



SESCO|2018

SECURITY & SOVEREIGNTY IN THE 21ST CENTURY



BUDAPEST

INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE | 16 NOVEMBER 2018



CONFERENCE PROCEEDINGS

Security & sovereignty in the 21st century

International Conference – 16–17 November 2018

Editor | András Lőrincz

Published by | Institute for Cultural Relations Policy

Kulturális Kapcsolatokért Alapítvány, Budapest

<http://culturalrelations.org>

institute@culturalrelations.org

ISBN 978-615-00-5470-4

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FOREWORD

The third international conference under the title “Security and sovereignty in the 21st century” (SESCO 2018) was organised by the Institute for Cultural Relations Policy (ICRP) and the Kodolányi János University (KJU) on the 16th and 17th of November 2018. The academic meeting was a part of a series of annual conferences that aim at facilitating the public exposure of important current issues in terms of security and defence policy, as well as various sovereignty related questions.

The conference was attended by academics as well as students of social sciences interested in security policy. During the conference more than fifteen speakers from nearly ten European and Asian countries held their presentations.

The Institute for Cultural Relations Policy recognises the emerging importance of security studies and thus, provides a platform for researchers to present their recent findings and analyses on contemporary security issues and sovereignty related problems. “SESCO” annual conferences were initiated as a joint effort of the ICRP and KJU and are held in every autumn in Budapest.

This ambitious aim of establishing an annual meeting point for knowledge sharing cannot be achieved without the professionals who participate to present their work during the academic meetings. Therefore, we are grateful to all speakers for their contributions to the conference, wishing success to the presenters in their future researches, and hoping that the conference proceedings will serve as resources for researchers as well as for a wider audience.

Finally, the editor would like to thank the members of ICRP Advisory Board for assistance and the sponsors for supporting the event and the proceedings.

This proceedings is issued on the responsibility of the Chief Operating Officer of Kulturális Kapcsolatokért Alapítvány. Views expressed are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the Institution or its members.

**ON THE WAY TO “A SOVEREIGN, UNITED, DEMOCRATIC EUROPE”? –
FEEDBACK FOR MACRON’S EUROPE-PLAN IN GERMANY**

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Since taking office in 2017, French President Emmanuel Macron has consistently supported the idea of deeper and more progressive European integration. His speech at the Sorbonne University on September 26th, 2017 provided the greatest impetus. In it, he pleaded in the style of the former founding father Robert Schuman for the rebuilding of a sovereign, united and democratic Europe.

1. Initiative for Europe

Macron's plan for Europe is not a novelty in itself. Historically, many such plans are already known, some more detailed and practical, others more philosophical. Since Immanuel Kant or Victor Hugo we have known these aspirations, which aim at a deeper and more intensive cooperation in Europe. In the history of European integration, Altiero Spinelli, Jacques Delors and Joschka Fischer, among others, have presented such plans at the time of the constitutional debate. (Koller – Arató, 2018.) It is precisely for that reason that it is important to study these plans, because over time many elements of these proposals have been put into practice. Whether it will succeed in this case also depends to a large extent on the agreement or rejection of the leading European states, first and foremost Germany. As it was said in a commentary: “Despite his lofty rhetoric and vision for Europe, Macron faces significant political challenges in implementing his desired European reforms, and many political analysts wonder whether any of the French president’s words will ever become a political reality.” (Hu, 2018. p. 13.)

It is precisely this question that we want to examine in the following. What proposals did Macron put on the table and what are the possibilities of implementation? Macron's proposal is based on the hypothesis that the European Union in its present form is too weak, too slow and too inefficient. This is problematic because, even for the nation states, including France, it is not possible to solve the great challenges of our time on their own, and the common frameworks are lacking. We must respond to each of the current challenges together and with concrete measures. What are the greatest dangers? On the one hand, Europe is exposed to the new storms of globalisation. On the other hand, Europe is also exposed to old ideas that all present themselves as better solutions. These include nationalism, protectionism and sovereignty through isolation, which, however, cannot react appropriately to global phenomena such as terrorism, migration and climate change.

These ideas have become strong “because we wanted to establish the idea that Europe had become a powerless bureaucracy. Throughout Europe, we explained that when there was a constraint, it was Europe’s fault!” - said Macron. (Unless otherwise stated, all of the following quotations are from President Macron's Sorbonne speech of September 26th, 2017.) The president wants to overcome this ideology. He sees the only possibility for a successful future as the rebuilding of a sovereign, united and democratic Europe. “Only Europe can, in a word, guarantee genuine sovereignty or our ability to exist in today’s world to defend our values and interests. European sovereignty requires constructing, and we must do it.” Today's political elite should primarily think about how to make Europe stronger in a divided and shattered world. What aspects need to be taken into account?

First of all, security: the French president mentioned two critical challenges. On the one hand the withdrawal of the US from Europe and terrorism, which attacks fundamental values of the West. On the other hand, the role of NATO: Europe must become able to act independently, without the help of the US. But even more important is a common strategic culture. This could lead to a situation where, “at the beginning of the next decade, Europe needs to establish a common intervention force, a common defence budget and a common doctrine for action”. This could be further enhanced by the creation of a European Intelligence Academy and a European Public Prosecutor's Office for Organised Crime and Terrorism. In order to be able to respond to non-military challenges, it would be of great importance to create a European Civil Protection Force in which the rescue and operational resources would be pooled in order to respond to disasters.

Another main question of the Macron-speech was migration: the task here is to secure borders and at the same time preserve European values. Macron makes it clear in his speech: “we have only one choice, one alternative: closing in behind our borders, which would be both illusory and ineffective, or the construction of a common area for borders, asylum and migration.” Helping this would mean a genuine European Asylum Authority, speeding up and standardising procedures. A European border police force should also be planned to ensure strict border security throughout Europe and the repatriation of those who cannot stay. However, the individual states of Europe must themselves carry out reforms in their procedures in order to ensure a better reception and distribution of refugees and to create an education and integration programme for refugees with the right of residence financed by solidarity.

Linked with the general questions of migration is the situation in the countries of origin, which must also be taken into account and a newly coordinated common European policy must therefore be developed in the Mediterranean region and in Africa. It would be possible to finance a new partnership with these countries by creating a new European financial transaction tax.

Since taking office, Macron has endeavoured to address current contemporary issues. So, it is no surprise that the topic of climate change was also highlighted here. Europe must play a pioneering role in defeating ecological change by redesigning means of transport, housing and industries in order to set new standards. This requires a single European energy market, intensive networking and CO2 taxes at Europe's borders. This could be accompanied by the

introduction of a European industrial programme to promote clean vehicles and develop common infrastructures. Sustainable development also in agriculture.

Another current challenge facing the European states is digitisation: Europe must take the lead here too and establish a European Agency for Radically New Innovations. In shaping digital change, however, it is also a matter of regulating the framework conditions at European level and establishing a digital European internal market.

In connection with this question, the euro zone must develop a long-term economic and political strategy, since crises and challenges cannot be overcome alone. “We need convergence and stability through national reforms, but also by coordinating our economic policies and a common budget. If we want to reduce our differences and develop our common goods – everything I have just mentioned, security, protection in the context of migration, digital transition, ecological transition, a genuine development and partnership policy – these common goods, foremost among which is our currency, must be financed. ... So, for all these reasons, yes we need a stronger budget within Europe, at the heart of the eurozone.” All this should be financed by European taxes in the digital or ecological field. This new budget should be coordinated by a common minister and demanding parliamentary control at European level. The result could not only be a competitive Europe, but also a revival of solidarity within the framework of a social Europe. To this end, Macron proposes a real project of fiscal and social convergence: common minimum regulations on corporate tax, minimum wages and social security standards and the creation of a new solidarity fund that could benefit the least wealthy countries.

In the field of culture and knowledge Macron states that cultural diversity has always been Europe's strength and that is why “Europe must be a place where all students can speak at least two European languages by 2024.” Young people should have spent at least six months in another European country by the age of 25. The establishment of a new European university network could help here.

