as the president, former presidents had done some negotiations to ensure peace. The GAM movement became stronger post-1998 after the secession of East Timor from Indonesia. They had hoped that Aceh would have the same possibility to have their independence from Indonesia. Therefore, the peace talks with GAM within the period of 1998 until 2004 mostly ended in stalemates and more insurgencies continued from both sides. President Yudhoyono's government entered the peace negotiations with better and clearer action plans and offers which included amnesty for GAM and concrete economic programs (Awaluddin, 2008). The government also managed to convince the military to have a ceasefire during the negotiations which helped significantly in the peace process.

Other than the internal factor of government's course of action with the peace negotiations, there was an external actor that significantly affected the peace process in Aceh. In 2004 a tsunami hit Aceh and damaged the province as well as the people significantly. Many people were dead, and not few lost their houses due to the tragic disaster. The tragedy instigated the international actors to put more pressure on the Indonesian government to resolve the conflict. In a way, the tsunami affected the conflict resolution significantly by creating a conducive environment for talks and negotiations to happen. After the tsunami, GAM lost their resources to continue fighting for independence. The conflict turned into collaborations to rebuild Aceh through humanitarian assistance and aid from international actors, such as NGOs, The World Bank, The United Nations, and directly from foreign countries under the provision of the central government of Indonesia. The freedom fighters also changed their mind from demanding "independence" to "self-government" (Panggabean, 2014, pp.34–35). With the help of Martti Ahtisaari, former president of Finland, as the mediator and facilitator for the conflict resolution process, the government of Indonesia and GAM reached an agreement and signed a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) which explains more about the status of Aceh in the territory of Indonesia, as well as their right to "self-govern" in different fields. In this case, "self-government" refers to:

"Aceh will exercise authority over all sectors of public affairs, which will be administered in conjunction with its civil and judicial administration, except in the fields of foreign affairs, external defence, national security, monetary and fiscal matters, justice and freedom of religion, the policies of which belong to the Government of the Republic of Indonesia in conformity with the Constitution; and a stipulation that all decisions on domestic or international affairs

related to Aceh undertaken by the national government or legislature would be made in consultation with, and with the consent of, the legislature of Aceh and the head of the Aceh administration.” (Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and Free Aceh Movement, 2005)^{1,2}

After the peace agreement was reached, Indonesia focused the collaboration on rebuilding the infrastructure in Aceh and rehabilitating the Acehnese society after the tsunami. Alongside the rebuilding of infrastructure, the Law on Governing Aceh (LoGA) was introduced in 2006 to ensure the freedom of Acehnese society to implement their self-government status and to enforce the Islamic legal system within its territory. In this case, Sharia was seen as a way to facilitate Aceh’s re-integration, after the conflict, into Indonesian national culture, including its own particular experiences of Islamic revival, as well as to protect Aceh (Feener, 2012, pp.285–286). The goal of implementing Sharia law was to bring a social change in both the regulation of society and the character of individual Muslims to conform to a particular set of modern ideals, which is in accordance with Islamic values (Feener, 2012, p.286).

Humanitarian assistance and aid were distributed to the Aceh province with the main purpose of restoring livelihoods and economic development which was believed to be able to contribute to the promotion of broader social improvements in terms of human rights, gender justice, and democratisation (Feener, 2012, p.282). However, Jakarta-based Islamist activists and conspiracy theorists began to actively promote the idea that the humanitarian assistance had hidden agendas from Christian missionaries and Zionist agents to turn Acehnese people away from Islam (Feener, 2012, p.285). Due to the fear of having Islamic values degraded by these hidden agendas, they not only used the foreign aid and assistance to rebuild Aceh, but also started to build a society which could be protected from the idea of globalisation (Feener, 2012, pp.285–286).

Sharia law in Aceh

Sharia is believed to be the way of life for Muslims with a divine foundation and purpose which regulates the relationship between one person and God by providing a social, moral, religious and legal guidances (Uddin, 2010, p.627). Sharia, literally meaning “way to a watering place”, comprises of the Quran, the *sunnah*, or tradition, of the Prophet Muhammad, the consensus of *ulama*, and *qiyas*, or analogical deductions (Uddin, 2010, pp.627–628). The implementation of Sharia laws depends on *fiqh*, or Islamic jurisprudence, which is a method for understanding the text of the *Quran* as well as interpreting law (Uddin, 2010, p.628). Sharia is considered to have “immutable and transcendent” characteristics due to its breadth

¹ The Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement., 2005. *Memorandum of understanding between the Government of the Republic of Indonesia and the Free Aceh Movement*. [pdf] Available at: <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/shared/bsp/hi/pdfs/15_08_05_aceh.pdf> [Accessed on 16 December 2015]

² The MoU was signed in Helsinki, Finland, in 15 August 2005.

and divine nature, while compared to specific legal rulings which are considered as “mutable and temporal” because they are issued by humans (Uddin, 2010, p.628).

In order to make sure the enforcement of Sharia law is being done by the society, a special security unit was established in Aceh, it is called Wilayatul Hisbah (WH). It was established by governor’s decree in 2004 for them to be responsible for monitoring conduct and compliance to Islamic bylaws by providing “moral guidance” since they are not supposed to have enforcement powers (Aspinall, 2007, p.7). They have to work alongside the local police unit, since they do not have the authority to act like police officers. The local police unit works under the supervision of each local government, but regulated nationally, to enforce local regulation created by the local parliament. Both security units in Aceh were established with different purposes and focuses, but with the same idea to maintain order and deal with crimes in Aceh.

By enforcing Sharia laws, Aceh also introduced corporal punishments as a method of punishing violators of Sharia. Offences are punishable by caning, fines or terms of imprisonment. The offences which are punishable by caning include *maisir* (gambling) which is punishable by up to twelve strokes, *khalwat* (illicit relations between men and women) which is punishable by up to nine strokes, and *khamar* (sale and consumption of alcohol) which is punishable by forty strokes (Aspinall, 2007, p.7). Homosexuality is also banned in Aceh as it is believed to be a sin in Islam. By the year 2015, the offences are also applied to non-Muslims in Aceh. There are also provisions in Aceh allowing punishment for Muslims who do not attend Friday prayers or observe fast (Aspinall, 2007, p.7).

As mentioned before, since 2015 the law applies to Muslims and non-Muslims in Aceh. Even before the Sharia law was enforced, Majelis Ulama Indonesia (MUI) or Indonesian Ulama Council of Aceh chapter issued *fatwas*, or non-binding decrees, to regulate social behaviour of people in Aceh which applies to every individuals despite their religious background. In 1980, MUI issued a *fatwa* to forbid intermarriage between Muslims and non-Muslims; a year later another *fatwa* was issued to forbid Muslims from participating in any Christian ceremony; in 1990, MUI Aceh chapter issued a *fatwa* ordering women to wear *jilbab*, or headscarf, regardless of their religion with the objective to prevent men from committing sex crimes and acts of violence (Uddin, 2010, p.629). Despite the non-binding characteristic of *fatwa*, the enforcement of *fatwa* seems binding and gives no option for people not to follow it. Even before the Sharia law was enforced, GAM had been conducting *jilbab* raids on Acehnese women, whether they were Muslims or non-Muslims, which often led to them cutting the women’s hair when it was uncovered (Uddin, 2010, p.629). Aceh punished its first non-Muslim violator in 2016. A 60-year old Christian woman was caned in public for thirty times for selling alcohol in Aceh (Iyengar, 2016).

The implementation of Sharia law in Aceh has received critiques from various human rights organisation. Human Rights Watch made a specific critique towards two provisions in Sharia law, one prohibiting men and women who are not married to meet in certain circumstances and one imposing public dress requirements, as denying individuals’ rights to make personal

decisions central to the conduct of their lives and the expression of their faith, identity and morals (Broecker, 2010).

There are at least three problems related to human rights in the implementation of Sharia law: it restricts freedom of expression, it violates people's freedom from torture and public humiliation, and it marginalises women. Indonesia has ratified three international conventions on those matters which are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) in 2006, the Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Convention Against Torture) in 1998, and the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW) in 1984.

The ICCPR affirms the equality of all people, as well as the right to privacy, freedom of expression and freedom of assembly (United Nations, 1976). These rights allow individuals to have a freedom of an intimate life peacefully, to express themselves, including gender identity, through clothes and behaviours, and to be able to assemble with other individuals in public without fear of harassment or assault. The ICCPR also prohibits discrimination on the basis of sexual orientation. The Convention Against Torture outlaws corporal punishment, such as caning. The Human Rights Committee refers the prohibition against torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment or punishment relates not only to acts that cause physical pain but also to acts that cause mental suffering to the victim (United Nations, 1987). The provisions in Sharia laws controlling women's dress requirements and how they should behave in public clearly marginalise women on their freedom to express themselves in their preferred manners.

Another critique towards Sharia law is that the implementation of it has been viewed as unfair. Yayasan Keumala, an NGO in Lhokseumawe, conducted a poll of almost 2000 people and saw a pattern that the implementation of Sharia law as being less than maximal and only touching the poor people (Aspinall, 2007, p.9). The *jilbab* raids done by WH are often targeting women riding motorcycles while those using cars are untouched. A cynicism on the implementation of Sharia law is also shown on the punishment on gambling. The focus on small-time gambling seems unfair for people who are more affected by corruptions done by government officials (Aspinall, 2007, p.10). The unfairness in the implementation of Sharia law shows how the law touches mostly poor people while rich people and government officials have protection against it.

Identity in Aceh

Edward Aspinall argues that the notion of identity, or Islam to be precise, in Aceh is a mere instrument for actors to achieve their, mostly political, goals (Aspinall, 2005). By actors, it means not only GAM but also the Indonesian government and local politicians in Aceh. GAM used identity to differentiate Aceh and Indonesia. At first, they had different understandings on the conception of "nationhood". The Acehnese community is seen as an ethno-nationalist community which put the sense of shared blood and kinship among members of the community into the ideal view of nationhood, likewise the primordial view of nationhood

(Huszka, 2014, pp.7–8). On the other hand, Indonesia, especially President Soekarno, had the conception of Indonesian nation as diverse and secular. While Aceh at the beginning had the conception of a nation as based on Islamic values.

The differences in the points of views of how to define 'nation' led Aceh to question their relationship with Indonesia and its future. Indonesia is a country with the largest Muslim population in the world. In 2015, Indonesia has more than 250 million of people and more than 80% of the population are Muslims (CIA Fact Sheet, 2010). Aceh was the place where Islam started to spread in Indonesia. However, the Acehnese society has always seen themselves as a different entity than Indonesian society. GAM has been using Aceh's historical backgrounds and traditions to differentiate themselves from Indonesia and to justify the creation of statehood with the ideology that even before the formation of Indonesia, Aceh had a tradition of always persistently resisting foreign powers (Aspinall, 2007, p.11).

The notion of Acehnese identity and Islam were used before by GAM at the beginning of their insurgency. However, that notion has faded throughout the years of insurgency and the movement became more political. The demand for independence was clouded, after years of insurgency, by the human rights violations and inequalities the Acehnese society experienced, especially during the authoritarian regime of Soeharto. After 1998, GAM focused more on demanding social justice for the human rights violations they experienced and asking for independence on those grounds. At the same period, the secession of East Timor from Indonesia gave hope for Aceh to be able to do the same. However, as the Indonesian government learned the mistake with East Timor, the approach they took was to ensure Aceh stayed within Indonesia's sovereignty.

The Indonesian government also used the notion of identity to assure that Aceh stayed within Indonesia's sovereignty. After the falling of President Soeharto, GAM started to pressure the government to give them independence as they saw the opportunity after the secession of East Timor. Negotiations between 1998-2004 mostly ended up in stalemates as both GAM and the government were unwilling to take the offer from the other side of the party. During this period, the government started to see that the implementation of Sharia law in Aceh was the best way to achieve peace and offered GAM that option. On the other hand, the goal of GAM, as mentioned before, had changed and the implementation of Sharia law was not what they asked for. The post-tsunami situation became a great opportunity for peace which allowed the implementation of Sharia law proposal offered by the Indonesian government to be accepted by GAM since the situation was not conducive for both parties to continue the conflict. In this case, the Indonesian government used the notion of identity to offer GAM what the government thought they wanted: the implementation of Sharia law.

Local politicians came into this discussion when the popular idea at that period was to implement Sharia law as a measure to stop the conflict. They used the implementation of Sharia law to gain support, even though GAM's demand was independence. Having close to no power in the armed conflict, local politicians used the implementation of Sharia law as their prominent program since it was more feasible for them to offer the people. With the central government trying to stop the insurgency, the local politicians were making ways to

demonstrate pride in being Acehese without creating a bad image of the central government. Therefore, the implementation of Sharia law was seen as a perfect instrument to achieve their goals, since it portrayed a long tradition connecting Acehese identity with Islam, yet it did not necessitate conflict with Jakarta (Aspinall, 2007, pp.20–22).

Aspinall argues that even though the notion of Islam has faded slowly in GAM's movement, it did not disappear from their nationalist discourse due to "its importance as an underpinning for individual commitment to the struggle and as a defining feature of Aceh's culture and identity in GAM's vision" (Aspinall, 2007, p.12). Nonetheless, the role of Islam faded due to the change of urgency from upholding Islam into countering the political game from Jakarta. The implementation of Sharia law is seen as a top-down program, despite the fact that there are many supporters of Sharia law in Aceh, since it was proposed by the central government (Latschan, 2014; Uddin, 2010, pp.603–648; Aspinall, 2005; 2007). GAM, itself, did not ask for the ability for Aceh to implement Sharia law, but independence from Indonesia. However, due to the situation post-tsunami disaster, having peace with the Indonesian government and accepting their offer to self-govern with Sharia law seemed to be the only option at that time.

The implementation of Sharia law has brought the discussion of identity into another layer. The implementation of Sharia law is believed to be a social engineering process to change not just the institution, but also the society's norms, morals and ways of life (Feener, 2012, pp.299–300). One can argue that the institutionalisation of Islam into the legal system has also institutionalised the primordial view of identity by highlighting the disparities between "Us" and "Others".

The Sharia law is putting Islam as its core, and everyone has to follow the rules and values despite their beliefs as long as they are in Aceh. There is one similar characteristic between Acehese identity during the conflict before and during the implementation of Sharia law currently: the exclusive characteristic of Acehese identity. Beata Huszka classifies the Acehese society as an ethnically exclusive community where the membership of the community is exclusively reserved for people who are of Aceh origin, not just religiously but also culturally (Huszka, 2014). However, the disparities between "Us" and "Others" does not only apply in religious terms, Muslims and non-Muslims, but also in economic terms, the poor and the rich and in ethnic terms, Acehese and non-Acehese.

As a society with the characteristic of being exclusive, it brings up another problem in relations to freedom of expression and human rights for people who do not necessarily represent the Acehese "identity" of Islam. Nonetheless, Aceh allows people with different beliefs to exercise their religious practices. However, there have been cases of churches being torched down by extremist Muslims who claimed that the churches were illegal due to lack of permits (Kapoor, 2015; Maxwell, 2015; Lamb, 2015). The authorities later tore down the so-called "illegal" churches to avoid more violence from the extremists. Despite people having the ability to believe in religions other than Islam, it seems that Aceh is still lacking on protection measures to ensure the freedom of expression and religious practices, other than Islam, can be done without people having to fear of getting attacked by the extremists.

Islamic nationalism in Indonesia

Globalisation forces the world to recognise locally-rooted risks within the plurality of the world which the national outlook could ignore (Beck, 2009, p.57). It means that by recognising plurality, it helps to describe local issues that may lead into global risks in the future. Beck writes about three distinct characteristics of global risks: delocalisation, incalculability, and non-compensatability (Beck, 2009, p.52). Delocalisation refers to the causes and consequences risks can make without limitation of geographical location or space. Incalculability means that consequences of global risks are in principle incalculable. While non-compensatability is referring to the change of idea of risks as something that cannot be compensated, instead it is seen as something that can be prevented with some measures.

When talking about how the implementation of Sharia law is discussed within the Beck's theory of risk, one could argue that the transformation of Acehese society into a more exclusive entity through the implementation of Sharia law may be a risk for the secularity of Indonesian society which was built by its founding fathers. The shift or transformation as such is feasible in accordance with the increasing ability of the Acehese society to reconfigure its social order through the peace agreement. There is a possible implication if the Acehese social order clashes with Indonesian diversity, and the increasing religious conservatism in Indonesia is also affecting the situation, which will result in the system's collapse (Beck, 2009; Emont, 2017).

Globalisation has caused hybridity and mobile cultural flows in the international society, but the local authority of power relations remains consequential in grasping how religions are constituted and politically invoked (Mythen, 2013, p.121). Yet, the basic reality is that no Muslim state, or Muslim-majority state such as Indonesia, has made any significant progress toward creation of a more ideal society as it has come ever closer to full application of Sharia law (Fuller 2011, 417). Without a doubt, Sharia law is being considered as a central aspect to the Islamic concept of strengthening the moral understanding of individuals and society, but it is not equipped with the practical political, social, and economic problems that plague all modern societies and states (Fuller, 2011, pp.417–418).

One of the risks that occur from the implementation of Sharia law is the arising notion that Indonesia could and should become an Islamic country where Sharia law is applied throughout the vast archipelago. This notion has arisen alongside the increasing of religious conservatism in Indonesia. Since the fall of Soeharto's era, Indonesia has witnessed many problems related to religion, such as the increasingly conservative interpretations of Islam gaining ground, increasing numbers of conflict between religious groups, and horrific acts of terrorism (Croft-Cusworth, 2014). For the moderate majority group, such actions do not represent the faith they believe in and everyone who believes in it. Nevertheless it affects the image of Indonesian Muslims as a whole.

As a country with "unity in diversity" as its foundation in reaching its independence from the colonies, the enforcement of Sharia law to non-Muslims questions the legitimation of the main component of the Republic of Indonesia. The increasing of, as one would call it, Islamic nationalism also occurs in many other places in Indonesia. Islamic nationalism refers to the

relationship of nationalism to Islam and how religion has become a political component. Religion has been used for political purposes for a long time in Indonesia. However, currently there is no dividing line between religion and politics as Indonesia turns into a more conservative society. This affects how political choices are made and how it affects every person in Indonesia.

In Jakarta, the capital of Indonesia, for example, there is an increase of Islamic nationalism on how the leaders of Jakarta, and Indonesia, have to be Muslims. The current governor of Jakarta, Basuki Tjahaja Purnama, is a Chinese and non-Muslim man. There have been many protests, especially from the extremist Islamic groups, to take him out from the office and to prevent him from running for the second term. The reasoning behind this is mainly because he is not a Muslim and therefore he should not lead the capital of a country with a massive number of Muslim population. Despite of the absurdity of their reasoning, these protests have invited many people to join their movement. Religion, in this case, is used to mobilise people for political purposes and it is affecting Indonesia in more ways than just politics.

The Islamic nationalism also refers to the idea of creating an exclusive Islamic community where Islamic law is applied and everyone should follow the rules. Currently Indonesia's motto of "unity in diversity" is being challenged by the lack of respect towards differences within the Indonesian community itself. Islamic rules have been used by some politicians in the past, however only in moderation. Stability and balance within the diverse Indonesian community are very important. The increasing of extreme Islamic nationalism will destabilise the harmony and create a chaotic situation for the minorities in Indonesia. This also refers to the more visible disparities between "Us" and "Others" in Indonesia which could impose greater risks of interethnic and interreligious conflicts to happen.

The implementation of Sharia law in Aceh has been used as an example by some provinces. There is a high sense of admiration on Aceh from many Islamic organisations, especially those who are more extreme, to implement Sharia law nation-wide, to make Indonesia as an Islamic country. The imposing of some Sharia-based ordinances in some provinces is showing how Islamic conservatism has grown and it challenges Indonesia's secularism (Emont, 2017). Currently intolerance is being institutionalised at an alarming rate and human rights of religious minorities are under threat in Indonesia. The government should be the one providing order and control in a chaotic situation (Snarr and Snarr, 2008, p.78) as they have the responsibility to create a just and stable condition within the society. The individualisation of religion might as well be a bottom-up process, but it requires endorsement from the top down, through concessions of power by religious leaders, the state and ruling monarchs, which is not simply a matter of ideational accommodation, but infers the disruption of a vortex of cultural, political and economic interests (Mythen, 2013, p.121). It is a challenge to construct new political principles that may resonate with thoughtful constituencies of multiple faiths (Tampio, 2012, p.319), yet it is very important to face that challenge in order to have a social harmony in the very diverse society such as Indonesia.

Conclusion

As a very diverse country, Indonesia's history has been filled with ethnic tensions, frictions and conflicts. In the beginning, I argue that the perception of identity, the role of the "Us" versus "Others" mentality, is central in the discourse of Aceh during the conflict with the Indonesian government and during the implementation of Sharia law after the peace was reached. During the conflict, the notion of identity played a crucial role as an initial cause of grievances towards the Indonesian government. The conflict started with the different perception of what a "nation" should be and the disappointment from the Acehnese people towards the Indonesian government's view on nation-building. The conflict then escalated into, some may say, a civil war between GAM and the Indonesian government. During the insurgency, GAM brought up the discourse of Acehnese identity as "distinct" from the rest of Indonesia. A special status was given to Aceh to give them the autonomy to create the society they hoped for. However, the revoking of Aceh's special status by President Soeharto and his developmentalist program ended up increasing the Acehnese society's grievances towards the Indonesian government.

The demand for self-autonomy changed into independence as it was a better way out for Aceh from the Indonesian government's political game which was a detriment to Aceh. The implementation of Sharia law in Aceh can be seen as a solution to resolve the tension between conflicted parties. The autonomy given to Aceh to enforce an Islamic legal system did bring peace between GAM and the Indonesian government. However, the goal of GAM was not to implement Sharia law but to be able to stand as its own nation. The situation after the tsunami, turned the tables by creating a non-conducive environment to continue the conflict, thus peace was reached in Aceh. The offer to implement Sharia law, nonetheless, can allow Aceh to govern the province with its own customs and values of which related to Islam. The implementation of Sharia law in Aceh has become another problem as people deem it violates human rights. It is unfathomable that Sharia law allows corporal punishment for violators of Sharia while at the same time it controls people's behaviours. Freedom of expression is being threatened by the implementation of Sharia law and it has been criticised by local and international NGOs.

This research shows that the mentality of "Us" and "Others" did exist within the Acehnese society which can be seen as a driver for the separatist movement. Despite the fact that the identity grievances slowly faded and political and economic grievances grew stronger throughout the years of conflict, the sense of identity did not disappear from the discourse of Aceh. After the peace agreement was signed, the sense of identity has taken a different shape. Since Sharia law is allowed to be implemented, the Acehnese society has changed its shape into a more Islamic community. The mentality of "Us" and "Others" still does exist in Aceh in the form of Sharia law implementation which is applied to everyone in Aceh despite of their religious beliefs.

The challenges that Indonesia is facing right now started when the government allowed Aceh to implement Sharia law. It opened the door for other provinces and Islamic organisations to impose Sharia-based ordinances in their regions. The growth of Islamic nationalism has been

more apparent in Indonesia right now. As a result, it challenges Indonesia's value of "unity in diversity" by creating a larger disparity between "Us" and "Others" which shows that Indonesia is facing the risk of Islamic exclusivity in a nation-wide level.

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NATIONAL SOVEREIGNTY IN THE UNITED STATES

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Key Words: *strategic planning, model, enterprise, active and protective alternative, strategy*

Abstract: *The year of 2016 has brought many changes into the world, which were not only influenced by one country or a continent, but through the others as well. Under this statement, we can talk about political actions, for instance the presidential elections in the United States, or about the economical fluctuations, like when the British font has decreased after Great Britain exited from the European Union. Moreover, we could mention the most urgent topic, the international relation problems, for example the terrorist attacks which in most instance were executed by the ISIS. Due to these factors, the concept of sovereignty and national sovereignty were quested out several times in the past year. Since these topics can not be considered as everyday and popular ones, most of the people barely aware of the real meanings. Hundreds of pages could be found on the internet, which are concerned with attempting to collect and elucidate them, both in a common or scholarly way. Although, much of these foundings are understandable and appropriate, unfortunately, a few other examples, on the other hand, can be proved as inaccurate ones. Therefore, one of the purposes of this research is to aggregate the appropriate compositions and try to give a comprehensive and articulate picture of their meanings and their historical background as well, for example the Peace of Westphalia or the Treaty of Augsburg. On the other hand, this research will examine these concepts through the American's eyes as well, including the analization of speeches and statements of American presidents. In the United States this serious matter has always been a recurring element, from the presidency of John Adams until up to this day. Throughout the decades of the history of the American foreign policy, national sovereignty was concerned and argued in connection with the territorial exchanges, criminal cases and international affairs. For instance, the Farwell Adress from George Washington, the Stinson Doctrine or Monroe Doctrine which stated that the United States will not interfere into domestic affaris in cases of the Europian countries. Furthermore, this study utilized, inter alia, sources from great authors like Jean Bodin, Thomas Hobbes and Martin Luther.*

* * *

Introduction

This study focuses on the concept of national sovereignty and its incarnation in the United States. It attempts to give comprehensible explanations for questions, such as, what is the meaning of this idea or what do we understand under the term of being sovereign. What differences can be brought up between concepts, for instance, integration, interdependence or self-determination. Furthermore, the research also analyses the terms from the U.S. perspective, through mentioning and explaining basic aspects, for example the signification of the Stinson Doctrine, and a collection of the president's attitude toward national sovereignty throughout the centuries.

With the purpose to understand the further processes, the first Chapter will build up from definitions and interpretations, not only about sovereignty, but also all the related topics which would emerged during the research, for instance, human rights or authority. Moreover, this part will lead on the historical development of the concept, from the Peace of Augsburg and the Peace of Westfalia up to the Second World War.

In Chapter 2, the appearance of national sovereignty in the United States will be discussed. Starting with the Declaration of Independence, going through important doctrines and documents for instance the Monroe Doctrine or the Farewell Address. Furthermore, there will be a representation of the three types of sovereignty which emerged in the U. S., including Dual and Popular sovereignty and Nullification.

Finally, in Chapter 3, the research part of the paper will be presented. As my study is based on the U.S. perspective, I examined, how the presidents were related to the topic. After several research, I organized and classified the found results and data according to their contents, such as one part is connected to international affairs, meanwhile the others to territorial expansions. At last, but not least, a chart will be demonstrated with the purpose to represent the summarized results of a certain topic how often did come up.

Sovereignty

As sovereignty is the main principle of this study, therefore, it is inevitable not to begin with its explanation, in order to understand the further concepts. In the following lines, such terms will be discussed as supreme authority, territoriality, internal and external sovereignty and its historical background.

Definitions

The first European philosopher who created a concept for sovereignty was Jean Bodin. His idea of souveraineté was the central term in his writing, *De la république* and presented it as “only a supreme authority within a territory could strengthen a fractured community.” (J. Bodin, 1898). Meaning, only the executive power of a state should be the one who could supervise the nation's political, cultural and social concerns, neither a foreign person nor another country. Sovereignty can only incarnate within a country's broadline, due to it presents those people and their rights who are living in the certain territory. This

determination is leading us to another important component of sovereignty, which would be territoriality. It is a fundamental principle by which people of a society are determined, in other words, “their membership derives from their residence within borders”. (Philpott, 2016) Moreover, it falls under the geographic territory where modern sovereigns are exclusively normative. Another maxim which should be mentioned in connection with sovereignty is the matter of the holder of sovereignty who possesses authority. Under this statement, it can be defined the situation when a person or entity is capable of to bring about another person to do something that he/she wouldn't do under other circumstances. The philosopher, R.P Wolff (1990) has defined this term in the following way: “the right to command and correlatively the right to be obeyed”. (Wolff, 1990, p. 20.) The *right* or the *legitimacy to rule* can derive from various aspects, for example, divine mandate, hereditary law, natural law, constitution or international law, and these were mostly depending on the actual political standpoint in the certain historical period. (Philpott, 2016)

The first couple historical actions which led to the emergence of national sovereignty were the Peace of Westphalia and the Peace of Augsburg. 1648 was the year when European countries finally overstepped from the Middle Ages into the foundation of the modern state system where states has started to become sovereign ones, moreover they has begun to evolving the concept of territorial sovereignty. This was one of the effects of the Peace of Westphalia, which had led to the end of the Eight Years War, which was fought between Spain, Dutch and German phase of the Thirty Year's War. (The Editors of Encyclopædia Britannica, 2015) At 1555 the Peace of Augsburg was signed, which meant that the German princes who ruled the state separately gained the right to determine what religion should be practiced in their own territory, which could be seen as an early attempt to sovereignty. The mostly used phrase during this time was “*Cuius Regio, eius religio*” which can be translated as “*Whose realm, his religion*”. (Boundless, 2017)

The presence of National Sovereignty in the United States

Although, the U.S. may not have been participated in the history for so long as other European countries, but it has accomplished to be one of the biggest and most powerful nation by the 20th-21th century.

The birth of the U.S. as a sovereign nation

When the Second Continental Congress has signed the Declaration of Independence in 1776, the American colonies became sovereign and independent from the authority of Great Britain. Under this statement, we mean, that Great Britain had no longer the right to command and dispose about what happens in America. They couldn't raise taxies, declare new bills or acts anymore, since they were stop being the “Mother country” and being in charge in the case of contorling America. After that, the new sovereign state has begun to build their own nation by set up new laws, bills, an own system of commerce and enjoying the rights of an independent nations, for instance, they did not have to answer to any other countrie's government, as they possessd their personal one. Although, America had to go through several hardships during

the decades, but eventually the colonies became the United States of America, and achieved their main goal, to be united and able to work together. Herewith, the United States could exist as a sovereign state, which means, neither a country nor an entity can or has control over the nation. (Leroy Way, 2012)

Doctrines and documents which have shaped national sovereignty

Throughout the American history, many documents and doctrines had seen the light, which has shaped the nation building and its progression. For instance, the Farewell Address, Monroe Doctrine and the Stimson Doctrine had the same influence, furthermore these meaningful papers affected the nation's international relations as well, thus relating to the term of national sovereignty, too.

The concept, political doctrine is often confused with political ideology, whereas, according to Bernard Crick, the term doctrine "refers to a coherent sum of assertions regarding what a particular topic should be". (Merriam-Webster, 2017). Moreover, it deals with the philosophical orientations on a meta-theoretical level.

The Farewell Address was published in Philadelphia's American Daily Advertiser on September 19, 1796 and stated President George Washington's idea about the nations should obviate relations and alliances with other countries. From that view, it can be seen as a predecessor of Woodrow Wilson's idea of isolationism after the First World War. (Courtesy of the Milstein Division of United States History, 1935)

Secondly, the Monroe Doctrine was considered as an American foreign policy, which was enacted in 1823. It represented the principle, that if a European nation would interfere or meddle into colonization in the United States, it will be seen as an act of assault, furthermore it will lead on U.S. encroachment. Another point that the doctrine declares, is that the United States will certainly avoid both the encounter with other colonies in Europe and the interfering into another country's inland affairs. Since its inauguration it was considered as a decisive element of the United States' international politics. As an example of its application, during the Cold War, more precisely between 1953 and 1959, when the Cuban Revolution took place, it was debated whether the U.S. should interfere with this internal conflict in order to stop the spreading of the communist ideology or not. (History.com Staff, 2009)

At last, there was the Stimson Doctrine, which declared, that the United States cannot recognize the equitableness of those agreements, treaties or situations that would harm the American treaty rights or even evoke any disagreement in reference to the Pact of Paris. This document was created in connection with the Manchuria occupation which was executed by the Japanese in 1931, the note was sent both to Japan and China. (McDougall, 2016)

Popular sovereignty

This principle in short term means, that the government's source of authority is coming from the will of the people. It is based on the concept that a government consists with the purpose to serve the people of the nation. This term were considered to be a fundamental principle of

the U.S. and mentioned both in the Declaration of Independence as “deriving their just Powers from the Consent of the Governed.” (Patrick, 2006), and also in the U.S. Constitution, enunciating the followings about popular sovereignty, “We the people of the United States . . . do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America” (Patrick, 2016).

With popular sovereignty, the people of the states are got the right to choose the representatives who will stand for them, and also are able to directly elect the member of the Congress. We can formally determine the ways of how popular sovereignty is expressed in a democracy. First of all, they are able to suggest and authorize amendments to the constitution, either in a direct or in an indirect way, furthermore, they also advocate their governmental work, maintain the basic maxim of their authorities and make an influence on public policy arbitrations by voting in public elections. Another characteristic feature, when the representatives are elected by a majority vote of the people, moreover, as already mentioned above, the people can be the part of a making process of a constitution, both in a direct way or throughout their delegates. (Kelly, 2016)

It may have been led to believe, that popular sovereignty only can be known from the United States, but it has become a “world-class standard of legitimacy” (J. Patrick, 2006) for other countries’ governments, for instance, in the Czech Republic or in Brazilia. Not to say, back in time, in the ancient Roman and Greek Empire, the same principle were used as in both case, the people elected representatives to superintend the government.

Dual sovereignty

Another form of sovereignty, which has emerged in the United States, was Dual Sovereignty. This principal represent a legal theorem, which refers to the case, when a person commits the same crime in more than one state, and the federal and state court can prosecute the individual without breaking the law of double jeopardy, since the person violated each sovereignty. The term’s name is originated from the time when the thirteen colonies had independent political entities, but when they united and abdicated from some part of their sovereignty, except their natural right to punish and define crimes in the states. (Duhaime.org Staff) Another phrasing of the term according to Justice Sandra Day O’Connor, “the doctrine of dual sovereignty grants each state the right to try a criminal under the laws of that state, regardless of whether he had already been tried under the laws of another state.” (Levy, 2011). This compositions of dual sovereignty was presented in the trial of the the Heath v Alabama case in 1985, which represented the case of Larry Gene Heath, who hired two men to kidnap and kill his wife. He met with the men in Georgia and led them back to their house in Alabama, later his pregnant wife’s body was found and the murderers were prosecuted. During the investigation, there was a cooperation between the two state’s authorities, since both of them were involved, from the standpoint, that however his wife was murdered in Georgia, but the kidnapping was executed in Alabama, therefore each prosecution were legally binding. (Heath v. Alabama, 474 U.S. 82 1985)

Nullification

This principle represents the idea, that the government has the right to withdraw or even to forbid the registration of unconstitutional federal laws. It had first appeared in 1798 in connection with the Virginia Resolution, when James Madison proclaimed that “duty bound to resist” (Woods), and it referred to the action when the federal government offended against the U. S. Constitution. Then, Thomas Jefferson used the term when Kentucky Resolutions of 1798 was introduced, moreover he stated that without nullification, the federal government will decide over the authority of its own power and possibly it will extend, due to it will possess the obligate right. On December 10, 1832, Nullification Proclamation was inaugurated by President Andrew Jackson, which pronounced the right of the states to “nullify a federal law” (The Library of Congress, 2015). It was after the South Carolina convention stated that the tariff acts of 1828 and 1832 are not sanctioned by the Constitution as well as offend the true meaning thereby they should be considered as invalid ones.

3. U.S. President’s relation toward National Sovereignty

My research’s analysis has started with America’s second president, John Adams and finished with Barack Obama, due to we only got stable and reliable informations until this period of time.

The List of the Presidents and their role in National Sovereignty

First of all a table will be shown, in which all the presidents are listed and organized periodically, according to their ministrations in office. Next to their names, the dates of the documents will be able to see, and in the last column, the contents will be summarized into a couple words as in what terms did they get in contact with national sovereignty.

President	Date	Context
John Adams	March 19, 1798	International matters
James Madison	March 4, 1813	Territorial expansion
James Monroe	March 4, 1821	Territorial expansion
James Monroe	May 4, 1822	Territorial expansion
Zachary Taylor	December 4, 1849	Crime case
Franklin Pierce	December 31, 1855	Crime case
James Buchanan	December 3, 1860	About national sovereignty in the U.S.
Andrew Johnson	May 10, 1865	Proclamation
Ulysses S. Grant	January 26, 1877	International matters
Theodore Roosevelt	December 7, 1903	Bureau of Corporation
William Howard Taft	December 6, 1910	International matters

William Howard Taft	December 3, 1912	International matters
Woodrow Wilson	January 27, 1916	About national sovereignty in the U.S.
Woodrow Wilson	February 2, 1916	International matters
Woodrow Wilson	September 2, 1916	International matters
Warren G. Harding	March 4, 1921	About national sovereignty in the U.S.
Franklin D. Roosevelt	May 16, 1933	Disarmament Conference
Harry S. Truman	December 18, 1946	United States Policy toward China
Harry S. Truman	October 14, 1948	Atomic energy
Dwight D. Eisenhower	June 7, 1953	Korea and Communism
Dwight D. Eisenhower	January 14, 1958	United Nations
Dwight D. Eisenhower	January 26, 1960	United States Policy toward Cuba
Dwight D. Eisenhower	February 27, 1960	About national sovereignty in the U.S.
John F. Kennedy	June 1, 1961	International matters
John F. Kennedy	October 11, 1961	About national sovereignty in the U.S.
John F. Kennedy	November 3, 1961	Senegal
John F. Kennedy	November 8, 1961	About national sovereignty in the U.S.
John F. Kennedy	April 11, 1962	Iran
John F. Kennedy	May 22, 1962	Ivory Coast, Africa
John F. Kennedy	June 22, 1962	Operation Crossroads Africa
John F. Kennedy	June 29, 1962	Mexico City
John F. Kennedy	July 31, 1962	Against aggression
John F. Kennedy	August 1, 1962	Assistance Act
John F. Kennedy	November 27, 1962	Somali Republic
John F. Kennedy	December 11, 1962	Chile
John F. Kennedy	December 12, 1962	Chile
John F. Kennedy	July 25, 1963	Nuclear weapons
John F. Kennedy	August 27, 1963	Brazil
John F. Kennedy	September 11, 1963	Nuclear weapons
John F. Kennedy	October 22, 1963	Latin America
Lyndon B. Johnson	August 29, 1965	About national sovereignty in the U.S.