After all these questions, it is also clear that for Macron democracy is the essence of the European project: therefore he wants to launch – through conventions – an extensive debate on the future of Europe in the countries that wish to participate. This could provide impetus for the European elections in 2019: European parties, top candidates for the chairmanship of the Commission and members of the European Parliament on transnational lists. Transformation of the Commission: only 15 members and the big founding states should set an example, renounce their Commissioner!

All this should be achieved through a new partnership with Germany. “So, let's get to work and put these joint commitments into a new cooperation treaty which we could sign together for the 55th anniversary of that founding treaty, on 22nd January 2018.”

2. The German feedback

For this reason alone, it was important how the German partner would react to the French President's proposals. Today it is already clear that Macron's initiatives were coordinated with Chancellor Angela Merkel. Macron himself admitted in an interview that he had clarified everything with the Chancellor before the speech: "I had spoken to her at the end of the election campaign and on election night. She even received the text of my speech in advance." (Spiegel, 13. 10. 2017.) So it was not surprising that in the first reactions to the Sorbonne speech Angela Merkel welcomed President Macron's proposals for further reform of the EU. The speech took place immediately after the elections to the Bundestag in Germany, which was probably also intended: the contents, which could have provided plenty of fuel and discussion, should not cast a shadow on the elections in Germany. At the same time, however, they should show a very clear direction before the start of the coalition negotiations and state: here are the new coordinates for the future Europe, so that the future is guaranteed, and he expects agreement on the part of German politics.

Germany's large newspapers were also fundamentally positive. Especially in the editorials of the serious political papers there was agreement for Macron's efforts, but also again and again questions whether the proposals will find a majority in Europe. The *Süddeutsche Zeitung* said: the speech of the French President "is a caesura, a wake-up call, a programme, a manifesto. It puts an end to European political timidity and the rigidity of fear in the face of the nationalists. It is - even if not everything seems realistic today - a cornucopia of ideas to make the European Parliament more powerful, the tax law fairer, the defence more effective and the EU Commission more active". (SZ, 26. 09. 2017.)

Clear approval of the plans came from the German Social-democrats (SPD). The foreign minister at that time, Sigmar Gabriel, said in a statement, that President Macron's speech is a "passionate argument against nationalism" and it highlighted key issues where Europe needs to find better common responses. But he also admitted that "we also need the common European will" to implement these big plans. (Financial Post, 26. 09. 2017.) Sigmar Gabriel was also able to stand behind Macron's ideas because the SPD had already announced on election night that it was not interested in coalition talks and would go into opposition after the election defeat. Thus, the words of CSU member Hans Michelbach were to be understood more as a warning to Chancellor Merkel: Macron's words "don't lead to a deepening, but rather to a deepening split in the EU". (Deen, M. – Viscusi, G. – Fouquet, H. 2017.) And it was precisely regarding the economic policy and monetary proposals that there were reservations in Germany. Chancellor Merkel has already called into question the increased cooperation between the euro zone and a common budget, as "catchwords" that "would also have to be filled with content". And she also feared a "communitarisation of debts at European level", which could mean further heavy financial burdens for Germany. (Meier, 2017.) This questions also cast a shadow over the coalition negotiations in progress, because the newly strengthened Liberal party (FDP) in particular did not want to hear about further German burdens for the European partners and even less about a European finance minister. (Raddatz, 2017.) But without Germany there will be no major reforms. "As Germany's domestic economic and fiscal situation remains one of the

best in Europe, German support for further financial and fiscal integration proves key to Macron's success.” (Hu, 2018. p. 13.)

As a cheer for Macron's plans we cannot therefore see the reactions in Germany. It's much more “a lukewarm support from Germany”. (Hu, 2018. p. 13.) The background to this cannot be overlooked: there is a fear that the current anti-establishment mood in much of the continent could not be overcome by a deepening of the Union. Rather, such reform plans would inflame anti-EU populism and give Eurosceptic parties the opportunity for further reinforcement. In the run-up to the Bundestag elections, the major parties did not conduct a pro-EU campaign, nor did they present any particularly intensive political messages on the future of Europe for debate. (Walker, 2017.)

The historic date of January 22nd, 2018, the 55th anniversary of the Elysée Treaty, passed without any further Franco-German cooperation. As a result, President Macron was forced to keep his thoughts on the agenda and make them even clearer. The first step was his address at the World Economic Forum in Davos. Here he deepened his initiative and called for a ten-year plan for European renewal. By the end of the year, a concrete plan for a more democratic, economically stronger and socially more balanced Europe should also have been drawn up. Macron spoke out strongly in favour of a two-speed Europe: “I have no illusion that all member states of the European Union will be ready to take the integration steps associated with this renewal of Europe ... That is why those countries with the greatest ambition should have the opportunity to move forward.” (FAZ, 24. 01. 2018.)

It was especially for that reason that the large-scale plans needed to be clearly affirmed, because the coalition negotiations in Germany lasted very long and the reactions to Macron's plan - as mentioned above - were not clear. Without a new German government with a corresponding majority in the Bundestag, the EU reforms could not be put on the agenda. The inaugural visits to France by the new Minister of Foreign Affairs, Heiko Maas, the new Minister of Finances, Olaf Scholz and Chancellor Angela Merkel in March 2018 were also important because more and more sceptics expressed their views on President Macron's visions over the months. This did not result in a joint Franco-German proposal to reform the EU, as originally planned by Macron, but instead the partners only agreed on a joint “roadmap”. Chancellor Merkel could therefore indulge in a more moderate pace and repeatedly refer to the opponents of the Macron Plan, to new concepts from Central-Eastern Europe and thus tackle a “policy of small steps” and the reconciliation of interests. (Finkenzeller, 2018.)

Without giving up his aspirations, Macron continued to try to win approval for his concept. Six months after his Sorbonne-speech on the future of the EU he spoke about his plans before the European Parliament in April 2018 and underscored his ideas and initiatives with current political events, in particular the elections in Hungary and Italy, where primarily EU-sceptical political forces were able to achieve an election victory. That is why he stressed that none of the member states should block those who want to go faster or further. This in turn referred to a two-speed Europe, which is being rejected by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in particular, who would rather follow the Orbán-Plan, a Europe of nations and nation states, because they fear too much power from Brussels. In the paper entitled “Towards a Union of

Trust and Action” the four Visegrad states state that for them the basis of the EU's success lies in “mutual cooperation”. In their joint statement, they expressly speak out against a two-speed Europe, as they do not want to become a “second-class EU”. (Wisdorff, 2017.)

3. Quo vadis, Europe?

But that was exactly what Macron wanted to avoid: lose the initiative and hand it over to another actor. That's why he said clearly at the meeting with Chancellor Merkel: “For many years Europe has waited for the Franco-German couple to go ahead and make proposals. We are ready.” (Handelsblatt, 16. 03. 2018.) And a few days later he repeated his appeal to Merkel: “Don't wait, act now” – Macron said at the award ceremony in Aachen, where the French president received the prestigious Charlemagne Prize for his efforts in boosting EU integration and cohesion. (NDTV, 10. 05. 2018.) This call was actually a cry for help, because the Spiegel magazine – as a result of the failure to date – said clearly: “The French President's European initiative is dead and buried after only seven months”. (RTNews, 24. 04. 2018.) Even the award of this prize to Emanuel Macron was probably an attempt to spread his ideas about Europe in German and other European societies. In the reasons given by the Board of Trustees at the award ceremony it was stated that Macron was a “courageous mastermind for the renewal of the European dream” and it was precisely his powerful vision of a new Europe and his struggle against nationalism and isolationism that made him worthy of the renowned prize. The laudation was of course held by Chancellor Angela Merkel, but the differences of opinion – first and foremost with regard to deepened financial cooperation and a common European budget – could not be concealed. (Die Zeit, 10. 05. 2018.)

It was therefore a real breakthrough that, at least on issues supported by both parties, an agreement and a new declaration could be presented. On June 19th, 2018 the two politicians met and agreed on the so called “Meseberg Declaration”. This agreement contains the most important points from Macron's plan: from the establishment of an annual euro-zone budget to an intervention army to the examination of whether EU foreign policy decisions can be taken by majority in the future. (Meseberg Declaration, 2018.) The monetary proposals are to be introduced from 2021, but must first be agreed with all Euro-partners, which can still lead to conflicts. Similarly, the issue of the joint military intervention force to be formed by a certain number of willing countries is questionable, it is uncertain how to move from unanimity to majority voting in foreign policy, and even the question of the future EU Commission leaves much to be desired. Even the introduction of transnational lists for elections to the European Parliament is not planned until 2024. (Business Insider, 19. 06. 2018.)

Important decisions have thus been postponed again into the future. The EU summits of heads of state and government held since then have not been able to discuss the plans any further, as the issue of migration has once again come to the fore. In addition, Angela Merkel's policies in Germany have again suffered severe setbacks since then. The elections in Bavaria, Hesse or North Rhine-Westphalia have all shown heavy losses for the governing parties. Macron has also been heavily criticised in France. So, it is not foreseeable in which direction this new Europe-plan can continue until next year's elections and if there will be any “new Elsé Treaty”.

(The manuscript for the present study was completed on October 15th, 2018.) And we cannot estimate at all which direction the EU will take after the elections with a new European Parliament and a new Commission and after the Brexit-procedure. But we are all looking forward to Brussels, Berlin and Paris... Therefore we can quote the words of the great Hungarian poet, János Batsányi in a new context here again: “Come! if the lineaments of fate you’d have bared for you, Feast your eyes on Paris and what is prepared for you...”

* * *

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THE INSECURE SOVEREIGNTY AND UNSOVEREIGN SECURITY IN THE XXI CENTURY AND THE ROLE OF NON-STATE ACTORS

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Abstract: *We live in the times of change, facing the insecure future on various levels of power and authority. The changes of how the world works – often identified with processes of globalization – affected the politics, societies and law strongly. This change includes the power shift in the international order and – because of technological innovations – affects both collective and individual security indirectly. Moreover, we can see how, based on nation-states, “Westphalian order” is changing, taking into account the erosion of sovereignty and transnational, asymmetrical threats (like terrorism). Also we can see how liberal regime of inter-state and economic relations reshaped the international sphere – the new sort of political actors has emerged, affecting the scope and content of “traditional” sovereignty of states. This includes giant subjects of the private sector (mainly business), non-governmental organizations, megacities (which sometimes even make a claim for independence), informal groups and networks (like terrorist organizations or hacking groups), subregional communities which endeavor to gain autonomy or independence (like Catalonia) and forms of regional, international or supranational cooperation like the European Union (but also NAFTA or Mercosur). The paper puts out a thesis that, apart from social, economic or cultural issues, these changes raised severe questions in the case of both collective and individual security. Apart from fields of cooperation, created by states (like the EU), the real influence of other non-state (and transnational) actors is not clear. Moreover, there appears a question of public authority itself which will be able to provide security in times of changing scope and content of states’ sovereignty (often big cities and economic regions try to achieve this goal). The aim of the paper is to outline a concept of political polycentrism which seeks an answer to the question how to bring together qualitative changes in international politics with the necessity to provide security and wellbeing for people in face of global and asymmetrical challenges.*

We live in the times of change, facing the insecure future on various levels of power and authority. We have many threats due to interconnection between sovereignty and security. Some of them exist from ages, some have been silenced by more outstanding events and turbulences in history of the nation-state and sovereignty in Europe and, later, around the world. But, despite their own story, there are changes (only time will show if they had been actually threats or maybe chances which hadn’t been taken) which seem to us quite new and which make us think of politics and power in order to create strategies for future.

The changes of how the world works – often identified with processes of globalization – affected the politics, societies and law strongly. This change includes the power shift in the international order and – because of technological innovations – affects both collective and individual security indirectly. Moreover, we can see how, based on nation-states, “Westphalian order” is changing, taking into account the erosion of sovereignty and transnational, asymmetrical threats (like terrorism). Also we can see how liberal regime of inter-state and economic relations reshaped the international sphere – the new sort of political actors has emerged, affecting the scope and content of “traditional” sovereignty of states. This includes giant subjects of the private sector (mainly business), non-governmental organizations, megacities (which sometimes even make a claim for independence), informal groups and networks (like terrorist organizations or hacking groups), subregional communities which endeavor to gain autonomy or independence (like Catalonia) and forms of regional, international or supranational cooperation like the European Union (but also NAFTA or Mercosur). In the field of international relations theory, this trend is recognized as the “new medievalism”, taking into account the enhanced status of non-state actors and their influence on the nation-state and global politics at all. According to Arnold Wolfers, it is the result of blurring the borders between the external and the internal and creating a specific interplay between states and other subjects in turn (Wolfers, 1962). Hedley Bull, who is considered to be the creator of this concept, called it as *the system of overlapping authority and multiple loyalty* (Bull, 2002, p.245). The “New Middle Ages” instead is a metaphor for the future of international system and its evolution in terms of its organization, governance, and its subjects in a way that can make the system similar to the medieval one (Kobrin, 1998, pp.365–366). A concept which describes the cooperation between various actors and helps to organize relations between them is “global governance” mainly associated with finance, trade and business issues but also with human rights and United Nations initiatives (Hale and Held, 2011).

It concerns also public authority and private sector, dismissing the “traditional” boundary between the public and the private. Also there appears a question whether the nation-state was the actor who allowed others to come in and gain some power or it was “the others” who came with no invitation and took whatever they wanted when the nation-state was weak (Hale and Held, 2011, p.9). The privacy of lifestyle and values, freedom of movement and trade, practical conditions of travelling around the world (which is easier to accomplish than ever before) and surfing on the Internet which makes us consume everything – created and opened the vast space of action, far away from that which we used to call public authority (it changes very fast, regarding experience and widening scope of the surveillance). This space is strongly determined by our choices. It refers overwhelmingly to non-state actors because we can find there charity initiatives as well as networks of criminals. It is often said that we have now “globalization of crime”, taking into account almost endlessly opportunities of mobility, sources, communication, “jurisdiction shopping” (to avoid taxation or responsibility at all) and information exchange (Boer, 2011, p.107). Also we have there another space for criminal activity – a cyber-space.

The paper puts out a thesis that, apart from social, economic or cultural issues, these changes raised severe questions in the case of both collective and individual security. Apart from fields

of cooperation, created by states (like the EU), the real influence of other non-state (and transnational) actors is not clear. Moreover, there appears a question of public authority itself which will be able to provide security in times of changing scope and content of states' sovereignty (often big cities and economic regions try to achieve this goal). The aim of the paper is to outline a concept of polycentric system of political and policing cooperation and coordination which seeks an answer to the question how to bring together qualitative changes in international politics with the necessity to provide security and wellbeing for people in face of global and asymmetrical challenges. Looking for new settlements and solutions is inevitable if we want to have a bit of impact on the future order.

These "assymetrical threats" are mainly connected to crime, scarcity, private violence and lack of law enforcement. Most often, they are identified as a "dark side" of globalization or, rather, negative outcomes of this process. We have many types of Transnational Crime Organizations, such as Mafia, illegal drug traffickers, warlords, terrorists, insurgents, street and trans-border gangs. What is important, "These illicit non-state actors are more interested in commercial profit and controlling territory to allow maximum freedom of movement and action to achieve their longer-range objectives" (Manwaring, 2007, p.1)

It's quite obvious. Commercial profit is more attractive than control of territory, but – commerce requires territory or, rather, space – including cyber space and, also, vast physical space like oceans (illegal trade by ships and ports can be example here) and the problem is that controlling these spaces and law enforcement on them is very difficult or even impossible. Right now, the case here are pirates and the come-back of piracy on trade routes. Another factor is, moreover, complex political status of various lands, what is an issue close to question of sovereignty. A good example can be here Transdnistria, which is de facto independent country, with support from Russia and informal – but actual at once – border with Moldova. In fact this region is a hideout for criminal organizations, including drugs and human being traffickers. This complex political situation affects other countries, including EU, taking into account that Transdnistria is a place just on Schengen border (BBC News, 2018).