Lyndon B. Johnson	February 23, 1966	National Freedom Award
Richard Nixon	July 31, 1969	India
Richard Nixon	August 2, 1969	The Romanian standpoint from Communism
Richard Nixon	February 18, 1970	New definition of peace
Richard Nixon	April 21, 1971	Mexican boundary
Richard Nixon	February 9, 1972	Action for development
Richard Nixon	September 27, 1972	Terrorism
Richard Nixon	September 20, 1973	Pakistan
Gerald R. Ford	June 1, 1975	Austria
Gerald R. Ford	August 3, 1975	The Romanian standpoint from Communism
Gerald R. Ford	September 25, 1975	Colombia
Gerald R. Ford	July 9, 1976	Uganda
Jimmy Carter	June 28, 1977	Venezuela
Jimmy Carter	April 13, 1978	The Romanian standpoint from Communism
Jimmy Carter	June 16, 1978	Panama Canal Treaties
Jimmy Carter	February 16, 1979	Mexico
Jimmy Carter	June 18, 1979	Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms
Jimmy Carter	June 19, 1980	Afghanistan
Ronald Reagan	June 30, 1981	Captive Nation week
Ronald Reagan	May 14, 1982	Latin America
Ronald Reagan	June 11, 1982	Soviet Union
Ronald Reagan	July 19, 1982	Communism
Ronald Reagan	June 23, 1983	Polish people's human rights
Ronald Reagan	August 1, 1983	Constitution
Ronald Reagan	May 27, 1986	Nicaragua and Communism
Ronald Reagan	September 22, 1987	International matters
Ronald Reagan	December 8, 1987	Article XV
Ronald Reagan	February 11, 1988	Communist affairs
George Bush	June 14, 1989	Communist affairs
George Bush	July 6, 1989	Captive Nation week
George Bush	February 15, 1990	Illicit drugs

George Bush	July 18, 1990	Captive Nation week
George Bush	August 3, 1990	Iraq
George Bush	December 3, 1990	Brazil
George Bush	February 1, 1991	About national sovereignty in the U.S. in connection with Prayer day
George Bush	April 13, 1991	Air war collage
George Bush	July 12, 1991	Captive Nation week
George Bush	June 12, 1992	Forest assistance
George Bush	October 29, 1992	About national sovereignty in the U.S. in connection with the refugees
William J. Clinton	April 4, 1993	About national sovereignty in the U.S.
William J. Clinton	April 21, 1993	Cyprus conflict
William J. Clinton	July 28, 1993	Mexicans
William J. Clinton	May 5, 1994	Hispanics
William J. Clinton	August 1, 1995	Iraq
William J. Clinton	October 10, 1995	President of Mexico
William J. Clinton	February 9, 1996	Iraq
Robert Dole	August 15, 1996	About national sovereignty in the U.S. and internationalism
William J. Clinton	February 23, 1998	Puerto Rico
William J. Clinton	May 16, 1998	Unified europe
William J. Clinton	December 8, 1999	About national sovereignty in the U.S.
William J. Clinton	June 2, 2000	Europe and the U.S.
George W. Bush	June 25, 2008	Vietnam
Barack Obama	March 26, 2014	Belgium
Barack Obama	June 4, 2014	African Republic
Barack Obama	June 5, 2014	African Republic
Barack Obama	July 28, 2015	African Republic

Table 1. List of the Presidents and their role in National Sovereignty

These data, show us that national sovereignty was always a part of the American history, moreover, it can be also seen, and that they appeared in connection with various topics, such as international affairs or contracts with other nations. In the followings two charts will be represented, the first is about, in which time interval national sovereignty was quested out the most, meanwhile, the second one is focusing on the frequency of the topics.

The appearance of National Sovereignty in the United States between 1800 and 2016



Chart 2. The emergence of National Sovereignty in the U.S. (Ngram Viewer)

It can be clearly seen, that the highest point is around the years of 1940 and 1960, which refer to the Second World War. During this period, most of the documents are related to wartime conflicts as nuclear weapons, contracts with the Soviet Union's nations, for instance Cuba, China and Korea.

However, for further research material the presidency of Donald Trump would be perfect, since his policy toward national sovereignty is emphasized due to it was presented in his campaign. On the other hand we have only speculations what will be his next moves in the international politics which would not stand for a liable source material for the investigations.

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THE ORGANISATIONS OF BUSINESS INTERESTS IN EUROPE

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Abstract: *In the last few years the question of policy making in the European Union is getting more and more relevant for both scholars interested in European politics and those concerned with the legitimacy of decision-making on European level. The field of work and influence of interest groups is especially the target of scientific interest. The chambers of commerce as economic associations are representing a very special type of interest groups in Europe. The recent study is giving an insight into the difficulties of defining a European standard for the organisations of business interests and the author is trying to show the actors of lobbying on the European level. Several national chambers, large city chambers of commerce and also associations of chambers have their own representations in Brussels, which are trying to influence the decision-making processes of the European Union directly. The study is dealing with the role of these interest groups and it is analysing the role of EUROCHAMBRES, the Association of European Chambers of Commerce and Industry, which is one of the largest business representative organisation in Brussels.*

* * *

A) The tradition of chamber autonomies in Europe

In our days, more and more attention is being paid to the activities of the civil sphere, to the framework and questions of its operation. The role and range of action of the organisations established as a result of the self-organisation of citizens, however, are not familiar to a lot of people, and little is known about their genesis and evolution either.

This is especially true in the case of the various interest protection and representation organisations, since the issue of these forms of autonomies has not stayed in the foreground of scientific attention so far. Both the Hungarian and the European scientific life and public are showing an increasing interest in these organisations. Our present work examines one part of this self-governmental segment, namely the chamber autonomies. We have chosen to deal with it especially because very little is known about what the exact task of these organisations is, and along what obligations and licences they operate.

Based on our experiences, not only do the chamber autonomies have great traditions in Europe, but now they also play – through their efficient operation – a decisive role in the EU

decision making processes, especially through the umbrella organisations present on the European stage as well as their joining the processes of the European Social Dialogue.

As an introduction to our topic, it is worth referring to the marked duality characterising the chamber autonomies established in the European culture. In the historical point of view, we may differentiate – with a slight simplification – between two main types of professional/economic self-governments: the Anglo-Saxon and the continental interest representation models. (Kluth, 2005, pp.78–81)

I) The Anglo-Saxon model

The establishment of the structures belonging to the Anglo-Saxon system is typical of Great Britain and its colonies – in this respect including the later United States as well. An important peculiarity of the Anglo-Saxon chamber systems is that they may be regarded as self-organisations fully built from the bottom: the central power was not present at their birth; therefore, they were granted no state licences of any kind. These organisations were not legal entities created by law, but were/are functioning as associations: each merchant, craftsman, lawyer, economist etc. could decide for himself to be or not to be member of the chamber. In this sense the British chambers of commerce, industry and agriculture were functioning either as structures representing local interests or as umbrella organisations of different associations, societies, but in every case, they were – and still are today – organised on free association basis and are a real part of civil life. They rarely participate in the professional public administration, neither do they help the government with counselling work in an institutional form. The activity of economic chambers is mainly concentrated on promoting the establishment of and stimulating business contacts, while in the case of professional bodies on ethical issues, the representation of its members' interests, and self-help. (Bennett, 2011) The chambers following the Anglo-Saxon model are virtually fully independent of the government and state public administration, although due to their optional membership system they represent only a fraction of the economic/professional circle, therefore their membership number, financial strength and social weight is often fairly trifling.

II) The continental model

The other group of chambers contains the economic/professional self-governments organised based on the continental model. These were mainly established following the French pattern, and markedly differed – and still differ in our days – from the structures set in the Anglo-Saxon countries. The chamber organisations created since the 19th century overall on the European continent were in most cases established by central will, their sphere of authority, tasks and responsibilities were regulated by regal decrees, later by the law. (Kluth, 2005:78) They were usually organised based on compulsory membership system, their main tasks were to help legislation preparation work related to the represented sphere by suggestions and proposals, and to represent the interests of the given economic/professional circle towards the

government and the society. During time, the chambers organised on the basis of the continental model have become legal interest representations that included the whole of a particular sphere, and through maintaining regular contact with the government they exerted some influence on the legislation as well. (Hendler, 2005, p.27)

If we look on the historical development of these organisations, it is worth emphasising that the French influence appeared especially with the Napoleonic Wars in Central-Eastern-Europe, then the idea of chambers gained ground from the 1848 wave of revolutions onwards. It was an important characteristic feature of the chamber organisations established in France that the monarchic/governmental and the public administrative power had a strong influence on them, so the autonomy and the individual – possibly initiative – activities of these structures could only be implemented in a very limited field. Therefore, these bodies may be considered as the executives and “extended arms” of the central will coming from above, rather than interest representations independent of external factors, serving their own members. As opposed to this, in several other countries of Europe including the southern states, Germany and Austria chamber structures with more freedom and – regarding their licences – broader influence were established. (Hendler, 1984, pp.25–26)

All in all, regarding the economic chambers three different types of interest representation may be defined in the European Community states in our days. (Sack, 2015) The first group includes the countries with organisations having compulsory membership. At this point we should mention that besides Austria and Germany, France, Italy, The Netherlands, Luxembourg, Slovenia, Spain and Greece also have interest representations (of public body nature) with compulsory membership. The second group, which at present includes Hungary as well, realize the voluntary chamber membership based on the law. Belgium, Poland, Lithuania, Slovakia, Sweden and The Czech Republic have such economic interest representations. We may place in the third group the countries that have created no legal regulation whatsoever concerning economic interest representations, so the tasks of these are performed exclusively by associations organised on civil law (association) basis. This group includes Great Britain, Denmark, Ireland, Latvia, Estonia, Malta and Cyprus.

B) The role of chambers in the socioeconomic system of Europe

The chamber operation in the 19th century repeatedly pinpointed in most of the states of Europe the inadequacy of infrastructure, especially rail transport, they raised attention to the necessity of building bridges as well as to the need for a telegraph network. Often, we can find actions in the field of social policy, the issue of cheap workers’ flats, and the interest representations also contributed to the creation of the acts on worker protection and patient aid formed at the end of the 19th century. The chambers mainly focused on the development of domestic economy, on the growth of domestic industrial and agricultural companies.

In the period between the two World Wars, the tasks and the main elements of the structure of the commercial and industrial interest representation bodies were mostly influenced by the philosophy of self-government. Despite the disastrous territorial and economic/social

consequences of the First World War, therefore no real change occurred in the traditional activities of the commercial chambers. They aimed at adapting to the altered situation and increased the intensity of their own initiatives; for instance, they played an important role in organising international fairs, in supporting the commercial school network. In the field of agriculture, the chambers established their own model farms, agricultural schools, started enterprises and supported among others the solution of the homestead problem. (Strausz – Zachar, 2008)

1) The problems of Central and East Europe

After 1945 we see a clear duality of development: while the chambers in Western Europe took a stand, and contributed to the reorganisation of the modern democratic states, in Eastern Europe these organisations were not able to further improve their activities, what is more, most of them were eliminated by the totalitarian communist rule. Thus, in Western Europe we have in a lot of countries a very strong and historically based chamber system. Here the functioning of the pluralist democracy could be reconciled with the neo-corporatist interest protection: the high level of dialogue among the different social, economic and political groups, and thus the high level of social cohesion and solidarity has contributed to the European integration. Two countries, Austria and Germany have stated in their legal regulations that the present system of self-government, together with other forms of free associations and corporations, is one of the main pillars of liberal and plural democracy. Among these the chambers established by law are organisations that were created by the legislation to protect the interests of certain social groups or profession groups (that is they are legitimate economic/professional interest representation bodies).

In the course of the regime change, the countries of Central and East Europe (as indicated by Lőrinczné, 2007:36-47) recreated some historical institutions, including the traditional chambers in their civil society. In these years, the number of organisations calling themselves chambers increased from month to month. Mostly they were established on the basis of the right of association, so they are commonly called associative chambers. The number of members, financial possibilities and therefore the range of motion of these chambers established on voluntary membership basis widely differed. However, in connection with the bigger organisations serving real needs, also the government realised that their status should be regularised, and in order to ease the burden of the state apparatus, they could be commissioned to perform certain public tasks. To realise this intention, in a lot of Central and Eastern European countries the chambers of economic nature were declared by law to be public bodies. In Hungary, this process took place in the year 1994. Thus, the chambers of commerce and industry, the chambers of craftsmen uniting the small entrepreneurs, and the chambers of agriculture were established – with compulsory membership and of public body nature. Although this could have marked a return to a historical chamber system, in the following years the legal status of these organisations changed again due to uncertainty in the political decision making processes. (Strausz – Zachar, 2008)

The forced reform of the economic self-governments occurred mostly in the years when it was the greatest need for the chambers to be able to perform their activities uninterrupted. The countries of CEE were in the entrance hall of the accession to the European Union, and one of the most significant tasks of the chambers would have been to prepare both in general the national economy and the domestic economic players for the consequences of the accession to the community. (Koudela, 2015, pp.40–49)

If we take a deeper look at the Hungarian economic chambers, we must state that after the legal changes they needed a further four or five years to consolidate their activities, to create the necessary financial resources for their operation, and to join once again in articulating the interests of the Hungarian economy, with an increased number of members. Nowadays they have still a voluntary membership system, though in theory operating with public body nature. They are located somewhere half way between the public administration and the professional self-organisation, on the middle level of the relationship system between the state power and the citizen. They also occupy a curious mid-position in the comparison of the international chamber systems, since on the one hand they are established by law and are operating as public bodies serving the interests of all in the field of economy, on the other hand they have voluntary membership. In this respect, they do not fully fit into either the Anglo-Saxon or the traditional continental system.

II) The Austrian model

If we are trying to localize the most developed and most influential chamber system in Europe, we can find it in Austria. By way of the different legal regulations following the Second World War – as well as due to the appearance of the informal forum of Social Partnership – the present-day system of the Austrian economic chambers took shape. The most important change may be detected in the fact that the requirement of the realisation of service within the chamber was brought into the foreground. The new program set the previous tradition based economic interest representation, the co-operation with the social partners and the various (civil) associations as the basic objective of the economic chambers, at the same time stating that they must not forget about acting in concert, that is about the realisation of the reconciliation and alignment (equalization) of interests among the members. (Zellenberg, 2007, pp.54–85; Rieger, 2003, pp.279–327)

In Austria, we can find not only find the traditional chambers of commerce and industry, but there is also an influential representation of agrarian interests: like in Hungary, the chambers of agriculture were established in 1920, and all natural and legal persons working in the agricultural sphere were obliged to become members of these. One chamber (*Landwirtschaftskammer*) was established in each province, and their structure and exact sphere of authority/field of work was regulated by the chamber act passed by the particular Provincial Assembly. Following the Second World War, besides promoting the issues of the agrarian sphere, the assistance of the authorities' work by suggestions, proposals, statistics and reports was set as the task of the chambers. Besides this, the interest representations ever since operating with an unchanged sphere of authority/field of work are obliged to co-operate

with the other agricultural organisations and associations, and they must provide their members with direct services by means of organising counselling, professional education and training. (Zachar, 2006)

Another unique fact of the Austrian chamber system is the existence of a legitimate interest representation of the employees: this was established as the curiosity of the Austrian system based on the bill of Ferdinand Hanusch, Minister of Social Affairs, on the establishment of the Chamber of Labour (*Arbeiterkammer*, AK) in 1920, which granted public body licences to this interest representation as well. The structure of the employee's interest representation bodies has been overall unchanged. Per the legal regulation, there is an AK in each province, and all individual employees registered in the given province have to be members of that. They are categorised into three groups: workers (*Arbeiter*), white-collar workers (*Angestellte*) and transport workers (*Verkehrsaktive*). Besides them, the unemployed have also been members of this organisation since 1992 (who, of course, do not pay the membership fee that mean the financial basis of the chambers' operation). No wonder the AKs have the highest member number among the Austrian chambers of economic nature. (Zachar, 2007, pp.116–125)

While analysing the peculiar experiences of the Austrian chamber system, three main sets of questions arose. One of these is the professional and political debate surrounding compulsory chamber membership. The chambers, under the influence of politics, organised in the 1990s a voting among their own members on the maintenance of the compulsory membership, and it ended in sweeping results. The members of the chambers in each province stood up for their institution by more than two-third majority. At the same time the debate contributed to a great extent to the taking shape of new fields of work in the life of the chambers, and – by redefining themselves – to the establishment of a modern, service-centred chamber operation having much deeper roots towards its members. (Strausz, 2007, pp.92–116; Oberndorfer 1993)

As the second set of questions, it is worth referring to the role of the chambers in the achievement of the Austrian EU membership. The different interest representation bodies participated in the preparatory work of the Austrian accession from the very beginning, what is more, they experienced a significant expansion of their licences. This could mainly be detected in the work of the “Council of the Austrian Integration Policy Related Issues” (*Rat für Fragen der österreichischen Integrationspolitik*). The structure of the council may be regarded as an extraordinary novelty. In order to create broad social consensus – besides the Chancellor, the Vice-Chancellor, the Foreign Minister and the Ministers of the appropriate department suitable for the given topic under discussion – the party-political representatives of the Austrian parliament, the delegates of the Provincial Assemblies (usually the presidents of the Provincial Assemblies) and the delegates of the social partners (that is the chambers and the trade unions) were also members of the council. (Karlhofer – Tálos, 1996) It was a further gesture on the part of the government towards the interest representation bodies that – pursuant to the social-democrat/people's party ‘Europe Agreement’ – the social partners could play a significant role in the negotiations of professional fields that concerned them as well. The agreement ensures their ‘equal participation’ in the Austrian decision making

processes going on in the framework of the EU, and as part of this, they may appear in the Austrian diplomatic mission as well.

Finally, as the third stressed set of questions, it is worth to analyse the genesis and operation of the Austrian Social Partnership, and within this examine the role of the chamber umbrella organisations. In Austria, this dialogue-based partner relationship consists of the wide range of institutionalised formal and informal relationships, in which the state, the associations of the employees and the employers, that is the Austrian Federal Economic Chamber (*WKÖ*), the Federal Chamber of Labour (*Bundesarbeiterkammer*), the Austrian Federation of Trade Unions (*ÖGB*), the Presidential Conference of Austrian Chambers of Agriculture (*Präsidentenkonferenz der österreichischen Landwirtschaftskammern*), and the government itself participate. The institution is considered by many the most developed form of the so called (neo-)corporative tripartism, in the course of which close relationship is established in every field of economic and social politics – while pushing the element of competition into the background – among the three key actors of economy, the state, the employer and the employee organisations discussed in detail in this volume as well.

This was partly due to the peculiar political structure of the Austrian modern age republic: two major political parties, the Social Democratic Party and the Christian conservative party aimed at co-operating for the sake of ‘consensus democracy’ (*Konkordanzdemokratie*). Social Partnership was – for both parties – the third route leading on the balk between capitalism and Marxism-Leninism. Perhaps this is why it is natural that the interest representation bodies tried to bring their own social standpoint into the decision-making processes not only through formal channels; there were (and still are) close connections between the individual umbrella organisations and the political parties.

C) Chambers on the European level – an overview

In today’s Europe, the chamber systems of the EU member states are very different. As we presented in the first section of our study, there are countries with organisations having compulsory membership, countries that realize the voluntary chamber membership based on the law. And last but not least we can find countries that have created no legal regulation whatsoever concerning economic interest representations.

Due to these differences we have various umbrella organisations on the European level, which participate in different ways in the operation of the Social Dialogue appearing on the community level. The interest representation bodies of the entrepreneurs, which belong to our primary field of research, are present – from institutional/organisational point of view – in a very scattered way, often with significant differences in quality and resource-basis in Brussels. (Lőrinczné, 2015, pp.231–260) On the one hand, we should differentiate the level of the European associations as the highest interest representation forum, where we can find not only the renown European social partners, but also several other Pan-European associations (e.g. EUROCADRES, EUROCHAMBRES, ECEC, UEAPME, CCBE, CEPLIS). Besides these, we have the individual sector trade union and employer organisations, which are not

members of the Pan-European associations, and their number may run to several hundred (e.g. EUROCOMMERCE, COPA, CEI, CEA etc.). Finally, on the third level, the national interest representation organisations appear before the Brussels and Strasbourg forums, which often run offices in the EU centres. Their rather straightforward aim is to gain information and to perform informal lobby activities. Most of the wide-spectrum interest representations come from the industry, while the minority originate from the commerce, freelance occupations and service sectors.

If we examine the European lobby possibilities only with respect to our narrower topic, the chamber organisations, we may conclude that the chambers are present in Brussels by means of both Pan-European associations and regional chamber representations and national chamber offices. This European level cavalcade is especially conspicuous if we contrast it to the previously presented and analysed well-organised structures of the Austrian Social Partnership and the social groups covered by the chambers.

The structural weaknesses of the European level (company related, chamber) interest representation may be confirmed by other factors as well. Thus, the intensity of representation is often low, that is not every association and organisation is member of the European level umbrella organisations. Moreover, the member associations do not fully represent the interests of the circle they intend to present either, since in the case of organisations with voluntary membership system the strength and legitimacy of the interest representation institution always remains doubtful. (Leitl, 2005; Mandl, 2004)

Three Pan-European interest representation bodies take part in the institutionalised Social Dialogue which has slowly been becoming neo-corporatist in nature: the European Trade Union Confederation (ETUC), the Confederation of European Business (now: BUSINESSEUROPE, previously: UNICE), and the European Centre of Public Enterprises (CEEP). The institution of the Social Dialogue itself contributes to the strengthening of the European economic environment in many ways. On the one hand, as shown by the nation-state experiences, the social partners – through their co-operation – are willing to shoulder responsibilities concerning the whole of the economy, and they forego enforcing their short-term particular interests by all means. The compromise and consensus made in the course of the bilateral dialogue are represented collectively by the partners towards the external parties, and they are implemented within their own circle. In order to have a stabilising function in terms of the whole of the economy, the dialogue must not be confined to the narrow terrain of social policy; it has to be interpreted comprehensively in economic management. Last but not least, the social dialogue bearing the above-mentioned criteria can be realised only between professionally competent parties. Thus, it has a decisive and unique role in the democratic governance of the EU, for it is the driving force of the modernisation of the EU economy and of the European social model, and it ensures that solidarity is preserved throughout the creation of welfare.

D) Conclusions

Throughout our work, we were intent on giving an overall picture of the past, the present structure, the activities and the up-to-date problems of the European chamber systems. In addition, we tried to present briefly the functioning of the various national and supranational social interest reconciliation forums as well as that of the international chamber associations. We did it in the hope that this way we may gain further information not only about the individual chamber systems, but also about the decision-making and social political philosophy of the given country or community. In fact, the interest reconciliation and occasionally interest representation work performed by the chambers is not an isolated, individual activity, but it is organically intertwined with the everyday life of the societies. We assume that the attitude of a certain political system towards the representatives of the non-political sphere gives away a lot about its mechanism of action, what is more, its outlook on democracy: are they considered as partners, and are some of them allowed to participate as real actors in decision preparation, or perhaps in the actual decision making processes, or not? Since the chambers belong among the above-mentioned non-political organisations (and they are perhaps the most tarnished and most powerful structures in this field), their recognition or non-recognition by the government and their relationship system with the government are good indicators of what the political life of a certain country thinks about the 21st century challenges and methods of exercising power.

This study shows that often very different answers were (and still are) provided by the various countries to these questions. It is true, however, to virtually all of the EU member states that political life, or the so-far interpretation of democracy, has been struggling with an increasingly serious legitimating problem. In this very respect, we could take advantage of the chambers located in the ‘mezzo sphere’, since one of their main functions should be the mediation and reconciliation activity. If, however, the possessors of power – regardless of political orientation – do not consider the different organisations of the society, including the chambers, as real, in some cases equal partners, the communication between these structures and the government will remain insincere and hypocritical. It is society that loses the most on this self-destructive process.

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**FAILED STATES: SAFE HAVEN FOR TERRORIST GROUPS
THE CASE OF LIBYA**

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Key Words: *post-Cold War era, security, security threat, failed states, terrorism, Libya*

Abstract: *The end of the Cold War not only marked the birth of a new world order, but also the appearance of some unprecedented security threats. In the post-Cold War era a number of so-called “new types of security challenges” have emerged, testing the stabilisation of some newly independent states and fracturing international security.*

Due to recent years’ and current international events the paper mainly engages in two of the aforementioned “new types of security challenges”, which are the phenomena of failed states and terrorism. The purpose of the paper therefore is to highlight the relation between failed states and terrorism by identifying and exploring the factors which allow a state becoming either fragile or failed. Moreover, the author underlines some other significant security challenges which non-functioning states have to face, such as cross-border crime and illegal migration. To simplify the analysis, the author examines an empirical example. Instead of using some of the most well-known cases of failed states, the author focuses on the case of Libya.

* * *

Introduction

“In the wake of September 11, the threat of terrorism has given the problem of failed nation-states an immediacy and importance that transcends its previous humanitarian dimension.” (Rotberg, 2002, p.127).

The end of the Cold War is considered as a significant turning point in recent world history from several aspects. The Cold War era, characterised by a bipolar international system with two great powers, the United States and the Soviet Union competing in the international arena was less complex than the world we live in today. Security threats as well as actors threatening national, regional and international stability were defined more easily, thus it was simpler to discover solutions within the classical international relations and the traditional security theory framework. In contrast, the post-Cold War era, defined by a new world order, as well as a shift in power politics is more complex, with a significant feature:

interdependence. As a result of the increasing interconnection of states in the 21st century no nation – regardless how powerful it is – enjoys unconditional security from contemporary threats (Kaplan, 2014, p.50). Due to the phenomenon of globalisation our world is not only dealing with the need to operate in a more accelerated pace, in addition must acknowledge some unprecedented global threats, which have highlighted the need for fresh ideas within the field of International Relations (IR). Even though Security Studies, a subfield of IR surfaced during the years of the Cold War, it has significantly developed and evolved after the collapse of the Berlin Wall and the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

The shift in the international system, as well as the phenomenon of globalisation resulted in the appearance of the so-called *new types of security challenges*¹, which have not only been affecting and challenging the newly independent states facing the constant struggle of political transition, but have been posing a significant threat towards international security and global stability as well. The appearance of such challenges demanded the broadening of the concept of security. This has partly led to the establishment of the Copenhagen School, which widened and deepened the notion of security, moreover introduced the concept of securitisation. The Copenhagen School, presenting five sectors of security², provides more detailed information on existential security threats challenging the international community. Thus, the field of Security Studies in general presents more accurate answers and solutions to threats which previously have either acquired less attention, or were generally unprecedented.

The recent years' and current international events stress that such contemporary challenges should be dealt with great caution, as well as with long-term commitment. Despite the fact that treating the aforementioned *new types of security challenges* are equally important, the paper mainly engages in two of today's hottest topics: the phenomena of failed states and terrorism. The purpose of the paper therefore is to highlight the relation between failed states and transnational terrorism by identifying and exploring the factors which allow a state becoming either fragile or failed. In addition, the author pinpoints some other contemporary challenges which non-functioning states have to face to emphasise that these issues can be and are indeed all connected in a way to the problematic of failed states. To simplify the analysis, the author examines an empirical example. The paper can be considered unique in a sense, since it does not employ the most well-known cases of failed states, such as Somalia, Sudan or the Democratic Republic of Congo, instead it introduces the case of Libya.

The paper, following the introduction, is constructed of three main sections. In the first section the author highlights the differences between strong, weak and failed states, mainly using the study of Robert I. Rotberg, *Failed States, Collapsed States, Weak States: Causes and Indicators* (2003). The distinction between the "stages of statehood" is crucial for understanding the many components of a stable, well-functioning, sustainable state and vice versa. The second section is dedicated to the empirical example, in which, mainly studying the Fragile State Index (FSI) the author presents Libya's position and ranking throughout the past decade. In this section the author firstly introduces the conflict which has significantly

¹ Illegal migration, cross-border and organised crime, failed states, ethnic conflicts terrorism, cyber terrorism, the spread of weapons of mass destruction (WMDs), the spread of epidemic and pandemic diseases, etc.

² Military, political, economic, societal and environmental security.

affected the North African country's "statehood status" then presents and explains the FSI, an annual report published by the Fund for Peace (FFP) on state stability. Following the introduction of the case and the Index, the author examines Libya's position between 2005 and 2016 by highlighting both internal and external factors which have caused the state becoming as it is today. Considering the previous sections' contents, the third part of the essay is dedicated to the main topic, as well as the purpose of the paper: the relation between failed states and terrorism, more precisely the factors that allow a failed state to become a safe hub for terrorist groups. In addition, as previously mentioned, the author underlines some other significant threats fragile or failed states have to face as a result of their "statehood status", stressing the connection of other new types of security challenges to the phenomenon of failed states in general. Finally, the author concludes the paper with a brief summary, as well as some final thoughts on the issue of failed states and terrorism.

1. Distinction between strong, weak and failed states

The role of nation-states is to provide a number of political (public) goods for those living within its borders. According to Rotberg (2003, p.3) political goods are "those intangible and hard to quantify claims" that citizens acquire from the state. On top of the hierarchy of political services stands the good of security, most importantly human security (Rotberg, 2003, p.3). Thus, the state primarily functions to ensure and maintain the safety of those living within its borders by providing them the good of security. This means that the state (1) has to prevent any potential threats to its territory, such as invasions, infiltrations or the possibility of losing a part of its land; (2) must eliminate any internal and external threats that are endangering either national order or social structure; (3) has to prevent and eliminate any form of crime that might threaten human security; and (4) has to provide the opportunity to its society to solve any kind of disputes without turning to the use of any form of coercion (Rotberg, 2003, p.3). The security of the citizens are ensured and maintained by the provision of a set of political, social and economic goods. The effectivity of providing such services allows drawing the distinction between strong, weak and failed states (Rotberg, 2003, p.2).

Strong states

Strong states, having the ability to fully control their territories and to guarantee the full range of political services to its citizens generally perform well in political, economic and social development, which is displayed by the statistics of several indicators (Rotberg, 2003, p.4). The GDP per capita in strong states are high and their position in the United Nation's Human Development Index, as well as Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index stress that life quality in the given country is high standard, in parallel, the rates in corruption are low. Moreover, strong states are awarded with "free" status according to Freedom House's Freedom of the World Report. Strong states function on high levels of security, therefore violence and crime rates are presenting low and stable numbers. The field of education is constantly progressing, in addition the medical and health care system are high quality. Strong

states are showing steady economic growth and sustainability, which can be partly observed by the states' infrastructural services. Citizens living in strong states have political liberty and the rule of law is operating through an independent judiciary. Consequently, strong states are mainly identified by peace and order, as well as freedom and liberty (Rotberg, 2003, p.4).

Weak or fragile states

According to Rotberg, weak states can be defined as the “halfway house” between strong and failed states (Rotberg, 2002, p.131), meaning that the position of a weak state is temporary: it can either strengthen in time or spiral into failure (Rotberg, 2003, p.4). Due to geographic location, physical constraint and economic restraints states potentially become weak, facing several challenges which result in fracturing the state. In comparison of strong states, weak states do not present as good of a performance in the aforementioned indicators. They are mostly defined by some kind of internal conflict, which is not yet or no longer violent, but can ignite and cause damage in a second. These ethnic, religious, linguistic and other intercommunal tensions put a great emphasis on the need of additional attention on security initiatives (Rotberg, 2003, p.4). Briefly put, weak states are not able to deliver political goods as well as strong states do. Crime rates are showing constant increase, partly due to the dividing tensions, as well as the rise of corruption within the police and other state authorities. The public institutions are more or less fragmented and economic development is rather declining than growing. As a result of all of the aforementioned factors, weak states are mainly defined by steadily increasing insecurity.

Failed states

Failed states are considered highly dangerous due to the fact that several violent conflicts are either already occurring, or disputes can unfold almost without any obstacle within the state's borders. Such tensions usually appear between government forces and armed protesters, in which it is not unusual that in the collision unprotected civilians are victimised, for instance, by the execution of ethnic or religious cleansings carried out by the troops of the government (Rotberg, 2003, p.5). Due to the aforementioned dimensions it should not come as a surprise when emphasising the fact that failed states are mostly characterised by violence and crime, as a result of the lack of – or non-existent – security. As a consequence, in such states the death toll is extremely high, which is perfectly demonstrated by the skyrocketing mortality rates. Despite that violence, crime and insecurity can be considered as the most significant characteristics of fragile or failed states, state level failure occurs due to the collapse of various structures, such as authority, power, laws and political order, resulting in the immense instability of the state (Hashi, 2015, p.80). The structural damage is visible through the highly flawed public institutions: the public facilities are weak, and even those few which are operating are privatised, in addition, the presence of corruption is a general component of everyday life. Different indicators show constant decline: the inflation rate is extremely high and economic deterioration is greatly presented by the damaged infrastructural services,

which are either not well-functioning or are almost fully destroyed; the constant shortages in basic necessities are not only challenging the implementation of government services, but are greatly affecting the citizens' well-being as well. Due to visible decline in many social policies the poverty rate is persistently increasing, potentially resulting in the spread of epidemic and pandemic diseases not only affecting the given failed state, but those within the region as well. The statistics about refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) in such states are continuously growing. Organised and cross-border crime, as well as smuggling is highly present, which contributes to the skyrocketing rates in violence and crime. Besides the internal issues, a number of external threats are also alarming to the given state, to its neighbours and the international community as a whole. Due to the loss of legitimacy and the unfolding anarchy a political vacuum is formed within the state, which is usually filled by non-state actors, such as terrorist organisations, aiming to take advantage of the situation by turning it into their benefits (Hashi, 2015, p.80). To treat the problematic of failed states the international community usually employs three methods: prevention diplomacy, conflict resolution and external intervention. If these methods fail to succeed it is most likely that a civil war ignites, or in most extreme cases, the state collapses (Rotberg, 2002, p.129).

2. Libya on the path of failure and the Fragile State Index (FSI)

The Arab Spring and Libya

In his 2003 study, Rotberg mentions Libya as a “potential” weak state (2003, p.5), but the country's “statehood status” has taken a significant turn in 2011, when the so-called *Arab Spring* has swept through the Middle Eastern and North African region, causing the worsening of some already weak states. The series of Arab uprisings started in December 2010 in Tunisia, when a local clerk, Mohammed Bouazizi set himself on fire as an act of protest after being unduly and publicly humiliated by the police (Naar, 2013). The clerk's action was considered as the initiative step of several protests in a number of Middle Eastern and North African countries. The uprisings in general have demanded regime change due to a number of political, economic and social problems occurring within the states' borders. The events of Tunisia started a so-called *domino effect*, causing the unfolding of a series of demonstrations in the region: in January 2011 the dissatisfied citizens of Egypt, Yemen and Sudan have occupied the streets demanding for regime change; in the following months similar protests have unfolded in Bahrain, Libya and Syria as well (Naar, 2013).

The uprising in Libya have started on 15 February, 2011, when a lawyer was condemned to a prison in Benghazi. Two days later, as part of the so-called *Day of Rage* a large number of demonstrations took place throughout the country, demanding the lives of dozens of people. From this point the mortality rate showed constant growth, partly due to a conflict taking place in the following days, in which anti-government fighters have successfully occupied Libya's second largest city, leaving several hundred people dead (Naar, 2013). To prevent further increase in the death toll, the United Nations Security Council passed Resolution 1973 in March 2011, authorising the forces of the North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) to intervene in the conflict. Not long after Resolution 1973 had taken effect, the forces of NATO

initiated a number of air operations aimed at the troops of the government (Kuperman, 2015, p.66). According to US President Barack Obama the priority of the intervention was “to save the lives of peaceful, pro-democracy protesters who found themselves the target of a crackdown by Libyan dictator Muammar al-Gaddafi” (Goldberg, 2016). Despite the fact that initially the intervention was considered as an admiring decision and had a couple of short-term successes, even President Obama admitted that it would have been better if the failed effort did not take place at all (Goldberg, 2016).

Even though the external intervention had a list of achievements, such as capturing and executing Gaddafi in October 2011 with the assistance of local forces, thus making way for democratic transition, these accomplishments were not turned into long-term successes and several of them even backfired. A year after Gaddafi was toppled a democratic election pressured by Western powers resulted in the victory of a moderate and secular coalition party, which was only in office for a month, eventually resulting in its collapse (Kuperman, 2015, p.67). After the rudimentary effort of establishing a democratic system in Libya has failed a political vacuum was created, which was filled by non-state actors. Thus, the country “turned from one of North Africa’s least radicalised countries into a global Islamist hub” (Choring, 2016). According to the FFP’s 2015 press release, Libya was one of the ten most worsened countries in the year of 2015. As it is clearly visible in Table 2: *Libya’s ranking in the Fragile State Index (FSI) between 2005 and 2016*, the North African country’s stability has been showing constant failure since the events of 2011 (Press Release: Fragile State Index, 2015).

Introduction and explanation of the Fragile State Index

The Fragile State Index (FSI), also known as the Failed State Index is an annual report published by the Fund for Peace (FFP), a United States-based non-profit organisation, in cooperation with its media partner, Foreign Policy, an American news magazine. The Index was first published in 2005, analysing a total of 76 nations. Today, the report includes 178 countries, which are ranked by “the levels of their stability and the pressures [both internal and external] they face” (Messner, Haken, et al., 2016, p.3). The Index is based on FFP’s Conflict Assessment System Tool (CAST), which rests on a social science methodology, collecting data starting from the first day until the last day of a given year³.

The Index uses three sets of indicators: social, economic and political/military⁴. These three sets altogether identify twelve key indicators (see *Table 2*), which are divided into several subcategories. Taking all the subcategories into account, the twelve key indicators receive a score from zero to ten, zero being the most stable and ten being the least stable, ergo, the lower the received score is, the better. After the twelve categories are appointed with a number, the given country is awarded with a total score ranging up to 120. The overall result

³ I.e. for FSI 2016 the collection of data started on 1 Jan. 2015 and ended on 31 Dec. 2015

⁴ The twelve key social, economic and political indicators: (1) **Social**: Demographic Pressures, Refugees and Internally Displaced Persons (IDPs), Group Grievance, Human Flight. (2) **Economic**: Uneven Economic Development, Economic Decline. (3) **Political and military**: State Legitimacy, Public Services, Human Rights and Rule of Law, Security Apparatus, Factionalised Elites, External Intervention.

identifies the state’s position in the Index, which can vary starting from “very sustainable” to “very high alert”.⁵

Libya’s position in the FSI (2005-2016): internal and external factors

Even though it is debatable whether or not Libya can be awarded with failed state status, it is certain that since the events of 2011 the country has been spiralling towards failure. In contrast of Rotberg’s claim in a 2003 study where he mentions Libya as a “potential” weak state (2003, p.5), Seth Kaplan classifies the post-2011 Libya, along with Nigeria, the Democratic Republic of Congo, Somalia and Syria as a fragile and unstable state (see *Table 1*). This clearly emphasises the deteriorating effects of the Arab Spring on the South African country’s “statehood status”. (2014, p.55).

	<i>Low Political-Identity Fragmentation</i>	<i>High Political-Identity Fragmentation</i>
High Government Capacity (at least in security realm)	<i>I: Dynamic</i> - Botswana - Turkey - Chile - China	<i>III: Fragile but Controlled</i> - Syria (before 2011) - Soviet Union - Iraq (before 2003) - Saudi Arabia - Uzbekistan
Low Government Capacity	<i>II: Stable but Sluggish</i> - Senegal - Armenia - Tanzania - Bangladesh	<i>IV: Fragile and Unstable</i> - Nigeria - DRC - Somalia - Libya (after 2011) - Syria (after 2011)

Table 1: *Seth Kaplan’s categorisation of countries according to their levels of social cohesion and institutionalisation*⁶

In addition to Kaplan’s classification, the examination of Libya’s position in the Fragile State Index between 2005 and 2016 demonstrates and highlights the worsening of its “statehood status”, mainly due to the events of 2011 and the rise of extremist terrorism in the region. From 2005 until 2011 Libya was ranked in the category of countries which have received “warning” status. Following the Arab uprisings, the country was classified with a “very high warning” then, from 2015, Libya was positioned in the “alert” category, as a result of the so-called Islamic State’s growing presence in the country. All in all, when looking at the overall score Libya has been receiving in the FSI since 2011 it is clearly visible that the country has been spiralling towards failure.