The next problem, connected to territory and sovereignty, is terrorism. It is especially important, because, from one side, terrorists need a territory for shelter and planning – often it's a part of a failed or weak state where law enforcement is not working. From the other, terrorists – groups as well as individuals – are this non-state actor which is a huge threat for the state – both as an institution and a place for live. Terrorists like pirates and hackers often are called "riders" or "free riders" (Jackson, 2011, p.171). It is because they wander along the routes of global system without responsibility. Obviously, terrorists are the most dangerous of the "riders". In considerations about sovereignty attention must be paid especially to the two-fold status of terrorism, because "terrorist violence is neither a criminal offense nor a legitimate use of force" (Jackson, 2011, p. 174) (White, 2005). That's why it is unclear which mode of treatment would be appropriate for the terrorists, taking into account a letter of international and national law (R. Jackson, p.174). As Z. Bauman pointed out, this leads to a situation in which law and order, "increasingly reduced to the promise of personal (and strictly speaking, bodily) security, are today the main, if not a fundamental, issues raised in political manifestos and during the pre-election campaign" (Bauman, 2007, pp.22–23). Security is a key issue. The problem is,

however, that it is “as much a matter of perception as of reality; different people in different places feel threatened in different ways. The sense of fear results of uncertainty and ignorance about how to respond to a threat” (Zielonka, 2018, p.140) Also, terrorism is a danger for other non-state subjects like non-governmental organizations, cities, regions, business, national and religious minorities. In case of terrorism, as well as organized crime, “it is a clash of controlling values between liberal democracy and criminal anarchy”, despite the temporary “order”, enforced by criminals or terrorist on their victims (Manwaring, 2007, p.1).

This issue concerned the second aspect of the interconnections between sovereignty and security which is “unsovereign” security, enforced by informal groups in spaces where state control doesn’t exist (for example in failed states, borderlands of weak states or suburbs of megacities) or against the state, where actually is law enforcement but is limited through bribery and blackmail. The last one is often known as the “protection”, which actually creates “state in state”. It’s just like that because “Gang violence develops from [...] taking political control of ungoverned territory and/or areas governed by corrupt politicians and functionaries which can be uneven and incomplete” (Ibidem, p. 4). The result of this condition affected the traditional warfare because conflicts of contemporary security environment, apart from traditional interstate war, include unconventional non-state war, interstate war in which non-state actors participate, indirect interstate war in which aggression of a nation-state is expressed to another one through non-state allies (Ibidem, p.7). The result is so-called “hybrid war” in which, “various sorts of security are combined much stronger than ever before” (Zielonka, 2018, pp.142–143).

What is important – from the point of view of a political strategist – the political nature of the non-state actors is omitted. As one author put it: “Non-state and intrastate wars involve political actors who thrive among and within various host countries. In describing the gang phenomenon as a simple mutation of a violent act that we label as insurgency, we mischaracterize the activities of non-state players who are attempting to neutralize or take control of a state. We traditionally tend to think of insurgency as primarily a military activity, and we think of gangs and other TCOs [Transnational Crime Organizations – A.S.] as law enforcement problems. Yet, all these actors are engaged in a highly complete political act: «political war». This type of conflict is often called «irregular war», «insurgency war», «asymmetric war», «fourth-generation war», and «a complex emergency»” (Manwaring, 2007, pp.7–8).

The case of criminal “protection” is close to self-defense of groups or networks which appear in places where public authority is too weak. As a result, in such places increases the risk of the “holes in the system of power” – so the risk of spaces where public authority does not enforce the law and which thus become vulnerable to numerous threats. It is also associated with the ambiguous role of cities, of which many are innovators of economic and political solutions, but also the place of violence and discrimination. One should also pay attention to the divisions which in some regions of the world (like in Latin America) take on more and more antagonistic forms because of the division into a rich elite, which during the day, visits financial centers, ministries or universities and the poor from the very center or from the slums. The process of this division is often called “medievalisation” of a city areas which are out of control of state power and which establish its own police and order, resembling a legal system (Spalińska, 2017,

pp.11–112) (Eco, 1996, pp.82–86). It is often associated with so-called urbanization of cities, which concerns the strong differences between districts and gentrification processes, leading to divisions into rich suburbs and poor centers with increasing crime. It concerns also shaping districts inhabited by specific ethnic or religious groups, closed to the others, even for a representative of the city authorities or the police. That's why the urban planning as well as condition of existing cities, especially "megacities" are becoming a serious political problem.

The next factor – maybe more brighter than the previous – is "the increasing role of international agreements affecting domestic law, as well as the huge, in fact in no way uncontrollable power capital markets, are just examples of the diminishing influence of states in their internal affairs" (Mazurek, 2013, p.132). Markets and corporations are supported by the transnational trade law – *lex mercatoria*, as well as the making already existing law transnational, not only in context of the European Union. Transnational law also functions well in other areas of the world, with even greater freedom than in Europe. As Ulrich Beck observes, "the weakness of state power results of what constitutes its strength: from territorial rooting" (Beck, 2005, p.192). The capital doesn't need the territory, as evidenced by the huge development of financial markets. Strong social inequalities are associated with the problem of the sovereignty of weaker countries – during the currency and financial crisis, the sovereignty of Greece was transferred to the "creditors" consortium" (Zielonka, 2018, p.117). A similar case applies to Cyprus. "Greece and Cyprus are no longer independent states, but half-protectorates governed by a consortium of creditor countries represented by the IMF and the Eurogroup" (Ibidem, p.121). It is worth to mention that another dispute with money and their redistribution in the background takes place in Europe. It concerns the opportunity of independence for Catalonia, which is the richest region of Spain and could be an independent state or something like a city republic, taking into account strongly developed power of Barcelona and the involvement of residents in decision-making processes.

The global governance structure also includes international organizations, non-governmental organizations, interest or pressure groups, corporations, think-tanks or investigative groups (such as the International Consortium of Investigative Journalists). One of the factors that enhanced their position was the "global revolution of associations", meaning "a powerful outbreak of organized, private, voluntary activity in all regions of the world" (Jackson, 2011, p.156). Non-governmental non-profit organizations started their activities on a massive scale, including, charity, educational, assistance, health organizations, based on specialists, as well as on the involvement of volunteers. In addition, important is philanthropy of individuals (both businessmen and rich celebrities), political observatories and research institutes, social movements as well as interest groups and transnational criminal groups.

Apart from threats and chances, identifying indirectly with the role of non-state actors, the more problematic issue should be mentioned. The changes of sovereignty and security concern almost the entire world. Moreover, the most serious threats like private violence and lack of effective public authority is a matter of failed states in a group of developing countries or global megacities like Bombay, New York, Los Angeles, Jakarta. From the other side, terrorist attacks increasingly concern the West and, mainly, Europe. Is it all to say about interconnections between sovereignty and security? No. The problem is that still the weakness and internal issues

of developing countries (mainly the states of global “South”) are used for Western domination; it’s easy to see that the majority of “positive” actors of global governance is associated with the West (taking into account the origin, headquarters, finance, staff, business contacts). These actors often help poorer countries (like charity organizations) but, like in the other cases, there is a shadow which affects the sovereignty and security of southern states (for example, the illegal arms trade, illegal fishing off the coast of Africa and other sorts of criminal business) (Nordstrom, 2007, pp.108–113).

This shadow is, apart from influence of various “stakeholders” on particular politicians, officials or experts, the dominance of the West in the structures of global governance, establishing them by the Western states and geographical location within the West. The concept that describe this issue is so-called “global apartheid” (Alexander, 1996). It means a situation in which the process of taking the most important decisions on a global scale (in various areas) is dominated by a certain group that can be distinguished on the basis of specific criteria. With regard to global political, economic or social issues, such group are the richest Western countries (as well as non-state actors established in the West, like grand corporations or international financial institutions). “Global apartheid” also manifests itself in social inequalities on a global scale. This concept is also connected with the issue of “minority government” (minoritarianism), not in only one society, but at the global level, despite existing countries and cultural differences (Robinson, 2010).

What we can do to limit these all threats and to improve positive aspects of qualitative changes of international politics? One of possible settlement could be a concept of polycentric system of political and policing cooperation and coordination. The term “polycentric” means a system of various centers of power and authority, often taking shape of a network of cooperating subjects (Zielonka, 2014). That’s why it concerns not only balanced relations between states (for which the better term is multipolarity) but also non-state actors which would create (and actually do so) centers of power in cooperation with states or independently. It of course would require the enlargement of the scope of international law and justice. In the ideal polycentric system states, states union (like the EU), NGO’s, cities, regions and private sector would cooperate to ensure prosperity and security. What is important, in this system will be also international organizations, established by states (for example, through the United Nations) to provide supervision of various actors in specific areas (for example, in banking sector). Agencies of finance, trade, health and environment would also be included. It is worth to mention that organizations like The Basel Committee on Banking Supervision, Financial Action Task Force and Global Forum on Transparency and Exchange of Information for Tax Purposes have a strong position in combating the transnational crime. Their competences concern financial regulation, dealing with money laundering and terrorist financing, combating tax evasion (Young, 2011) (Roberge, 2011) (Porter and Vega, 2011). Also among these subjects we have some which provide policing and security: International Policy (Interpol), European Policy (Europol) and other forms of transnational cooperation in the field of combating crime (Boer, 2011) (Haberfeld and McDonald, 2005).

So, apart from the types of non-state actors, this approach would concern, enhancing the structure of global governance as a whole in order to improve the information flows and

transparency and to establish the mechanisms of mutual control. Some of these solutions are applying by governments themselves right now; it concerns “voluntary agreements between firms and government regulators”, “participatory regulation” and “transparency-based initiatives” (Hale and Held, 2011, p.11). In polycentric positions, these methods would be combined with strengthening the public authority of cities and regions (especially in region inhabited by national or religious minorities), along with separation the term “public” from connotations with political power of the nation-state. From the other side, the monitoring capabilities of non-governmental organizations (especially in human rights) and international agencies (in finance and trade) should be enhanced to provide control over the actions taken by states. Also the solution of problem of the failed states is inevitable – unfortunately in this case role of non-state actors could be applied only to diplomatic treatments because we need global powers to solve this issue. Nevertheless, the monitoring activity of NGOs would be helpful. This form of control and management should also be applied in case of corporations or, wider, private sector. Of course, improving the technology of threat detection is necessary. This would be possible not only by applying new technical methods but also by strengthening public authority in polycentric environment.

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NO COHESION EQUALS NO DETERRENCE

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Abstract: *As of 2018, relations between the EU and Russia have reached a new low since the end of the cold war. Besides the sanctions and countersanctions still in force, the relations did still not recover from the international diplomatic fallout over the Salisbury attack. Apparently, the red line for the international community was not crossed by the Litvinenko murder but by the Skripal case. The question rises, how does the EU react to such a violation of its borders, security, breaking of the written and unwritten norms of international relations, and other conflicts? Is Europe able to put aside the interests of certain countries and different interest groups, and stand up to a unified frontline or the common European foreign policy that mostly exists only in theory?*

This paper opts for assessing the most significant happenings of the last 12 years in terms foreign policy clashes between the EU and Russia; notably the Georgian invasion of 2008, the annexation of Crimea in 2014, the Litvinenko murder of 2006 and the Salisbury attack in 2018, and the responses and reactions of the EU. It argues that the measures taken were necessary but not satisfactory, and that the bigger cohesion in the member states' foreign policy is vital for the future of the EU.

Common Russia policy – easier said than done

The European Security and Defense Policy (European External Action Service, 2016) and the common, harmonized actions have crucial importance in the Eastern neighborhood or the EU, as Russia intended to signal several times since 2008 that it considers Eastern Europe its own sphere of interest, which being threatened it does not refrain from entering into hybrid wars. Russia's goal is not only to destabilize countries tempted by and turning to the EU but also to create an 'arc of instability' of frozen conflicts that pose a constant threat to the security of Europe. (Kasčiūnas, et al. 2014)

There is a declared will to have a common foreign policy allowing a strong representation of interests, but they are not backed by an equally strong political will all the time. The conflicts of interests between countries and even different interest groups within countries obviously result in debates and challenge the community at agreeing. The different degree of economic dependence on Russia, former and present relations with the country of certain EU members makes the situation complex. When the EU has sanctioned Russia for the illegal annexation of Crimea, destabilizing and violation of territorial sovereignty of Ukraine in 2014, these sanctions were taken after long and hard debates and noticeable clashes of different interest groups, which

continued every time they got renewed. (Council on Foreign Relations, 2017) However painful it was, as it will be demonstrated later it was still possible and manageable against all the critical voices.

Conflicting interests of the member states seem to effectively hinder the creation and more importantly the implementation of a common EU foreign policy towards Russia. The five guiding principles drafted by Federica Mogherini (Mogherini, 2016) and agreed upon by EU MFAs, as the core of the EU's Russia policy would be a good starting point, however, the lack of their sufficient enactment shows a lack of commitment on behalf of the member states. They are the following: full implementation of the Minsk agreements, strengthening relations with our Eastern Partners and other neighbours strengthening internal European Union resilience, in particular in view of energy security, hybrid threats and strategic communication; selective engagement with Russia and supporting Russian civil society and engage and invest in people-to-people contacts. These principles are broad and forward looking, however, their proper implementation would be more than necessary. As the four examples listed in this paper will show, no cohesion of foreign policies and no agreement on adequate responses or weak common responses bear no deterring force for the future.

One of the most significant documents describing and determining Russia's recent military strategy (Gerasimov, 2013) is known by the name of Valery Gerasimov, Chief of Staff and Deputy Defense Minister appointed by Putin in 2012. In March 2013, the General Staff of the Army announced that the 'color revolutions' and the 'Arab Spring' has redefined the forms and elements of warfare. Russian hybrid warfare completely rewrites the rules of non-conventional warfare, for not the weaker, but the stronger party uses asymmetric warfare forms against his opponent. Gerasimov's instructions fit into the increasingly obvious Russian geopolitical strategy that creates dependent de facto states of Russia's near neighborhood. Though the hybrid warfare defined in it is considered mostly to be used by Russia, Russian experts and the document itself suggest that it is used primarily by the United States to change regimes for example in the Balkan, and the Russian Federation is forced to apply it as a kind of a response to this threat. Hybrid warfare is based on massive amount of disinformation, financing separatist movements, often opposing sides of conflict to destabilize countries, deter foreign investment and make joining international organizations more difficult. It does not consider non-military means auxiliary but the preferred way to win. (McKew, 2017)

Is the EU ready for the new challenges posed by hybrid war? As an example, taking the spread of massive amount of fake news in order to weaken the EU from the inside, it can be declared that the EU is far from being ready for it. On EU level, there is only one agency that copes with fake news, East StratCom Task Force that is tasked by the European Council to communicate and promote EU policies to the Eastern Neighborhood, strengthen the media environment, support media freedom and independency, address and respond to disinformation activities by external actors such as Russia. The staff however, is very limited, the East StratCom Task Force includes fourteen employees which seems incomparably few comparing for example to the 'troll factories' such as the infamous Internet Research Agency employing hundreds of people 'on the other side'. (Ifraimova and Shuster, 2018) Besides East StratCom Task Force, the EU member countries handle the question of 'fake news' and subversive activities themselves. Do

they handle this question equally as a priority, that could be a precondition for strengthening the volume of the common work, increase the number of staff probably and the resources?