⁵ Categorisation within statehood (from least severe to most severe): very sustainable, sustainable, very stable, more stable, stable, warning, elevated warning, high warning, alert, high alert, very high alert.

⁶ Source: Kaplan, S., 2014. Table 1: Four Types of Political Orders (with Examples), p.55. In: Identifying Truly Fragile States. *The Washington Quarterly*. 37:1 (Spring 2014), pp. 49–63.

The United Nations Human Development Index (HDI) used to rank Libya as the country with the highest standard of living within the whole continent of Africa, but ever since the year of 2011, the quality of life has been showing major declines (Kuperman, 2015, p.69). The statistics about demographic pressures have presented a slight increase between 2011 and 2012, which is clearly demonstrated by the growing rates in mortality. The numbers of refugees and internally displaced people (IDPs) have been also showing constant increase, first due to the Arab uprisings, later as a result of the emergence of the so-called Islamic State. The rise of extremist terrorism in the region has caused the unfolding of the current refugee crisis, challenging regional and international security and stability. As a consequence of the crisis, Libya has become a transit state for migrants flowing in from neighbouring countries, passing through in the hope of finding better opportunities in Europe. Migration within the state of Libya is not unprecedented either, especially since the year of 2011. While in power, Gaddafi was believed to be threatening the Libyan civilians with carrying out an ethnic cleansing. To prevent even the risk of the authoritarian ruler's claim to be true Western powers decided that external intervention was needed (Kuperman, 2015, p.70). In addition to the threat of ethnic cleansing, the self-proclaimed Islamic State, first occupying Iraq then Syria, slowly made its way towards Libya, resulting in greater numbers of people fleeing from the North African country.

Indicators measuring economic development and economic decline have been showing alarming numbers as well. It is safe to say that the Libyan economy has been presenting an overall decline, especially since 2011 and is on the verge of collapsing completely. This figure is a result of the severe depression in oil products, which is considered as Libya's main export. Other difficulties concerning trade has been challenging economic growth as well: the closure of several air- and seaports did not only make it almost impossible for trading goods to get in and leave the country, but also resulted in internal conflicts in the two biggest cities, Tripoli and Benghazi (Kuperman, 2015, p.69). Despite the fact that in recent years Libya's efforts were partly aimed at gaining back control over its economy it has been unsuccessful, mainly due to the controlling presence of Islamist terrorism (Wehrey, 2016).

State legitimacy has been showing an overall and constant decline, receiving the highest rate (9.8 out of 10) in the FSI in 2015. Since the successful toppling of the authoritarian regime of Gaddafi, Libya has been facing the constant struggle of political transition, which, as for this moment has been very far from being complete. The coalition government, which was set up right after removing Gaddafi from power collapsed within a month, leading to "a power vacuum and instability, with no authority in control" (BBC News, 2017). The political power was given to different state authorities in different time intervals, but it is believed that Libya was – and probably still is – officially governed by militias (Kuperman, 2015, p.67). Due to such factors the subcategory within the political/military indicator of the FSI showing factionalised elites has been showing constant decline as a result of power struggles and highly flawed elections. In late 2015 the United Nations has taken further action for treating Libya's unfortunate situation and initiated an agreement to form a so-called unity government, which, as all previous efforts, ended up unsuccessful (BBC News, 2017).

Public services have seen the biggest decline since 2011, which can be partly explained by the alarming increase in corruption rates: Libya's position in Transparency International's Corruption Perception Index has been worsening since 2012⁷ (Transparency International, 2016). In addition, human rights and the rule of law are far from represented. Freedom House's annual report on freedom of the world has been awarding Libya with a "not free" freedom status for many years, the country receiving an aggregate score of 20 out of 100 in 2016⁸. The report has also given a score of seven out of seven to political rights and a six out of seven for civil liberties, a score of seven meaning "least free" (Freedom House, 2016). Just like in the whole region, Libyan journalists and reporters are in constant danger when deciding to stand up against the restriction of the media by reporting on the crucial issues occurring in the country (BBC News, 2017). Since the security apparatus is as corrupt as any other state authority, not only rebels, but peaceful civilians are also threatened in Libya. The country is mainly defined by insecurity, which is perfectly demonstrated by the score given (9.6 out of 10) to the security apparatus in 2016. The state's inability to protect its citizens and ensure their security is highlighted by the ever-growing rates in violence. Since the year of 2011 several internal conflicts, riots and protests resulted in the skyrocketing numbers in fatalities.

In addition to the aforementioned internal problems, an external intervention carried out by NATO forces aimed at providing foreign assistance to the Libyan citizens has added a fair share of damaging factors to the already disturbing situation. It was reported that NATO extended the civil war from less than one and a half months to more than eight months, magnifying the already alarmingly high death toll (Kuperman, 2015, p.71). The intervention was initiated with two main goals: preventing Libya to experience an ethnic cleansing and preventing the country to become a safe haven for extremist terrorism (Kuperman, 2015, p.72). Even though the intervention's first aim was accomplished, the second goal has completely backfired: the so-called Islamic State has managed to take control over cities in Libya, just like it previously did in Iraq and Syria. The presence of Islamist terrorism in the North African country has worsened the economy as well, by preventing the still functioning state authorities to gain back their power, while continuously attacking facilities (Wehrey, 2016). Overall, the external intervention can be considered as the step which has ignited significant terrorist presence in the country. It is also believed that the intervention caused a so-called *spill-over effect* and has led to the prospering of Islamist terrorism in the region (Kuperman, 2015, p.73).

⁷ The Transparency International Corruption Perception Index monitors 176 states. The Index measures corruption on a scale 0 to 100, 0 meaning "highly corrupt" and 100 meaning "very clean". In the year of 2016 Libya ranked 170, with a score of 14. Libya's scores in previous years: 2012 – 21; 2013 – 15; 2014 – 18; 2015 – 16 (Transparency International, 2016).

⁸ 0 – least free, 100 – most free (Freedom House, 2016).

Year	Rank (out of)	Demographic Pressures	Refugees and IDPs	Group Grievance	Human Flight	Uneven Economic Development	Economic Decline	State Legitimacy	Public Services	Human Rights & Rule of Law	Security Apparatus	Factionalized Elites	External Intervention	TOTAL
2005	63 (76)	7.0	8.0	6.7	7.1	9.0	3.1	8.7	3.0	8.7	8.0	8.4	3.0	80.7
2006	95 (146)	6.0	2.1	5.5	4.0	7.3	5.1	7.5	4.5	8.1	5.5	7.9	5.0	68.5
2007	115 (177)	6.2	2.6	5.6	4.0	7.3	5.3	7.4	4.5	8.1	5.3	8.0	5.0	69.3
2008	111 (177)	6.2	4.0	5.6	4.0	7.3	5.3	7.4	4.5	8.1	5.6	7.0	5.0	70.0
2009	112 (177)	5.9	4.2	5.8	4.0	7.1	5.5	7.1	4.2	8.1	5.4	7.1	5.0	69.4
2010	111 (177)	5.7	4.3	5.8	4.2	6.9	5.3	7.3	4.2	8.3	5.2	7.1	4.8	69.1
2011	111 (177)	5.5	4.6	6.0	3.9	6.9	4.6	7.3	4.3	8.3	5.9	7.0	4.4	68.7
2012	50 (177)	5.8	5.1	7.0	3.9	7.0	5.5	8.1	7.6	9.0	9.0	8.0	9.0	84.9
2013	54 (178)	5.5	5.4	7.4	4.2	6.7	5.0	8.4	7.3	9.0	8.9	8.0	8.8	84.5
2014	41 (178)	5.7	5.7	7.5	5.5	6.4	6.1	8.5	7.4	8.7	9.2	8.1	9.0	87.8
2015	25 (178)	5.4	7.4	7.8	6.4	6.1	8.0	9.8	7.5	9.0	9.3	9.1	9.5	95.3
2016	25 (178)	5.1	8.0	8.3	6.5	5.8	8.0	9.5	7.2	9.3	9.6	9.4	9.7	96.4

Table 2: Libya's ranking in the Fragile State Index (FSI) between 2005 and 2016⁹

3. The relation between failed states and terrorism

The problematic of failed states is not a new phenomenon, but, according to Rotberg (2002, p.127) it “has become much more relevant and worrying” in recent years. The attack carried out against the United States on 11 September 2001 emphasised the dangers of failed states and their connection to extremist terrorism, in addition highlighted the fact that even the most powerful players of international politics are exposed to such threats and do not enjoy unconditional security. This realisation can be considered as the lighter of George W. Bush's initiative: the global war on terror (GWOt). Not long after the 9/11 attacks, US President G. W. Bush has emphasised that rogue states mean the greatest threat towards international security and global stability, since such dysfunctional nations potentially provide a safe haven for terrorist groups. Bush also stated that the GWOt is not only aimed against extremist terrorist organisations, but against those as well who are assisting such groups in any way. Thus, states which do not join the United States in the fight against transnational terrorism will be understood as the supporters of terrorists. As a consequence of the 9/11 terror attacks,

⁹ Source: The Fragile State Index, 2005-2016. Published by *The Fund for Peace* [online] Available at: <<http://fsi.fundforpeace.org>> [Accessed on 19 January 2017]

failed states were embraced as a label of international concern. The securitisation of failed states therefore implies that ungoverned territories could potentially become a safe hub of terrorist organisations (Hashi, 2015, pp.78–79).

The fact that the problematic of failed states in relation of terrorism is one of – if not – the greatest contemporary challenges of nowadays, has affected and developed the understanding of threats in two ways. Firstly, it questioned what is considered as a de facto international security threat. In the 21st century rhetoric “terrorism or extremism is diagnosed as a mental disorder, in which failed states are the bodies and the United States is the cure” (Hashi, 2015, p.85). Therefore states which fit to the fragile or failed category, generally characterised by, or facing the risk of, severe instability pose an international concern, which demands the long-term commitment of the most powerful actors of the international system (Hashi, 2015, p.79). Secondly, the term of threat has changed according to the redefinition of factors which allow a state to become fragile or failed. In contrast of the classical theories of IR, which do not include non-state actors, or the “failed states thesis”, which claims that failure is caused by exclusively domestic factors (Hashi, 2015, p.82), it is argued that state failure is not originated from its governing or political leaders, but rather from actors which have the ability to operate freely within such states (Hashi, 2015, p.85).

Considering all the previous sections of the essay the following part argues the factors that allow a state to become fragile or failed, thus eventually leading the country into such immense instability that inspires the emergence of terrorist activity within its territory. Some factors are rooted in the actions of colonial powers, which, when allowing the independence of their possessions did not prepare or assist their political transition as they should have (Traub, 2011, p.52). According to Kaplan (2014, p.53), political transition reveals a state’s fragility, testing whether or not it is able to complete the transition on its own. During the transition if the state is defined by power struggles an inevitable political vacuum is formed. If the domestic powers ultimately do not accomplish a healthy balance or do not have the ability to shape a compromise, the vulnerability of the state encourages non-state actors to take control over the state’s territory and to turn the struggle according to their advantage (Hashi, 2015, p.80). Thus, the blame can be partly awarded with the colonial powers. But the problematic is more complex and as the thorough examination of Libya’s status in the Fragile State Index revealed, several internal and external factors play significant roles in causing state failure.

As previously mentioned, according to the classical theoretical framework of IR and the failed states thesis, state failure occurs exclusively due to internal struggles. The FSI divides the causes of instability by measuring three different indicators: social, economic and political/military. When talking about the internal factors affecting state failure all three indicators play a key role, in contrast, external causes can be mainly projected to the political/military category. Even though when talking about fragile or failed states an overall decline is presented in social, economic and political services, the author of the essay believes that there are three main internal factors which, when appear simultaneously, are most likely to cause the weakening or the failure of a state: (1) intercommunal tensions, (2) corruption of state authorities, and (3) power struggles. As highlighted in the first section of the essay, weak

states experience a number of intercommunal tensions, which are able to become violent at any moment. In addition, the corruption of state institutions greatly affect the rates in violence, due to the dysfunctional police, which, on one hand does not ensure the security of the citizens, on the other hand, it turns to actions which are threatening the civilians, even potentially resulting in their victimisation. If the danger of religious or ethnic cleansing is represented by the authorities, which are generally created to ensure and maintain the safety of inhabitants then the conflict becomes even more severe, indicating decline and possibly igniting a civil war, which, if not dealt with great care, can cause actual state failure. Moreover, the internal power struggles due to the problematic of transition, as well as other factors easily lead to the loss of state legitimacy, resulting in anarchy. If the political vacuum is formed and not filled quickly by a governing power then terrorist activity is most likely to evolve in the state's uncontrolled territory. Thus, according to the author, the three main internal factors causing a state's insecurity, instability and the potential failure of the state are the significant presence of intercommunal tensions within the state, in addition, the high corruption of state authorities, most importantly the police and internal power struggles. If these factors are present simultaneously it is very likely that the given state sooner or later will provide a safe haven for terrorist organisations.

The aforementioned internal factors, depending on their severity, call for the actions of the international community. According to Traub, (2011, p.54) "intervention in itself is a sign of failure, a failure to anticipate the moment of crisis". Thus, state failure arguably can be understood by only internal factors, since external intervention, as Traub formulates, is an immediate sign of state failure. But when looking at the essay's example of Libya, the intervention carried out by NATO forces in 2011 was what caused the failure of the North African country: the internal struggle would have ended after six weeks, but due to external assistance it became an eight months conflict, which has potentially resulted in the evolvment of terrorist activity within the state's territory. Despite external military intervention is considered as the most severe factor that can cause state failure, external intervention in the form of economic sanctions and restraints can be a significant weakening feature as well. If the economy is already struggling it is most likely that the social policies show constant decline, which, as in the case of the Arab spring, can possibly lead to an internal or regional conflict. In addition, if institutions are already highly flawed and the state has the disability to treat the skyrocketing rates of inflation, corruption, poverty, crime, etc., the process possibly reaches the point where a series of protests or a civil war ignites, possibly resulting in state failure.

All in all, each highlighted internal and external factor plays a significant role in allowing a state to become fragile or failed. The level of instability and insecurity of the state depends on the severity of such factors. If a country's conflictual situation is not dealt with great care, caution and long-term commitment, it is feared that its territory sooner or later will be occupied by terrorist organisations. If the situation reaches such a point it takes great efforts to eliminate the threat of terrorism in the region, since terrorist groups are known to be operating in a network with an objective of constant expansion. Even though if the head of such network is successfully cut off, the body still operates. Thus, despite that failed states on their

own are not considered to pose an international security threat, they should be dealt with in advance, since when associated with extremist terrorism the problematic becomes an international security concern (Hashi, 2015, p.87).

Conclusion

The post-Cold War era, with its significant feature of interdependence, as well as the phenomena of globalisation has found itself facing a number of unprecedented threats challenging international security and global stability. These “*new types of security challenges*” have emphasised the need for new answers to such contemporary problems, leading to the development of fresh ideas within the classical IR and traditional security theory framework. The birth of Security Studies and the Copenhagen School introducing five factors of security, additionally the notion of securitisation provide more accurate answers and solutions to problems which had previously required less attention or generally were unprecedented. The 9/11 terrorist attacks, highlighting that even the most powerful actors of the international system do not enjoy unconditional security, have partly resulted in the securitisation of failed states. Despite the fact that failed states on their own do not pose an international concern, when connected to Islamic extremist terrorism they are considered as one of the greatest challenges of international security.

When aiming to define the notion of failed states it is crucial to realise what are the distinctive factors between strong, weak and fragile states. In short, strong states are able to provide a wide set of political goods to their citizens, most importantly the good of security. Thus strong states perform well in social, economic and political indicators. As Rotberg (2002, p.131) highlights weak states can be considered as a halfway house between strong and failed states, meaning that they can either strengthen or spiral into failure. States become weak due to intercommunal tensions within the state, the state’s geographical position and economic restraints. Failed states are mainly defined by violence, insecurity and instability, which can potentially lead to the emergence of terrorist activity within the state’s ungoverned territory.

The differentiation between strong, weak and failed states questions whether or not Libya can be considered as a failed state. Even if it cannot be put to the failed states category, it is certainly spiralling towards failure, mostly due to the events of 2011, since the so-called *Arab Spring*, causing a *domino effect* has resulted in a number of weak states within the Middle Eastern and South African region. In addition, the crisis of the Arab states did not only lead to the rise of the so-called Islamic State, which has first occupied Iraq and Syria, in addition making its way towards Libya when seeing an opportunity to take advantage of an unfilled power vacuum, but has caused the current refugee crisis as well, severely threatening international security and global stability. Despite the Arab Spring’s significant effects on Libya, the greatest factor causing the state’s failure was arguably the external intervention carried out by NATO forces in 2011. The intervention has completely backfired, not only resulting in Libya’s immense instability, but possibly causing the unfolding of terrorist activity within the North African country’s territory, as well as some neighbouring countries.

After carefully studying the Fragile State Index, in addition Libya's position especially after the events of 2011, the author highlights three main internal factors, which, if appear simultaneously can potentially cause state failure, in addition result in the unfolding of terrorist activity. These factors are (1) intercommunal tensions within the state, (2) corruption within state authorities, especially those which are created to ensure and maintain the security of citizens and (3) significant power struggles. These factors can cause the severe loss of state legitimacy, additionally anarchy within the society. Since the security apparatus is dysfunctional it most likely that the unfolding tensions cannot be contained, potentially leading to a civil war and the complete collapse of the state. When the political vacuum created as a sign of weakness and is not filled instantly, it is feared that non-state actors become inspired to take advantage of the unfortunate situation of the state, therefore causing the ungoverned territory of the state to potentially become a safe haven of terrorist activity, just like it did in the case of Libya.

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GEOPOLITICAL ASPECTS OF THE FRENCH SECURITY POLICY DURING THE PRESIDENCY OF FRANCOIS HOLLANDE

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Key Words: geopolitics, geostrategy, arm conflicts, interventions, security, terrorism

Abstract: *How are the balances of power formed and where do the various games of power and authority stem from? When analysing the international relations we conceive the whole realm of relations as systems, which guide and support us in orientation. We may hear the phrase “Our place in the world” quite often – our geographical features, our administrative characteristics, the population of our home country, our economic indices and other statistical parameters all define us as a country and entity even before we provide any further and empirical characteristics about our country. When these features are coupled with real acts, dialogue and strategy, we immediately find ourselves in the midst of the system of international relations, where national interest is the main priority. In today’s global strategic perspective organisational changes and the ability to react swiftly are of paramount importance. All this can be achieved where the conditions are given. A state has to know well its own structural weaknesses, since being aware of these alone may already provide at least a tactical advantage, but a strategic one on all accounts. Does France know these? Could the popularity of leaders’ rise who preside countries that have proven to be strong and determined in armed conflicts? What were the main effects of military interventions of the popularity of Francois Hollande? In addition, this study examines the French Mediterranean geopolitical views and interests. At last but not least this paper is looking for the answers the role of the French intelligence service in the fight against terrorism during the Presidency of Francois Hollande.*

* * *

Introduction

Montesquieu puts it in his work *The spirit of the laws* as follows: All greatness, all power and all force is relative. (Montesquieu, 1999) Still, how are the balances of power formed and where do the various games of power and authority stem from? When analysing the international relations we conceive the whole realm of relations as systems, which guide and support us in orientation. We may hear the phrase “Our place in the world” quite often – our geographical features, our administrative characteristics, the population of our home country, our economic indices and other statistical parameters all define us as a country and entity even

before we provide any further and empirical characteristics about our country. When these features are coupled with real acts, dialogue and strategy, we immediately find ourselves in the midst of the system of international relations, where national interest is the main priority.

In today's global strategic perspective organisational changes and the ability to react swiftly are of paramount importance. All this can be achieved where the conditions are given. A state has to know well its own structural weaknesses and weaknesses, since being aware of these alone may already provide at least a tactical advantage, but a strategic one on all accounts. Does France know these?

Is it possible at all to evaluate international relations clearly? As a matter of fact, the globalisation of telecommunication and the easy availability of news may provide a stable and reliable base for processing information. Still, partly exactly due to this abundance, we may find ourselves caught up in the maze of chaotic manipulation, where the perceptions of reality can easily be different.

The effect of military interventions on the popularity of Francois Hollande

Could the popularity of leaders rise who preside countries that have proven to be strong and determined in armed conflicts? It is not uncommon to assume of French leaders to regard African interventions as a chance to extend their elector base. Nicolas Sarkozy too expected the 2011 intervention in Ivory Coast to help consolidate his dented reputation. In February 2011 in Libya anti-government (anti-Gadhafi) demonstrators drew to the streets. On 28th February Paris was first to call on the International Community to intervene. One of the main reasons for this is the active and expansive foreign policy of Nicolas Sarkozy. The Eastern Libyan city of Benghazi became the centre of the conflict. After the UN unsuccessfully urged Gadhafi to handle the situation in a peaceful manner, the NATO initiated an armed intervention. Nicolas Sarkozy became the main figure of the series of operations. On 19th March French military aircraft destroyed a Libyan military vehicle marking the beginning of the intervention. Beside air strikes a naval blockade was introduced against Libya partly with the participation with the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle. It was highly debated in this period as to whether rebel groups in Libya were armed with the assistance of Egypt. These groups could not be pacified even after the removal of Gadhafi. After the intervention the popularity of Sarkozy saw a surge but despite this trend he lost to Francois Hollande during the subsequent elections. (Le Figaro, 2012)

One of the most important foreign policy-related campaign promises of Francois Hollande was to withdraw French forces present in Afghanistan by the end of 2012. By this time, Nicolas Sarkozy had already suspended operations and envisioned the withdrawal of forces by the end of 2014 at the latest. France participated in the consolidation of the conflict in Afghanistan but did not achieve any palpable success. The vast majority of French people regarded the participation as unnecessary and inefficient. This affected the popularity of President Nicolas Sarkozy too, who entered upon his presidency with a popularity index of about 65% – certain polling stations put it at 70%. (Chrisais, 2012)

As a result of his stormy domestic and foreign policy – with an index of above 40% throughout his Presidency, though – his popularity hit a historic low in March 2011, becoming the least popular President ever in France with a rate of below 20%. Probably it is no coincidence that he approved the military operation l’Harmattan exactly during that month.

The situation in Afghanistan posed a number of questions for the foreign policy of Hollande, too. On the one hand as the main commander of the army he had to exert authority but on the other hand he was supposed to prefer the peaceful settlement of conflicts whenever it was possible. Certain media sources find Hollande moderately determined, whose own terrain is of diplomatic nature rather than military. (Boniface, 2013) A number of factors contributed to the judgement of Hollande not so long after his inauguration as President. According to the majority of French people his ability to assert his interests is not as good as German Chancellor Angela Merkel’s regarding EU-related issues. His private life hardships too had an unfavourable effect on his political success.

By means of the Mali intervention he managed to recover his reputation up to certain degree, but by far not to such an extent as he had hoped.

The Mali intervention was started on 11 January under the name Operation Serval. Francois Hollande declared anti-terrorist fight and the protection of the French population living in Mali as his main priorities. Just like in its previous colonies France made significant efforts to maintain its influence. Despite the Mali being the biggest African community living in France, the Western African country did not seem to be particularly important in the Sahel zone, as it is Mauritania and Niger which provide for essential minerals such as iron ore and uranium ore respectively, rendering both strategic economic partners. Furthermore, due to the fact that a large responsibility of France has been established in its involvement during the 1994 genocide in Ruanda, Paris suspended its African activities as the countries of the Sahel looked with suspicion on all its political manoeuvres.

This is why President Hollande tended to justify the intervention by the protection of the French population and the responsibility felt towards the Malian citizens. The French government put a great deal of importance on measures aimed at the containment of extremist groups, rendering the establishment of terrorist training camps even more complicated. The extremist terrorist cells trained here would be likely to carry out attacks in Europe, too.

But in the background we may find significant economic considerations too. France wanted to demonstrate clearly that in its sphere of influence it is completely capable of protecting its own economic interests, for instance mining companies in Niger and Mauritania.

In France, Hollande was unable to show up major successes in his interior policy. Unemployment grew, the purchasing power of salaries declined so he saw himself forced to introduce restrictive measures. Asserting the expansive foreign policy was an adequate means to divert attention from his domestic fiascos. This strategy worked well. As in the case of other leaders before, his popularity shot up momentarily, 60 per cent of the population supported him in his decisions. However, after the intervention, his popularity fell back to the level before the operations. This may be attributed to his poor communication as well.

To sum it up we may conclude that the operation in Mali was well-timed, it helped avert attention from domestic hardships, but regarding public relations it did not pay off as opposed to previous expectations.

In December 2013 Michael Djotodia rose to power in the Central African Republic from the rebels of the Seleka Alliance following a coup d'état. UN peacekeepers had already been present in the country for years. Francois Hollande was unwilling to take the role of the “pacemaker” upon himself but after having been pressed for action he eventually agreed to participate in the intervention.

In the end, he was authorised by the UN Security Council to carry out the military operation.

The French views on the Mediterranean geopolitics

“The world inspired the hope. The people’s vitality, the need for a good governance and the endeavours to an innovative way of thinking are all there. Policies change, shift away, and dictators are removed. In this respect the world is moving in the direction of development.” - Excerpt from President Hollande’s speech in his 20th conference in Paris (Hollande, 2016)

A book was published in February 2015 in which Francois Hollande admitted having provided certain Syrian rebels with armaments despite the arms embargo already in place in the period in question. According to the report it was Hollande himself who confessed the action to journalist Xavier Panon: “We started it when we were already sure that the weapons end up in good hands.” (Panon, 2015)

“The armaments bringing death were served to them by our services”-added Francois Hollande. According to the journalist the French delivered 20-mm autocannons, 12.7 mm automatic guns, mortars and other anti-tank guns were delivered to the rebels fighting against President Bashar el-Assad. (Panon, 2015) As they say, the goal was to strengthen moderate opposition groups and not to contribute to the final outcome of the fight. Syria is plagued with severe crisis since the beginning of 2011, in which the US and especially its allies – France, Saudi Arabia, and Turkey - support rebel forces.

Due to the deterioration of the situation within the country the EU imposed an arms embargo which was lifted in 2013. Until now France has been reporting consequently that it only delivered so-called passive armaments such as anti-bullet vests and night vision devices to the rebels. Contrary to this, Panon claims definitely that France had concrete plans for possible air strikes against Syria already back in August 2013. The plans in question were worked out after a chemical attack of Assad’s regime caused the death of several hundreds of people in a city held by the rebels. According to the book the attacks would have had two goals. On the one hand, the changing of the Syrian political system and on the other hand making Russian President Putin change his views and attitude regarding the consolidation in Syria. (Diplomatie, 2014)

France applied also its special forces in Syria. They joined the coalition against ISIS consisting of the US and NATO in 2014, but it was only in 2015 when they carried out their first operation on Syrian soil. (Until then they had been attacking the lines of ISIS from the territory of Iraq.) After the terror attacks in France, Raqqa, the de facto capital of ISIS was the primary target. According to some sources Salah Abdeslam and his accomplices had been trained here. French air strikes are regularly based on information obtained from US intelligence sources. It is part of the power demonstration of France that beside robotic airplanes and RAFALE fighter jets, the aircraft carrier Charles de Gaulle was directed to this area too. Defence Minister Jean-Yves Le Drian added that special land forces were deployed in the territory of Syria. As he put it, the mission of these troops is only to provide assistance and training for the democratic Syrian forces. Syria was a French colony for a long time, so it had already belonged to the interest sphere of France long before the civil war unleashed.

With the current participation in the operation France endeavours to demonstrate its military and economic power. Besides, their active presence implies their wish to participate in the reconstruction of Syria after the war. As for the Middle East, France has aimed to withstand Russian influence in its previous colonies since the Second World War. But due to the new geopolitical situation the classical colonial policy need to be revised. The French- as opposed to the British – decided to defend their colonial territories even by means of weapons. It was quite an unreal and utopian endeavour but back then the French society was indeed saturated by the “gloire”-feeling in all realms of the French empire, marking first of all the sense of dominance over its colonies. This has led to the Indochina Wars, then the Algerian war and it was the primary cause of the failure during the Suez Crisis. In the Cold War French diplomacy was successful, that is, they managed to make the country seem much powerful than it really was. But after the dissolution of the Soviet Union, the political terrain became different. After the Soviets, a significant vacuum of power emerged, the filling of which was targeted not only by France but China and India too. (Hitchcock, 1999) Nowadays, France intends to create a similar dominance around the Mediterranean zone, that is, in the European Union too. France has been deploying contingents since the 60s in several African countries (Congo, Chad, Ruanda), whereas in the Middle East it focuses on economic issues.

The relation of France with Turkey is similarly contradictory. Erdogan, who emerged as an active participant in the Syrian crisis, is considered as a challenging figure regarding the political consolidation of the region. The relation of the two countries has hit a new low from 2012 when France criminalised the denial of Armenian genocide with a punishment of up to 45 000 euros. This step triggered an enormous protest from the Turkish side. A number of agreements and trade deals between the two countries were revoked. Now, the two powers encountered each other in Syria. They cooperate in certain operations rather unwillingly, and the ad-hoc diplomatic fights and debates at press releases are general. Besides, after the revenge of Erdogan experienced in all walks of life following the coup attempt against him, the relation between the two countries has become even more complicated. As a result, France does not definitely support the EU membership of Turkey any more. (Independent, 2014)

The Syrian civil war started in March 2011 after the Tunisian events as part of the Arab Spring. On 27th August 2013 at the 21st Ambassadors' Conference Hollande has

unambiguously debated the issue of chemical weapons used by the Assad regime in Syria. The civil war erupted as in internal conflict but as the situation escalated events triggered active steps from the International Community. The civil war not only affects the region but also threatens the peace of the World- Francois Hollande said.

The role of the French intelligence service in the fight against terrorism

In 2014 Francois Hollande promoted the restructuring of the French secret service besides renewing the National Security and Defense Strategy. DCRI (La direction central du renseignement intérieur), the interior intelligence agency was reshaped as DGSI (Direction générale de la Sécurité intérieure), as the General Directorate of Interior Security. Besides, the SCRT (Service Central du renseignement territorial), the Central Service for Territorial Reconnaissance was created. (Le monde, 2014) This organisation encompasses police forces commissioned with secret service tasks and the gendarmerie too with a staff of 1975 in 2014 and 2062 in 2015, but in order to reach a higher level of efficiency this number is expected to rise to 2562 in 2017. (Türke, 2015) As for the budgets of such secret service organisations the least possible data is released. According to Buzánek “such institutions operate under very special frames, as their special role in national security requires them to do so per definitionem.” (Marton, Balogh, Rada, 2015) The fight against terrorism by means of secret service methods includes elements such as the usage of human reconnaissance, incorporation into terrorist organisations, the change of information between secret services, negotiations and the creation of an early alarm system. (Gazdag, 2011) The terror attacks in France point out the weaknesses of this system, and the failures in using this infrastructure. (Chrisafis, 2016)

Even if this study does not aim to present the French secret services and the French-Arab diplomatic relations in depth, but by means of mentioning some facts we may discover some relevant cause- effect relations. After the creation of Israel, France supported the newly-established country. In 1956 France and the UK stepped up jointly in an effort to protect the Suez Channel nationalised by President Nasser. (Hegyí, 2016) In 1967 a big change initiated by Charles de Gaulle took place. As France realised its enormous needs for crude oil, the French foreign policy started to favour Arab countries where it was possible. This attitude could be experienced even until the end of Jacques Chirac’s Presidency. The change was ushered in by the “Libya-policy” of President Sarkozy, but as a result of the Mali intervention of President Hollande the terror danger even more increased.

Even if a number of military operations served the purpose of eliminating terrorist threats against Europe and France, the country has become the target of several terrorist organisations. For instance, the magazine “Inspire” (an extremist newspaper closely linked to the Al-Qaeda) published a detailed article about the Mali intervention in its 10 March 2013 issue. Furthermore, during the war against Assad the relation between the French and Syrian secret services hit a low point, rendering information flow from the Middle East even more complicated. As an aftermath of the November 2015 attacks in Paris, President Hollande ordered the supervision of intelligence services. Responsibility of these secret services has

continuously been debated lately and it has been argued on a number of occasions that the attacks “could have been prevented.” Despite several reorganisations the main problem with the structure of secret services is that intelligence and anti-terror tasks are intermingled. During the informal 2015 Riga summit of ministers of interior new proposals aimed at improving the efficiency of information exchange and creating a common platform to filter out the funding of terrorism. (Riga Statement, 2015)

After the Nice terror attacks, Georges Fenech, the head of the parliamentary commission in charge of the issue urged the creation of an integral anti-terror organisation, one similar to that of the United States. (The Local, 2016)

Conclusions

“In every century there seems to emerge a country with the power, the will, and the intellectual and moral impetus to shape the entire international system in accordance with its own values.” – Excerpt from Henry Kissinger’s book *Diplomacy* (Kissinger, 2008)

Ernest Renan put it as follows in the conference held at Sorbonne in 1882: “To suffer, to experience joy, to hope for something together is something more than the common exterior trade barriers, the barriers built on strategic principles, this is what holds us together regardless of racial and language differences.” (Wirth, 2008) We can conceive the French national unity from more perspectives. The principles of the French Revolution, the Constitution created by Charles de Gaulle on 4th October 1958, the cornerstones of the Fifth Republic, the intellectual heritage of the great French philosophers, writers and statesmen all contribute to the formation of the national unity which is rooted in national identity. Whether there is national unity in France is difficult to answer. In fact, the answer always depends on actual developments. There is no obvious answer but we can see that the existence of such a unity has been debated many times during the presidency of Hollande. The latest geopolitical conflicts, the emerging of the identity of nations, the civil wars in the Middle East too warn us that a local conflict may escalate to large extent, threatening the stability of France and the rest of Europe too. The terror attacks spurred the French government to be able to react swiftly and effectively, but this system is by far not complete and perfect. The situation of radical extremists still has not been resolved in France. President Hollande lost his personal and institutional authority. Due to an unsuccessful amendment of the Constitution, the primacy of human rights is still prevailing. Francois Hollande has not always been successful in the practical adjustment to the reality. From the point of view of the 2017 elections we can clearly observe that security questions form an integral part of the campaign. Hollande’s chances are commonly regarded as low. After the terror attacks Hollande turned down the possibility of an “ad-hoc legislation” among other things regarding the wearing of burqini and also refused other anti-terrorist sanctions promoted by the right side. (Le Point, 2016) Pointing to the general security the President does not allow any infringements to the state of law and opposes any measure that might restrict human rights. At the same time, his plan to amend the constitution regarding citizenship questions was criticised by the Opposition on the ground that it may infringe human rights.

“Un président ne devrait pas dire ça” – A president should not say something like that. This was the title of the book which was published in the second week of October 2016 by two journalists of Le Monde, with sentences cut out from Hollande’s interviews. Polls showed that Hollande was losing voters. In the light of the 2017 Elections the publishing of the book is a political suicide. (Soós, 2016)

There is a theoretical anti-terrorism strategy in the National Security and Defence Strategy of 2013 and the European Union provides assistance by means of its added value for member countries in order to promote European cooperation. Terror attacks highlighted the failures of the security system. According to Max Weber, extraordinary situations such as a war make charisma work. (Soós, 2012) Francois Hollande took steps only after the events, he did not have any strategic answers. As we get an insight to the background of events, we may clearly see that internal crisis that France is facing.

As for the security policy, we may consider the war on terrorism, the structural reform of French intelligence services, the handling of mass migration, the prevention of the forming of parallel societies, and the consolidation of Muslims unable to integrate and living on the periphery of society as the most significant challenges for the future. In the light of all these we may put the question as to whether we can hope for fundamental changes after the 2017 elections.

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**GENERATING DEFENCE AND SECURITY WITHIN NATIONAL FRAMEWORKS:
A RETROSPECTIVE ANALYSIS OF THE ROMANIAN STRATEGIC CONCEPTS**

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Key Words: *national security, strategy, defense, content analysis, political discourse, security policies*

Abstract: *The paper analyses the placing of the new Romanian security conceptual map following the Euro-Atlantic integration, by comparing and connecting a series of strategic documents during the period 2007-2015. Placing the discussion at the level of national frameworks for defence and security, the paper enlists on a quest on the following directions: (1) retrospectively targeting the dynamics of national security policies, (2) depicting the strategic concept in national defense and security strategies, (3) identifying risk management techniques and (4) problem structuring the military spending and acquisitions issues. The analysis evolves around the reflections and discussions facilitated by the selection of Romanian national security strategy documents during the period 2007-2015. Centering the argumentation on “institutional fit” as a prerequisite for the national strategic concept’s harmonization to the European Security Strategy (ESS) and NATO Strategic Concept, methodologically, the content analysis is drawn on the following lines (a) hammering out the strategic vision, (b) building the strategic concept by (1) resonating and connecting national aims, values and interests, (2) shaping strategic vision and objectives, (3) organizing for security, and (c) resource allocation. The paper provides insights into the planning of national defense and security strategies with implications and justifications for future policy-making in the field.*

* * *

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Problem statement

Following the accession to the Euro-Atlantic structures, national authorities had to face a series of incentives elevated by the European Union membership obligations⁶. An element of the elite discourse pinpointed as a national agreement was that EU membership was a necessary condition for the fulfillment of democratization and of the national project most commonly styled as “the return to Europe”. The Western Balkans case is also an example in this sense, urging the accession to the EU as a prerequisite for peace and stability in the region⁷.

The paper analyses the placing of the new Romanian security conceptual map following the Euro-Atlantic integration, by comparing and connecting a series of strategic documents. Placing the discussion at the level of national frameworks for defence and security, the paper enlists on a quest on the following directions:

- (1) retrospectively targeting the dynamics of national security policies, especially the main document outlining the strategic vision of national security as an output of the presidential administration during the mandate conferred on the basis of constitutional provisions for the chief of state as main official within the national security management and chief of the Supreme Council of National Defense (SCND),
- (2) depicting the strategic concept in national defense and security strategies, in direct connection to national interest(s) and strategic goals, objectives and targets,
- (3) identifying risk management techniques at the level of the strategies’ discursive practices and outlining institutional structures and mechanisms designed to facilitate the overfulfillment of the issues at stake, and
- (4) problem structuring the military spending and acquisitions issues, tracing the discussion at the level of resources allocation, budgetary inputs and preliminary targets to be achieved.