According to the analysis of the European Values Think Tank's Kremlin Watch Programme that examines the awareness of EU countries of Russian subversive intervention and of the threat Russia poses with it, there are enormous differences between them. (European Values, 2017) The study shows in details the various levels of awareness of fake news in general and those spread by the Kremlin especially, and the governmental countermeasures to them (if there are any). Ranked by awareness of the problem and actions taken to counter it, the countries are put in 6 categories. The least aware countries labeled as '*Kremlin collaborators*' are Cyprus and Greece, which governments are not only inactive in countering disinformation, but also do not acknowledge the threat. The '*ignorant*' countries are Hungary, Austria, Croatia, Luxembourg, Malta, Portugal, Slovakia, Slovenia, where there is a political acknowledgement of the threat, but very few or no measures are taken against it, denying the existence of Russian disinformation and hostile influence operations is more noticeable. The '*hesitant*' countries are Ireland, Italy and Bulgaria, where the threat is acknowledged and some stronger measures are taken. The '*mildly concerned*' group contains Belgium, France and Spain, these countries generally fight 'fake news' more effectively than the previous groups but are primarily concerned about radical islamist propaganda and not Russian disinformation. The '*cognizant*' group has a high political acknowledgement of Russian subversive activities, works against Russian disinformation, usually takes part in the work of East StratCom Task Force. These countries are Denmark, The Netherlands, Romania, Finland, Czech Republic, Germany, the United Kingdom and Poland. The most achieving group labeled as '*Full scale defenders*' are Sweden, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania where the awareness of the threat is maximal, significant resources are available for fighting disinformation, media literacy is part of school curricula, and the fight against 'fake news' is institutionalized.

Considering this wide gap between even the mere acknowledgement of the threat that Russian disinformation means for the EU and the political will of taking effective measures in order to minimize its hostile influence operations, it is safe to say that the road to a stronger, agile, proactive agency countering Russian disinformation is going to be long and rocky. The situation is especially critical in countries which are often treated as "black sheep" of the EU such as Greece and Hungary, where the governments are extremely Russia-friendly, use strong anti-EU, pro-Russia rhetoric and do not intend to take further measures to decrease Russian influence. Further threat are posed by decreasing freedom of press (in the case of Croatia and Hungary) as large portion of the media is owned by the government and circles close to the government and investigative journalism is often obstructed.

1. Invasion in Georgia (2008)

In August 2008 a war broke out in the self-proclaimed republics Abkhazia and South Ossetia, resulting in the authorization of official ties between the separatist of the territory and the Russian government by a decree signed by president Putin. The violation of territorial sovereignty of Georgia did not induce a common reaction from the EU. The EU and the US sent a joint delegation to negotiate a cease fire that was reportedly violated several times ever

since. Joint statements were issued by the Baltic states, and Poland calling the international community to reconsider the strengthening of Russia's partnerships as the country does not respect sovereignty, breaches the international norms and law. (Press Service of the President, 2008). The Presidents of Estonia, Poland, Lithuania, Ukraine and the Prime Minister of Latvia jointly visited Georgia and held speeches at a rally.

Some country leaders and opposition politicians condemned the invasion, but all over there were no powerful responses, especially a common EU stance was missing. The four countries which are members of the UN Security General's Group of Friend of Georgia: the United States, Germany, the United Kingdom and France issued a statement saying: '*We call on the Russian Federation to revoke or not to implement its decision.*' As of the the official point of view of Moscow however, the recognition of the breakaway territories and establish official linkages with them '*only aimed at improving social conditions of residents- many of them Russian passport holders*'.(Civil Georgia, 2008) As not only the EU but other major international organizations did not apply sanctions or any meaningful penalties, it can be declared that the inaction of the international community is highly responsible for the Ukrainian crisis 6 years later.(Beridze, 2014)

2. Destabilizing Ukraine and annexing the Crimea (2014)

Only a few years passed after the Georgian invasion when Russia surprised the international community again. The possibility of Ukraine signing an association agreement with the EU and the large protesting masses on the Maidan against its suspension seemed to menace Russian interests. Russia could not allow itself just to passively look at losing and letting Ukraine slip out of its sphere of influence, but decided to take serious actions. In accordance with the principles of the Gerasimov Doctrine Russia successfully destabilized Ukraine, scared off foreign investments and pushed its possible rapprochement with the EU far into the future. By providing support for Ukrainian nationalists and pro-Russian forces fueling riots and conflicts, Russia created a noble pretext for intervention and protection of Russian compatriots. Supporting separatists in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions in Eastern Ukraine lead to a permanent war ever since. The Crimea was first flooded by '*little green men*' Moscow denied to have any connection with, then riots started and a referendum was hold from where the OSCE observers were excluded, thus which is not accepted by the overwhelming majority of the international community (OSCE, 2014).The annexation of the Crimea and destabilization in the Eastern Ukraine did not only undermine the established principles of territorial inviolability and self-determination of a sovereign country, especially from a direct neighbor of the EU, the EU side by side with the US and other countries could not go on to keep business as usual with Russia any longer. The idea of introducing sanctions has created deep cleavages between the EU28. Countries which traditionally have stronger economic ties with Russia, with Hungary at the front lobbied against the sanctions as they would backfire, damaging the member countries' economies more than that of Russia (Reuters, 2014). This argument is often echoed ever since as the sanctions were renewed each 6 months ever since. The primarily goal of the sanctions imposed by the EU were to de-escalate the crisis in Ukraine, stabilize the country, support its sovereignty and territorial integrity, considering the Minsk agreement the basis of a sustainable

political solution. Due to the lack of de-escalatory steps from the other side, the EU imposed travel bans on people involved in the destabilization of the country, then reinforced them, and linked their duration to the complete implementation of the Minsk agreement. In addition to these Russia's voting right in the Council of Europe was also suspended.

The sanctions themselves consisted of restrictive measures, namely visa bans of 149 persons and asset freezes of 38 legal entities, and special restrictions for the Crimea and Sevastopol:

A ban on imports of goods originating in Crimea or Sevastopol unless they have Ukrainian certificates, a prohibition to invest in Crimea. Europeans and EU-based companies can no longer buy real estate or entities in Crimea, finance Crimean companies or supply related services. In addition, they may not invest in infrastructure projects in six sectors; a ban on providing tourism services in Crimea or Sevastopol. European cruise ships may not call at ports in the Crimean peninsula, except in case of emergency. This applies to all ships owned or controlled by a European or flying the flag of an EU Member State. Goods and technology for the transport, telecommunications and energy sectors or the exploration of oil, gas and mineral resources may not be exported to Crimean companies or for use in Crimea; Technical assistance, brokering, construction or engineering services related to infrastructure in the same sectors must not be provided. (EU Newsroom, 2014)

An embargo for arms was also introduced including police equipments (Council of the European Union, 2014). The G8 summit in Sochi of 2014 was also boycotted, a G7 meeting was held in Brussels instead without the Russian Federation. So was an EU-Russia summit cancelled and bilateral negotiations on visa issues and on the New Agreement between the EU and Russia suspended. In January 2015 Greece planned to veto further sanctions on Russia, but agreed to extend them in the end. Besides the EU unanimously condemning the escalation of fighting in the Donetsk and Luhansk regions. The foreign ministers of the EU added that 'The Council expects Russia to exert its influence and to induce the separatists to fully live up to the commitments under the Minsk agreements. These include notably the cessation of hostilities and the withdrawal of heavy weapons from the security zone as urgent first steps.' (EEAS, 2015) At the same time the number of sanctioned individuals and entities grew. The sanctions were extended again and again, and extended to a wider circle of officials including the former Ukrainian President Viktor Yanukovich. After years of no significant rapprochement to the consolidation of the Ukrainian crisis, in 2017 September Vladimir Putin to a major surprise offered the idea of sending UN peacekeepers to Eastern Ukraine.

Another crack on the wall however, is starting to appear as Russia expressed its intention to withdraw from the Council of Europe if its voting right remains suspended resulted considering abolishing the suspension. According to the Secretary General of the Council of Europe Jagland "It will be a negative development for Europe, because we will have a Europe without Russia. It would be a big step back for Europe." (Buckley, 2017) The effects of the sanctions and the Russian countersanctions are often argued. Nevertheless, it is difficult to measure their impact objectively and independently from other factors as their effect coincided with the ruble crisis, the downturn of the Russian economy and falling oil prices. According to the report issued by the by the European Parliament's Committee on International Trade issued in 2017 September (European Parliament, 2017) the sanctions did not backfire as suggested by some of the lobbyists for their lift such as Hungary and Russian press prefers to refer to. Nevertheless as the

report highlights, not every EU country was equally hit by the sanctions, the shares of total export to Russia of the Baltic states, Poland, the Czech Republic and Austria has declined much more significantly than that of the whole EU.