The analysis selected its casuistry among Romanian national security strategy documents issued during the period 2007-2015. Centering the argumentation on “institutional fit” as a prerequisite for the national strategic concept’s harmonization to the European Security Strategy (ESS) and NATO Strategic Concept, methodologically, the content analysis is drawn on the following lines

- (a) hammering out the strategic vision,
- (b) building the strategic concept by (1) resonating and connecting national aims, values and interests, (2) shaping strategic vision and objectives, (3) organizing for security, and

⁶ Barbé Esther, Oriol Costa, Anna Herranz Surrallés, Michal Naturski (2009) Which rules shape EU external governance? Patterns of rule selection in foreign and security policies, in *Journal of European Public Policy*, No. 16 (6), pp.834–852, DOI: 10.1080/13501760903087845.

⁷ Belloni, R. (2009) European integration and the Western Balkans: lessons, prospects and obstacles, *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, 11:3, 313-331, DOI: 10.1080/19448950903152177. Burgess J. P. (2009) There is no European security, only European securities. *Cooperation and conflict*, 44(3), pp.309–328. Citi, Manuele (2014) Revisiting Creeping Competences in the EU: The Case of Security R&D Policy, *Journal of European Integration*, 36:2, 135-151, DOI: 10.1080/07036337.2013.813024.

- (c) resource allocation. The paper provides insights into the planning of national defense and security strategies with implications and justifications for future policy-making in the field.

Methodological inputs

This study is designed to discuss and interpret the unfolding of the domestic strategic concept as envisaged by a series of documents elaborated after Romania's acquiring Euro-Atlantic structures membership status. In this sense, we selected for content analysis and comparative study⁸ the following documents:

- (1) the National Security Strategy of Romania adopted in 2007 entitled "*European Romania, Euro-Atlantic Romania: for a better life in a safer, more prosperous, democratic country*" (NSSR 2007)
- (2) the National Defense Strategy of Romania adopted in 2010 styled "*For a Romania guaranteeing the security and prosperity of future generations*" (NDS 2010)
- (3) the National Defense Strategy for the period 2015-2019 "*A powerful Romania in Europe and the world*" (NDS 2015).

The analysis outlines the discursive constructs in the establishment of national security and defense policies on the foundation of national security and defense strategies with a special focus on the subsequent lines: (a) discussing the development of national security strategic documents, (b) recognizing the convergence along European and Euro-Atlantic discourses, institutions and policies and (c) associating the authorities' strategic thinking within a unitary political discourse constructively providing strategic insights along clearly defined variables⁹. As such, the study has been developed on the following dimensions:

- (A) Providing a comparative overview of the key goals in ensuring national security and defense,
- (B) Pointing out the statements centered on defining elements of national security. At this point the analysis attempted to register the trends in defining national security: (1) defining national values and principles, (2) defining national security interests, (3) defining national security objectives, and (4) assessing national security threats within a risk management framework along capabilities and resources allocation.

The selected methodology is used so as to favour the analysis of national policies and strategic documents. The study as such focuses on documents' qualitative content analysis by highlighting the themes, the selection of phrases, keywords and symbols employed to describe

⁸ Anca Parmena Olimid, Cătălina Maria Georgescu, *Research Handbook of Democracy, Institutions and Policy-Making in Communism and Post-Communism: Facts, Trends & Outcomes*, Craiova: Sitech, 2016.

⁹ Cătălina Maria Georgescu, *Drawing up national security policies and strategies: A legislative and political framework of security and defence after the Euro-Atlantic integration*, in Cătălin Stănculescu (coord.), *Drepturile omului, globalizare, securitate*, Craiova: Sitech, 2015, pp.43–50.

national security and defense guidelines and quantitative analysis by outlining frequencies in the use of concepts. The study attempts to point out the elements of institutional and discursive change within a contingency theoretical framework that asserts the importance of Euro-Atlantic institutions and structures membership status in drafting and promoting a national strategic vision. In this sense, the analysis claims a need to search for elements of convergence along national strategic security and defense documents themselves and along national and European/international strategic security and defense documents.

Documents review: developing the strategic concept

At this point the study asserts the main characteristics of the three documents under research. The National Security Strategy of Romania adopted in 2007 entitled “*European Romania, Euro-Atlantic Romania: for a better life in a safer, more prosperous, democratic country*” (NSSR 2007) is the most extensive document featuring 54 pages. As a contrast, the following documents the National Defense Strategy of Romania adopted in 2010 styled “*For a Romania guaranteeing the security and prosperity of future generations*” (NDS 2010) and the National Defense Strategy for the period 2015-2019 “*A powerful Romania in Europe and the world*” (NDS 2015) have 29 and 23 pages, respectively.

The content of NSSR 2007 is divided into twelve thematic chapters aimed at strategically planning the development of the national identity within the new Euro-Atlantic status (chapter 4) and the establishment of an international security environment (chapters 1, 2, 3) and regionally (chapters 5 and 6) and at home (chapters 7, 8, 9, 10, 11), along with the means and resources that could be employed (chapter 12). The document combines a programmatic vision of external security with a special interest as regards homeland, highlighting the need for good governance (chapter 8), economic competitiveness (chapter 9), institutional fit (chapter 10) and “critical infrastructure” (chapter 11).

NDS 2010 is a seven chaptered document referring to continuity with the former security strategies and adaptation or “institutional fit” to the Euro-Atlantic integration requests and to globalization, to which it confers the value of “the main factor of influence of the contemporary security environment” (p.6) correlating within the “security matrix” the following elements: “prosperity”, “identity” and “citizen’s safety” (p.5).

NDS 2015 dwells on four chapters and several sub-chapters in defining and programming for national security: security interests and objectives (chapter 1), assessing the international security environment (chapter 2), outlining the threats, risks and vulnerabilities (chapter 3) and planning the directions and capacities (chapter 4).

Analysing the results

Use of keywords, concepts, symbols

The conceptual content analysis by identifying the frequencies of the keywords and concepts in use has highlighted that the strategies appear as internationally and regionally-oriented strategic approaches. The frequencies of keywords, concepts and symbols are consistent to the length of the two documents under study (NSSR 2007 – 56 pages and NDS 2015 – 23 pages).

<i>Concept</i>	NSSR 2007	NDS 2015	<i>Concept</i>	NSSR 2007	NDS 2015	<i>Concept</i>	NSSR 2007	NDS 2015
security	244	102	<i>(geo-) strategic</i>	45	21	<i>defence</i>	32	29
national	108	52	<i>democratic/ democracy</i>	77	4	<i>(financial) economic</i>	31	22
Europe(an) (Union)	123	48	<i>threats</i>	42	16	<i>(national) values</i>	30	16
Romania	150	52	<i>(North-) Euro- Atlantic</i>	41	12	<i>NATO (Alliance)</i>	46	16
(international) organizations	29	5	<i>political institutions</i>	38	18	<i>(security) environment</i>	29	37
state(s)	81	15	<i>(international) cooperation</i>	34	14	<i>Regional (security/ threats)</i>	33	21
risks	47	13	<i>(international) terrorism</i>	49	8	<i>energy policy</i>	27	16
prosperity	24	1	<i>integration</i>	23	2	<i>(settling) conflicts</i>	23	12
(good) governance	17	2	<i>(preserving/ restoring) peace</i>	16	-	<i>proliferation (WMD)</i>	15	2

Figure 1. Comparative conceptual content analysis of NSSR 2007 and NDS 2015.

Source: Authors' analysis.

Establishing “power” constructs

NSSR 2007's vision of the world outlines the trend to connect security and prosperity within a security environment styled as “strongly conflicting” especially at regional levels (p.9) and “rapidly changing” at international security environment level (p.10). The Strategy encompasses the “responsible and effective exercise of power, in full compliance with the principles of democracy and human rights” (p.15).

NDS 2010 militates for the use of peaceful means, however, in its interpretation of “power” it also allows the use of “all elements of power, including its military capabilities, as an ultimate solution” (NDS 2010, p.9). It also defines the international security environment as “a re-positioning international world” (NDS 2010, p.15)... “a dynamic world, under a continuous change” (NDS 2010, p.7). NDS 2015 makes reference to the changes undergone in the realm of geopolitics in the recent past and claims the need to adapt to the change of paradigm in the international relations (p.3), to the unpredictability and complexity of the international environment (p.5).

Identifying national threats

As regards the definition of national threats, we observe that all three strategic programming documents NDS 2015, NDS 2010 and NSSR 2007 converge along pointing out “terrorism” and the “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction” (WMD). According to a path dependence perspective, the NDS 2015 follows the line traced by the previous strategic documents; however, it increases the perspective of threats by referring merely to “terrorism” thus indicating both general and specific external and homeland threats and extends the indication to weapons of mass destruction to encompass the “bearing vectors”. Accessing the literature in the field, we noticed that the Romanian strategic programming documents are also convergent as regards other national or international/European vision.¹⁰

Moreover, the National Security Strategy of Romania issued in 2007 identifies a series of six threats collectively joined in a unitary category styled “asymmetric threats of military or non-military nature”: “international terrorism”, “proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, “regional conflicts”, “cross-border organized crime”, “bad governance”, “phenomena of geo-physical nature, climate change or similar” (NSSR 2007). The National Defence Strategy 2010 is convergent along the National Security Strategy of Romania issued in 2007 by listing as core risks and threats: terrorism and “the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction”, “organised crime”, “drugs trafficking”, “insecurity in the Black Sea area (...) and the Western Balkans”, espionage, radicalism, public health risks and concerning the environment (NDS 2010, p.13), while the National Defense Strategy 2015-2019 indicates seven threats: “terrorism”, “proliferation of the weapons of mass-destruction and of the bearing vectors”, “actions performed to destabilize”, “frozen conflicts in the Black Sea Region and the Western Balkans”, “distortions on the energetic markets”, “cyber threats”, “hostile informational actions” (NDS 2015).




Figure 2. Comparative view of national threats perceived by the National Security Strategy of Romania 2007 (NSSR 2007) and the National Defense Strategy (2010) (NDS 2010) and the National Defense Strategy 2015-2019 (NDS 2015). Source: Authors’ representation.

¹⁰ Olimid Anca Parmena (2014) International Peace and Security Cause in UN Security Council Resolutions. A State of Art Analysis (2012-2014), in *Revista de Științe Politice. Revue des Sciences Politiques*, (43), Craiova, Universitaria Publishing, pp.208–221; Mikaela Hedborg, Comparing Security Strategies, Swedish Institute of International Affairs (UI) 9 Oct 2012, No. 1, www.ui.se.

Conceptual mapping

At this point of the research the interest has moved towards organising the three national strategic documents into conceptual maps by coding and highlighting the concepts/phrases used to describe national perspectives and approaches of defining national security interests, defining national values and principles, defining national security objectives and resources allocation to promote and ensure those ends.




Figure 3. Conceptual map of NSSR 2007

Source: Authors' own representation.

The three conceptual maps indicate the sense of the relation between security concepts and phrases by marking through connection lines and the use of different colours. These relations are presented separately for each of the three national security and defence documents for a comparative overview.




Figure 4. Conceptual map of NDS 2010

Source: Authors' own representation.

The graphical view enhances the identification and categorisation of key concepts used in the three strategic documents and the definition of the relations established among them. Conceptual mapping thus renders the organization and comparability of the strategic documents and enhances the defining traits.




Figure 5. Conceptual map of NSSR 2007
Source: Authors' own representation.

Conclusions

In a nutshell, the purpose of this research was to interpret content of the National Security Strategy of Romania adopted in 2007 “*European Romania, Euro-Atlantic Romania: for a better life in a safer, more prosperous, democratic country*” (NSSR 2007), the National Defense Strategy of Romania adopted in 2010 “*For a Romania guaranteeing the security and prosperity of future generations*” (NDS 2010) and of the National Defense Strategy for the period 2015-2019 “*A powerful Romania in Europe and the world*” (NDS 2015). Content analysis was employed to reveal the dynamics of national security and defense strategic texts adopted by the presidential administration by sketching out the strategic concept in national defense and security strategies, with a view at national interest(s) and strategic goals, objectives and targets. The study combined the qualitative and quantitative dimensions of content analysis into conceptual and relational analyses of the selected material. The texts have been analysed for the purpose of tracing concepts and outlining frequencies in a comparative perspective and essentially organised for identifying the key categories of study and drafting the conceptual maps for understanding the defining of the strategic concept and national security.

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RUSSIA AS A GLOBAL PLAYER**Ali Sarikaya**

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Key Words: *Russia's foreign policy, Vladimir Putin, New world order, Middle East*

Abstract: *This analysis comprises of brief review of the major aspects of Russia's role in the new world order. Particularly it lays emphasis on the Russian foreign policy in the period of President Vladimir Putin. The rebirth of Russia as a global player is a necessary step to re-establish an overall balance of power in the world. After Vladimir Putin was elected as a president of Russian Federation, Russia began to pursue very effective foreign policy. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the replacing Russian Federation has enhanced its political and economic efficiency on the new world order for the first time. Since the end of the Cold War, Russian Federation was not be able to speak knowledgeably or authoritatively about foreign policy that much in the recent times. Although Russia is the heir state of the Soviet Union, its status in the global hierarchy cannot be compared with the one of the USSR. Especially this analysis dwells on Russia's effective foreign policy.*

* * *

The collapse of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union and the disintegration of the USSR is undoubtedly the most significant development in world politics since the Second World War.¹ The Soviet Union extended its power over much of Eastern Europe. By the 1960s, it appeared that communism was permanently established in the region. During the 1960s and 1970s, the Soviet Union's Communist leadership kept tight control over the Soviet people². By summer 1989 the tide of nationalist contention spread to the point that the Soviet regime appeared highly unstable. Enormous demonstrations (involving hundreds of thousands of people, and sometimes up to a million) racked all the republics of the Baltic and Transcaucasus at the time, spreading as well to Western Ukraine and Moldova. During summer 1989, multiple violent inter-ethnic conflicts also broke out across the southern tier of the USSR: between Uzbeks and Meskhetian Turks, Kazakhs and Lezgins, Abkhaz and Georgians, Armenians and Azerbaijanis, and Kyrgyz and Tajiks. Massive miner strikes in eastern Ukraine, western Siberia and northern Kazakhstan – though non-national in character – reflected the spread of large-scale protest to the Russian community, as well as the growing

¹ Lorimer, D., 1997. *The collapse of "communism" in the USSR. Its causes and significance*. Resistance Books, first published in 1992, p.3.

² The Collapse of the Soviet Union, Struggles for Democracy, chapter 35, p.1046.

disaffection of Russians from the Soviet state.³ During the uprising of Soviet states, Soviet Union state structure was about completely to collapse. Despite the fact that Soviet Union was very powerful country but state structure and social equality in social structure was not that much powerful. During the 1990s, Russia underwent extraordinary transformations. It changed from a communist dictatorship into a multiparty democracy in which officials are chosen in regular elections. Its centrally planned economy was reshaped into a capitalist order based on markets and private property. Its army withdrew peacefully from Eastern Europe and the former Soviet republics, allowing the latter to become independent countries⁴. In some cases, the fall of communism broke the bonds that had held countries together, with the dissolution of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia followed in 1993 by the “velvet divorce” of the Czech and Slovak republics. Conversely, less than a year after the Berlin Wall came down, East and West Germany were reunified. Eventually more than 20 countries emerged from the process. The violence that took place in parts of the former Yugoslavia, and also in Romania and Moldova, stood in marked contrast to the major achievement in almost all other cases, that a transformation of such momentous scale was effected peacefully. Rapid political changes have continued throughout the quarter-century since 1989. Most notable has been the reintegration with Western Europe. Partnerships with the EU strengthened through the 1990s, culminating with the accession of eight former socialist economies in 2004, followed by Bulgaria and Romania in 2007 and Croatia in 2013. Four of these have joined the euro area, with Lithuania also set to join in 2015. Looking forward, the remaining countries of the Western Balkans all have EU candidate or potential candidate status. Political and economic integration has not only involved the EU. When the Soviet Union was dissolved at the end of 1991, the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS) was established, comprising most of the former Soviet republics. Recently this region too has moved towards closer integration through the development of the Eurasian Economic Union, to become operational in 2015 with initial members Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Russia⁵.

The break up of the Soviet Union in 1991 entailed a profound transformation of the Geopolitical landscape in the Eurasian land mass. A truncated Russian state, surrounded by a series of politically and economically fragile newly independent states, emerged in the territory of the former USSR. This created a fundamental problem, namely whether Russia, having lost vast amounts of land and over 25 million ethnic nationals would be able to discard its imperial legacy and consider the new states as independent and entirely sovereign entities of international law, or whether instead, its leaders would attempt to restore Russia's hegemony over the post-Soviet space⁶. After the dissolution of Soviet union, Russian Federation confronted economically and politically problems. Especially Russia lost its reputation at the world public opinion. The meaning of dissolution of Soviet Union is to lose

³ Beissinger, M. R., 2009. Nationalism and the Collapse of Soviet Communism. *Contemporary European History*, 18, 3, pp. 331–347 C 2009 Cambridge University Press, p.338.

⁴ Shleifer, A. and Treisman, D., 2005. A Normal Country: Russia After Communism. *Journal of Economic Perspectives*, Volume 19, Number 1, Winter 2005, p.151.

⁵ Roaf, J., Atoyian, R., Joshi, B. and Krogulski, K., (n.d.) *25 Years of Transition Post-Communist Europe and the IMF*. Regional Economic Issues Special Report, p.3.

⁶ Sagramoso, D., 2000. *Russia's Geopolitical Orientation Towards the Former Soviet States Was Russia Able to Discard its Imperial Legacy?* London: School of Slavonic and East European Studies University College, p.8.

the war against USA that its biggest rival in the world. Some of the states of gaining their own independence against Soviet Union caused Russia to lose huge source of income. Before the First World War, Russia was an under-developed and industrializing country. In the early 1920's, after the First World War, the 1917's Revolution and the Civil War, USSR has lost part of his limited capacity production and still remains an essentially rural country. In a context of international unanimous hostility, USSR economic recovery and industrialization was a necessary condition to survive, but, could be financed externally by foreign credit and investment only to a minor extent⁷. Russian economy was very a very difficult situation even in the period of Soviet Union. Because Soviet Union was fighting a running battle not only against US but also against developed western countries. Although all difficult conditions in every respect, Soviet economy was quite powerful. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, Russia confronted not only economic problem but also social problem. Communist system was defeated by capitalist system in the beginning of 1990 years. Russian society was exposed to adapt to the new world order that it has been fighting against it for years. On the other hand Russia has very dynamic and powerful social structure. A dynamic civil society is essential to a functioning democracy. After the fall of the Soviet Union there was hope that Russia could create a robust civil society to compliment its burgeoning democracy, but 15 years after the fall neither occurrence appears to be the case. Instead of an open society, Russian civil society faces challenges of oppression, threats of violence, an overbearing bureaucracy, and a constitution open to interpretation.⁸. Russian people were oppressed by new administration of Russia in a short while. Beside Russian people have cut off from outside of the world. Because Democratic order is still becoming a threat for Russia. Seven years after the collapse of the Soviet Union, Russia is still seeking to consolidate the institutional foundations of political pluralism, including a popularly elected legislature, the rule of law, an independent judiciary, civilian control of the military, and a constitution that embodies democratic principles which are accepted by government and society alike. A substantial majority of Russian citizens participate in regularly held and widely contested elections for local and national representatives and also for the country's president. While elected officials may not always be responsive to popular demands, they are still the most accountable rulers in Russian history. Freedom of expression is at an all-time high, and the Russian government must regularly confront public challenges to unpopular policies. A market economy is replacing centralized planning, though there is still considerable risk that a left-oriented government might reintroduce some of the mechanisms of a state-run and centrally managed economy. There are many other challenges to Russia's democratic transition. Though not a single scheduled election has yet been cancelled, many people fear that constitutionally mandated elections would not be held if President Boris Yeltsin were to die or become incapacitated before his term expires. The Russian legislature is weak compared with the presidency, and those two branches are still a long way from achieving the level of regular consultation that characterizes politics in most developed democracies. The weakness of the legislature leaves a lack of incentive for political groups to dedicate more

⁷ Mazat, N. and Serrano, F., (n.d.) *An analysis of the Soviet economic growth from the 1950's to the collapse of USSR*, p.2.

⁸ Nowakowski, A., (n.d.) *Human Rights in Russia and the Former Soviet Republics*. Denver: Graduate School of International Studies, University of Denver, p.4.

time, thought, and money to the arduous process of forming mass parties, and the absence of parties denies Russian citizens a means of conveying their will to their elected representatives. In addition, the weakness of the court system, combined with the ineffectiveness of well-intentioned law enforcement officials, has forced a considerable portion of the Russian population to resort to semi-legal or illegal means to gain protection and to seek redress of their grievances⁹.

The United States and the USSR gradually built up their own zones of influence, dividing the world into two opposing camps. The Cold War was therefore not exclusively a struggle between the US and the USSR but a global conflict that affected many countries, particularly the continent of Europe. Indeed, Europe, divided into two blocs, became one of the main theatres of the war. In Western Europe, the European integration process began with the support of the United States, while the countries of Eastern Europe became satellites of the USSR.¹⁰ In that time US and Soviet Union were the most powerful countries. During the cold war US and Soviet Union have competed with each other at weapons productions. After the dissolution of Soviet Union, Russia had old Soviet weapons, weapon factories and army. On the other hand Russia was not in need of modernising the old heavy weapons. Normally Russian army is still one of the most powerful army in the world but using unmodernized weapons makes Russian army uncontrolled power. In October 2008, Russian Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov announced the launch of a new stage of military reform, aimed at transitioning the Russian Armed Forces to a new look. This rapid and intensive military reform has turned out to be the most radical transformation of the country's military since the creation of the Red Army in 1918.¹¹ The Defense Ministry has embarked on an active and vigorous campaign of reforms, most of which were completed on an organizational level by December 1, 2009. However, the reform process is still continuing on many fronts. The changes affected all the main elements of Russia's Armed Forces – strength, command and control, organization, and officer training. It is not only the radical nature but also the speed of the reforms that is astonishing. In fact, in an unprecedentedly short period for peacetime, the Russian Armed Forces underwent a restructuring that was radically different from the traditional form of the Red, Soviet and Russian armies. Whether by intuition or consciously, Defense Minister Anatoly Serdyukov and Chief of General Staff of the Armed Forces Nikolai Makarov in this respect seem to be following the principle once formulated by the Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the Russian Empire Count Sergei Witte: “In Russia, you need to enact reforms quickly; otherwise they mostly do not work out and are inhibited.”¹¹

⁹ Shevtsova, L. and Olcott, M. B., (n.d.) *Russia After Communism, Russia Transformed*.

¹⁰ The Cold War (1945–1989) – Full text, CVCE.EU by UNILU, p.3.

¹¹ Mikhail Barabanov, (Editor-in-Chief of Moscow Defense Brief), Konstantin Makienko, (Deputy Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies; member of the Expert Council under the Russian State Duma Defense Committee), Ruslan Pukhov (Director of the Center for Analysis of Strategies and Technologies; member of the Public Council under the Russian Defense Ministry), Military Reform: Toward the New Look of the Russian Army, Russian military reform was discussed at the conference of the Defense and Security section of the Valdai Discussion Club titled “Modernization of Russia's Armed Forces and Cooperation in International Security” which was held on May 25–27, 2011 in Moscow. p.3.

Especially Soviet economy was suffering so much in 1980 years against USA economy. Because Soviet economy was about to stop producing industrial materials except weapon productions before 10 years of the dissolution of Soviet Union. Until recently, the Russian economy was one of the fastest growing economies in the world. The growth brought an improvement in the standard of living of the average Russian citizen and also brought economic stability that Russia had not experienced in at least a decade. This strong economic performance had been a major factor in the popular support that the Russian leadership enjoyed and was also arguably a factor in the boldness with which that leadership reasserted Russia's status as a world power, challenging the United States, Europe, the neighbouring former Soviet states in economic and national security areas. However, as has been the case with most of the world's economies, the Russian economy has been hit hard by the global financial crisis and recession, the effects of which have been readily apparent since the fourth quarter of 2008. The crisis brought an abrupt end to the decade's long (1999-2008) economic growth with real gross domestic product (GDP) increasing 6.9% annually on average. Russia is expected to experience negative growth in 2009 and only modest growth at best in 2010. Its real GDP decreased 9.8% during the first quarter of 2009. The high oil prices were a major factor in the economic success Russian enjoyed, especially in the early and middle parts of this decade; however, the collapse of world prices for oil and other commodities in 2008 exposed the downside of Russia's dependence on the production and export of oil, gas, and other natural resources. The failure of Russia to complete important economic reforms and the government's penchant for re-asserting its control over key economic sectors loom among the possible roadblocks to a return to high economic growth rates down the road. Although its influence has been greatly diminished since the Soviet period, Russia remains a formidable force on the global stage, and its influence seems to be growing. Russia's economy is large enough to influence global economic conditions. Many European countries and former Soviet states are highly dependent on Russian natural gas. Russia is a significant player on a number of issues critical to the United States, for example, nuclear proliferation by Iran and North Korea. Russia's perceived national interests do not always match those of the United States, creating an environment for disagreement if not conflict¹². Russia's influence on the state of the global oil and natural gas market has increased significantly in recent decades. This was promoted by recession of industrial production in the country caused by the reform of the economy and the transition to a market economy, which has led to a sharp fall in domestic demand for almost all types of raw materials. Russia takes an active part in forming the world economic space by integrating into the world economy and belongs to the group of the leading exporters of energy resources. Large Russian national energy companies already claim to world leadership in the global economic process. Their progress on the global market contributes to the growth of business efficiency and competitiveness of the country. Russia is the largest supplier of energy resources to foreign countries among the former Soviet republics¹³.

¹² Coope, W. H., 2009. *Russia's Economic Performance and Policies and Their Implications for the United States*. Congressional Research Service, June 29, 2009, p.1.

¹³ Sergeev, I. and Ponomarenko, T., (n.d.) *Russian export of raw materials and balance of economic interests*. National University of Mineral Resources "Mining" (Russian Federation), p.8.

Russia, and specifically Gazprom, is the largest single supplier of gas to European countries. In 2013, Gazprom exported a record volume of gas to Europe, significantly exceeding deliveries in the 2008–2012 period and, due to a fall in European demand and deliveries from other indigenous and external suppliers, representing 34 per cent and 30 per cent respectively of European imports and demand¹⁴. Under the any circumstances, EU countries need Russian raw materials especially its natural gas. In the recent years, some of EU countries try to create solar energy production technology as an alternative energy for Russian gas. Germany is taking the lead of solar energy production in the world. Germany is leaving the fossil-nuclear age behind, paving the way for photovoltaic (PV) to play a significant role in a future shaped by sustainable power production. This compilation of current facts, figures and findings is regularly updated. It aims to help in creating an overall assessment of PV growth in Germany¹⁵. On the other hand, Germany's project is very long term. Time will show us that Germany makes it or not. During this period, Germany or the countries that are trying to produce solar energy system still need Russian gas. The 28 member-state European Union (EU) has been a growing natural gas consumer and Importer for decades. As Europe's natural gas production has declined in recent years, its dependence on imported natural gas has increased. This has left it more dependent as a whole on its primary supplier, Russia, which has shown some inclination to use its resources for political ends. Natural gas, unlike oil, which is a global commodity, is a regional commodity with regional buyers and sellers exerting more influence.

Over the past decade, some European officials have become increasingly concerned about the potential for cut-offs or curtailments of Russian natural gas supplies to Europe. At least until recently, most Russian natural gas exports to Europe flowed through Ukraine and Belarus. Fragile and sometimes hostile relations between Kyiv, Minsk, and Moscow have in the past resulted in interruptions in the flow of natural gas to parts of Europe, as happened in 2006 and 2009. Some countries in Eastern Europe, which are in some cases almost exclusively reliant on Russian gas imports, have been particularly susceptible to these fluctuations¹⁶.

EU countries do not want to be dependant with only Russian gas. They started to seek alternative solution against Russians. EU's first alternative solution was surely to contact with Ukraine. The Ukraine crisis was immediately preceded by competition between the EU and Russia for the future geoeconomic orientation of Ukraine. The roots of the crisis lie in the 2008 war between Russia and Georgia, which ended the prospect of enlargement of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) for both Georgia and Ukraine, and in the beginning of the global financial crisis, which seemed to give more credence to regional economic arrangements. Then, the EU and Russia drew different conclusions from the war and the crisis. The Europeans, through the Eastern Partnership program the EU launched in 2009,

¹⁴Reducing European Dependence on Russian Gas: distinguishing natural gas security from geopolitics, Oxford Institute for Energy Studies, October 2014, p.4.

¹⁵ Wirth, H., (n.d.) *Recent Facts about Photovoltaics in Germany*. Division Director Photovoltaic Modules, Systems and Reliability Fraunhofer ISE, p.4.

¹⁶ Michael Ratner, Coordinator (Specialist in Energy Policy) Paul Belkin (Analyst in European Affairs) Jim Nichol (Specialist in Russian and Eurasian Affairs) Steven Woehrel (Specialist in European Affairs), *Europe's Energy Security: Options and Challenges to Natural Gas Supply Diversification*, p.4.

looked to associate Ukraine, along with five other former Soviet republics, economically and politically with the EU. Rather than a step toward future EU enlargement, however, this initiative was an attempt to constitute a “zone of comfort” to the east of the union’s border and enhance these countries’ Western orientation¹⁷.

Especially Ukraine is very important country between Russia and European countries. Ukrainian government carried out convergence policy to EU in the recent times. On the other hand, Russia under the administration of Putin was dissatisfied with Ukrainian foreign policy with EU. Actually Ukrainian-EU relations are based on mutual interests. Despite the fact that Ukrainian was under the administration of Soviet for long years, They did not accept the soviet regime, they have been forced. Ukrainian politicians always tried to find alternative power that can help Ukrainian to revolt against Soviet Union. For instance, some of Ukrainian politicians secretly were supporting the Nazis Germany against Soviet Union during the WW II. At the present time, EU is one of the remarkable power against Russia. Ukraine is very weak country against Russia in every aspect. That’s why Ukraine needs some powerful ally. Putin was aware of Ukrainian convergence policy with EU. If Ukraine is part of EU policy or USA (this worse part for Russia), Russia can lose it biggest trump against EU. That trump is surely natural gas. EU will need petrol and natural gas as long as industrial production exists. So EU always needs Russia. Some of EU countries, particularly Germany, are seeking alternative energy suppliers instead of natural gas. The crisis in Ukraine has made painfully obvious just how dependent Germany and other European countries are on Russian natural gas. There are serious alternatives for supplying the vital natural resource, but they all come at a price.¹⁸ After the Ukrainian crisis, German government escalated the renewable energy researches. Beside that, Germany is most effective country in Europe that creates renewable energy. Growth of renewables has been most dynamic in the power sector. In 2015, renewables surpassed coal, nuclear and natural gas as Germany’s most important energy source on the power market. The share in gross power supply reached 32.6%, compared to 27.4% in 2014. On 23 August, the share of renewables set a record high of 83.2% of power demand between 1pm and 2 pm. Power production from renewables rose by 33.4 TWh from 2014 to 2015 due to a sunny and windy year. Wind power production alone increased by 30.6 TWh (+50%). Photovoltaics (PV) contributed 2.3 TWh more than in 2014. Biomass, water and geothermal power production stayed roughly the same.¹⁹ Germany is dominating about the renewable and alternative energy resources in the world. But this renewable energy can take the place of natural gas, coal and petrol energies or not. It is still a matter of debate. Even if this renewable energy projects become successful, it takes long time for infrastructure.

After the dissolution of Soviet Union’s, many soviet states gained their independence. Ukraine is one of them. Russia did not cut political and economic relations from former soviet republics on the contrary it developed it relations with the states. If one of the former soviet

¹⁷ Trenin, D., (n.d.) *The Ukraine crisis and the resumption of great-power rivalry*. Moscow: Carnegie Moscow Center, p.11.

¹⁸ Dohmen, F. and Jung, A., (n.d.) How Germany Could End Russian Gas Dependency. *Spiegel online*, Translated from the German by Charles Hawley and Daryl Lindsey.

¹⁹ Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue press office, *The German Energy Transition*. March 2016, p.6.

republics follows anti-Russian policy, Russia shows very strong reaction in every aspect. Georgia, Kyrgyzstan they are a few examples.

Tension between Russia and Ukraine is escalating. According to the Russians, a special operations team from Ukraine attacked Crimea. The Ukrainians denied the claim. The Russians appear to be moving forces around in Crimea and increasing the number and the posture of the forces in the area. More significant militarily, there are some reports of Russian troop build-ups east of their border with Ukraine and an unconfirmed report of a brigade of Russian troops deploying in pro-Russian rebel-held territory inside Ukraine. The Russians have done nothing to tamp down tension. In fact, they have increased it by citing multiple Ukrainian provocations and insisting that they will not be allowed to persist. Whatever the truth in the reports, it is obvious that the Russians are establishing a justification for taking action against Ukraine. Our model predicts that the Russians will eventually move to change the situation in Ukraine, militarily if necessary. Ukraine is too important to them strategically to accept anything less than a neutral government in Kiev. A pro-Western government with close ties to the US and other militaries can evolve dangerously from the Russian point of view. Therefore, we expect the Russians to take some significant action – diplomatically, economically and/or militarily²⁰. After Russia's strong reaction and attempt of invading the Ukraine lands, USA and EU started to carry out economic sanctions to Russia. Economic sanctions are a common tactic used against countries to show displeasure over their practices.²¹ After the annexation of Crimea, trouble spread through parts of eastern Ukraine. Separatist groups (many of them led by citizens of Russia such as the notorious intelligence officer, Igor Girkin, known as Strelkov) took over government buildings and whole towns. As the conflict entered a more violent phase from April 2014, and in particular after the shooting down of flight MH17 on July 17th, the West imposed a second wave of sanctions, including sweeping economy-wide measures that have frozen credit flows and high-tech goods exports to Russia. More than two decades of work to integrate post-Soviet Russia into the world economy came to a sudden juddering halt²².

The Russian economy has declined precipitously and is still declining. This has to be hurting President Vladimir Putin's political position, especially among senior officials and oligarchs who constitute the Russian elite.²³ So far the EU has clearly not forced Russia to change its behaviour: Russia and its proxies are in control of more Ukrainian territory than was the case in March or July 2014, and are continuing to fight for more²⁴. Although all economic sanctions, Russia still pursue its military existence in Crimea and supports some military forces who are fighting against Ukrainian army. Maybe Russian economy received very huge

²⁰ Friedman, G., (n.d.) *Russia, Ukraine and Threats, Geopolitical Futures Keeping the future in focus*, p.1.

²¹ ISSUE: Should the United States continue to import from Russia during the Ukraine dispute?, Daniels Fund Ethics Initiative University of New Mexico.

²² Bond, I., Odendahl, C. and Rankin, J., 2015. *Frozen: The politics and economics of sanctions against Russia*. March 2015, p.3.

²³ Friedman, G., (n.d.) *Russia, Ukraine and Threats, Geopolitical Futures Keeping the future in focus*, p.2.

²⁴ Bond, I., Odendahl, C. and Rankin, J., 2015. *Frozen: The politics and economics of sanctions against Russia*. March 2015, p.3.

blow from the economic sanctions, but Russia is still afloat. On the other hand, Russia not retreating from Crimea is very big intimidation for former Soviet republics.

After the dissolution of Soviet Union, Russian pursued its economic and politic relations not only with former Soviet republics but also with middle-east countries, especially Shi'a Islamic countries (Iran-Syria). Since Islamic revolution in Iran, Russia has consistently well-based relations with Iran. Since 2012 relations between Russia and Iran have improved significantly. This warming of relations can be seen in a series of visits and meetings between leaders and senior figures from the two countries, significant cooperation and coordination of military activities in Syria, and plans for the substantial expansion of connections regarding weapons supply, nuclear infrastructure, economic ventures, and trade²⁵. Thus Russia increased its economic and political influences on Syria co-ordinately with Iran the beginning of civil war in Syria. Strengthened relations between Russia and Iran are the result of a number of regional and global developments. The risks and problems for both Russia and Iran presented by the turbulence in the Middle East have prompted them to expand cooperation. Both countries view stabilizing the Assad regime and contending with the Islamic State as critically important, with Russia seeing Iran as a counterweight to the threat of Sunni radicalism. At the same time, Iran's growing influence in Syria and Iraq and in the Middle East in general, and the international legitimacy it gained with the nuclear agreement, has increased its importance from Russia's perspective as well. Moreover, the lifting of the nuclear-related sanctions allows Russia to expand its economic relations with Iran, and perhaps also to renew its arms supply. In tandem, the Ukraine crisis and the Western sanctions imposed on Russia in the wake of the crisis have spurred Russia to flex its muscles in the Middle East, especially at a time when the Obama administration is seen as demonstrating weakness in the Middle East, which leaves an opening for both Russia and Iran to make gains in the region.²⁶

After the outbreak of Civil war in Syria, Iran officially took on Assad regime side. Assad regime has been always following political relations based on mutual interests with Russia and Iran. For long years. Following general support for the hard-pressed Assad regime, Russia moved in September to establish a small task force in regime-controlled territory near the north-west city of Latakia, and then started attacks using strike aircraft and helicopter gunships at the end of the month. Most were relatively old aircraft using unguided bombs but Russia mounted an intensive information campaign to highlight the significance of what it was doing, and added to this by firing cruise missiles from warships in the Caspian Sea which overflew Iran and Iraq with the agreement of these governments. Most of the Russian air strikes have been against forces opposed to the Assad regime rather than IS, and indeed IS used the opportunity to make gains on the ground against anti-Assad forces pre-occupied with fighting Syrian Army units. It should be noted that Russia's direct intervention is not entirely unilateral. It may be seen as a reaction to the battlefield advances over the spring and summer of anti-Assad forces trained and supplied by Turkey, Qatar and Saudi Arabia as well as the

²⁵ Kam, E., 2016. Will Russia and Iran Walk Hand in Hand? *Strategic Assessment*, Volume 19, No. 2, July 2016, pp.1-2.

²⁶ Kam, E., 2016. Will Russia and Iran Walk Hand in Hand? *Strategic Assessment*, Volume 19, No. 2, July 2016, p.2.

stated intent of Turkey and the United States to establish a no-fly zone between Aleppo and the Turkish border. By late August, the collapse of pro-Assad forces in their northwest Syrian strongholds began to look a real possibility. The Russian operations also come at a time of an easing of the intensity of the conflict in eastern Ukraine, and serve to emphasise Putin's insistence that Russia was and is a great power well beyond its "near abroad". They also serve to divert attention from problems of the domestic economy brought on by sanctions and the sustained fall in oil and gas prices. More specifically, the Russia offensive is directed at ensuring that Russia will have a prominent role in whatever negotiations eventually bring the devastating civil war to an end. Its long-term motivation remains to make sure that a post-Assad Syria will still be an ally or client of Russia.²⁷ Russian forces are fighting against the forces these are fighting against Assad regime. These forces are known as terrorist groups (undoubtedly They are terrorist groups) by the whole world. Additionally Russia strengthens its political position in Syria and wins the approval of the world public opinion. And also Russia is shown as only country that can stop the war in Syria by the world public opinion. Russia succeeded to increase its reputation, which was damaged in Ukraine crisis.

Another interesting thing about Russia's policy of Syria is that Russia's reaction to Turkey after Turkish jets shot down Russian jet. On the morning of 24 November 2015, the Turkish Presidency announced that the air force had downed a Russian SU-24 that violated Turkish airspace – perhaps the most public clash between Russia and a NATO country in decades.²⁸ Contrary to what is believed, Russia acted very cold-bloodedly. Russia's first reaction was economic sanction. And Russia warned explicitly Turkey. If any jet of Turkish air forces crosses the Syrian air space, Russia will shoot down Turkish jets. Thus none of Turkish jets could not dare to violate the Syrian air space. Turkey is a member of NATO. Russia carried out very effective and successful policy at this situation. Thus Turkey was pushed out of Syria political area by Russia. It means that Turkey is not actor state anymore on the crisis of Syria. Additionally under the leader of Putin it was assembled a meeting about Syria with the participation of Iran, Turkey, China. USA and other EU countries were not invited. Russia became main actor in Syria in less than no time. Similarly, on the ground in Syria, Russia's minimal goals have also largely been met. Russian forces have "corrected" the military balance by helping Bashar al-Assad's government survive and even expand areas under its control²⁹. Now Russia became a peacemaker assembling the countries in Astana for finding the solutions for the civil war in Syria. Russia carried out right and correct policies about the Syrian situation. On the other hand some political situations also helped Russia to be main actor in Syria. After the outbreak of the civil war in Syria, many refugees flock into developed western countries. This situation caused dissatisfaction into European societies. Some of them welcomed well the refugees but most of them did not welcome well the refugees. On top of that, several terrorist attacks took place in France, Germany and Belgium. And also ISIS

²⁷ Rogers, P. and Reeve, R., 2015. Russia's Intervention in Syria: Implications for Western Engagement. *Global Security Briefing* – October, 2015, p.3.

²⁸ Aydintasbas, A., (n.d.) With friends like these: Turkey, Russia and the end of an unlikely alliance. *European Council on Foreign Relations*, p.2.

²⁹ Stepanova, E., 2016. Russia's Policy on Syria after the Start of Military Engagement. *PONARS Eurasia Policy Memo*, No. 421, February 2016, p.2.

assumed the full responsibility of terrorist attacks in Europe. According to intelligence reports, Terrorists leaked in crowds thus they would arrive at Europe easily. EU ruling governments have been held the responsible for that by public opinion and opposition parties. Right-wing parties used this as a trump card against the ruling parties in their own countries. Right-wing parties started to rise in front of public opinion. Some of liberal and left-wing parties lost the elections against right-wing parties because of their refuge policy. Majority of Europe's population did not admit their own countries refuge policy. All the happenings prevented EU directly to interfere with Syrian civil war. Beside that there is another important internal issue that Ukrainian crisis. This issue is still unsolved. After these developments, EU could not participate the issue of Syria.

On the other hand, American people were getting excited to elect their new president. Obama administration was being criticized because of some wrong economic policies and also Iraq policy. All these happenings created very comfortable political area for Russia actually. Russia used the opportunity very well.

On January 24, Kazakhstan's capital city Astana witnessed the final day of negotiations between Syria, Russia, Iran, Turkey and the Syrian armed opposition seeking a more comprehensive ceasefire for Syria. The Astana talks became a breakthrough in the process of resolving the Syrian crisis. It was the first time the opposition was brought to table. The sides were able to include an effective role of Tehran and Ankara as guarantors, with Moscow, of the negotiations, and this contributed to the success of the talks. In Astana, the parties started to move towards it. They agreed on marking the combat lines with ISIS and to begin to identify Jabhat al-Nusra's positions. Another condition of an intra-Syrian agreement is a total ceasefire. Russia, Iran and Turkey agreed to create a mechanism to control a truce in Syria. In cooperation with Damascus, the parties will set up a trilateral monitoring body to enforce the ceasefire³⁰. Thus Russia increased its existence not only in Syria but also in the Middle East.

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**LEGAL, SOCIAL AND GENDER ASPECTS
IN MIGRATION FLOW REGULATION IN FRONTIER AREAS**

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Key Words: *migration flows, frontier areas, legal and social status, culture shock, social, psychological support, linguistic problems, gender aspect*

Abstract: *Migration is not a new thing – it is known historically, that people have always had migratory lifestyles, but in the modern world there are too many problems caused by migration that encourage investigation of migration different aspects in order to find solutions to some of the problems. This paper analyzes the inevitable linguistic, social and psychological problems caused by migration flows. There are several kinds of migration, including temporary, permanent, illegal, labor, and disaster- or conflict-induced migration, voluntary or forced (involuntary), permanent and involuntary migration being the worst as it causes the most trouble. The main focus of the article is to outline the problem, to single out its social, psychological and gender aspects as the ones to be investigated, and to offer possible solutions to migration flows regulation problems.*

Back in time many people left native countries to escape poverty and periodic crop failures, political or religious persecution. The situation is very similar today. In fact, people find it easier to migrate because of the availability of efficient transport, improved communications, mass media and information, even though new policies, laws and controls in entry points are much more rigorous than ever before. Yet migration is not an easy process and imposes a lot of stress on migrants because of job and legal status loss, social or civil pressure, and culture or language shock.

The various kinds of migration depend on the flow and number of people often involved, the reasons for their movement, the time they spend in migration, and the nature of that migration. People who relocate to another country due to any possible reason (political, economic, religious, educational or personal) undergo serious psychological changes, experience culture shock and social isolation, and suffer from lack of communication because of a foreign language.

Especially, these problems are vital in frontier areas as the migrant density is high there, their goals are different, and they do not have a sense of belonging because of their temporary stay in the area (even though their migration intentions are permanent). Psychological support to migrants is a vital ingredient of cultural adaptation to a new

country of residence and social inclusion. It helps reduce the conflicts that might appear, prevent stresses and other (sometimes more serious) psychological disorders or even mental illnesses. Culture identity of migrants is at risk, well-being of their family life is on a razor-edge, and their legal and social status is unclear. The purpose of the present study is not to come to a solution of all social or psychological problems that usually appear in the process of relocation to a different country, but to outline these problems, to attract attention to significance of the research in this field and to predict consequences and complications that might occur in case problems are ignored. The methods used for the study are analysis of the situation in general, questionnaires and surveys to single out migrants' social, psychological and linguistic problems, compare and contrast method is used to complete analytical database for frontier areas in order to determine forms of support for different kinds of migrants.

The most unobserved factor in migration studies is gender factor, although male migration for work is being thoroughly researched. The "gender as a variable" approach appeared in many research projects, yet not many of them consider gender factor in decision making process or in gender-specific adaptation to a new country. The impact of migration problems on social and psychological adaptation both of male and female migrants in their new country and cultural environment is being observed, researched, described and analyzed in the present research project.

* * *

Migration processes so inevitable in different parts of the world are well known in the Russian Federation, too, especially in frontier areas. As similar processes in other regions have different causes and development trends, it is necessary to research on particular circumstances of migration processes dynamics, especially in the areas where they appear to be inherently ambiguous. Migration can be defined as a complex social process of going from one country, region or place of residence to settle in another, voluntarily or involuntarily. There are several kinds of migration caused by various factors (political such as conflicts, wars or turmoil; social and economic such as crisis, unemployment, social changes, level of economic development in general; natural disasters such as floods, hurricanes, droughts and famine; religious such as persecution and harassment; educational or individual such as getting vocational education, marriage, family reunion etc.).

The focus of the study is to outline the problem of migration in its modern manifestation (as the problem is not absolutely new, but recurs again and again in different parts of the world in different times because of different historic events), to single out its legal, social, psychological and linguistic aspects as the ones to be investigated, to figure out migration patterns and to offer possible solutions not to the problem in general which is not impossible but extremely arduous and time-consuming, but to its different aspects one step at a time to weaken the burden of migration for many thousands of migrants and their families. Thus it might help lessen political, social and psychological tension in border-line areas and also assist migrants' adaptation in their new home.

Among the significant phenomena causing mass migration of population in different areas there are geopolitical crises as a result of political and economic confrontation between countries and their alliances. In today's Russia the main reason for migration of population is the USSR disintegration, breakdown and further weakening of its influence on Western European countries. Some researchers considered it to be discontinuation of economic aid to the former Soviet countries located in the zone of the USSR geopolitical influence.

The first peculiarity of their existence at that time were constant efforts to search a new leader to follow, so that they could continue to feel vassal dependence on a politically and economically more powerful state. The second peculiarity of their existence was a kind of discrepancy between their expectations and reality of limited sovereignty, but despite this discrepancy they continued unequal partnership on the principles of vassal dependency. As a result they were led to economic stagnation and trade depression, to state institutions and democracy destruction, social life slowdown. In its turn, stagnation caused society organizational structure deformation, labor devaluation and, in general, social life decentration and disorganization.

Nowadays, migration flows all over Europe are the result of political and economic problems, closed businesses, failed banks, and bankrupt factories with the governments having no money or desire to revitalize them. Some of the former Soviet republics were lucky to become a part of Commonwealth of Independent States or European Union and to use the potentials of these unions of developed countries to avoid own crisis or to overcome its consequences. Migration flows became latent in these countries; the result manifested itself in labor force mobility and in freedom of currency transfer within the limits of Schengen zone. Without this factor migration in Eastern Europe would get the features of Asian or Middle East migration, so chaotic, unstoppable and inevitable that the governments of most European countries are seriously concerned about political and economic safety of their countries and have to adopt new migratory laws and to take borderline security measures. Even those countries that used to welcome migrants in their labour markets are now worried about troubles that come along with migrants and migration.

The Russian Federation has also experienced the consequences of uncontrollable mixed migration flows, administrative and criminal offences led to adopting new legislative bans forbidding illegal migration. Thus the article 322.1 of the Criminal Code of Russian Federation provides for the fine and 5 year imprisonment as a penalty for illegal crossing the borderline of the Russian Federation by foreign citizens or people without citizenship, or illegal stay and transit via the territory of the Russian Federation.

It would be erroneous to say that the country is not used to migration and migrants. A phenomenon known as hidden migration was widespread in the Soviet Union, demographic structure of national republics, including Russia itself, was changing a lot during the years of the Communist rule, and as an after-effect of this migration a new multinational community of people, i.e. the Soviet people, was created. The situation is completely different in today's Russian Federation, as growing streams of migrants with the changed involvement of women and children in new migratory streams are flooding the country, a widespread discontent

increases, so the new rules of migration control have been adopted for uncontrollable migration of foreign citizens or people without a citizenship in the Russian Federation or in the frontier area prevention.

In order to highlight some patterns of migration processes and to restrain the problem's aspects for the present study it would be helpful to analyze and to interpret existing studies of the problem in different countries of the world, thus creating a theoretical framework for further practical implementation of ways and methods used in the present study. Literature review is the first step in this process. We don't have to reinvent the wheel, but can and would use whatever results have been achieved in the problem's solution. European countries have a lot of valuable experience of how to deal with unmanageable flows of migrants, ways and methods to mitigate the pains of involuntary migration. Some of them can be taken as they are, while others need adaptation to a different national environment, legal requirements and ethnic peculiarities. Some previous researches have come up with general definitions that are relevant to our present study and can be quoted in this article.

“Migration can be classified in a number of ways; e.g., by the reasons for the migration, the social class and education of the migrating people, the duration of relocation and the geographic distribution of the resettlement. Further, a distinction can be made in the classification of migrants according to whether their contact with the ‘majority’ or ‘dominant’ culture is deemed voluntary. Migrants can be classified as immigrants and sojourners when the change in their location results in contact voluntarily, whereas refugees are deemed to change their location involuntarily” (Berry, Poortinga, Segall et al, 1992).

The process of migration has been described as occurring in broadly three stages. The first stage is pre-migration, involving the decision to be made and preparation to move. The second stage, migration, is the physical relocation of individuals from one place to another. The third stage, post-migration, is defined as the “absorption of the immigrant within the social and cultural framework of the new society”. Social and cultural rules and new roles may be learnt at this stage (Bhugra, 2001). At that last stage legal, social and psychological support is highly appreciated by migrants.

The inference can be made that all by itself migration cannot be considered good or evil, although in many countries business companies see migrants only as cheap unskilled labour force to keep their industry growing at no cost thus getting a competitive place in the world trade market. The good thing about migration is mobility and integration of cultures and ways of life that contribute to world diversity. Migration is an integral part and contributes greatly to the globalization processes in the world. Thanks to globalization the world has shrunk to the size of “global village” with working force moving back and forth across the borderlines and within the countries.

The bad thing is that migrants have hard time coping with problems and adjusting to a new language, culture and a lot of new things in a destination country. The worst of them is that migrants are not always welcomed and accepted by the indigenous community (discrimination and segregation). The first issue addressed at this stage pertains to *social reintegration*. This one is aimed at legal support. The second issue aims at *social support*.

Coping and adaptation can be facilitated by tangible assistance and emotional attachment. Migrants have to deal with a number of stressors, among them tenacious job search and the constitution of a new social network. Prolonged unemployment and lack of social support can result in enduring negative effects (Schwarzer, Jerusalem, 1994).

In Russia migration policy issues are of a different pattern compared to Western Europe, as migrants come to the country not to earn money or due to labour force mobility, their status is determined by the Federal Law №115-FL “About rights of foreign citizens in the Russian Federation”, dated July 25, 2002. This Law identifies legal status of foreign citizens living in the Russian Federation and regulates legal relations between them, the State governmental authorities and local governments within the time period of their temporary stay, business or other activities on the territory of the country.

In order to be accepted by the local community migrants to Russia should accept rules and ways of life, supported by the local population and Russian legislature; the law should be the mainspring of migration flows and direct them to mutual benefit both of migrants and local population in compliance with International Law standards. Using such approach the local authorities consider migration as inevitable historic event and do their best to integrate newcomers into different structures of Russian market economy in a civilized way, filling a business niche keenly experiencing the shortage of labour force, avoiding overpopulation and other hazards connected with migration.

But the migration problems cannot be solved in a course of chaotic measures, following supply and demand of the labour market. Relying exclusively on the market economic strategy the Russian government had not known what to do with uncontrollable multimillion migration flow until the Federal Law №109-FL “About migration census of foreign citizens and people without citizenship” dated July 18, 2006 was adopted. This Law established new forms of migration flows authorized regulation, complying with the Constitution of Russian Federation and respecting the rights of those who (after having been reintegrated and having become legal residents of the country) could enjoy free migration within the country, free choice of residence location, and other rights and freedoms of Russian Federation citizens. This Law greatly influenced national interests of Russian people and foreign citizens in the migration sphere.

Analyzing current situation both on the local and worldwide scale, investigating migration processes and migration legislature reforms should ensure balanced migration policy targeted at interests consensus first on the local, then on regional and federal, and after all on global levels. Besides, framework projects are highly demanded on federal level, however their implementation should be provided by standard legal documents of local government as the majority of migration problems are solved on the local level, and inclusion of migrants into local community activities always takes place where they reside and work. Moreover, the Federal Law № 115-FL states that foreign citizens as RF permanent residents can vote and be elected to local municipal authorities; also they can take part in local referendums. So they can enjoy their democratic rights as well.

The next in importance migration problem is migrants uncontrollable settling on the Russian Federation territory, but uncontrollable does not mean chaotic; on the contrary, migration flows have their own logic and migrants have their own interests and targeted areas. In the end, the majority of migrants settle in the places where they can find jobs; by doing this they create additional tension in such spheres as social assistance, free housing, job vacancies, medical service and city infrastructure. It is no secret that migrants do not comply with the infrastructure work; more often they abuse the system. That is why local population is not happy with the aliens “invasion” and do not hesitate to demonstrate it by hostile actions and incidents.

Although migration of any kind contributes to diversity of languages, cultures, religious beliefs, ethnicities and races in developed countries, it also causes a lot of political, economic and psychological problems both to migrants and population of receiving countries. Because of increasing migration flows into different parts of the globe, today’s multicultural world community has turned into a “melting pot” shaped by the migration of people from different cultural, religious, racial and ethnic backgrounds. But despite positive effects on the planet in general, the combination of the migration factors: native country and home bereavement, cultural identity and cultural congruity deprivation along with economical, psychological and social factors play a major role in the increased rates of stress or even mental illnesses in migrant groups. Migration factors also include culture shock, a discrepancy between expectations and achievement, and acceptance by the new nation are potential post-migration factors (Bhugra, 2001).

These factors can be thought of as vulnerability factors, and along with biological, social and psychological variables migrants may experience feelings of alienation and mental distress, with consequent difficulty in settling into the new society. Social change, assimilation and cultural identity may be significant factors in the relationship between migration and mental illness (Bhugra, 2004). Vulnerability factors include the loss of cultural norms, religious customs, and social support systems; also there may be adjustments to a new language, culture and changes in identity and concept of self. Eisenbruch (1991, pp.673–680) has defined cultural bereavement as “the experience of the uprooted person – or group – resulting from loss of social structures, cultural values and self-identity: the person – or group – continues to live in the past, is visited by supernatural forces from the past while asleep or awake, suffers feelings of guilt over abandoning culture and homeland, feels pain if memories of the past begin to fade, but finds constant images of the past (including traumatic images) intruding into daily life, yearns to complete obligations to the dead, and feels stricken by anxieties, morbid thoughts, and anger that mar the ability to get on with daily life”.

For many people migration can be compared to survival in the extreme situation (in the desert, in the jungle or amidst the ocean), it demands great efforts to overcome all the extremities and adjust to a new life situation. Migration can be considered a non-normative critical life event (Cohen, 1988; Montada, Filipp, & Lerner, 1992; Williams & Westermeyer, 1988). As with other critical events (such as accidents, losses, divorces, illnesses or deaths), the corresponding psychological crisis may have a tremendous impact on an individual's personality development, psychosocial functioning, and health.

Sometimes this process exceeds the migrant's physiological and psychological resources, and only the feeling of threat to migrants themselves and their beloved (children and family) keeps them going. That is why efficient professional assistance is highly appreciated. Individuals who migrate experience multiple stresses that can impact their mental well-being, leading to different psychological disorders and even mental illnesses. Indeed the rates of mental illness are increased in some migrant groups. Factors of stress are the loss of a mother tongue and cultural identity; being deprived of familiar environment in general, living in crowded housing conditions, experiencing (un)employment burden and necessity to re-establish their social networks or to regain social contacts.

In order to help different groups of involuntary migrants, a detail research is extremely necessary, especially in the field of migrants' relations with the local population for migrants' adaptation and locals' tolerant acceptance of aliens as their neighbours. In social integration psychological support plays an important role in adaptation process and weakening cultural and ethnic barriers between both sides. It is a psychologist's main duty to develop a certain kind of tolerance culture in order to help people comprehend different culture and a different way of life. There is an urgent need to investigate psycho-social adaptation of migrants and as a result of this investigation a program of psychological and social support should be tailor-made which would take into account more detailed knowledge about peculiar problems of the given group of migrants: their social status, gender differences, age differences should be considered in the research as women and children integrate into social networks easier and faster than men, they readjust to new living conditions and cultural environment better than men. In a crisis situation, active networking can represent an instrumental way of coping. When challenges are faced, losses occur and social support is needed, the mere existence of social ties is a crucial prerequisite for instrumental coping. (Schwarzer, Hahn and Schroder, 1994, pp.57–69).

Over the last decade, no research has considered gender in different theories of international migration. Yet, understanding gender is critical in the migration context and relocation problem solution. First, because theory of migration has traditionally emphasized the causes of international migration over questions of who migrates, it has often failed to adequately address gender-specific migration experiences. Without theoretical research it becomes difficult to explain the conditions under which women migrate, or why women participate in certain migration flows. Second, traditional theory fails to help us understand the circumstances that encourage women to become transnational migrants, to enter into trafficking channels, or to seek refugee resettlement. Answering these questions and other more gender-sensitive inquiries requires showing how a seemingly gender-neutral process of movement is, in fact, highly gender-specific and may result in differential outcomes for men and women (Grieco, Boyd, 1989, pp.98–139).

To understand gender-specific psychology of female migration it is necessary to consider major research areas that represent its current status and will predict the future outcomes. Psychology of women has come a long way from Helene Deutsch's psychoanalytic writing (1944-1945) and the century-long tradition of gender differences research in psychology. Psychology of women today includes three branches: (a) psychological research of women-

associated issues such as family violence, sexual abuse, persecution and rape; (b) gender-specific psychology focused on gender differences (anatomical, anthropological, psychological), and (c) feminist psychology emphasizing equal opportunities for women in different spheres of life.

To answer the question “How can gender be incorporated into general understanding of migration, its problems and ways of their possible solution?” a certain theory should be applied. From a variety of “grand theories” Bem’s gender schema theory has been chosen for the purposes of our research. The gender schema theory focuses attention on gender stereotyping development and creating a particular schema of gender specified behaviour and its reflexive understanding. According to Bem, a gender schema is a person’s general knowledge framework about gender, with which information is processed and organized based on gender-linked associations. Children gradually form a gender schema as they learn their culture’s network of associations with gender. Moreover, the gender schema becomes linked to self-concept so that children, as part of their motivation to become “good” girls or boys, engage in the gender-appropriate behaviour specified by the gender schema (Bem, 1981, pp.354–364).

History of contemporary gender related studies of migration flows can be traced from the beginning of the 1960s. In the 1960s and early 1970s the phrase “migrants and their families” was a code for “male migrants and their wives and children.” (Boyd, 1989, pp.638–671). Such attitude made women as migrants almost invisible, assuming their passive role in the migration process, complete dependence on males and their roles and responsibilities as wife, mother, daughter or sister while men were playing the role as breadwinners and providers for the family. It was assumed that women could not have their own reasons for migration, but followed their men wherever they moved. The advantage of such approach was that it finally marked differences between men and women in their individual decisions to migrate and also in integration into social niche of their new home country.

The development of new economic and social conditions in the world has changed the roles people used to play in their family life; unified household decisions are now made by equal beneficial outcomes from all members. The diverse interests of men and women in family life, their social status, qualification and education strongly suggest that women may affect decisions about who migrates, for how long, and to what country.

The argument that gender is an integral part of the migration process and that theories of migration must incorporate it has also influenced other areas of migration research. At the global level, economic development may affect the roles of men and women in different ways, thus stimulating or retarding the international migration of women versus men. The way both men and women migrate and settle in a new country, adapt to new legal, social, cultural and linguistic environment, continue contact with the original country and plan possible return there is of particular psychological interest. We can consider gender as a core organizing principle that underlies migration and related processes, influences people’s behaviour and expectations. Masculinity and femininity are regarded in migration context regardless of sex.

Throughout the 1980s and 1990s further changes in social and gender roles of men and women occurred despite the gender schema. *The gender schema* is “socially constructed and reconstructed” matrix of identities, behaviours, and power relationships that are constructed by the culture of a society in accordance with sex (Bem, 1981).

The 2000s saw masculine women and feminine men both in their attitudes and behaviour. This means that gender is not immutable but changes through social time and in different social settings. Social roles, content of gender and social relationships are assigned to people according to a particular time or a particular setting. While sex is defined as a biological outcome of chromosomal structures, gender roles in society are culturally-based and culturally-biased. They mean the hierarchies of power, domination, and control. It is interesting to examine the dynamics of power relationships and authority within the family when men migrate as a labour force, leaving women behind in the origin country, or when women migrate to find a job in a foreign country leaving men to take care of a household and children. In this case a “gender role” is changed into a “market role” and should be considered accordingly.

How does gender affiliation affect people’s ability to migrate, the decision they make, the timing, the causes of migration, and the final destination? How does it help adjust in a new social, legal and cultural environment? How do women’s relationships to family members, including spouses, change with migration? How do social roles change when people get into a new cultural surrounding? How is patriarchy (matriarchy) altered or reconstituted immediately before and after migration? How does migration process influence power relations and decision making roles between men and women? These are research questions that are to be answered in our research project. It is a longitudinal study and comparative analyses project intended for 6 years, as a result of which Longitudinal Migration Database will be compiled.

Previous analyses in different research works have focused on the specific role of unemployment after migration and its consequences on physical health (Schwarzer, Jerusalem, & Hahn, 1994) and on anxiety and depression (Schwarzer, Hahn, & Jerusalem, 1993). In contrast, our present research considers development of social relationships as an instrument of adjustment and coping with problems. In the present study different important factors that influence the participants’ levels of adaptation are investigated. Social support and active participation in social life of the community are found to be of the most significant forces that influence the process of adaptation. It determines the choice of the acculturation strategies, and, consistent with previous research in this field (Walsh, Horenczyk 2001, pp.501–528), the appraisal of acquired roles within family and society, perceived cultural and social identity, and the choice of coping strategies.

As a result of our study, due to a great number of migrants in South Federal District of the Russian Federation (a frontier area is located 40 kilometres away from the Ukrainian border and flooded with voluntary and involuntary mixed migration flows fleeing the war and escaping from the South Eastern part of Ukraine) and the requirements of local authorities a significant initiative in the area is implemented in students’ voluntary “research and

assistance” project. The main idea of the project is to determine if linguistic and cultural differences could negatively affect communication between local people and migrants and aggravate adaptation into new community. Students who participate in the project as volunteers have to collect significant information to keep records about challenges and changes that migrants have to face and to arrange free-of-charge legal advice, social assistance and psychological support to migrants and their families within the framework of counselling centres.

Methodology

Research data are being collected through questionnaires, surveys, information analysis, desk research, study of the relevant laws and migration policy tools related to equality of sexes and non-discrimination, cultural participation, participation in social life, along with other aspects of social cohesion and inclusion in society. This research will be complemented in 2017 by data produced by Statistics Agency and the analysis of existing relevant statistical data at the national level.

To create a theoretical framework for our study the following methods have been used: literature review to find out and highlight patterns in migration as a modern phenomenon in general; statistic data, facts and figures analysis to create analytical database and to make our study reliable and valid; questionnaires and surveys among migrants to determine aspects of the problem and to compile and implement the program of support; “compare and contrast” method to outline respondents’ ethnic peculiarities, linguistic and cultural difficulties that emerge in the course of adaptation. Also, in order to compile and implement the program of support, different questionnaires and surveys have been used to ascertain the level of migrants’ social desadaptation, civil rights deprivation, legal abuse and psychological discomfort in their new country, all these needed to restrain the problem’s aspects to those that can be solved not on the governmental, but on the local level with the help of volunteers. Both respondents and interviewers are volunteers.

The students’ project in Taganrog Institute of Management and Economics (the city of Taganrog, RF) was designed as a longitudinal study with three measurement points over 3 years and was initially launched to gain relevant data about the migrants’ adaptation and coping processes. Participation of migrants in this project is voluntary and guaranteed anonymous. Along with the research free psychological and legal support to participants is provided by the students. The main objective of the assistance is to help form communicative skills and cultural schema, to develop migrants’ emotional world and self-control or control over the situation, to develop anger or fear control, to motivate their independence and ability to take responsibility for their own life and lives of their families, to mitigate culture shock, to facilitate adaptation in a new working environment and new living conditions, as well to rediscover their new identity in different situations, which will teach them to be socially flexible in the new cultural and ethnic surrounding. In our research we have shown that the communication and cultural difficulties between migrants and native speakers not only lead to misunderstanding but have also contributed to alienation and anger, racial discrimination and

harassment, intolerance and even xenophobia. Both linguistic and cultural differences produce the problem, as the language spoken by one group is a product of their cultural schema and is not comprehended by another group. That is why great attention in the project is paid not only to migrants' learning a language, but also to building a cultural schema (lifestyle, non-verbal communication, social interaction, attitude to interlocutor etc.).

One of the major advantages of the project is its longitudinal design that allows the examination of social relations development, of success or failure of migrants' interaction in the community over a long time. Integration in the society and assimilation there can help migrants to cope with problems, to overcome feelings of loss and helplessness. Special psychological support is needed in the acculturation process, while the migrant's culture is incorporated in the cultural schema of a majority population in their new homeland.

As a result of the project, a huge theoretical and statistical database is compiled based on the literature analysis and respondents' answers to interviews, questionnaires and surveys questions. Besides, psychological testing was provided according to the results of which measures of psychological adaptation and different kinds of training were suggested. Legal advice is offered upon request in the Students' Legal Advice Office (Legal Clinic). Social support is provided within the framework of the Migrants' Social Adaptation Program sponsored by the local government. Therefore both theoretical and applied results have been achieved by the students' project implementation. Valuable contribution has been made by the students into the area sustainable development and migration risks management.

Conclusion

Migration is a complex process, involving a variety of causes and motives. Migrants do not simply move to a different geographical area, they gain new cultural experiences, a new legal and social status, learn a new language and culture; all of these can be highly stressful and may influence migrants' psychological health and safety. The stresses of the migration process are harmful, but combined with an unclear legal status, lack of social support, unemployment; a discrepancy between expectations and reality, economic hardships, a lack of proper housing, medical care, and religious practice can lead to lots of legal, financial and social problems, and these factors definitely jeopardize migrants' psychological or physiological health.

Legal, social, linguistic and psychological support should be provided to migrants in order to prevent bigger problems, understanding of vulnerability factors and scientific research of migration and migrants can help arrange preventive measures designed to lessen social tension and psychological pressure upon migrants and their families.

Students of different majors (Law, Psychology, Social Studies, Foreign Languages and Governmental and Municipal Management) participation in the project helps not only find solution to different aspects of migration problem in the area, but also motivate students to implement their theoretical knowledge and practical skills into real life situation, thus

contributing both to their own professional development and to the area's political, economic and social sustainable development.

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**THE PROSPECTS OF REHABILITATION CONCERNING
THE UNDERAGE MIGRANT VICTIMS OF HUMAN TRAFFICKING**

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Key Words: *migration, refugees, children's rights*

Abstract: *The wave of migration in recent years can be interpreted as one of the biggest challenge of our time and so by its global nature it requires sufficient concerted solutions. It is essential to emphasize the significance of human trafficking during the discussing of process of current migration. As being a wide-ranging organized crime which concerns the whole world not just some countries, human trafficking is an integral part of migration. However, the exploitation of victims is independent from the process of migration, it also exists in itself. By adopting some useful tricks, traffickers are almost invisible for the authorities. Human trafficking- like any other features of migration- means significant burden for the affected countries on the area of public health, economy and justice. The features of the path to the proper prevention are: legislative harmonisation, exact collection of data, the flow of information, exposition of experiences, sharing of foremost practises and help the victims.*

* * *

Human trafficking – which apart from the fact that it is a very serious crime also violates human dignity – is standing at the centre of the international attention in the past some decades and the fight against it, the thought and practice of the international actions have already been drafted in several significant international and European documents and were acted on too. Child prostitution as one most repugnant phenomenon of our days requires significant preventive solutions from the society during which we have to make even more people be aware of this existing problem. The sexual abuse does not only refer to the infants of course but the adult women too, who are usually enticed to certain Western-European countries with false work promises.

It is essentially important to make difference between the notion of human smuggling and human trafficking because a lot of problems originate from the mixing of the two notions which make the official measures difficult. The main point of human smuggling is that the person who wants to emigrate pays certain smugglers to transport them into the desired country, whereas, because of the complex nature of the notion of human trafficking and the

different opinion of the different countries it is difficult to define the notion of human trafficking exactly. According to the UNODC (2000), human trafficking can be identified with the following notions: victim collection-recruitment, transport, hiding, pressure, limitation, enticement, physical abuse. In many cases young girls, children are enticed with false promises from their homeland, encouraging them that they will be able to support their family but in the reality this work only means prostitute work.

Sexual abuse of children

According to the average estimations, every year more than one million, in great majority infant refugee children, get onto the sex-market all over the world who mostly come from the countries of the third world. The same proportion of children arrives at the labour market. According to exact figures 170 million children do undeserved work. We are obliged to mention the participation of children in armed combats and their active participation in drug trafficking. (ECPAT, 2004) Besides, it is very “profitable” to train the children from the countries of the Balkan region to purse-snatchers in the Western developed countries, just for example the United Kingdom. It is not rare either that the children make the children work as domestic servants. (<https://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2015/may/23/vietnam-children-trafficking-nail-bar-cannabis>, 2015). In the most cases the infants who are forced to sexual “work” usually come to court as perpetrators who have chosen this way of life on their own, say the authorities. The sexual abuse of this kind of children abroad can only be considered as illegal “migration problem” according to the foreign authorities too, after which we cannot talk about forced labour. The lack of the suitable procedure also originates from the proper social judgement too during which it is difficult to define and determine the way and the level of the children-exploitation.

It is difficult to find a kind of uniform definition which copes with all cultural, social circumstances and it is of the same importance, because the use of the children’s work and its judgement are changing from one culture to another. (Jaguszti-Bodnár, 2008) One example is that the fates of the children living in the third world who are regularly performing burdensome physical works, where the local authorities and communities, do not denounce the children labour because the participation of children in the world of work has socially been accepted for a long time. (Nichols, 1993)

According to the standpoint of International Labour Organization (2011), the child prostitution and pornography belong to the most serious types of the force labour which forms the most terrible part of the human trafficking for the sake of its complex character too. The exploited children are violated many times both in physical and in mental sense of meaning because in many cases they are also the victims of sexual exploitation out of the household and agricultural work. By the sexual exploitation of children we mean the following: sex tourism, forcing to marriage, prostitution, sexual exploitation through mediators, making and distributing pornographic video, film, photo and sound records of children. (European Council, 2005)

The exploitation of children with commercial purpose knows no bounds, mostly in the regions where the child prostitution is intensively required and the local economic, social and legal situations also contribute to the development of the child prostitution. It is sad to note that we do not have exact figures of the age and number of the exploited children which makes the definition of the problem more difficult. Not only the children are exported into the developed countries but many clients are travelling into the undeveloped regions (South-East Asia, Africa, Eastern Europe, Latin America and the region of the Caribbean Sea) in order to use the services of the child traffickers. (ECPAT, 2008) The political opening of Eastern Europe contributes to the spread of the child prostitution very much too, owing to which a lot of “clients” visited our country and the surrounding countries for child prostitution from the 90s (Romania, Ukraine, Bulgaria, Albania, Russia). The existence of the problem cannot be denied in these countries, that is why a lot of preventive solutions and rules were born in these countries, however, regrettably, no special measurements were born that could enforce the rights of children and prevent child prostitution. The roots of the problem are that the workers and employees in the jurisdiction and the child welfare have insufficient knowledge regarding the recognition of the phenomenon.

International Organization For Migration (2011) considers the imprisonment of the prostitutes a primary problem, it means that it does not count the exploited persons to be victims, accordingly, they do not receive any suitable support and assistance either. In many cases the assistance depends on certain conditions according to which they can only receive support and assistance after the human traffickers had been identified. The sexually exploited children bear the imprints of the child prostitution during their life, in the mental, physical and social meaning too. They are often victims of serious venereal disease, even with fatal end and they show the lifelong signs of self-estimation problems, depression which makes their reintegration in the society more difficult and the quality of their performance at school too. (Póczik, 2011) Moreover, these children also have to face the unwanted pregnancy and the terrible experience of abortion and its physical consequences. The role of drugs makes the rehabilitation of children who have experienced such horror much more difficult which are used by the “procurers” as an instrument in order to hold the children. These children will belong to the drug dependents until the end of their life. Children often consider using drugs as useful means with which they do not take notice of the horrors they undergo in the reality. Unfortunately, the prospect for the future for these children is the adult prostitution and other series of crimes committed for their existence. We can mention the defective school qualification as one possible explanation of the above mentioned and as a result of their social integration problems they are unable to take part in the society effectively.

The majority of the victims of children trafficking come out of the children living in the poorer regions where the family of the child do not find any other financial resource than selling the children. On the basis of many social values and traditions the female children are in discriminated situation, so, it can give significant reason for the migration and the desire to succeed in other countries. Children from these societies got on the market of child prostitution mostly not by their own choice. We have to mention the fate of those children leaving their family who are socially disadvantaged on their own free will, in the hope for a

better world but the reality keeps only defencelessness for them. Therefore, we can definitely state that the family life of the given child affects his future quality of life. Many children get into state care out of this reason and they try to flee several times from the institution. (Póczik, Fehér, 2008) Unfortunately, the investigation of the case not only depends on the goodwill of the representatives of the authority because we can state in general that the authorities do not investigate the individual cases considering the lack of capacity and the clearing up of the real perpetrators does not happen in most cases. We can see many examples that children only mean a burden for the certain police office because they divert significant resources from the police. (Herzocg, Gyurkó, 2005) The younger a child is the easier they can suffer a loss in psychical meaning of the word because they still do not have the suitable mental protection and intellectual functions. Accordingly, at earlier age a child undergoes a sexual abuse the more difficult it is to heal the psychological scars. Besides all one can say that the rehabilitation of a child with more stable psychical condition is a much easier process. Of course, the length and seriousness of the exploitation is a significant factor in respect of the mental and physical consequences. It is an important fact that the girls experience a bigger trauma by the sexual exploitation than the boys. (Kovács, 1997) The relation of the child and the perpetrator is an important factor too. Domestic violence means the biggest trauma for the child, while in case of the foreign perpetrator the rehabilitation of the child through adapting him into a family is easier because the family means safety for him in connection with the unknown. (Virág, 1995) In connection with the “success” of the perpetrators it is important to remark the organized companies which can perform their “traffic” with their well-coordinated operation without disruption. The organised networks obtain children to be sold in two different ways. The one method is the false promise for the families after which they offer household works under suitable circumstances for the child. Of course, in many cases the parents are aware of the sexual exploitation abuse and they get rid of their children against this background, besides, the method that is used by the human traffickers is kidnapping.

As far as the children’s sexual exploitation is concerned, the most important fact to mention is that while there is a demand for the sexual abuse of the children this terrible crime will not stop unfortunately. One interesting case of the decision made on behalf of the preventive purposes is the law introduced in Holland according to which they count on the decrease of the crime with legalizing prostitution. The case of Holland is especially noticeable because we can meet a very high proportion of the child prostitution the big part of whom is “delivered” from foreign countries, mainly from Nigeria. (Tiggloven, 2001) After the local organization about 5000 foreign girls in number are made worked as prostitutes.

UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

If somebody act in contravention of the right in the form of sexual abuse against a child, the primary law to be applied is the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child that was legislated in 1989 by the UN, according to which the member states assume the obligation regarding the prevention of the sexual abuse with commercial purpose and their rehabilitation. (Act C of 2012 on the Criminal Code, 2012) Unfortunately, no significant further steps have happened

during a lot of decades, right until 2000, when the United Nations emphasizes the protection of the rights of children in its Millennium Declaration then the most important action has happened when the ILO has accepted the agreement No 182. (55/2. United Nations Millennium Declaration, 2000) This step has an indescribably big importance because the existence and the definition of the children's sexual abuse and the possibilities of handling the serious consequences of it were drafted here the first time.

With the publication of the Supplementary Protocol we can already read exact definitions in connection with the child trafficking and the child prostitution. (UNICEF, 2009) The Protocol has made a lot of important steps for the prevention and rehabilitation of the problem, among others, the definition of the child trafficking was drafted here the first time, in the lack of which it is more difficult to pass a sentence against the child abuser and its one hinge is that the exploitation of a child with commercial purpose can be forbidden with reference to this law. However, the most important point of the "fight" against human trafficking is the Supplementary Protocol on the Human Trafficking of 2004 (United Nations, 2004), which arises several important questions from which one most important is that the question that is particularly worrying is formulated finally, whether in case of the sexual abuse of a person younger than 18 we have to calculate with the fact whether the infant in question has agreed with the exploitation or not.

Summary

One can definitely state that human smuggling does not equal with the notion of migration but at the same time any immigrant can become the victim of the human trafficking very easily. The problem is global against which concerted and powerful actions have to be made. Young girls leave their home in the hope of a better work, while most of the children are sold by their own parents for a little money in the hope that the child's fate will be better in a better world. Even if we cannot prevent these cases we have to assist the process of the victims' rehabilitation and the reintegration into the society at least.

The rehabilitation and treatment of the children who became the victims of the sexual work with commercial purpose or any other exploitation are of high importance. However, there is no special care in many countries of Europe (first of all among the countries which have joint the EU recently or are waiting for the joining) which would assist the therapy and rehabilitation of the victims of the sexual exploitation. It is in the complex nature of the problem, as a properly effective prevention with the common application of the fight against poverty, the programmes against child poverty, family supporting systems, anti-discrimination and equal opportunity programmes, implementation of the children's rights, therapeutic occupations with the perpetrators of sexual abuses, supports for the endangered families we could create the possibility that the least possible children become the victims of sexual exploitation.

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THE EFFECTS OF MIGRATION PRODUCED ON THE GERMAN SOCIETY**Edina Wittmann**

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Abstract: *In the history of the Federal Republic of Germany it has been the target country of the immigrants since 1955. Most of the citizens with migration background migrated from Turkey to Germany as of 1961. For the reason that they were not considered as immigrants but foreign workers their integration into the society seemed to be unnecessary because they would stay only temporarily in the country, the Germans thought. Because of the integration that did not happen and the structural changes since the end of the 1980s the second and the third generations have significant integration problems.*

The continuous decrease of the governing parties in Germany and the strengthening of the smaller radical parties pose a serious challenge to the democratic structures.

The radicalisation of the union with the name of PEGIDA and the increasing support is as dangerous as the movements of the radical far left. It is a fact that these extremist organisations are popular in the eastern territories first of all, however, the number of the persons with migration background is the lowest just there.

It is clear that the NPD (National Democratic Party of Germany) wins its new supporters from the poorer segments of the society first of all, the most absurd fact is that exactly the citizens with migration background are talking about the immigrants with hate in Germany.

The best instruments of the integration are the stable economy and the job for the immigrants. This is the reason why the proportion of the immigrants is much higher in the territories with lower unemployment rate, however, much smaller part of the population belongs to any extreme organization and the integration of the citizens with migration background is much more successful too.

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1. Introduction

In the 20th-21st century such significant changes took place on the field of politics, society and economy which cannot absolutely be left out when one considers the security policy. We could experience radical changes on all fields of life in the past decades and most of them came as a surprise to us. The global financial crisis was just the last in the series of our convictions and system of belief. As a consequence of globalization there is no part of the world which would not have been affected by the massive migration. As a result of the even more frequent local wars, conflicts, natural disasters, millions of people are forced to leave their home and mother country.

Wandering has been an important part of the history of humanity from the very beginning, history is essentially the story of wanderings and wanderers. One typical character of people's wandering of people, it means the migration, is that the group of indigenous and incomer people contact and communicate with each other and as result of this the wanderers can be either admitted or refused by the local communities. Sometimes wandering implies conflicts and raises the series of questions of culture philosophy, political sciences, sociology, anthropology, (national) economic and (national) security from the point of historical and theoretical point of view.

Migration is now and will be a national, safety and social key issue. At the same time it is a problem of security and immigration policy, employment, penal and social policy too. The perception of safety is subjective and it substantially depends on the receiving social medium and the sociological, economical, historical, political and other situation of the incomer persons and groups. These are the viewpoints according to which the author is examining the reasons of the development of the Pegida organization that appeared in Germany and refers to the human sector of safety and the possible perspectives to avoid its becoming politically extreme in the explanation of the human dimension of the modern security policy. The goal of the essay is to reveal the facts alone and it is focusing only on the description of the events. Along the political borderlines the author does not want to take sides.

As it is revealed by Ildikó Lőwi in her article with the title " Cultural pluralism in the light of the international migration" that the intensive experience of the incidents in connection with the migration often causes the negative feelings come to a head of which consequences cannot be foreseen. Caused by the modern migration of people and the international migration the common living of different cultures, identities can happen and as a result of this prejudice, xenophobia can appear¹.

Gordon W. Allport, one personage of the American social psychology is examining the mechanism of the development of prejudices in connection with the relationships among the groups. Prejudice – he writes – is only reflecting the individual's general way of thinking of the world".² The organisation that was grown up on the ground of the German multiculturalism, the Pegida that expresses the opinion of the majority in connection with the

¹ Lőwi, I. (n.d.) Cultural pluralism in reflect of the international migration. *Hadtudomány*, 2016 Annual electronic [pdf] Available at: <http://real.mtak.hu/37523/1/14_LC591wi20IldikC3B3_u.pdf> [Accessed on 2 October 2016]

immigrants in the first decade of the 21st century, identified itself with the thoughts of Allport².

The topic of my analyses is the effects that are produced on the society by the migration which I will illustrate by the example of Germany. The German language means the “economic immigrants” when it is about the expression “immigrant” who decided to leave their home only for economic reasons with the purpose to work under better conditions than in their mother country and to apply for a residence permission in order to work and for a settlement permission after having stayed in Germany 5 years long.

The present analyses considers the persons who are already leaving in Germany and have a migration background as immigrants and not those who apply for the status of political refugee who were forced to leave their home because of war or persecution.

My analysis is focusing on the security policy risks that are produced on the democratic order by migration.

My analysis touches upon the general legal background of the question, afterwards I introduce the history of migration from the 50s in Europe, then in Germany. I also introduce the questions of the increasing social safety that are concerned by the appearance of the first generation immigrants.

In the framework of this I will analyse the different forms of the motivations of migration in more details. I also mention the security policy challenges that are produced by the so-called “late displaced persons” who, in spite of being German citizens, are fighting the same problems as the immigrants. I will also emphasize the differences between the problems of the “late displaced persons” and the Muslim immigrants which concern the second and third generations the most. In the course of this I introduce those real factors that are threatening the security policy and affect the citizens by the so-called “honour-murders” committed by a group of immigrants.

Thereafter, I will analyse the answer that are given by the politics and the voters to the problems that originate from the integration of the immigrants. First of all I would mention the dangers here that concern the CDU-SPD big coalition that was established in 2013 which has already been experienced during the EP elections 8 months later. The failures that affected CDU are significant but the unpopularity of the junior governing party is also historical. The successes of the right-wing parties against migration, within this the AfD (Alternative for Germany) that was founded in 2013, make us think. We can find all of these in the unsuccessful attempts of the governing parties of the past years for the elimination of the parallel societies too.

During the answers to the security policy risks that are caused by migration I am focusing on the social safety, it means the factors that are influencing the subjective safety feeling. One can also draw a conclusion from the selling statistics of the German book that gives answers to the questions that is on the mind of the inhabitants and it is indicative that the bestsellers of

² Allport, G., 2009. The prejudice. In: F. Erős: Directions and tendencies in the research of prejudices. Study, p.5.

the past five years were works that show both the immigrants and the migration politics of Germany in critical lights. The fact itself proves that the official migration politics of Germany is not in harmony with the interests and values represented by the voters. In the light of this it is only the question of time when and how much the extremist parties will grow stronger.

I also make my further social sampling without fullness, rather to evoke some thoughts. I will also introduce the migration problems of Germany on the provincial levels, first of all through the example of Berlin that is fighting the most problems and Bavaria with the best integration of the foreigners.

In my analyses I not only want to highlight the problem but I also show some solutions with which, even if the security policy challenges cannot be abolished but kept on a certain level.

2. Start of migration in Germany

On the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany there are living 16.4 million people with migration background according to the data of the Federal Statistical Office of 2014.³ Among them one can find the then foreign workers and their descendants, people with German nationality who returned from the territory of the ex-Soviet Union and their descendants, people who applied for right of asylum and the foreigners who applied for the citizenship after a stay more than 8 years. I will analyse these groups and those factors from the approach of security policy which play a security policy risk and the effects they produce too. Furthermore I analyse how much the success of the extremist more and more popular parties can be brought into connection with the migration and the integration of the immigrants and how far the certain migration groups and their members pose risks from the point of view of national safety.

I consider it important to mention the integration policy that has been applied since the beginning of migration and the changes that happened in the Citizenship Law.

After the World War II the government tried to give solution to the labour shortage that has developed as a result of the loss of people with foreign, first of all European immigrants. Germany concluded a labour recruitment contract in 1955 with Italy first. Accordingly, 100 thousand⁴ Italian citizens could undertake work on the territory of the Federal Republic. As a result of this agreement, the mediation of the mass of labourforce started to Germany in the 20th century.

The Catholic Church, the local society organizations, like for example the Caritas, also tried to assist the temporary stay of the Italian workers in Germany. The Church for example has

³ Migrationshintergrund: Zahl der Zuwanderer in Deutschland so hoch wie noch nie [online] Available at: <<https://www.destatis.de/DE/ZahlenFakten/GesellschaftStaat/Bevoelkerung/MigrationIntegration/Migrationshintergrund/Migrationshintergrund.html>> [Accessed on 1 October 2016]

⁴ Die ersten Gastarbeiter [online] Available at: <<http://www.zeitklicks.de/brd/zeitklicks/zeit/alltag/wohnen-und-leben-1/die-ersten-gastarbeiter>> [Accessed on 2 September 2016]

provided a native pastor for the Italian people and they also did their best to provide experts in law in labour who are speaking Italian.⁵ The above agreement that was concluded in Rome has been closed five years later, in 1960 with two other South European countries, Spain and Greece, then in 1961 with the native country of the biggest group of immigrants, Turkey by German Federal Republic. This latter agreement was the most debatable because Theodor Bland, labour minister, and the majority of the government fearing from the tension out of the significant social, cultural differences between the two countries were against Turkey's participation in the programme, however, as a result of pressure from the USA, Germany has agreed that they approve the boom of the newly elected NATO member.⁶ According to the agreement with Turkey, 825 thousand of people received the possibility to work in Germany. Previously, the Greek, Spain and Turkish citizens have already had the possibility to stay for some years in Germany in order to acquire qualification since 1958.

After the labour recruitment contract some foreign workers arrive from the above countries who can return to their home after some years. The German idea did not even question the future return of the immigrants because according to their interests they wanted to use the foreign workers until that they could cover the labour shortage of German workers.⁷ Accordingly, the foreign workers would have only received permission for a one-year-long work, however, they did not put this regulation into the practice, which meant that the foreign workers settled down.⁸

This fact is important for the reason that the early integration of the foreign workers or any kind of attempt did not happen because these people were only considered as "temporarily residing".

2.1. The Turkish immigration from the 1970s

Most of the foreign workers arrived from Turkey in the Federal Republic of Germany, until 1973 more than 860 thousand workers. Today the number of the individuals with Turkish migration background exceeds 2.5 million. They represent the biggest group of the immigrants so.⁹

However, the early economic advantages from the point of view of the host country seemed to change because the foreign workers became not only the contributor but the claimant of the social system too. To limit this, the family of the foreign workers received only the half of the children benefits at home, therefore even more foreign workers have been followed by their family members and they moved to the Federal Republic of Germany too.

⁵ 50 Jahre Deutsch-Italienischer Anwerbevertrag [online] Available at: <<http://www.dbk.de/presse/details/?presseid=633&cHash=1f758a339061817257abe9ee61072fc3>> [Accessed on 2 October 2016]

⁶ Türkische Gastarbeiter kamen auf Druck der USA [online] Available at: <<https://www.unzensuriert.at/content/002553-T-rkische-Gastarbeiter-kamen-auf-Druck-der-USA>> [Accessed on 23 September 2016]

⁷ Weg mit dem Maulkorb [online] Available at: <<http://www.taz.de/!5168897>> [Accessed on 2 October 2016]

⁸ Esterluss, K., 2009. *Eine Dekade macht eine neue Welt*. Norderstedt: Grin Verlag, p.8.

⁹ Deutschlands Integrationspolitik [online] Available at: <<http://www.berlin-institut.org/online-handbuchdemografie/bevoelkerungspolitik/deutschland/deutschlands-integrationspolitik.html>> [Accessed on 4 October 2016]

Most of the Turkish immigrants arrived in 1973, right after that the mediation of the labourforce and the possibility of the Turkish individuals to work in Germany were stopped because the decreased economic performance that was generated by the oil crisis which among others did not justify the delivery of the foreign workers any more.

From this point of time we can talk about the entry of the family members, then after the coup of 12 September 1980¹⁰, during which Kenan Evrens the chief of general staff assumed power, the number of the Turkish citizens who applied for right of sanctuary was dominant. After foreign workers' husband, wife and the children having entered into Germany the host country still considered Turkish people and all other groups of immigrants as if they would only temporarily stay on the territory of the country, so they did not supported their integration into the society.¹¹

The integration problems of the Turks have to be mentioned because not only their number is the highest among the immigrants but they have the least integration ability and willingness.

This can be explained by the cultural differences, the everyday effect of the religion and its explanation, the lower school qualification level as compared to the other groups of immigrants and the numerical superiority of the Turks in relation to the other immigrants too. This enables of course that a lot of Turkish immigrants can live under a Turkish environment with ignoring the German reality, which is the source of problems too because in the lack of the language knowledge they are not in the position to undertake any work, talk with the teachers of their children or see the doctor. This situation is typical for a lot of women.¹²

The notion of "honour-murders" also became well-known in Germany by the migration of the Turks. This notion means a kind of crime when the perpetrators are driven by the rehabilitation of the honour of the family which they think to realize by killing the person who "muds" the honour of the family. This is the viewpoint of a certain extremist, narrow radical Islamic circle after which the fact of a love affair with a non-Islamic person has already fulfilled the "mud" of the honour of the family. On the average 20 honour-murders are committed a year in Germany,¹³ two-thirds of them are committed against women, often their own brothers, fathers, the mail victims are usually those men who got near to the forbidden lady.

The low school qualification, observing the strict religious dogmas, the patriarchal relationships and the low income were all typical for the perpetrators, therefore, with the

¹⁰ Kenan Evren, leader of Turkey's 1980 military coup and former president, dies [online] Available at: <<http://www.theguardian.com/world/2015/may/10/kenan-evren-leader-of-turkeys-1980-military-coup-and-former-president-dies>> [Accessed on 11 October 2016]

¹¹ Lemper, K., 2011. *Mit Fremdheit leben-Entwicklungen in der Integrationsarbeit*. Norderstedt: Grin Verlag, p.50.

¹² Türken sind die Sorgenkinder der Integration: [online] Available at: <<http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article7222075/Tuerken-sind-die-Sorgenkinder-der-Integration.html>> [Accessed on 3 September 2016]

¹³ Fragen zum Ehrenmord [online] Available at: <<http://www.ehrenmord.de/faq/wieviele.php>> [Accessed on 11 October 2016]

decrease and compensation of the factors there is a chance that the number of the “honour-murders” one per month can be cut in the future.¹⁴

The crimes committed by the immigrants are the triple than that of the German inhabitants,¹⁵ and, however, this data does not only concern the Muslims but the “honour-murders” can be attached to them only. Just like the September 11 attacks and the participation in their preparation.

The fact, that the instigators and executors (Atta, Alshehhi, Jarrah, Binalshibh) of the September 11 attacks had lived in Hamburg since 1998, they were the students of the Technical University of Hamburg and regularly met each other in the Al Quds Mosé¹⁶ in Hamburg that became the pool of the Islamic extremity persons and was closed in 2010, they have been planning global criminal attempts since 1999 in the meantime the German offices knew about nothing, proves that the risks out of the individual immigrants were undervalued.¹⁷

However, not only these murders and acts of terrorism mean work for the police, the courts and prosecutions but the even more active radical Salafists too. These Islamic fundamentalists consider themselves the only representatives of the Islam and they follow the strict doctrinaire Salafist direction of the Islam.

95 per cent of the Salafist ideology corresponds with the views of the Al-Kaida terrorist organization and their action that was started in April 2015 during which they planned to distribute 23 million issues of the Koran not for Muslims in Germany has already drawn the attention of the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution and Counterterrorism too.

The duty of this office is to supervise those organizations, groups, parties which danger the German statute, the German democratic order and the primary rights of the individuals, monitor their activity and report the possible dangerous factors and make the necessary measurements on behalf of the protection of the constitution.¹⁸

The German translations of the issues of the Koran that are distributed by the Salafists do not correspond with the other issues of the Koran that are available in Germany, the purpose of the distribution is to influence a part of the German inhabitants, win them for the military Islamic Salafism and establish an Islamic state in Germany.

¹⁴ Warum tötet ein Vater seine 13 jaehrige Tochter [online] Available at: <<http://www.news.de/panorama/855250200/stolzenau-in-niedersachsen-warum-erschiesst-ein-vater-seine-13-jaehrige-tochter-auf-offener-strasse/1>> [Accessed on 4 September 2016]

¹⁵ Schmelz, A., 2002. *Migration und Politik im geteilten Deutschland waehrend des Kalten Krieges*. Leske Budrich Verlag, p.140.

¹⁶ Behörde schliesst Moschee der 11. September Attentater [online] Available at: <http://www.focus.de/politik/deutschland/extremismus-behoerde-schliesst-moschee-der-11-september-attentaeter_aid_539252.html> [Accessed on 4 September 2016]

¹⁷ 11. September Terrorpilot sprach schon 1999 von Tausenden Totem [online] Available at: <<http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/11-september-terrorpilot-sprach-schon-1999-von-tausenden-toten-a-263323.html>> [Accessed on 5 October 2016]

¹⁸ Verfassungsschutzbericht [online] Available at: <<https://www.verfassungsschutz.de/de/oeffentlichkeitsarbeit/publikationen/verfassungsschutzberichte/vsbericht-2010>> [Accessed on 10 September 2016]

Today even smaller part of people practice its religion actively in Germany, however 63 per cent of the Germany population profess Christianity, however, it exhausts itself in the payment of the church-rate and the holding of the important religious holidays.¹⁹ People usually bring all of this into connection with the liberal scale of values and the bigger freedom, however, it is the fact that the Muslim way of life and religion provide an alternative for the today career-oriented life for many Western people.²⁰

The goal of the Salafists is to radicalize and prepare the young people to the holy war, they do this with so much success that the parents of those German young persons who were snatched from their home by the Salafist ideology turn to the human rights and integration association more and more often that was founded for the support of the girls being oppressed in the family.²¹

The supervision of the Internet is an important part of the national security because more and more contents are uploaded that contravene the constitution and the basic rights.

Before having distributed the issues of the Koran the Salafists circulated their hater “sermons” on the Internet, their target audience was the young generation who are using the Internet very often and can be influenced very easily.

These young people are the potential source of risk of the homeland security, therefore the prevention of the radicalization is a very important viewpoint of the security policy. Because the extremist groups can collect followers in the economically undeveloped new territories, the provision of the German “basic care”, with which each German citizen can get to housing, medical care and other rights, could prevent radicalization that originates from poverty.²²

However, the situation is much more nuanced than this because exactly this basic care is used by the extremist hate imams too and they can finance their life from this. So, the leader of the Salafists in Germany and the intellectual father of the distribution of the Koran, the Palestinian Ibrahim Abou Nagie, living in Berlin who receives 2300 Euro public social aid per month also include the benefits after his children.²³

In addition, the grounds of the basic care are even more debatable because the less qualified workers do not have more income than those who are living on social aid and because the number of the immigrants who use the transfers is much higher the conflicts between the Germans and the immigrants are unavoidable. But, exactly those who are living on social aid

¹⁹ Christen in Deutschland werden zur Minderheit [online] Available at: <<http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article119742216/Christen-in-Deutschland-werden-zur-Minderheit.html>> [Accessed on 1 October 2016]

²⁰ Rahner, J. and Schambeck, M., 2011. *Zwischen Integration und Ausgrenzung*. Berlin: Lit Verlag, p.179.

²¹ Salafisten nutzen speziellen Koran Übersetzung [online] Available at: <<http://www.n-tv.de/politik/Uebersetzung-ist-entscheidend-article6018511.html>> [Accessed on 10 September 2016]

²² Molthagen, D., 2006. *Gegen Rechtsextremismus in Ost und West*. Berlin: Friedrich Ebert Stiftung, p.7.

²³ Sozialbetrug: Salafistischer Hassprediger sorgt für Eklat im Gerichtssaal [online] Available at: <<https://www.unzensuriert.at/content/0017561-Sozialbetrug-Salafistischer-Hassprediger-sorgt-fuer-Eklat-im-Gerichtssaal>> [Accessed on 11 September 2016]

denounce the German order and way of living in far larger number and they vote for the extremist movements and parties.²⁴

According to the governments of the past years, the token of the more stable homeland security can be guaranteed by the early social inclusion, the integration already started in the kindergarten. Because these people were not considered as immigrants but foreign workers, no special attention was paid to the support of their social inclusion.²⁵

At the same time all of this did not mean any special problem in case of the second, third generation (who have already been born in Germany) because they have learnt the German language in the German native environment, in the school without any problem, they finished school and they could learn a profession.

This could work until the number of the immigrants in a school exceeded that of the Germans. The school Rütli in the Neukölln ward in Berlin and the violence that could be experienced there and in the course of which several teachers and parents were insulted by the students was accompanied by the decline of the ward and the increase of the immigrants from 30 to 83 per cent.²⁶

However, today not only the school Rütli has difficulties with the inclusion of the immigrants.

The nursing of the children of the many foreign parents means a huge challenge for the most of the public schools because the German environment is not enough for a part of the children to learn the language because they practically do not stay in German communities, they are living in the Turkish quarter, they watch the broadcastings of the TürkSat, they are only playing with Turkish children who are talking only Turkish too, no affection or patriotism develops in them for Germany because they were born on the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany and received the German citizenship with their birth conditionally in vain they cannot identify themselves with the country they are living in, however, the goal of the Citizenship Law in force since 2000 (according to which the children of the parents who have been staying in Germany for more than 8 years are entitled to receive the German citizenship too beside the citizenship of their parents, but at the age of 18 they have to decide which to keep) was to integrate the immigrants and to bring up citizens who are loyal to the Federal Republic and free from risk from the viewpoint of the national security.²⁷

The right-winger radical parties and the neo-Nazi terrorist organizations do not make the inclusion of the immigrants and their loyalty for Germany easier, just like last time the terror

²⁴ Sarazin, T., 2010. *Deutschland schafft sich ab*. München: Deutsche Verlags Anstalt, p.85.

²⁵ Migrantenstudie des Bundes: Türken haben die grössten Integrationsprobleme [online] Available at: <<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/migrantenstudie-des-bundes-tuerken-haben-die-groessten-integrationsprobleme-a-689659.html>> [Accessed on 11 September 2016]

²⁶ Portraet einer Lehranstalt: Der Abstieg der Rütli Schule [online] Available at: <<http://www.spiegel.de/politik/deutschland/portraet-einer-lehranstalt-der-abstieg-der-ruetli-schule-a-409011.html>> [Accessed on 12 September 2016]

²⁷ Rechte und Pflichten von Spätaussiedlern [online] Available at: <<http://www.aecura.de/rechte-pflichten-spaetaussiedler.html>> [Accessed on 12 September 2016]

cell in Zwickau which has specifically killed foreigners living in Germany. The Turkish nationals blame the German authorities for these massacres.²⁸

2.2. The legal background of the settlement of the German nationals

Besides the Turkish immigrants a group is playing a role as far as the security policy is concerned, the members of which have had German citizenship since they entered the territory of the Federal Republic of Germany. So, we do not actually talk about foreigners because these people received the German citizenship with referring to their German nationality without living in Germany even for a moment.

The Germans from Russia have the possibility to resettle in Germany according to the federal rule “Bundesvertriebenengesetz” that is regulating the rights of the so-called “late deportees”.

People with German nationality who are living out of the territory of Germany are belonging to the late immigrants who have settled from the ex-Soviet Union, its successor states and the other Eastern-European states to Germany. From the 1950s until now we are talking about 4.5 million people. The status of “late deportees” includes the widest sphere of rights which immigrants can receive in Germany.²⁹ Its legal background is the above mentioned federal rule that is regulating the “rights of the expellees” (expellees from their residence, in case of the Germans in Russia we can mean the discriminations from 1941). Accordingly, the German citizenship is guaranteed for the foreign citizens with German nationality but registered as the citizens of the above states and for their family members after having entered Germany on the basis of the 7.§ of the German Citizenship Law (StAG). As soon as they received the status of the “late deportees” after the 15.§ of the law about the federal expellees and refugees (Bundesvertriebengesetz) after having entered the territory of the Federal Republic.³⁰

Beyond this, all rights are due to them which they would have received too, if they had lived their life till then on the territory of Germany. They recognize their school qualification and the labour years are proportionally included in the German pension too. If they are already retired when they immigrate into Germany after having received the German citizenship, they are entitled to receive pension from the German pension fund on the basis of the labour years and position in their homeland until then.

This regulation provides the wide range of authorities for the foreign citizens which are not even due to the German citizens because out of the award of the citizenship they are also entitled to material aids and further advantages on the basis of the “late deportees” status.

²⁸ Umfrage in Deutschland: Türken geben Staat Mitschuld an Neonazi Terror [online] Available at: <<http://www.spiegel.de/panorama/gesellschaft/umfrage-in-deutschland-tuerken-geben-staat-mitschuld-an-neonazi-terror-a-808815.html>> [Accessed on 12 September 2016]

²⁹ Spätaussiedler [online] Available at: <<http://www.bamf.de/DE/Migration/Spaetaussiedler/spaetaussiedler-node.html>> [Accessed on 13 September 2016]

³⁰ Hilfen für Spätaussiedler [pdf] Available at: <<http://www.julateg.org/wbboard/data/hilfen-fuerspaetaussiedler22.pdf>> [Accessed on 13 September 2016]

However, the background of the regulation is that it handles the foreign citizens with German nationality as Germans even before the award of the citizenship. These people are Germans according to the Constitution (Art. 116 GG). The husbands and wives with non-German nationality will receive the same rights, if the marriage has been existing for at least three years. This proves too that the regulation takes these citizens for Germans and it enables to treat the husbands and wives as Germans after the third year of the marriage. Of course, if the marriage still has not been going on for three years the husband and wife are entitled to enter the country anyway, but they will receive the German citizenship only in the third year of the marriage. From year to year fewer and fewer applications arrive today, in 2015 only 1817 persons received this status, while in 1989 still 390 thousand people.³¹

From 1990 the number of the “late deportees” has been decreasing continuously because after the re-union of Germany this status was only granted the persons from the ex-Soviet Union (and later its successor states). The other Eastern-European people with German nationality only, if they can prove their discrimination which can be lead back to their German nationality.

The late deportees cannot be called immigrants in the traditional meaning of the word because in their case the first step of the settlement is not the entering the German territory but the submission of an application to the Federal Office for Administration with the residence in Cologne through the German consulate that is competent for the main place of residence³². If the fact of the German nationality is proved, the applicants are informed in a decision about the award of the “status of late deportees” after the processing time (max 1 year). Afterwards they have the duty to organize the travel to the first reception station, to Friedland. They organize this totally alone, the Federal Republic can provide a part of the resources that is necessary to the travel to Germany. The contribution to the travel costs amounts to 102 Euro/person³³ now, which the authorized persons can only receive after having entered the country.

After the entry and the occupation of the tenement flat appointed in a definite living area it is recommended to visit a so-called integration course for the deportees called “Germans from Russia” too. This is the same course which the immigrants can make use of upon payment of compensation, the difference is just that the course for the people with the status “late deportees” is free of charge.³⁴ However, this would mean expenses of 1152 Euro which means a very advantageous price considering the 960 lessons.

³¹ Spätaussiedler [online] Available at: <<http://www.bpb.de/nachschlagen/zahlen-und-fakten/soziale-situation-in-deutschland/61643/aussiedler>> [Accessed on 1 September 2016]

³² Merkblätter zum Spätaussiedleraufnahmeverfahren [online] Available at: <http://www.bva.bund.de/DE/Organisation/Abteilungen/Abteilung_S/Spaetaussiedler/Vordrucke/vordrucke-node.html> [Accessed on 2 October 2016]

³³ Information für Russlanddeutsche [online] Available at: <http://www.bva.bund.de/DE/Organisation/Abteilungen/Abteilung_S/Spaetaussiedler/Vordrucke/InfowennVisumerhalten.html> [Accessed on 9 October 2016]

³⁴ Integrationskurse für Spätaussiedler [online] Available at: <<http://www.bamf.de/DE/Willkommen/DeutschLernen/Integrationskurse/TeilnahmeKosten/Spaetaussiedler/spaetaussiedler-node.html>> [Accessed on 19 September 2016]

It may be that the visit of the course does not seem to be reasonable at the first hearing because in case of the “late deportees” it is about Germans but in the praxis these people do not speak German at all, usually, an old family member (for example grandmother) understands/speaks some German in the family, the other family members are her descendants and husbands and wives. The reason for this can be found in the scare they experienced during the Soviet regime because after having closed the German schools even the use of their mother language was permitted for the Germans. The use of the German language on public places was followed by retorsion.

They also had the opportunity to translate the Russian names into German and, however, they need the integration they considered the inclusion of the late deportees easier as compared to the other groups of immigrants. The fact is that in the circle of the Germans in Russia the integration of the second generation is much easier than that of the first one, but, up to now, a part of them rather feels Russian than German.³⁵

It is questionable that in case of the late deportees how strong the German roots are after the emigration from the homeland two centuries later and whether the blood can overwrite the even more massive Russian influence of several hundred years and the deficits because of the socialisation in the leftist dictatorship.

A part of people who received the citizenship because of their German nationality are members of any of those 500 Russian unions in Germany which can also make good their rights through a coordination council since 2007. During their annual meetings the participant organizations strengthen each other by their efforts to keep the Russian culture. All this refers to the fact that they take themselves German less and less and the target is to strengthen the Russian consciousness more and more. Partly one can understand this because as I mentioned above the husbands and wives of non-German nationality can also make use of the status of the “late deportees”, so the effort they make for keeping their culture is fully acceptable, but Russia means the homeland, the Russian language the native language for the big part of those who received the citizenship because of their German nationality too and their settlement in Germany can only be explained by economic reasons. As Germany was named as the biggest country that gives home for the Russian diaspora in the Meeting of the Coordination Council of the Russian Unions in Germany that was held in Hannover in 2013³⁶, it is questionable whether we can consider the Germans who returned from Russia or the Russians who settled in Germany as German citizens who are also speaking Russian?

According to the official German standpoint, those persons with German nationality who are speaking Russian as their native language has to be legally considered Germans and have the same rights as the citizens who were born on the territory of Germany. The opinion of the German inhabitants is entirely different because a significant part of the people who have transmigrated does not speak German at all, their habits and traditions are also different that

³⁵ Russland-Deutsche: Viele fühlen sich heimatlos [online] Available at: <<http://blog.initiativgruppe.de/2013/07/26/russland-deutsche-viele-fuehlen-sich-heimatlos>> [Accessed on 4 September 2016]

³⁶ Die russischsprachige Diaspora in Deutschland [online] Available at: <<http://www.migazin.de/2013/08/22/bundeskonferenz-russen-diaspora-deutschland>> [Accessed on 20 September 2016]

those of the today Germans of Germany, these are much more traditional, conservative. All these can be explained by the socialisation in the totalitarian system and with the fact that they did not have the imagination of the today Germany but the country of Germany which they could get to know from the stories of their ascendants, the image of the German territories in the 18th-19th century.

However, the big part of people who returned from Russia can integrate into the today German society successfully.

A smaller group of those who returned orientate politically towards the German extreme right, within the NPD (German National Democratic Party – Nationaldemokratische Partei Deutschlands – NPD) there has been founded a special working team of the “Germans from Russia” and they distributed their propaganda both in Germany and in Russia. However, another group of the Germans in Russia regards itself the member of the Russian minority.

It is very sad that many people with German nationality consider the country as their real home in which their ancestors were forced to suffer the series of unlawful measures because of being led by complexes that originate from the insufficient knowledge of the German language. The cultural order that is different from the today German one plays a significant role in the strengthening of the “Russian feeling” and the ideas of Russia being their home.

Analysing the everyday life of the families who have returned from the today Russia one can note that the order based on the traditional patriarchy and the big families living together is applied in Germany too. However, the classical “power relations” cannot succeed unrestrictedly because the role of the father (or the role of the “senior” man and the related privileges) is taken over by the family member who is speaking German the best in the family because as a result of his competence he can act on behalf of the family in the official, job, school issues.³⁷

This changed field of activity, the lack of the suitable knowledge of the German language the often hopeless situation that originates from this, the joblessness, the state without any prospect for the future in connection with the low school qualification contribute to the reason why a part of the immigrants is thinking of the return to Russia.

2.3. Radicalisation of a level of the German society – PEGIDA

I think so that it is important to emphasize that just like in my whole study I do not mention the security policy risks that originate from the stay of people who arrived in Germany in September 2015 and claim asylum in this chapter either. Just for this I regard as important that the anti-immigrant association called PEGIDA was established in October 2014 already and it was the topic of the most news in Germany after that. The name of the organization is an acronym the meaning of which is “European Patriots against the Islamisation of the West”

³⁷ Zum Familienverständnis der Russlanddeutschen [pdf] Available at: <www.dekanat-nu.de/page1/files/ReferatFamilieAussiedler.pdf> [Accessed on 20 September 2016]

(Patriotische Europäer gegen die Islamisierung des Abendlandes). The organization was established after the session of the German Parliament when the delivery of arms for the Labour Party of Kurdistan that was BANNED IN Germany has been passed.³⁸ This information indicates too that the organization was not established after the arrival of the immigrants but a year earlier, so it was not launched by the protest against the flow of the immigrants.

But, the question is which factors could make the PEGIDA so popular and when the establishment of a new, maybe even more extremist organization is expectable.

The proposal of Hans Christian Ströberle, the representative of the Green Party who is quoted by the PEGIDA very often too, in 2009 to declare an Islamic holiday for bank holiday, can be heard like a deterrent initiative in discussion fora even today because Ströberle has proposed the elimination of a Christian bank holiday at the same time with his proposal too.³⁹

The reaction of the citizens was the same just after the changes that were performed for the political fairness that was introduced by the Kindergarten in Bad Homburg. In the course of this the day of Saint Martin was to the Holiday of the Sun Moon and Stars.⁴⁰

The bestseller of Thilo Sarazin pointed to the problems of integration that was neglected by the politics for the big part of the sympathizers of the PEGIDA movement.

Thilo Sarazin social democrat politic, ex Minister of Finance in Berlin, then the member of the board of directors of the Federal Central Bank published his first bestseller in 2010 with the title Germany writes itself off (Deutschland schafft sich ab). The book is the most debatable Bestseller in our days and the most successful book of the history of the Federal Republic that was sold in 1.3 million copies. Sarazin harps on the topics that were handled as taboos until then but he refers to statistical data therefore he cannot inciting violence because his analyses that are based on the facts and the sources of the Federal Statistical Office are not distorted, he is just summarizing and assessing the public sources.⁴¹

The most debatable points of his paper were the relationship between the school qualification and the number of children and connection between the alleged lower school qualification level of the Muslim immigrants and the higher rate of crime. However, it is questionable which means more danger for the democrat order of the society. If we drive the authors like Sarazin to the border and make him discreditable or we analyse the situation objectively and we can prevent the problems in time. It is to be feared that the former method assists to hold on a false harmony only and there is a danger ahead that the conflict, even if in another form, will appear in a much more intensive effect.

³⁸ Deutsche Waffen außer Kontrolle [online] Available at: <<https://www.tagesschau.de/inland/deutsche-waffen-kurden-101.html>> [Accessed on 7 September 2016]

³⁹ Ströberle will muslimischen Festtag als Feiertag [online] Available at: <<http://www.welt.de/politik/article4840623/Stroebele-will-muslimischen-Festtag-als-Feiertag.html>> [Accessed on 8 January 2017]

⁴⁰ Sonne, Mond und Sterne [online] Available at: <<http://www.faz.net/aktuell/gesellschaft/umbenennung-des-martinsfestes-sonne-mond-und-sterne-12654476.html>> [Accessed on 8 Januar 2017]

⁴¹ Das gebildete Deutschland schafft sich ab [online] Available at: <<http://www.welt.de/politik/deutschland/article131305611/Das-gebildete-Deutschland-schafft-sich-ab.html>> [Accessed on 8 January 2017]

The chapter of the book of Sarazin that is mentioned by his critics is that one in which the author proposes the payment of a premium of 50 thousand Euros for the highly qualified women, if they undertake that they give birth to their first child before their age of 30. In the critiques it is often called racist expression because the critics distort the proposal of Sarazin because they mention “highly qualified German women” instead of “highly qualified women” and they neglect the fact that the child allowance in Germany amounts to more than 50 thousand Euro until the children’s age of 18, so, the premium would only advance the child allowances. It seemed to be racist in the work of Sarazin to make difference between the immigrants after the race and to draw conclusions accordingly, his policy seems to be debarring at the first hearing, but the author does not state that every single immigrant is a criminal and is unable to be integrated, just that on the basis of the statistical data one can state that the citizens who have been requiring aid for years and the citizens who were previously convicted occur in higher proportion between them. The reasons for this could not be brought into connection by their origin anyway but with other sociological problems.

The critics of Sarazin called the encouraging childbearing racist too, because, they say that Sarazin considers the transmission of the intelligent genes primary and he is selecting on the racial basis, however, in my opinion it is hypocritical to overlook the fact that the children of the higher qualified people become more qualified but not necessarily because of the genes but owing to the early development. The reasons for this can be the better material conditions. One of the biggest tasks of the present German society is to catch up the marginalized people because Germany cannot provide work and perspectivity for the unqualified common people insomuch as in the 60s, 70s because production was placed to the East.