This is why in order to ensure a more fair and equal situation within the EU member states that could support a more harmonized common policy of sanctions against Russia establishing financial bridges would be advisable. By compensating the economies mostly hit by the sanctions and countersanctions the wind could be gotten out of the sail of governments lobbying for the abolishment of sanctions referring to the loss of trade, questioning the necessity of common EU foreign policy measures. Nevertheless, the fact that Germany has doubled its investments to Russia in 2016 shows a decent level of hypocrisy considering that Angela Merkel is one of the biggest advocates of keeping the sanctions against the country (Godlewski, 2017). Especially the German car industry makes and plans huge investments in the Russian Federation. Considering this double game, the question arises whether the sanctions were only imposed to show some kind of principal efforts from the Western side, or they are well thought through, hit Russian economy where it hurts, have a deterring force and are able to convince Russia about ‘giving the Crimea back’ as the sanctions intended to?

3. The Litvinenko case (2006)

The Litvinenko poisoning has shaken the popular opinion of Europe in 2006. Even though he was a KGB figure of minor significance according to Moscow, after quitting and moving to the United Kingdom his information were precious to the West as they could discredit the Putin regime such as exploding apartments in Moscow as a pretext for the war in Chechnya. However as the traces of the murder lead even as high as the presidential chair (National Archives, 2016), there was no official response to the attack, even though it was committed against a – by then already – British citizen on British soil. There was no EU level response for the murder, and no solidarity actions besides carefully condemning the act. Even the UK did not intend to draw robust measures, as politicians wanted to keep Russia on board for security policy partnership, hence only a handful of Russian diplomats were sent home from Britain as a reaction. As the Head of Chatam House’s Russia and Eurasia Program argued in 2016 (Nixey, 2016), the mild and uncoordinated answer would not deter the Kremlin from reckoning with its adversaries, shall they be spies joining the other side. Two years from his article its forecast came true, and the next Russian ex-spy’s murder in the United Kingdom got into the headlines.

4. The Skripal case or Salisbury attack (2018)

The Salisbury attack has shocked and astonished the world. Financing and supporting euro-sceptic radical parties is one thing, but a murder attempt targeting a British citizen on British soil however having had a double agent past is apparently another when it comes to official responses. Russia does not accept any kinds of responsibility for the attack and urges for ‘a new and proper investigation’ that the UK with EU backing refused. The UK considers the Russian offer for a joint UK-Russian investigation a “perverse diversionary tactic” (Cluskey, 2018). According to the ongoing investigation not only the nerve agent Novichok was used of

which production only Russia is able, but the two suspects are working for the GRU (Bellingcat, 2018).

The initial responses on EU level were very weak. For the offer of Hungarian Prime Minister Orbán the EU ambassador to Moscow, Markus Ederer was called back for consultations in Brussels. A few days later to the call of British Prime Minister Theresa May: *'The challenge of Russia is one that will endure for years to come. As a European democracy, the UK will stand shoulder to shoulder with the EU and NATO to face these threats together. United, we will succeed'* (The Guardian, 2018). France, Poland, Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania were the first considering expelling Russian diplomats in a coordinated strike against Moscow. The Lithuanian Prime Minister did not even congratulate President Putin on his election victory that nearly coincided in time with the request of solidarity of Prime Minister May. Though Lithuania has not, Germany was among the first who did. In her congratulations Angela Merkel urged Vladimir Putin to cooperate: *"It is more important than ever that we pursue dialogue and promote the relations between our countries and peoples. (...) On this basis, we should endeavor to address bilateral and international challenges constructively and find sustainable solutions."* (Reuters, 2018)

There are some more hesitant voices as well such as the Greek Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras who said: *"We have to express our solidarity to the UK, to the British people, but at the same time we need to investigate"*. Greece however had several times prevented actions against Russian meddling activities and lobbied to undercut the EU sanctions. To the original action of solidarity numerous EU and other countries (US, Ukraine, Norway, Montenegro, Moldova, Macedonia, Canada, Australia and Albania) joined. The majority of the EU member states have joined the action as well, except for Portugal, Luxembourg (it called home its ambassador from Moscow instead), Malta, Greece, Slovakia, Austria, Slovenia, Bulgaria and Cyprus. The 19 countries which did, expelled 150 diplomats. Even though the action did not represent a common European stance, the fact that eighteen EU countries joined the UK in it however Brexit negotiations are ongoing, might be a sign of a possible strong relationship in security aspects along with NATO between the EU and the UK in the future.

There are some worrisome facts though, as a recent investigative article shows, Budapest's expel of a Russian diplomat did not even intend to be a punitive measure. It had been negotiated prior, so that the mutual expel would not damage the two countries' 'special relationship'. Apparently Hungary wanted to please the Tories of the UK, while not giving up on its strong Russian connection (Panyi, 2018). Such behavior however, is perilous as such 'tricks' can weaken the European alliance and Hungary's place within it, but it also suggests to Russia that the EU should not be taken seriously as bilaterally accompanied with a *wink* the countries themselves are easier to get along with. Nevertheless, Russia's preferred way of negotiating is usually based on bilateralism, as it can reach much better conditions for itself when concluding agreements with smaller, single states than negotiating with the European Union as a whole. Trade agreements about gas are nearly exclusively concluded on bilateral base between Russia and EU countries, creating divisions between the member states (Buck, 2018).

Conclusion

Taking 4 examples of the last 12 years of occasions when Russia has surprised the West and the reactions given to them, the same pattern is visible in both categories, shall it be violating the territorial integrity and sovereignty of a country or attempting murder of a former spy. Although the first action induced a certain condemnation from the international community, but as no meaningful actions were taken, Russia was not deterred from implementing a very similar step yet again.

Considering the fact that geopolitically Russia is definitely not interested in a strong neighboring supranational organization, and the success how the Gerasimov doctrine seems to work causing chaos spreading disinformation, amplifying contrasting views and mobilizing groups seeking riots and backing separatist movements, the EU should be prepared for countering hostile operations on a common level. As member states themselves acknowledge the threat of subversion as a different priority and do or not do acts and measures against it, the EU28 may not allow themselves to have such a gap on the shield and become an easy target for Moscow's undesirable operations. This is why the East StratCom Task Force should be enlarged, supported much stronger financially and by experts from each EU country, and widen the scope of its activities.

In case of considerable harm towards any EU28 country, the EU should act and respond together. This is why the consequences of the Skripal case could be more powerful than those of the Litvinenko case. Apparently there is no other viable option, as not responding, and 'going back to usual business as soon as possible' as an approach of handling such situations apparently did not work out. The EU should focus on a coherent, common foreign policy strategy instead of leaving it to the sovereign states (however difficult it may sound now with euro-sceptic governments of power which highlight the importance of national sovereignty constantly). Individual responses of independent countries, especially that of small ones is incomparably worth less than a common stance represented by the EU, thus responsible governments should consider it seriously.

However difficult it is to negotiate interests within the EU, an ever closer union would unquestionably profit more from harmonized, responsive and proactive EU foreign policy. It is unavoidable for a more effective conflict management and the prevention of the patterns discussed above to continue as well.