In my opinion, not necessarily Sarazin's book but the one or two sentences that were picked out from his book and were distorted are debarring, mostly then, if the extremist organizations use them to prove the reason for their existence and they are talking about one ethnic group in general. It is a fact that the author has launched an avalanche because he highlighted the unspoken problems of the society, however, his most important duty in connection with this is to find a solution for the German society.

The popularity of the book is indicative and it highlights the fact that the many economic and social problems that originate from the lack of the integration of the immigrants do not only mean problem for a narrow extreme minority only.

From the political parties only the relatively young AfD (Alternative for Germany) is supporting the PEGIDA. This party is the proof for the debarring behaviour of the political élite because of the founders of the party separated from the conservative CDU the members of which party could not identify themselves with the items of programmes keeping in mind the interests of the German nation. The main political programme of the AfD is the introduction of a stable currency instead of the Euro, the cut on the Brussels bureaucracy,

introduction of the referenda after the Swiss model, regulation of the migration after the Canadian model.⁴²

The level of the support of PEGIDA and its judgement highlights a very deeply rooted social conflict which in the lack of any solution will surface more and more and every single missed opportunity for the rapprochement will strengthen the shift of the organization into the direction of extremism.

In the meantime the gap between the political leaders and the PEGIDA become sharper. Meanwhile the city of Dresden did not alive the march of PEGIDA, the leader of the organization, Bachmann has resigned after the continuous assaults, within a short time the more radical branch of the organization in Leipzig, LEGIDA⁴³ stood in the limelight for a while, which has subsided within a short time. The population seemed to release the anger and calmed down, it can only be apparent.

3. Summary

The German society, economy and culture are about to change. The aging German society creates challenges the government for which it can give different answers. The problems from the lack of the integration of the immigrants originating from different cultures mean further difficulties for the country. This condition also dangers the democratic order and in an extreme case it can even lead to a civil war situation too. Notwithstanding, the majority of the German citizens are not motivated by the xenophobia but the fear from the change and things they do not know. In connection with the introduction with a measurement it turns out only at a later date that it was still not unsuccessful or the measurement that seemed to be absolutely positive did not only produced positive effects. For the earlier, there can be an example the castle of the king Luis II in Neuschwanstein, because of which the monarch was criticized very strongly by his peers because the operation costs posed a major challenge for the budget, however, the castle is the target of more than one million tourists a year today. For the latter one the state support of the bio diesel and bio gas power stations. However, in the context of the environment protection both energies has the CO² neutral impact but this has increased the world market price of the rape and maize for that reason there are starving more people in the world. This contributes to the migration too.

People living on social aid are the most susceptible to the radial views who are blaming people with migration background for their own wasted life, their catching up can be the key the warding off the dangers that are threatening the democratic order. Since the foundation of the Federal Republic in 1949 the extremist parties have won a bigger support on those years

⁴² Wahlprogramm AfD [pdf] Available at: <http://www.alternativefuer.de/wp-content/uploads/2014/05/AfD_Europawahl_Programm_web.pdf> [Accessed on 8 January 2017]

⁴³ PEGIDA und Legida: Ihr seit am Ende [online] Available at: <<http://www.tagesspiegel.de/politik/PEGIDA-und-legida-ihr-seid-am-ende/11265398.html>> [Accessed on 1 October 2016]

when the economy became weaker. We can talk about the NPD as a party only in the Eastern territories currently too. The party loses its popularity there in direct ratio to joblessness.⁴⁴

It is questionable, if the joblessness drives back the support of the extremist powers to this extent, what kind of reaction would the contrary evoke from the population. Of course, it would increase the number of voters of the parties, but, what kind of a reaction one could count with, if the state were forced to introduce more serious restrictions.

The taxation of the pensions is planned now too, but, if we can also calculate with the decrease of the pensions, because according to the present figures there will not be enough contributing citizens, what an opposition a society can count with bigger and bigger part of the voters of which are retired or those who are close to the retirement age.

Bavaria that is fighting the less integration problems is the best performing territory in Germany, this fact itself confirms the fact too that the key of the avoidance of radicalisation and the successful integration is the stable economy which drafts attractive prospects for the future for the citizens.

⁴⁴ NPD has reached 9.2 per cent in the regional elections of 2004, in 2009 only 5.6 per cent, in comparison with the unemployment statistics with this, we can see that we can talk about 4.38 per cent unemployment in 2004, while in 2009 only about 3.41 per cent.

HOW THE MIGRATION CRISIS DETERMINES THE RELATION BETWEEN TURKEY AND EU?

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Abstract: *This paper highlights the consequences of migration influx in Europe and Turkey. I attempt to look into how the migration is impacting Turkey and Europe as well, and how the relationship has changed between Turkey and EU. The migration crisis indicated new partnership between Turkey and the EU. In November 2015, EU in its annual report reviewing Turkey's EU membership bid had raised concerns regarding the worsening freedom of press in the country. EPP rapporteur on Turkey, Dr Renate Sommer MEP shared that the country is not in sync and is instead diverging from the Copenhagen Criteria. The report expressed concerns regarding new laws like the security law which gives additional powers to the police in terms of arrests, search warrants and use of weapons. Migrant crisis has been triggered by the Syrian civil war which has been going on for nearly five years. More than 4 million people have been forced to flee the war-torn country and have sought asylum in Turkey and recently in EU. These situations have changed the cooperation between Turkey and the EU.*

* * *

Introduction

In March 2016, EU and Turkey reached a deal to solve the ongoing migrant crisis. Under this deal, the two nations would work together and any migrants arriving in Greece, who fail to apply for asylum or have their claim rejected would be sent back to Turkey. However, for each such Syrian returned, EU would accept a Syrian refugee from Turkey. The deal also came with promises for visa liberalization, financial aid to Turkey to improve care of the Syrian refugees to the tune of \$3.3 billion and speeding up the Turkey's bid to join EU.¹

¹ Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect. *BBC* [online] Available at: <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35854413>> [Accessed on 23 October 2016]

The deal did reduce the inflow at EU borders, however the sequence of events in the following months like failed military coup in Turkey,² Turkey's crackdown over the journalists, soldiers or anyone possessing critical views towards the government or having any trace of association with Fethullah Gülen the US based cleric considered responsible by Turkish government for the failed coup,³ have escalated the tensions between the two.

Concerned EU has sought changes in anti terror laws used by the Turkish government for crackdown and made the changes a prerequisite for any visa liberalization for the Turkish citizens. However, the same law is considered as necessary by the Turkish government and any such criteria for visa liberalization by EU is viewed as dishonoring the promises which in the eyes of Turkish officials is as good as bringing an end to the migrant deal itself.

As part of this paper, I look into the migrant crisis and how it's impacting the relations between Turkey and EU.

Importance of the migrant deal

Since Jan 2015, EU has been struggling with mass influx of migrants coming from various war torn countries including Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia and other countries. The extent of crisis could only be understood by the fact that by March 2016, more than one million migrants had attempted to reach EU from Turkey. A large number of these migrants have taken the dreadful journey over the Mediterranean Sea with more than 460 losing life according to the International Organization for Migration.⁴

This irregular migration to Europe has been described as the biggest crisis the region has seen since 1945.⁵ The inflow has been overwhelming and has divided EU over the management with approach varying from identifying and accepting some of the asylums seekers and setting migrants' distribution quota by the EU for member states⁶ to some countries setting up border controls to some Eastern European countries like Hungary protesting the quota and sealing their borders to restrict the inflow of migrants.⁷

² Sam Adams, 2016. Turkey coup 2016 explained: What happened and what is a military coup? *Mirror* [online] Available at: <<http://www.mirror.co.uk/news/world-news/what-happened-turkey-attempted-coup-8432395>> [Accessed on 23 October 2016]

³ T. Karadeniz, G. Solaker and C. Sezer, 2016. Turkey Targets Gulen Followers; Dismisses Military Personnel and Closes Media Outlets. *The Wire* [online] Available at: <<http://thewire.in/54551/turkey-targets-gulen-followers-dismisses-military-personnel-and-closes-media-outlets>> [Accessed on 22 October 2016]

⁴ Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect. *BBC* [online] Available at: <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35854413>> [Accessed on 23 October 2016]

⁵ Migrant crisis explained in numbers *Financial Times* [online] Available at: <<https://www.ft.com/content/7f7e0d28-5225-11e5-8642-453585f2cfd>> [Accessed on 21 October 2016]

⁶ Relocation quotas. *The Economist* [online] Available at: <<http://www.economist.com/blogs/graphicdetail/2015/09/europe-s-migrant-crisis>> [Accessed on 23 October 2016]

⁷ Nick Gutteridge, 2016. The Great Wall of Europe: Hungary splits continent in two with huge fence to stop migrants. *Express* [online] Available at: <<http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/648269/Hungary-plan-fence-border-Romania-migrants-refugees-crisis-Viktor-Orban-Schengen>> [Accessed on 23 October 2016]

However despite the measures in place the migrants continued to arrive at the EU borders with over 143,000 arriving in first three months of 2016 itself. In addition, with the increasing casualties of migrants attempting to cross sea to reach Greece or Italy, the human right activists, UN appealed for opening up the borders and requested for an empathetic approach. With pressures from all sides, EU worked with Turkey to resolve the issue and in March 2016, migrant deal came into place.

The deal is of paramount importance for both the EU and Turkey. The deal mentions about returning any irregular migrant entering Greece from Turkey post 20th March. Though the asylum claim would be processed on individual basis but this meant all the migrants travelling over the sea to be returned which till now have been huge in number. In addition, the deal had provision of one for one exchange for migrants i.e. any Syrian migrant reaching Greece, who fails to apply for asylum or whose claim is rejected would be returned to Turkey. While in exchange, EU would accept a Syrian refugee from Turkey. However, important thing to note there is that even then the number is capped at 72,000,⁸ which is pretty low compared to the influx of millions of migrants EU has been dealing with. Additionally, the deal automatically discourages the illegal migrants from travelling to EU or risking their life over the sea in pursuit of asylum in EU.

On the other hand, the promises coming with the deal to Turkey are critical and fall in line with its long possessed ambitions. One of the important provisions of the deal is of visa liberalization i.e. Turkish nationals would get access to the Schengen passport free zone by June. The other important provision of the deal is the promise to speed up Turkey's EU accession. As part of this, new chapters required for EU membership candidate are to be opened up. Both provisions are what Turkey has sought for decades i.e. to work closely with EU and be part of EU, the membership which Turkey officially applied for in 2005.⁹ In addition to the above provisions, the country would get aid to the tune of \$3.3 billion from EU to help support the Syrian refugees on its soil.

Implementation of the deal and its impact on EU-Turkey relations

Though the deal came into place in March 2016, the implementation of the deal has run into various hiccups for either side which have varied from logistics to human rights concerns.

The first obstacle came from the logistics point of view. As part of the deal, migrants reaching Greece need to be held up, their requests processed and if their asylum claim is rejected, they need to be returned to Turkey. However, at the time the deal was announced, Greece lacked the officials to process the asylum requests. Around 2300 civil servants including security, migration officials and translators were required to handle the process. In addition, there was no process in place to send the rejected applicants back. The deal coming in place also meant

⁸ Migrant crisis: EU-Turkey deal comes into effect. *BBC* [online] Available at: <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-35854413>> [Accessed on 23 October 2016]

⁹ Jennifer Rankin, 2016. Turkey's long road to EU membership just got longer. *The Guardian* [online] Available at: <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/jul/20/turkeys-long-road-to-eu-membership-just-got-longer>> [Accessed on 22 October 2016]

that, huge number of migrants seeking asylum in Germany were now stuck in Greece. The deal along with measures against the people smugglers across the Turkish coast is considered to have stemmed the inflow of migrants to EU. The number of migrants reaching Greece on a given day dropped down to 50 in May 2016 compared to 6,800 a day in October the peak of migrant crisis. Though, the number of migrants reaching dropped but just 30% of the asylum claims were rejected which was unexpected because as per the deal all the migrants coming from Turkey were illegal and needed to be returned to Turkey. With the process being slow, the asylum applicants continue to pile up and were held in the detention centers.¹⁰

In June 2016, Turkey had a failed military coup where faction of Turkish armed forces used tanks and arms to bring down President Tayyip Erdogan. As part of the coup, nearly 265 people were killed including civilians, pro-government forces and plotters.¹¹ Turkish government blamed Fethullah Gülen, US-based cleric for attempting to bring down the government. It also initiated a crackdown against anyone found having any trace of association with Gülen or possessing critical views against the government. As part of the crackdown, more than 131 media outlets were shut down,¹² more than 32,000 people were put behind bars, in addition to 100,000 plus individuals who were dismissed from their jobs in security and civil services. Even the top military officials were not spared amounting to roughly 40% of all generals and admirals in Turkey's military.

The coup and crackdown however, strained the Turkey EU relations. Turkish government felt a delay in any support or response from EU despite the huge number of deaths of civilians and pro-government forces. While European leaders raised concerns over the crackdown carried out in response to the coup by the Turkish government. The EU sees this as increasing concentration of power in Erdoğan's hands and the EU members have become concerned about the rule of law in Turkey and have sought changes in anti terrorism laws which are deemed too broad and oppressive for European standards. In addition, EU is concerned about the direction Turkey is taking under President Tayyip Erdoğan i.e. the target of shifting Turkey to an executive presidential system, role of Turkey in Syria, Iraq and Ankara's relations with Moscow.¹³ The situation is so dire that the Austrian government and Nicolas Sarkozy (French's presidency candidate) have stressed the need to end Turkey membership talks citing the country's attempt to flout EU policies.

¹⁰ Nektaria Stamouli, 2016. Greece Struggles to Return Migrants Under EU-Turkey Deal *The Wall Street Journal* [online] Available at: <<http://www.wsj.com/articles/greece-struggles-to-return-migrants-under-eu-turkey-deal-1463653671>> [Accessed on 21 October 2016]

¹¹ W. Worley and H. Cockburn, 2016. Prime Minister says 265 people killed in attempted military coup, including at least 100 'plotters'. *Independent* [online] Available at: <<http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/europe/turkey-coup-dead-erdogan-military-chief-ankara-istanbul-death-toll-plotters-how-many-killed-wounded-a7140376.html>> [Accessed on 23 October 2016]

¹² T. Karadeniz, G. Solaker and C. Sezer, 2016. Turkey dismisses military, shuts media outlets as crackdown deepens. *Reuters* [online] Available At: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-journalists-idUSKCN1070NO>> [Accessed on 23 October 2016]

¹³ Britain and Turkey talking about the future of the EU? *Hürriyet Daily News* [online] Available at: <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/britain-and-turkey-talking-about-the-future-of-the-eu.aspx?PageID=238&NID=105155&NewsCatID=409>> [Accessed on 24 October 2016]

Following the events described above, EU sees the changes in anti-terror laws as a prerequisite for allowing visa free access to the Turkish nationals. Additionally, EU despite its promises to speed up the EU accession process for Turkey has been reluctant due to the human rights issues and out of opened chapters only one has been closed and only one new chapter was opened on finance and budgetary affairs.¹⁴ However, the progress is seen as very slow and recently Turkish EU Affairs Minister Omer Celik raised that these requirements of changes in anti-terror laws translate to EU not honoring its part of the deal and if by the end of year the visa related provisions of the deal were not implemented, Turkey would stop the readmission of migrants. Celik added that Turkey has done its part and the results can be seen already by looking at the number of illegal arrivals on the Greek islands which has dropped to 20-30 people a day way down from 7000 in 2015. Çelik also raised that the only way to save the deal would be to engage in a dialogue.

In such times of refugee crisis and their rehabilitation across EU countries, there is a growing sense of fear and xenophobia among the people. The situation in Turkey is not helpful. It was in fact the possibility of Turkey being given visa free travel to Schengen area and the inflow of migrants it might bring that dominated the Brexit debates and later Britons choosing to vote in favor of UK leaving EU.¹⁵

Security policy in Turkey

Turkish security policy has undergone change since July 2016 when the country faced military coup. The military coup did fail, but what followed next was a crackdown by the government against the critics or anyone suspected of support or association with Gülen, the US based Turkish cleric. While the crackdown progressed, the country was shaken every now and then by terrorist attacks planned by ISIS or the Kurdish forces.

As a follow-up to these terrorist attacks including the New Year's nightclub attack in which 39 people were killed, Turkish police have been detaining people suspected of association with ISIS. Haldun Solmazturk, head of the Ankara based research institution shared the existence of terror infrastructure within Turkey and threat posed by it to the Turkey's security. He highlighted that it was Turkey's and the west's focus on bringing down the Syrian regime, which gave opportunity for the terror infrastructure to grow and radicalize the society. The nationwide network is involved in activities like smuggling people from across the globe into Iraq and Syria.¹⁶

¹⁴ AFP, 2016. EU opens new chapter in Turkey membership talks. *Middle East Eye* [online] Available at: <<http://www.middleeasteye.net/news/eu-opens-new-chapter-turkey-membership-talks-49617643>> [Accessed on 23 October 2016]

¹⁵ Steven Erlanger, 2016. Britain's 'Brexit' Debate Inflamed by Worries That Turkey Will Join E.U. *The New York Times* [online] Available at: <<http://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/14/world/europe/britain-brexit-turkey-eu.html>> [Accessed on 21 October 2016]

¹⁶ Dorian Jones, 2017. Turkish Security Forces Launch Major IS Crackdown. *VOA News* [online] Available at: <<http://www.voanews.com/a/turkish-security-forces-launch-major-is-crackdown/3708228.html>> [Accessed on 17 February 2017]

The attacks have forced Turkey to change its position over ISIS and the country is now actively involved in ground operations to counter and eradicate the threat of ISIS. However, the operations and efforts to secure Turkey have been diluted after the government crackdown over the security and intelligence officials, which have resulted in loss of tens of thousands of officers from the workforce. Despite the concerns, the government considers the purges to be critical and stresses that these individuals are a threat equivalent to one posed by ISIS.

The security challenges posed by ISIS require global co-operation for which Turkey depends on NATO partners especially the US. During Obama's time, the two countries held different positions. However, post Trump election to the US presidency, Turkey is keeping a cautious eye on changes to US foreign policy, which holds the potential to alter security co-operation between the two nations. The extent of co-operation extends from NATO to fight against ISIS in Syria. Turkey looks forward to extend this co-operation to its fight against the so considered Kurdish sponsored terrorist forces and over extradition of Gülen, the Turkish cleric considered to be behind the military coup last year.

Recent telephone conversations between Trump and its Turkish counterpart, Recep Tayyip Erdogan and visits to Ankara by CIA director Mike Pompeo offers sign of possible support to Ankara. Metin Gurcan, former adviser to the Turkish military highlights Turkey's focus to create Turkey operated safe zone in northern Syria and to push Kurdish forces (YPG) out of the region.¹⁷ Ali Faik Demir, Turkish foreign policy expert at Istanbul's Galatasaray University raised that support from US over Turkish security policy to restrict Kurds may require Turkey to play greater military role in the region. He added that the military involvement could also give Turkey a bargaining hand in its demand for extradition of Gulen, who has been the focus of Turkey security policy and crackdown on various officials since last year.

Security law

Turkey's anti-terror law has for long been questioned by EU and international bodies for being too broad and post the failed military coup, the law has been widely used to prosecute individuals by the government. These references have raised further concerns among the global community. The concern with the law is that it is deemed too loose, which gives the government the opportunity to crackdown on critics over charges of spreading "terror propaganda". The concerns are backed by the fact that since 2014 when Erdogan became president, laws has been used to file more than 1800 cases against journalists, cartoonists whose main crime was that their work insulted Erdogan. Turkey's Minister of EU Affairs, Volkan Bozkir has defended the laws mentioning that they are much needed in the present

¹⁷ Brice Bora, 2017. CIA chief in Ankara: A security partnership? *Aljazeera* [online] Available at: <<http://www.aljazeera.com/indepth/features/2017/02/cia-chief-ankara-security-partnership-170209063400733.html>> [Accessed on 18 February 2017]

times where Turkey is being frequented by suicide bombings and ongoing military operation against the PKK.¹⁸

Earlier, the Venice Commission, legal advisory of the Council of Europe on request from the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council had reviewed the Turkish laws and proposed changes to articles which had seen rise in related cases. Regarding Article 299, which is directed at insulting the president, commission raised concerns on its frequent use and its conflict with freedom of expression and suggested that the article be completely quashed. The corresponding articles in EU member nations' penal code were identified. However, in the respective penal code of the EU member nations, the insults to head of state are decriminalized or carry a fine. The articles are rarely used unlike Turkey where, large number of convictions has been associated with the concerned article. Turkish Justice Minister Bekir Bozdağ had shared that the number of related cases to be around 1,845. In addition, the commission proposed changes to Article 301, which is directed at degrading the state and the nation, that the article be redrafted and amended enhancing clarity and specificity of all the notions used in the article. Commission also suggested that the application of article be limited to statements inciting violence and hatred.¹⁹

Having shared the above, the concerns are not new. Even in Oct 2013, the Justice Ministry had revealed that anti terrorism law was being misused to target critics of government convicting nearly 20,000 people in four years. EU has repeatedly called for reforms to facilitate freedom of assembly and expression. Human rights groups have even described Turkey as the world's biggest jailer of the journalists. Award-winning journalist Ahmet Şık had shared that anti-terror law was being applied against one and all, against students for demanding free education, against journalists for expressing any critical views and all being charged as terrorists.²⁰ The situation had improved between 2014 and 2016 but post military coup, the situation has spiraled back to the concerning zone.

Fight with ISIS

ISIS, which aims to establish global Caliphate, has posed a threat to Turkey's peace and stability by carrying out suicide attacks in various towns and cities targeting Turkish nationals. ISIS and a bunch of other factors have pushed Turkey to get involved in military operations in Syria. Turkish engagement in Syria is attributed to multiple factors. Firstly, the Syrian war and the threat of ISIS in the region has flooded Turkey with inflow of migrants. Turkey hopes to contain ISIS with other coalition partners. Secondly, the country has been

¹⁸ Why Turkey's terror law is the 'Achilles heel' of the EU-Turkey visa deal. *France 24* [online] Available at: <<http://www.france24.com/en/20160513-why-turkeys-terror-law-achilles-heel-eu-turkey-migrant-deal>> [Accessed on 19 February 2017]

¹⁹ Article on insulting the president 'must change'. *Hürriyet Daily News* [online] Available at: <<http://www.hurriyetcailynews.com/article-on-insulting-the-president-must-change.aspx?pageID=238&nID=96527&NewsCatID=510>> [Accessed on 20 February 2017]

²⁰ Dorian Jones, 2013. Turkey's 'Anti-Terror' Law Casts Increasingly Wide Net. *VOA News* [online] Available at: <<http://www.voanews.com/a/turkey-anti-terror-law-casts-increasingly-wide-net/1772399.html>> [Accessed on 20 February 2017]

shaken by attacks backed by ISIS and the Kurdish militia. The attacks have created a period of un-certainty among the people and business owners. Thirdly, expansion by the Kurdish militia in northern Syria is considered a threat to national security. To deal with these anti-Turkish forces, Turkey has extended military support through ground operations, tanks and war planes. The operations have involved co-ordination and co-operation with Syrian opposition rebels and US led coalition.²¹

Syrian rebels with the support of Turkey have been achieving breakthroughs in Northern Syria. In recent months, they have been successful in pushing ISIS out of the majority of Northern Syria and look forward to extend their hold over the city of al-Bab, the last major hold of ISIS in the province of Aleppo. However, the same would not have been possible without Turkey co-operation with Russia. Turkey and Russia have jointly carried out air strikes against ISIS stronghold in northern Syria.²² In addition, Turkey is working with US and could possibly play greater military role in Raqqa, the stronghold of ISIS. Erdogan is trying to get US on board to a plan to retake Raqqa which does not require involvement of Kurdish fighters. Turkey considers Kurdish forces, YPG a terrorist organization and accuses them of attacking military and police officials within Turkey.²³

On the other hand, Turkish European partners in EU like Germany and France which face security, economic threat because of the Syrian war, have played a very limited role. EU has faced the migrants' wave but its involvement has been limited be it in military or diplomatic efforts.²⁴ It had mainly focused on its own challenges emerging from the Syrian war like for migrants' inflow; it has worked with Turkey and other neighbors to combat the inflowing refugees and providing humanitarian aid. Some of this indifference is attributed to the Syria and EU ignoring each other in their foreign policy. For instance, the EU negotiated the Association agreement with Syria but never signed it unlike other Mediterranean countries who did. However, with the growing ISIS threat in the region showcased through various attacks be it in Nice, France or Berlin, Germany or Brussels, Belgium,²⁵ EU members have acknowledged the need for greater co-operation and have worked with partners like Turkey to identify measures which could be used to cut off the money supply and stop the flow of

²¹ Kareem Shaheen, 2016. Turkey sends tanks into Syria in operation aimed at Isis and Kurds *The Guardian* [online] Available at: <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2016/aug/24/turkey-launches-major-operation-against-isis-in-key-border-town>> [Accessed on 20 February 2017]

²² Russia, Turkey in Joint Airstrikes on ISIS in Northern Syria. *Military* [online] Available at: <<http://www.military.com/daily-news/2017/01/18/russia-turkish-joint-airstrikes-isis-northern-syria.html>> [Accessed on 19 February 2017]

²³ Carlo Muñoz, 2017. Turkish, Syrian moves could transform fight against Islamic State. *The Washington Times* [online] Available at: <<http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2017/feb/8/isis-fight-could-turn-on-military-moves-by-turkey/>> [Accessed on 20 February 2017]

²⁴ Marc Pierini, 2016. In Search of an EU Role in the Syrian War. *Carnegie Europe* [online] Available at: <<http://carnegieeurope.eu/2016/08/18/in-search-of-eu-role-in-syrian-war-pub-64352>> [Accessed on 20 February 2017]

²⁵ P. Christys and M. Pallenberg, 2016. Germany wants POWERFUL EU army to fight against terror and promote world peace. *Express* [online] Available at: <<http://www.express.co.uk/news/world/747997/Germany-EU-Army-terrorism-ISIS-Islamic-State-France-European-Union-military-YouGov>> [Accessed on 18 February 2017]

foreign fighters.²⁶ In addition, EU members are looking into common defense network. Germany has proposed development of EU army to combat the growing global security challenges.

EU-Turkish cooperation

Following the failed military coup in July 2016, by the end of November, Turkey had suspended or dismissed more than 110,000 people and arrested nearly 36,000. The crackdown did not spare individuals of any particular field and was extended to soldiers, military officials, intelligence officials, judges, journalists, academics, security services officials as well as ministry officials holding office in areas of economics, foreign affairs. This crackdown has been targeted against Gulen supporters, Kurdistan Workers' party (PKK) or anyone suspected of having any association with them or anyone found guilty of spreading terror propaganda. Freedom of media has been compromised with a large number of outlets being shutdown.²⁷ In addition, continuous efforts have been made by Erdogan to push constitutional changes which would grant him more powers.

However, the purges have been criticized and are considered to be targeted towards the political opposition. This claim is supported by the fact that many opposition lawmakers, including heads of the pro-Kurdish Peoples' Democratic party (HDP) have been put behind bars on terror propaganda charges. Recently, İbrahim Kaboğlu, a prominent constitution professor was dismissed. He had earlier opposed the proposed changes to the constitution.²⁸ With the ongoing purges, leaders of the European Parliament's two largest groups have suggested that the accession talks be frozen. Gianni Pitella, the leader of the socialist group, raised concern that Turkey under President Erdogan is moving to an authoritarian regime and that EU cannot compromise on the issues of human rights, civil rights, democracy. Austria and Luxembourg hold similar views and have led calls to stop the EU accession process for Turkey.

Erdogan has criticized lukewarm response of the EU following Turkish military coup and has expressed displeasure over the remarks and stand taken by the EU officials and member nations. The disagreements have even led to threats from Turkey to scrap the migrant agreement which is considered to have stemmed the huge inflow of migrants to the Europe and a possible end to accession talks with EU. He has also shared the possibility of the country to hold referendum on EU membership and consider joining security alliance run by China and Russia.

²⁶ Mehmet Solmaz, 2015. French intelligence lacks cooperation with Turkey on foreign fighters *Daily Sabah* [online] Available at: <<https://www.dailysabah.com/politics/2015/01/13/french-intelligence-lacks-cooperation-with-turkey-on-foreign-fighters>> [Accessed on 20 February 2017]

²⁷ Alissa de Carbonnel, 2016. European lawmakers call for end to Turkey EU membership talks. *Reuters* [online] Available at: <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-turkey-security-eu-idUSKBN13H1RK>> [Accessed on 20 February 2017]

²⁸ Kareem Shaheen, 2017. Turkey dismisses 4,400 public servants in latest post-coup attempt purge. *The Guardian* [online] Available at: <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2017/feb/08/turkey-dismisses-4400-public-servants-erdogan-trump-phone-call>> [Accessed on 20 February 2017]

Despite the concerns persisting, Finnish Foreign Minister Timo Soini recently shared how Europe and Turkey are working together on many areas varying from Turkey's EU membership to trade and security. He mentioned about the ongoing Cyprus peace talks being carried out as part of the EU accession chapters and expressed his belief that success in talks would foster progress on other issues. He also stressed on the importance of timely completion of the talks. Soini added the need for EU to work with Turkey over the refugee crisis and exchange of delegations to increase trade. Focusing on his Finland, he shared that the trade between the two stood at €1 billion.²⁹

Turkey's referendum

Turkey has been working on a new draft constitution, which would move Turkey from a parliamentary to a presidential republic. The draft is highly controversial as it enhances the powers of president significantly and benefits the current Turkish president Recep Tayyip Erdogan directly. The draft entails lots of changes. Firstly, the position of Prime minister will get scrapped and instead the president will become the head of state and the executive. Secondly, presidential powers will get significantly enhanced giving him the privileges to appoint ministers, judges, prepare budget and even issue decrees. The President would even get the power to announce all by himself the state of emergency and dismissal of the parliament. Thirdly, Parliament would no longer be able to propose enquiry against the ministers. However, it could initiate impeachment proceedings against the president with the 2/3rd support of the MPs. Fourthly, the number of terms of president will be limited to two and the presidential and parliamentary elections would be scheduled together on same day every five years.

Opposition is distraught over the changes and have cited concerns highlighting that during Mr Erdogan's presidentship, nearly 140,000 people have already seen arrests or dismissal. Presidential system is not new and has worked in countries like the US. However, their judiciary system and media enjoys much more freedom and are able to question the decrees issued by the president or the policies framed by him. Unlike in Turkey, where in recent past there has been crackdown against the media, judiciary and Article 299 related to insult to the president has been used on a regular basis. Government argues that the changes are critical and would speed up the decision making, increase in efficiency, which are often compromised by the coalition governments. The government also mentions that the proposed changes could end terrorist attacks. The government with the support from MHP has got the required parliamentary majority to hold a referendum over the constitutional draft on April 16th. The referendum is perceived as a referendum over the president himself.³⁰

²⁹ Finnish minister backs further Turkey-EU cooperation. *MEMO* [online] Available at: <<https://www.middleeastmonitor.com/20170114-finnish-minister-backs-further-turkey-eu-cooperation>> [Accessed on 17 February 2017]

³⁰ Why is Turkey holding a referendum? *BBC* [online] Available at: <<http://www.bbc.com/news/world-europe-38883556>> [Accessed on 20 February 2017]

Conclusion

The migrant deal has escalated tensions between Turkey and the EU. Both parties need to reevaluate this deal both internally as well as internationally. As Turkish EU Affairs Minister Omer Celik raises that the only way to save the deal would be to engage in dialogue. Some of the promises made like visa fee travel, speeding up the EU accession for Turkey do not seem reachable with current set of Turkish laws and human right violations. The two must discuss, identify achievable targets and be willing participants to an eventual agreement.

The two parties must work together and keep in mind the important relationship they share with each other. For Turkey, the EU is the largest trading partner they have and with ongoing war in neighboring territories, it needs all the investment it can get. Where as the EU who have enjoyed the benefits of the migrant deal for months would not like to see any severing of ties with Turkey, fearing another uncontrollable migrant crisis. Turkey and the EU must continue co-operation over security, migration, trade. The accession talks could lead to Cypriot reunification. EU member states must regroup and review the promises as they may have to give in if Turkey keeps its end of the deal for visa liberalization.³¹ Dialogue and co-operation is the only way ahead for both nations.

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³¹ Turkey’s bid to join the EU is a bad joke; but don’t kill it. *The Economist* [online] Available at: <<http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21708693-two-cheers-hypocrisy-turkeys-bid-join-eu-bad-joke-dont-kill-it>> [Accessed on 20 February 2017]

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**MATRIXING THE SECURITY AND STRATEGY SETTINGS IN THE NATO SUMMITS 2012–2016
(MASES AGENDA’S FOCUS ON “POPULATION” AND “TERRITORY”)**

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Key Words: *security, strategy, NATO, summit, consultation*

Abstract: *The present study indexes and scrutinizes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter NATO) official texts, Summits’ declarations and press conferences. Specifically, we methodologically analysed the latest three summits communiqués issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the NATO meetings and the press conferences issued by the NATO Secretary General as follows:*

1. *NATO Summit Warsaw (8-9 July 2016) (hereinafter S1_W);*
2. *NATO Wales Summit (4-5 September 2014) (S2_W) and*
3. *NATO Chicago Summit (20-21 May 2012) (S3_C).*

In so researching, we embodied S1_W, S2_W and S3_C official texts such as: declarations, joint statements and press conferences on a conceptual matrix focused on the security and strategy agenda (entitled MASES Agenda) linking four topics aimed at revealing the transatlantic nexus as follows:

- a) peace and security (Topic 1: PeS);*
- b) security consultation among NATO members and Allies (Topic 2: SeC);*
- c) resources and capabilities (Topic 3: ReC);*
- d) sovereignty and territorial integrity (Topic 4: SOTI) to suggest why the NATO Summits final declarations are vital moments for the Euro-Atlantic security frames.*

In the MASES analysis, the PeS, SeC, ReC and SOTI indicators are surveyed to explore the new trends issued to safeguard the shared security of the Alliance in accordance with the international law.

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Introduction

Security agenda is fundamentally a conceptual core which holds that the strategic unit of the policies, political actions and the national security actions are compatible. Relating security to the strategy landscape is one of the most challenging equations of the scholarly literature. Within each of these positions of security settings have also been shaping policies and complexes of influences reordering and/ or replacing the security concerns as follows: a) population, resources and planning (Walker, 2016, pp.980–1004; Olimid and Olimid, 2016, pp.35–47); b) capabilities (Grant, 2012, pp.418–429); c) mission(s) (Woody, 2013, pp.37–40); d) security, data and communication network (Rader and Wash, 2015, pp.121–144); e) local self-government and Europeanization empowerment (Georgescu, 2011, pp.21–40); f) global risks and vulnerabilities (Kaminskiy and Ayyub, 2008).

The present study indexes and scrutinizes the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (hereinafter NATO) final declarations in the period 2012–2016. The paper examines the links between the topics of “mission”, “cooperation”, “dialogue” and “defence” both at the theoretical equivalent and through the final declarations of the following summits: NATO Summit Warsaw (8–9 July 2016); NATO Wales Summit (4–5 September 2014); NATO Chicago Summit (20–21 May 2012). The first part of the paper describes both dimensions of the subject: the “peace and security” landscape and the “security and consultation” paths. The second part places “security and consultation” and “sovereignty and territorial integrity”. The third part of the analyses requires a strong attention to the following main coverages:

- 1) Main Coverage of the Topic of PeS : Mission;
- 2) Chart 2: Main Coverage of the Topic of SeC: Cooperation;
- 3) Chart 3: Main Coverage of the Topic of ReC: Dialogue;
- 4) Chart 4: Main Coverage of the Topic of SOTI: Defence.

The fourth part of the study discusses the Categorization of the Sub-topics in the Summit declarations by ranking the various types of the sub-topics from “highly used” to “standardized interposition”

Methods and Data

Specifically, we methodologically analysed the latest three summits communiqués issued by the Heads of State and Government participating in the NATO meetings and the press conferences issued by the NATO Secretary General as follows: NATO Summit Warsaw (8–9 July 2016) (hereinafter S1_W); NATO Wales Summit (4–5 September 2014) (S2_W); NATO Chicago Summit (20–21 May 2012) (S3_C).

Although the NATO Summit Declarations undertake new extents to the security and strategy environment focusing on the population and territory understanding and evolutions, the paper also examines through a content analysis of the official documents the impact of the main institutional patterns of the political dialogue, partners solidarity and consultations, and NATO’s resources and capabilities.




Figure 1. Content Analysis of the MASES Agenda
 Source: Authors own compilation

Consequently, Figure 1 entitled: “Content Analysis of the MASES Agenda” marks that current undertakings of security is enabled to correlate the main topics and sub-topics of the security by rediscovering the impact of the concepts of “consultation” and “dialogue” (see Figure 1. Content Analysis of the MASES Agenda).

We titled our analysis MASES Agenda taking into consideration two different analyses (MASES AGENDA= MASES A1 (topics)+MASES A2 (subtopics): 1. MASES A1

(based on counting and analysing the main topics of each summit declaration) and 2. MASES A2 (based on counting and analysing the subtopics of each summit declaration.



Figure 2. Topics of the MASES Agenda
 Source: Authors own compilation

In the MASES analysis, we analysed the PeS, SeC, ReC and SOTI topics (MASES AGENDA 1) using their conceptual coverage and the conceptual coverage of sub-topics (MASES AGENDA 2). We also used a “ranking system” for the conceptual coverage grading from 1-5. In so researching, we embodied S1_W, S2_W and S3_C official texts such as: declarations, joint statements and press conferences on a conceptual matrix on the security and strategy agenda (entitled MASES Agenda) linking four topics aimed at revealing the transatlantic nexus as follows: peace and security (Topic 1: PeS); security consultation among NATO members and Allies (Topic 2: SeC); resources and capabilities (Topic 3: ReC); sovereignty

and territorial integrity (Topic 4: SOTI) to suggest why the NATO Summits final declarations are vital moments for the Euro-Atlantic security frames.

Table 1. Division of the main topics in sub-topics in the MASES Agenda

Peace and security (Topics 1 PeS) Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C	Peace (reconciliation)	Mission(s) (operation(s))	Security (NATO solidarity)	Partnership (partner country(ies))
Security and consultation (Topic 2 SeC) Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C	Consult(ation) (consultations and 28+n formats)	Dialogue (Political Dialogue)	Cooperation (Cooperation with Russia)	Military (responsibility)
Resources and capabilities (Topic 3 ReC) Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C	Resource(s) (NATO’s resources)	Capability + capabilities (Management capability/ operations, etc.)	Strategic (Strategic Concept)	Development(s) (planning)
Sovereignty and territorial integrity (Topic 4: SOTI) Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C	Sovereignty (sovereignty of)	Territorial/ territory (territory and forces)	Defence (collective defence)	Regional (population(s))

Source: Authors own compilation

In Table 1, Column 1 we identified the division of the main topics for each summit declaration in the MASES Agenda as follows: (a) Peace and security (Topics 1 PeS) identified in the Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C; (b) Security and consultation (Topic 2 SeC) identified in the Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C (c) Resources and capabilities (Topic 3 ReC) identified in the Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C (d) Sovereignty and territorial integrity (Topic 4: SOTI) identified in the Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C. From Column 2 to Column 5, we identified the main topics of the: 1) first division defined in Column 1 (peace, consultation, resource(s), sovereignty); 2) second division defined in Column 2 (mission, dialogue, capability and capabilities, territorial and territory); 3) third division in Column 3 (security, cooperation, strategic, defence); 4) fourth division in Column 4 (partnership, military, development, regional).

Results

Tables 2-5 sample the main topics of the summit declarations from the perspective of the relationship peace-security-consultation-resources and capabilities and the impact on sovereignty and territorial integrity. Table 2 analysis the peace and security framework related

to the impact and redefinition of mission and partnership in the summits’ declarations. The findings provide a practical framework for further analysis on dialogue and cooperation (Table 2). Consequently, Table 1 reinforces the argument of a strong security construction within the Euro-Atlantic environment according to which the partnership undergoes a new level of its own development: “mission” - 24 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 14 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 22 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012). Not surprisingly, Table 3 also analyses the attitude towards the relationship between consultation-dialogue-cooperation. On this conceptual basis, Table 3 argues that “cooperation” tends to be the meaningful argument enabling a central reliable and consolidated indicator that incorporates the transformation of the dialogue perspectives (“dialogue”: 25 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 21 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 21 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012); “consultation”: 68 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 61 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 53 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012); “military”:1: 52 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 22 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 14 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012).

Table 2. Peace and security (Topics 1 PeS)

Summit Declarations and Content Titles (web page/ right display) S1_W→S2_W→S3_C (Official text)	Peace (reconciliation)	Mission(s) (operation(s))	Security (NATO solidarity)	Partnership (partner country(ies))
S1_W(Warsaw, 2016)	26(3)	24(127)	188(1)	40(3)
S2_W (Wales, 2014)	31(1)	14(112)	151(1)	36(2)
S3_C(Chicago, 2012)	29(2)	22(99)	78(1)	30(4)

Source: Authors own compilation

Table 3. Security and consultation (Topic 2 SeC)

Summit Declarations and Content Titles (web page/ right display) S1_W→S2_W→S3_C (Official text)	Consult(ation) (consultations and 28+n formats)	Dialogue (Political Dialogue)	Cooperation (Cooperation with Russia)	Military (responsibility)
S1_W(Warsaw, 2016)	8(0)	25(9)	68(0)	52(9)
S2_W (Wales, 2014)	5(0)	21(32)	61(0)	22(5)
S3_C(Chicago, 2012)	4(1)	21(9)	53(3)	12(4)

Source: Authors own compilation

Table 4 focuses on the relationship resources-capability-strategy as a fundamental catalyst for the Euro-Atlantic security. Various findings of Table 4 enable the common vision of the members’ solidarity and partnership including mission activities, operation development etc. Using the data of the three summit declaration, Table 4 suggests the contextual assertions and influences of the “resources” and “capability” taking as a point of the departure the positive impact of “development”. Table 4 links the following findings: “resources”: 14 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 6 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 8 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012); “capability”: 73 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 65 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 31 items displayed

within S3_C (Chicago, 2012); “strategic”: 30 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 24 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 21 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012); “development(s)”: 25 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 18 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 10 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012).

Table 4. Resources and capabilities (Topic 3 ReC)

Summit Declarations and Content Titles (web page/ right display) S1_W→S2_W→S3_C (Official text)	Resource(s) (NATO's resources)	Capability + capabilities (Management capability/ operations, etc.)	Strategic (Strategic Concept)	Development(s) (planning)
S1_W(Warsaw, 2016)	14(0)	73(1)	30(1)	25(8)
S2_W (Wales, 2014)	6(0)	65(1)	24(2)	18(8)
S3_C(Chicago, 2012)	8(1)	31(6)	21(7)	10(6)

Source: Authors own compilation

In predicting the paths of “sovereignty and territorial integrity”, Table 5 refers to a two-dimensional context relating to “territorial” and “regional” achieves. Table 5 also re-examines these conceptual dimensions and shows that both supports for sovereignty and defence engagements are dependent variables within the analysis. To further consider the intensity of these variables, Table 5 indicates that the use of the concept of “defence” is the most significant comparing to the other variables. However, the other concepts have a moderately strong use within the declarations of the Wales Summit (2014). The Columns 2-5 show the results for all the four concepts showing that the difference between the uses in the Chicago Summit (2012) and Warsaw Summit (2016) are minimal: “sovereignty”: 8 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 21 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 4 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012); “defence””: 116 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 101 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 54 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012); “territorial”: 116 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 101 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 54 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012); “regional”: 17 items displayed within S1_W (Warsaw, 2016), 20 items displayed within S2_W (Wales, 2014) and 21 items displayed within S3_C (Chicago, 2012).

Table 5. Sovereignty and territorial integrity (Topic 4: SOTI)

Summit Declarations and Content Titles (web page/ right display) S1_W→S2_W→S3_C (Official text)	Sovereignty (sovereignty of)	Territorial/ territory (territory and forces)	Defence (collective defence)	Regional (population(s))
S1_W(Warsaw, 2016)	8(3)	8(23)	116(14)	17(16)
S2_W (Wales, 2014)	11(2)	22(0)	101(14)	20(12)
S3_C(Chicago, 2012)	4(2)	9(3)	54(5)	21(5)

Source: Authors own compilation


The analysis turns to the coverage of the main topic for each division. Chart 1 individuals the variable of “security” in a strong and consistent relationship with “partnership” (Chart 1. Coverage of the topics of peace, mission, security and partnership in S1_W, S2_W, S3_C).

Chart 2 posits that “military” and “cooperation” have an interaction effect on the agenda of “dialogue” and “consultation”. To emphasize the effects of this interaction Chart 3 and Chart 4 provide a strong support for the findings of the Chart 2.

Chart 1. Coverage of the Topics of Peace, Mission, Security and Partnership in S1_W, S2_W and S3_C



Chart 2. Coverage of the Topics of Consult(ation), Dialogue, Cooperation, Military in S1_W, S2_W and S3_C



Source: Authors own compilation

Hence, although the main impact of the “dialogue” on support for “cooperation”, Chart 3 extends the significant relationship between the items of Chart 1 noting the need for “resource(s)” and “capability and/ or capabilities” (Chart 3. Coverage of the topics of resource(s), capability and/ or capabilities, in S1_W, S2_W, S3_C). Chart 4 is dedicated to answering the question of the significance of “defence” explaining the relationship between regional gaps-territorial challenges and sovereignty approaches (Chart 4. Coverage of the topics of sovereignty, territorial, defence, regional in S1_W, S2_W, S3_C).

Chart 3. Coverage of the Topics of resource(s), capability+capabilities, strategic, development in S1_W, S2_W and S3_C





Chart 4. Coverage of the Topics of sovereignty, territorial, defence, regional in S1_W, S2_W and S3_C



Source: Authors own compilation

Categorization of the Sub-topics

Categorization of the Sub-topics in the Summit declarations according to the following indicators are intended to cover the focused scope of the S1_W, S2_W and S3_C as follows: status of peace and security (Topic 1: PeS); approaches to security consultation among NATO members and Allies (Topic 2: SeC); perspectives on resources and capabilities (Topic 3: ReC); regard on the sovereignty and territorial integrity (Topic 4: SOTI) to suggest why the NATO Summits final declarations are vital moments for the Euro-Atlantic security frames.

Ranking types of the sub-topics from “highly used” → “standardized interposition”

The further step of the analysis is to rank the various types of sub-topics “highly used” → “standardized interposition”. Using these results, we categorized the Summit declarations topics of the analysis into five categories from “highly used” to “standardized interposition”:

Rank 1: Highly used, with large developments of the conceptual connections within the Summits declarations (used between higher than 21);

Rank 2: Highly used, with some random developments of the conceptual connections within the Summits declarations (uses between 16-20);

Rank 3: Moderate used, but dependable developments of the conceptual connections within the Summits declarations (uses between 11-15);

Rank 4: Compelling used and dependable developments of the conceptual connections within the Summits declarations (uses between 6-10);

Rank 5: Standardized interposition of the conceptual connections within the Summits declarations (used between 1-5); Rank 6: No use (*).

Table 6. Ranking the SUB-Topics 1 PeS

<i>Summit - Declarations S1_W → S2_W → S3_C</i>	<i>Reconciliation</i>	<i>Operation(s)</i>	<i>NATO solidarity</i>	<i>Partner country(ies)</i>
<i>Summit Declarations + Content Titles (moh kano = riobt dicitlan)</i>				
<i>S1_W → S2_W → S3_C (Official text)</i>				
<i>S1_W (Warsaw, 2016)</i>	(5)	(1)	(5)	(5)
<i>S2_W (Wales, 2014)</i>	(5)	(1)	(5)	(5)
<i>S3_C (Chicago, 2012)</i>	(5)	(1)	(5)	(5)

Source: Authors own compilation

According to the methodology, the highest rank (1) was achieved by “operation(s)” (S1_W, S2_W, S3_C) (Table 1); “political dialogue” (S2_W) (Table 2); “territory and forces” (S1_W) (Table 9); rank (2) was achieved by “population(s)” (S1_W) (Table 4).

Table 7. Ranking of the /SUB- Topic 2 SeC

<i>Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C</i>	<i>Consultations and 28+n formats</i>	<i>Political Dialogue</i>	<i>Cooperation with Russia</i>	<i>Responsibility</i>
<i>Summit Declarations + Content Titles (web page = nicht dicitlen)</i>				
<i>S1_W→S2_W→S3_C (Official text)</i>				
<i>S1_W (Warsaw, 2016)</i>	(*)	(4)	(*)	(4)
<i>S2_W (Wales, 2014)</i>	(*)	(1)	(*)	(5)
<i>S3_C (Chicago, 2012)</i>	(5)	(4)	(5)	(5)

Source: Authors own compilation

Compelling used and dependable developments of the conceptual connections within the Summits declarations (Rank 4: uses between 6-10); and standardized interposition of the conceptual connections within the Summits declarations (Rank 5: used between 1-5) was achieved by: “reconciliation” (rank (5), Table 6); “NATO solidarity” (rank (5), Table 6); “partner country(ies)” (rank (5), Table 6); “consultation and 28+n formats” (rank (5), S3_C, Table 7); “political dialogue” (rank (4), S1_W and S3_C, Table 6); “responsibility” (rank (5), S2_W and S3_C, Table 6); “planning” (rank 4, Table 6); “sovereignty” (rank (5), Table 6); “population” (rank (5), S3_C, Table 9); “strategic concept” (rank 5, S1_W and S2_W, Table 8).

Table 8. Ranking the SUB-Topic 3 ReC

<i>Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C</i>	<i>NATO’s resources</i>	<i>Management capabilities/ operations etc.</i>	<i>Strategic Concept</i>	<i>Planning</i>
<i>Summit Declarations + Content Titles (web page = nicht dicitlen)</i>				
<i>S1_W→S2_W→S3_C (Official text)</i>				
<i>S1_W (Warsaw, 2016)</i>	(*)	(5)	(5)	(4)
<i>S2_W (Wales, 2014)</i>	(*)	(5)	(5)	(4)
<i>S3_C (Chicago, 2012)</i>	(5)	(4)	(4)	(4)

Source: Authors own compilation

Highly used, with some random developments of the conceptual connections within the Summits declarations (Rank 2: uses between 16-20) and moderate used, but dependable developments of the conceptual connections within the Summits declarations (Rank 3: uses between 11-15) was achieved by: “population” (rank 2, S1_W and rank 3, S2_W, Table 9) and “collective defence” (S1_W and S2_W, Table 9).

Table 9. Ranking the SUB-Topic 4 SOTI

<i>Summit – Declarations S1_W→S2_W→S3_C</i>	<i>Sovereignty of...</i>	<i>Territory and forces</i>	<i>Collective defence</i>	<i>Population(s)</i>
<i>Summit Declarations + Content Titles (web page = nicht dicitlen)</i>				
<i>S1_W→S2_W→S3_C (Official text)</i>				
<i>S1_W (Warsaw, 2016)</i>	(5)	(1)	(3)	(2)
<i>S2_W (Wales, 2014)</i>	(5)	(*)	(3)	(3)
<i>S3_C (Chicago, 2012)</i>	(5)	(3)	(5)	(5)

Source: Authors own compilation

Discussion

The topics of “population” and “territory and forces” are enabling various challenges for the security environment and the collective defence engagements. According to the data provided in Table 9. Ranking the SUB-topic 4 SOTI, the collective defence continues to the settled within the classic understandings of the Euro-Atlantic landscape.

There is in fact a broad agreement that the sub-topics of “population” (Table 9) and “territory (forces)” emphasize the subjective ambivalence of these challenges. However, contrary to the usual findings regarding this subjective ambivalence of security, the use of the items of “population” and “territory and forces” are discussed in Table 9 pointing to a dichotomy of the “strategic concept” (Table 8), “planning” (Table 8), “management capability/ operations” (Table 8) and “responsibility” (Table 7).

By recognizing the importance of the topics of “population” and “territory”, the analysis of the MASES Agenda raises a valuable set of questions regarding the various security concerns and prioritize the responsibility-planning-mission-operation measures (Table 7. Ranking of the /SUB- Topic 2 SeC and Table 7. Ranking of the /SUB- Topic 2 SeC).

This conceptualization of “population” and “territory” refers also to the co-existence of the partnership assistance and the positive effects (Table 6, Column 5) and of the consultation 28+n framework (Table 7, Column 2). As noted before, the ranking of sub-topics 3 and 4 (Table 8 and Table 9) points two major approaches to the relationship between the conditional actions (Table 6) and the dominant effects of these actions (Table 8 and Table 9).

Second, besides the consultations 28+n format, the security engagements enable various influences and effects of the “collective defence”. On the other hand, there is a direct-input of the security topics on the well-established “management capability” (Table 8) and the reconciliation paths (Table 6).

Conclusions

MASES findings demonstrates that the security frameworks are invariably challenged by the sources of stability and the responsibility of the decision-making processes and policies. These results and engagements challenge the need for security assurance of the Allies and the coherence claimed by the Alliance as inner tasks of its Strategic Concept. We confer how these basic demands for security policies and close partnership are committed to respond to the multi-dimensional threats.

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**THE ROLE OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN
INTERNATIONAL SECURITY AND PEACE
FROM NEO-REALIST PERSPECTIVE**

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Key Words: *nuclear proliferation, international security, anarchic structure, world politics, neo-realism*

Abstract: *Existence of the nuclear weapons and rising nuclear proliferation in 21st century continue to increase the security concerns in international political arena. Today, there are 9 countries holding nuclear weapons and 5 countries that aim to develop a more affective nuclear technology in the world. In last decade one of the most critical problems based on rising nuclear armament is the crisis that broke out between Iran and US on the issue of Iran's Nuclear Development Program. At this point, this study focuses on the role of nuclear weapons in international security and peace within the case concerning the crisis between Iran and US from the Neo-Realist perspective. It plans to create rational explications concerning with four main questions in order to elaborate the problem: 1) Would nuclear weapons both Iran and Israel held as regional hostiles create a serious crisis which could trigger a war if Iran became a nuclear state? 2) Is the peaceful solution reached by framework deal sustainable in the long term? 3) What will happen if the framework deal is broken? 4) Is there any possibility in which Iran repeals the agreement if the current Iranian government changes in next presidential elections? In this study, the role of nuclear weapons in international politics is considered by applying the problem to the Kenneth Waltz's Neo-Realist arguments with regards to the structure of nuclear world.*

* * *

1. Introduction

Striking level of technological development in 20th century has created an upheaval in defence and military industry for nation-states. Advent of high-technological military industry based on chemical, biological and nuclear materials has increased the destructiveness of weapons that advanced and professional armed forces hold. These weapons are called as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) on account of their ability to decimate irreversibly the existence of antagonists. In this sense, the innovation of atomic bomb and its use by United States (US) against Japan in World War II showed how subversive the WMDs with nuclear infrastructure could be due to its formidable impacts on human life.

The gruesome experience of atomic bomb in Nagasaki and Hiroshima jeopardized the international stability, and forced the nation-states to take necessary precautions concerning with security weaknesses through recruitment of their military power. In order to relieve the rising anxiety in Europe because of spreading nuclear armament during Cold War era, *European Atomic Energy Agency (EURATOM)* was established in 1957. EURATOM aimed to create a market in which the member states share the responsibilities for the development of a nuclear technology in Europe. However, escalating competition between two dominant global powers of Cold War -US and Soviet Union- polarized the international political order. Due to the bipolar structure of international political system everlasting retaliations between US and Soviet Union caused a dangerous security crisis that broke out between two rivalries in 1964. Two super powers were on the brink of a nuclear war when Soviet Union deployed the anti-ballistic missile system in Cuba in response to the American deployment in Turkey. With the collapse of the SU in 1990, the era of bipolar world also ended and international political arena became more stabilized in the new unipolar world order dominated by only US.

Unfortunately a security concern which derives from the existence of nuclear weapons has not completely disappeared in Post-Cold War period. Today, there are 9 countries that possess nuclear weapons and 5 countries that are trying to develop a more affective nuclear technology in the world. The group of the countries; which Russia and US pioneer; comprises of both Western and Eastern states such as UK, France, China, India, Pakistan, Israel and North Korea that hold approximately more than 2000 nuclear warheads in total. The number of the warheads that Russia and US have is more than 15,000; namely more than seven times of warheads that the other seven countries have. Although North Korea became a threat for the security of US' homeland after the Cold War as a remained symbol of communist regime, it is claimed to have an undeveloped nuclear technology in contrast to US. Nevertheless, despite of its weak nuclear power the escalation based on conflicting ideologies and North Korea's aggressive foreign policy-within the uncertainty of which type of nuclear weapons North Korea has- between US and North Korea increased the instability in international political arena.

Correspondingly, the problem of nuclear proliferation in 21st century emphasized the need of establishment of capable institutions which could restrict or control the nuclear development especially in problematic regions to prevent a possible nuclear conflict or war. For this reason, *International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA)* was founded in 1957 by United Nations (UN) as the world's "Atoms for peace" organization to promote the safe and peaceful use of nuclear technologies. (Anon, 2016) IAEA granted by the voluntary contributions of UN member states prepares annual reports to inform the UN General Assembly about the nuclear activities and programs conducted all around the world. IAEA cannot make binding decisions on nuclear development programs of the countries on the purpose of limiting or bringing them under control. Its report only gives information and serves as a warning paper about the level of danger in the nuclear activities. Furthermore, "*Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons*" (NPT) was signed by 191 countries in 1968 including permanent members of UN Security Council to monitor the nuclear capacity of contracting parties and comprehend the

real aim behind their development programs. (Anon, 2016) However, four UN members holding nuclear weapons has never been a part of NPT; which they are India, Pakistan, Israel and South Sudan in order to strengthen their nuclear capacities without any external intervention. In addition, North Korea that recognized the procedures of the treaty in 1985 – but never complied with it- announced its withdrawal in 2003. (Anon, 2016)

It shows that international treaties and organizations could not completely eradicate the threat of nuclear war or conflict owing to the lack of legal jurisdiction to implement efficient sanctions which can discourage the nation-states from developing nuclear technology. Pakistan and India is always on the verge of war because of Kashmir dispute. Israel has been isolated by Arab States in Middle East as a result of its expansionist policies in Palestinian territories and Arab States' Islamic radicalism since Israel appeared in the region as a sovereign state. Concerns on national security issues trigger the nuclear proliferation, and the rising nuclear proliferation stimulates more and more states to execute their own nuclear development program; which creates a security dilemma in world politics.

2. The case of Iran-US nuclear deal

In last century, one of the most important crises corresponding nuclear armament in international political arena erupted between Iran and US from Iran's Nuclear Development Program. Iran started to run a nuclear development program in 1967 during Shah Regime under US control. It became a part of NPT in 1970 and established the *Iran Atomic Energy Institution* in 1974. However, Radical Islamic Revolution launched by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 and following hostage crisis in the years of 1979-1982 profoundly damaged the US-Iran relations. Iran continued to consolidate its nuclear capacity independently since 1980s. It accelerated the uranium enrichment process as an essential material for the construction of nuclear weapons and increased the number of the centrifuges in last decade.

US and Western European Powers such as UK, Germany and France claimed that Iran had been conducting its nuclear development program for the use of military purpose since 2000 and threatening the regional stability and peace. In response, Iran indicated that it had consolidated its nuclear capacity peacefully, not offensively with the intent of preserving its national interests in the problematic region. Suspicions on a possible clandestine nuclear program executed by Iran forced Germany, UK and France (European Triple) to organize a range of negotiations with Iran to compromise on the suspension of Iran's uranium enrichment activities in 2004. Although an agreement on a restriction of Iran's uranium enrichment could be reached for indefinite period between the sides, negotiation process stopped in 2005 in that Iran increased the number of existing centrifuges from 165 to 3000. (Beachy, 2015) In return European Triple proposed that Iran could continue to run its nuclear technology program in Russian territories under UN control. However, Iran refused this recommendation. Following that, European Triple and US alleged that Iran would never stop its nuclear activities posing a danger to the security of other states in the region, especially for Israel as a loyal US ally. They started to implement strict economic and political sanctions

which were isolating Iran from international arena to wear out its power until it stopped its uranium enrichment activities.

In June 2008; who is Former Representative of Common Defence and Foreign Policy of European Union; Javier Solana visited Tehran and offered a common incentive pocket of P5+1 countries (US, Russia, UK, France and Germany) including financial help for Iran to run a nuclear program with a light water reactor, legal guarantee of nuclear fuel and relief for commerce. Nevertheless, this pocket could not convince Iran to stop its uranium enrichment activities. Therefore, new economic and political sanctions against Iran were expected to be implemented by P5+1 countries; but Russia vetoed this proposal in UN Security Council. The report prepared by IAEA in September 2008 could verify neither the allegations of P5+1 countries nor the Iran's claims. (Beachy, 2015) In the report, IAEA stated that Iran did not fulfil its responsibilities according to NPT by continuing its uranium enrichment activities, but there was no proof which showed that Iran was executing a clandestine nuclear program on military purpose. Khomeini's refusal for incentive pocket proposed by P5+1 countries entered the negotiations into deadlock. Consequently, UN Resolution 1929 came into the force with additional sanctions on Iran's economy in 2010.

However, in the report published in 2011 related to Iran's nuclear activities, IAEA expressed its doubts regarding the possibility of a nuclear program which might be developed on military purpose by claiming that Iran did not allow IAEA to control all of the facilities it had. (Morello, 2016) Consequently, United States Senate confirmed a new sanction pocket restricting business activities with Iran which comprised energy, ship building, transportation and heavy metal industries. European Union (EU) settled on the implementation of new sanctions limiting the banking transfers and marine transportation with Iran. Also 27 EU members announced that they would stop to buy natural gas from Iran.

First promising attempts on the crisis between Iran and P5+1 countries were made after Hassan Rouhani; who was described as a moderate politician by Western World; won Iran's presidential elections in 2013. A promising reconciliation; which was an interim deal under Joint Plan of Action (JPA) based on Geneva Agreement; was reached between the sides in November 2013. Geneva Agreement entered into the force in January 2014 as a historical turning point in terms of ongoing negotiations lasting more than one decade. (Morello, 2016) The interim deal could persuade Iran to decelerate its nuclear program gradually in return for the relief from specific economic sanctions for integration with the rest of the world in contrast to many previous unsuccessful steps. Negotiations under JPA started in February 2014 at the UN's centre in Vienna with the first round in which the parties could only schedule a timetable and framework concerning the meetings. (Morello, 2016) In the fourth round in May 2014 the US and Iran came together bilaterally and agreed on roughing in final agreement; but they made a little progress on template. In the sixth (final) round of the negotiations the parties could not even approach a comprehensive and efficient deal. Therefore, the term of negotiations required to be extended to July 2014 to handle with the contradiction between what P5+1 countries expected to acquire and what Iran expected to acquire with the final agreement. Nevertheless, first extension of JPA also fell through in November 2014 and could not create any settlement for a mutually beneficial solution in that

both sides evaded making concessions. Then, JPA was extended for the second time with a new deadline to July 2015.

Negotiations under the second extension started on 18th of January 2015 in Geneva, and had lasted four days within bilateral talks between US and Iran. (Beachy, 2015) Even though any remarkable progress could not be made on the majority of the disputed issues at the end of the meetings, parties realized that they had to make concessions for a deal satisfying the needs of both sides. In April 2015 during the negotiations proceeding in Lausanne, P5+1 countries and Iran compromised on a preliminary agreement that Iran committed to temporarily limiting its uranium enrichment activities which would continue at least for ten years. In addition, it promised to increase the number of the international inspections under the framework deal which would be completed by 30 June 2015. (Beachy, 2015) In exchange, significant amount of sanctions imposed on Iran's national economy would be removed in order to reintegrate Iran with the international economic and political arena.

Contradictions on the issue between two parts did not disappear completely while negotiating process on the framework deal was still continuing. Firstly, their opinions as to which the point they arrived at in Lausanne were not in harmony. During his speech in White House on April 2th 2015, US President Barrack Obama stated that "historic understanding" was accomplished between two sides with a comprehensive agreement which was able to meet the core objectives of US in the region. (Morello, 2016) He also emphasized that if Iran cheated or violated the agreement by continuing its nuclear development program clandestinely, stricter economic and political sanctions would be imposed against it in international arena. Conversely, on the same day Iran Foreign Minister Mohammad Javad Zarif said that "No agreement has been reached so we do not have any obligation yet. Nobody has obligations now other than obligations that we already undertook the Joint Plan of Action that we adapted in Geneva in November 2013." (Beachy, 2015)

According to their statements, it is explicit that when US considered Iran as the main responsible part for the obligations of the agreement which had not been ratified yet as if it was ratified, Iran refused the existence of any agreement reached with US that was against its national interests. Also, Radical Islamist politicians in Iran opposing to negotiate with US raised the degree of mistrustfulness which derived from historical antagonism between two sides. Secondly, their expectations from the final agreement were still contradicting. On April 9th President Hassan Rouhani indicated in his explanations that they would not sign any agreement unless all economic sanctions imposed on Iran were lifted immediately. Whereas Iran introduced the removal of the economic sanctions as prerequisite to reach a comprehensive agreement with US, US was supporting the remove of the sanctions incrementally in a period of time that was at least a decade according as Iran's compliance with its obligations.

Thirdly, one of the most important factors that caused a fragility in negotiation process was Israel's attitudes. According to Israel's Prime Minister Benyamin Netanyahu, the aim of the nuclear technology program developed by Iran was to threaten Israel's entity in the region. He severely criticized US given that the framework deal reached in Lausanne was based on

specific limitations on Iran's nuclear technology instead of eliminating it wholly. He claimed that US made unacceptable concessions from the point of Israel's national security to compromise with Iran. On 3 March 2015 in the speech he gave at US Congress; he stated that Iran as an Islamic extremist state stimulating the spread of Islamist terrorism in Middle East had already destabilized the region by escalating the religious and ethnic conflicts. He also added that under the circumstances, an Islamist terrorist country that found an opportunity to produce its own nuclear weapons secretly within the framework deal did not only endanger Israel's existence and regional stability but also endanger the international security and world peace, and US had to withdraw from the negotiation table it sit down with Iran in favour of its only secular and democratic ally in Middle East. Correspondingly, Israel's opposition supported by Republican members of the US Congress who were close to Jewish Lobby embroiled Obama Administration in difficulty to persuade US Senate to approve the agreement in legal ground. The refusal of the agreement in US Senate would encourage Iran to stop the negotiations with the claim that US was not willing to reach a peaceful settlement of the dispute and prefer to act aggressively rather than use diplomacy.

However, Iran and P5+1 countries could agree to landmark comprehensive nuclear agreement on July 2015 despite of the mistrustfulness among the conflicting parties and rising tension between Israel and US. By January 2016, Iran has drastically reduced the amount of centrifuges it held and shipped tones of low enriched uranium to Russia. Two third of 25,000 centrifuges were removed from Iranian territories. Iran's nuclear facilities started to be monitored by the international inspectors for 24 hours in a day. (The White House, 2016) In January 2016, IAEA announced that Iran fulfilled all the essential conditions according to Joint Plan of Action. In exchange, particular economic and political sanctions imposed on Iran were removed by US and European Triple, and Iran has become more integrated country with the rest of the world.

When the process is substantially delicate, the questions that have to be answered on the issue are: Would nuclear weapons both Iran and Israel held as regional hostiles create a serious crisis which could trigger a war if Iran became a nuclear state? Is the peaceful solution reached by framework deal sustainable in the long term? What will happen if the framework deal is broken? Is there any possibility in which Iran repeals the agreement if the current Iranian government changes in next presidential elections? In this sense, the role of nuclear weapons in international politics has to be elaborated with specific political theories from realist traditions.

3. Nuclear world from neo-realist perspective

One of the most striking explications which refer to the effects of nuclear proliferation to the international security and stability is Kenneth Waltz's Neo-realist approach without question. As a founder of Neo-realism, Waltz claims that the existence of nuclear weapons stabilizes the international political system and preserves the world peace instead of undermining it contrary to what is believed. To explain why nuclear weapons are necessary to protect the international security and how they can do that, he emphasizes the distinctive nature of

nuclear weapons by comparing the world with conventional weapons and world with nuclear weapons. He addressed the structure of international political system in unit-level. He also focuses on the problems that nuclear weapons caused, and that the theory could not find any efficient solution to cope with. Realist theory states that chance for peace increases when the states can reach their most crucial goals without active use of force. The possibility of war decreases as the costs of conflict rise in respect to the accessible gains. In this regard he indicates that nuclear weapons deter states from going to the war significantly in comparison with conventional weapons. (Waltz, 1981) Because in conventional world, states know that both of them might win or lose and the costs of the war can be tolerable and atoneable. If the power is accumulated excessively by one state or an alliance, the opposition of other states emerges and they start to come together for balance of power. First World War had lasted under the conditions of conventional world and stimulated the Second World War in the first half of 20th century. However, the experiences which were acquired from the use of atomic bomb by witnessing its destructiveness in Nagasaki and Hiroshima made Third World War more difficult to begin. Because states know that the costs of a nuclear war cannot be compensated easily and its effects might never be reversed. Nuclear weapons noticeably decrease the possibility of the war between the states thanks to their characteristics of nature. Within this scope, US-Iran negotiations on the issue of Iran's nuclear development program verify the Realist argumentations in relation to its dissuasive characteristic. US and Iran realized that they needed to solve the problem on the existence of nuclear weapons in Middle East by negotiating to avoid from a possible war in which use of nuclear military technology would cause an irremediable harm for both sides. Iran-US Nuclear Deal justifies that deterrence of nuclear weapons is so high that it could force two historical antagonists whose relationships has been tense more than four decades to negotiate though their religious and ideological characteristics are dramatically opposite.

Nonetheless, Waltz states even though nuclear weapons decrease the risk of fighting and protects the international security and peace; it cannot eliminate the possibility of war completely in international political arena. (Waltz, 1981) States compete militarily in nuclear world as they do in conventional world. When they are in rivalry militarily, they might also resort to use of conventional force against their enemies in nuclear world. For this reason, nuclear weapons might trigger the conventional wars in international anarchic order though states hold them without the intent to attack. On the other hand, negotiating might not possible and there might no way to avoid from fighting if the states are in balance of power. (Morgenthau, 1978) The nature of nuclear weapons might accelerate the process which leads up to war instead of deterring the states from going to the war on the contrary to conventional weapons. Because they will be lacking in enough power they need for counter-attack if they are defeated at the end of the war in nuclear world. For this reason they want to be the first one which attacks to protect themselves from the formidable damage of nuclear weapons they can only recover for a long time.

Realist theory also indicates that states try to continue their existence in anarchic order of international politics which self-help is the main principle. (Waltz, 2008) In self-help system first aim of the state is to maintain its existence. It aims to be dominant power at maximum

and to survive in the system at minimum. Under the circumstances, it is impossible to provide a perpetual peace in anarchic world. States are the primary units of this anarchic system, and the number of the units in the system and how much they are capable to dominate the others is shaping the structure of international politics. Politics in multi-polar world which the numbers of capable units are high is based on the interdependency, diffusion of dangers and confusion of responses. (Waltz, 2008) In multi-polar world; who threatens the existence of whom, who has enough power to cope with the threats and who could be an ally against a common enemy are in uncertainty. Miscalculation by some or all great powers is the main source of wars and conflicts in multi-polar world. (Waltz, 2010) On the contrary, politics in bipolar world which the numbers of capable units are low is based on self-dependency, clarity of dangers, and certainty about who has to face them.

When two powers compete to reach their goals in bipolar world, a loss of one is the gain of other. Overreaction by one of them is the basic reason of wars and conflicts in bipolar world. Atomic bomb was used by US against Japan in Second World War in the system of multi-polar world. Cuban Missile Crisis between Soviet Union (SU) and US broke out in 1964 in the bipolar world of Cold War. The number of the great powers in anarchic order has a critical role in the use of nuclear weapons. Accordingly, if Iran became a nuclear power as a second state that had nuclear weapons in Middle East except Israel, the bipolar regional system would be consolidated with the balance in nuclear development. As two contradicting countries on religious and ideological issues, the existence of nuclear weapons in the hands of both Iran and Israel would increase the risk of conflict and war between them on the domination of the region by depending on overreaction.

Therefore, Waltz specifies that most critical problem the nuclear weapons have to solve is how to provide the perpetual peace when it is not likely to annihilate all of the causes of war in anarchic world. The crisis that emerged on Iran's nuclear development program does not create any risk of a nuclear war between Iran and Israel or US in near future. Because each possible way to avoid from the war have been already tried. However, it is important to consider that the final agreement could be signed between US and Iran in diplomatic ways only after Hassan Rouhani became president as a more moderate politician for Iran's Foreign Policy. It is not easy to predict that what will happen if Iran starts to pursue a more radical and aggressive foreign policy as it did before the last presidential election. Within a more radical and antagonist foreign policy, Iran might not hesitate to breaking the framework deal. The deterrence of economic sanctions is problematic due to the fact that Iran had been maintaining its nuclear technology program over the years in spite of strict economic sanctions. In this context, Iran and US might start a new war in Middle East if the deal is broken by Iran.

On the other hand, US-Iran relations are highly vulnerable because of their historical antagonism and conflicting identities based on religious and ideological discrepancies. Realist theory emphasizes that the states entitle the behaviours of others which have similar identities with theirs as peaceful activities. (Gellman, 1988) The states which have similar religious and ideological characteristics tend to become an ally whereas the states which have different religious and ideological characteristics tend to become an enemy. For US Israel's nuclear activities never threaten its national interests in any period of time both in the region and

international arena. However it does not think the same for Iran because of its Islamic extremist identity even if its nuclear activities have no aim to threaten the US interests. While the possibility that a crisis occurred between US and Israel cause a war is highly low, the possibility that it would induce a fighting between Iran and them is remarkably high if the framework deal is deliberately broken by Iran.

The deal reached in January 2016 is an historical change that can fix the problem in US-Iran relations. However, the opposition in Iran which is against a comprehensive deal with U.S. and thinks that it is not beneficial for national interest can affect the relationships negatively. In addition to that, Iran's leader Rouhani usually states that the protection of Iran's moral principles and values against Western World will always maintain. Furthermore, US states that only the sanctions concerning with the crisis on Iran's nuclear development program will be removed. Contradicting identities might have reduced the sustainability of the reconciliation. Extension negotiations for two times, Iran's insistence on the maintenance of its nuclear development program before July 2015, unwillingness for making concession of conflicting parties have displayed the mistrustfulness between them and their intolerance against each other until the final agreement was reached. As a result, sustainability of the agreement between Iran and P5+1 countries is depended on their eagerness to make more concessions, to adhere to the agreement, to accept each other's differences and capability to convince the opposition parties at home. For this reason, it is very difficult to find out where the limits of the making concessions start and finish so as maintaining the deal in Iran Case.

4. Conclusion

Technological developments in 20th century increased the subversive effects of arms with the use of chemical, biological and nuclear materials in military-defence industry. These weapons are called as Weapons of Mass Destruction (WMD) due to their high capacity to destroy the enemy harshly. The experience of atomic bomb in Nagasaki and Hiroshima endangered the international security and stability, and pushed the states to take precautions related to their security weaknesses by the way of armament. Today, there are 9 countries which have nuclear weapons and 5 countries that are trying to develop a more affective nuclear technology in the world. In last century, one of the most serious crises concerning with nuclear proliferation emerged between Iran and US on Iran's Nuclear Development Program that it had been maintaining more than six decades. US and European Triple (UK, Germany and France) asserted that Iran had been running its nuclear development program on military purpose since 2000 and destabilizing the region. In contrast, Iran claimed that it had been conducting its uranium enrichment activities peacefully, not offensively with the intent of strengthening its national security in Middle East. First promising attempts to deal with the problem between Iran and P5+1 countries were stepped after Hassan Rouhani; who was described as a moderate politician by Western World; became Iran's new president in 2013. The interim deal under the Joint Plan of Action (JPA) according to the conditions of Geneva Agreement was accomplished with by the conflicting parties in November 2013.

Geneva Agreement came into the force in January 2014 as a historical mainstream in terms of formal negotiations continuing more than ten years. Eventually Iran and P5+1 countries could settle on a comprehensive agreement on July 2015 in spite of all the problems caused by interrupted negotiations during the process and disputes on the issue between Israel and US. The process of US-Iran Nuclear Deal justifies the Realist approach which refers to its dissuasive characteristic. US and Iran realized that they had to find a solution on Iran's Nuclear Development Program in diplomatic ways to avoid from a possible war in which use of nuclear military technology would cause an irremediable harm for both sides. From Realist perspective, it is not wrong if it is said that deterrence of nuclear weapons is so high that it could encourage two historical enemies whose relationships has been suspended more than four decades for negotiating even though their religious and ideological identities are diametrically different. Nevertheless it is unpredictable that what will happen if Iran follows a more radical foreign policy as it did before the framework deal was signed between the sides. With a more radical foreign policy, Iran might not be doubtful about withdrawing from the negotiating process. According to the Realist theory the states consider the behaviours of others which own similar religious or ideological identities with theirs as peaceful activities. US-Iran relationships are highly fragile owing to the historical adversary between them based on their conflicting identities concerning with religious and ideological discrepancies. Under the circumstances, maintenance of the agreement reached by Iran and P5+1 countries with US is depended on their willingness to adhere to the final agreement and to respect for each other's characteristic differences.

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