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CONTROVERSIES IN POLISH-RUSSIAN RELATIONS OVER THE APPROACH TO UKRAINE AND GEORGIA

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Abstract: *The subject of the article is the impact of the approach to Ukraine and Georgia on Polish-Russian relations. The introduction consists of a synthetic outline of the difficult neighborhood between Poland and Russia in the historical perspective. In the first part article discusses the problem of Ukraine and Georgia in Polish-Russian relations in the first decade of the 21st century. The next part of the article focuses on the impact of the crisis in Ukraine on the destabilization of Polish-Russian relations. The conclusion contains the assessment of Russia's and Poland's policy towards Ukraine and Georgia and its consequence to the mutual relations. The main thesis of the article is the statement that the problem of Ukraine and Georgia is a key factor destabilizing relations between Poland and Russia. These states have contradictory, mutually exclusive visions of the future of Ukraine and Georgia. In addition, they undertake diverse activities to implement them, and the Russian Federation even reaches for military instruments for this purpose.*

Keywords: *Polish-Russian relations, Georgia, Ukraine, the Russo-Georgian war, the Russo-Ukrainian war*

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1. Introduction

For centuries, Central and Eastern Europe was dependent on Russia. This also applies to Poland, whose neighbors, including Tsarist Russia, deprived it statehood for a period of 123 years. Regaining independence in 1918 did not eliminate the threat from the East. Poland, like Ukraine, was forced to fight against the Bolsheviks for independence. Poland managed to stop the expansion of the communist revolution to the West of Europe thanks to the Warsaw battle of 13-25 August 1920, which went down in history under the name "Miracle at the Wisła". Two decades later Soviet Russia tried again to remove Poland from the political map of Europe. After the Nazi aggression of September 1, 1939, the wartime fate of Poland and Poles was sealed with the Soviet aggression of September 17, named in Poland as the "knife in the back." After the Second World War, Poland became a part of the Eastern Block controlled by the Soviet Union. The forced alliance with Russia was guaranteed by the communist authorities

subordinate to Moscow and the Soviet Army units stationed in Poland. In contrast, Ukraine and Georgia remained a part of the Soviet Union. The disintegration of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union has brought the Poles the desired sovereignty. Democratic authorities, realizing the will of society, adopted a pro-western vector in the foreign policy. The inclusion of Poland into NATO and the European Union was to guarantee that it would not be pushed back into the sphere of Russian influence (Orfy, 2011, p.75). Ukraine and Georgia were less fortunate. They became formally independent, but Russia wanted to keep its dominance over them. The Polish authorities decided to support the neighbors from Eastern Europe, threatened by Russian imperial ambitions. However, the pro-Western aspirations of Ukraine and Georgia met with a strong reaction from Russia.

The aim of the article is to analyze and assess the impact of the approach to Ukraine and Georgia on Polish-Russian relations. The main research problem is the answer to the question, what is the significance of Ukraine and Georgia in Polish-Russian relations? The main thesis of the article is the statement that the problem of Ukraine and Georgia is a key factor destabilizing relations between Poland and Russia. Russia breaks the fundamental principles of the international law and reaches for various instruments, including military power, to keep these countries in its sphere of influence. Poland, in turn, actively supports democratic processes in these countries and their aspirations for membership in Western organizations. The method of text source analysis was used in the article.

2. Georgia and Ukraine in Polish-Russian relations in the first decade of the 21st century

In the first decade of the 21st century, a number of serious problems and differences of positions existed between Poland and Russia. For Russia, Poland's activities involving the promotion of the Baltic states' inclusion into NATO and supporting democratic changes in other former Soviet republics, mainly in Ukraine and Georgia, as well as international Polish initiatives for the independence of Europe from Russian supplies of energy resources were particularly unfavorable. In addition, the tension prompted a plan to locate on the territory of Poland elements of the US missile defense system, or support for the US in the war in Iraq. Poland, in turn, was worried about the growing authoritarian tendencies in Russia. Its objection raised Russia's use of energy blackmail against the countries of Eastern and Central Europe (Sloan, 2008, p. 78) and the construction jointly with Germany of the "Nord Stream" gas pipe affecting the region's energy security (Neumann, 2008, p.119).

The most important factor negatively affecting Polish-Russian relations was Polish support for democratic processes and pro-Western aspirations of the states of the former Soviet republics, including Ukraine and Georgia. During the "Rose Revolution" in Georgia in November 2003 the Polish authorities showed favorable attitude towards the pro-Western reformist Mikheil Saakashvili. However, they were not more seriously involved in this political crisis. It was different in relation to the "Orange Revolution" in Ukraine which took place in the turn of 2004 and 2005. At that time, Poland strongly opted for the democratic political grouping of Viktor Yushchenko. Many high-ranking Polish politicians, including President Aleksander Kwaśniewski, gave him a personal support during the revolution. In reaction, Russian President

Vladimir Putin limited the intensity of political contacts with Warsaw. What was symbolic, during the celebration of the 60th anniversary of the end of World War II, the Russian President did not even mention Poland among allies fighting against Nazism (Braun, 2008, p.59).

Poland's diplomatic efforts caused that NATO and the European Union began to perceive Ukraine as a potential candidate for membership in these organizations (MacFarlane, 2008, p.47). Already in August 2005, President Aleksander Kwaśniewski said that Ukraine was ready for joining NATO and it should have been allowed to do so. Unfortunately according to Sergei Lavrov, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Russian Federation, further expansion of NATO to the East was the most serious problem destabilizing relations between Russia and the West (Chenoy and Kumar, 2017, p.237). Even bigger support for Ukraine emerged in Poland from the end of 2005, when conservative party Law and Justice took over the power from the postcommunists, and its member Lech Kaczyński assumed the presidency. The actions of new Polish authorities were motivated by the conviction about the threat posed by Russia and the desire to separate it from Poland by the strong, democratic and integrated with the West Ukraine. In order to limit Russia's influence in Europe and protect it from energy blackmail, Poland also submitted a proposal of the European energy solidarity (Cornell, 2013, p.198). In response, Russia imposed an embargo on the import of Polish meat and other food products, under the pretext of sanitary issues (Donaldson et al., 2014, pp.257–258). The conflict deepened when the Polish authorities agreed to place in Poland elements of the US anti-missile system. Moscow responded with a numerous threats, including the deployment of Iskander short-range missiles in Kaliningrad (Lindstrom, 2013, p.177).

After the takeover of power in Poland by the coalition of the Civic Platform and the Polish People's Party in November 2007, relations with Russia gradually began to improve. In the same year, Moscow lifted the embargo on the import of Polish meat, and in February 2008, it recognized the responsibility of the USSR for the Katyn massacre of 1940 (DeBardeleben, 2014, p.74). Contrary to the Kremlin's expectations, Warsaw has not ceased to support the pro-Western aspirations of Eastern European countries. During the NATO summit in Bucharest on 2-4 April 2008, Member States promised that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of the Alliance in the future. This promise was a consequence of lobbying of their membership in the Pact by the United States and Poland (Madej and Terlikowski, 2009, p.49). It was a big success, despite the fact that it was not possible to push through the concept of immediate inclusion of Ukraine and Georgia into the Membership Action Plan (Dunay, 2013, p.58). Moreover, in May 2008, Poland, together with Sweden, presented the initiative of the Eastern Partnership, which assumed an increase in the EU's involvement in democratic processes in the countries of the region, including Ukraine and Georgia.

After the outbreak of the Russo-Georgian war in August 2008, President Lech Kaczyński and the opposition party Law and Justice formulated strong accusations against Russia. On August 12, 2008, in Tbilisi, the President of Poland, along with the presidents of Ukraine and the Baltic states, stood behind the president of Georgia Mikheil Saakashvili when he accused Moscow of starting a war in front of the assembled crowd (Black, 2015, p.136). During this rally, Lech Kaczyński said the significant words "Today Georgia, tomorrow Ukraine, the day after tomorrow the Baltic states, and later maybe will be the time for my country, for Poland!" (TVP

Info, 2018). Unlike the president, the Polish government took a moderate stance on this matter, supporting the mediation undertaken by France, holding at that time the presidency of the European Union. Poland also sent its representatives to the EU observation mission in Georgia (Zięba, 2013, p.192). The Polish government reacted more decisively when in 2009 Russia cut off gas supplies to Ukraine. Warsaw loudly protested against this decision and demanded from the EU to take action that would force Russia to change it. Some of the Western countries, including Germany, did not want to risk the deterioration of energy cooperation with Russia and have retained much more restraint in this matter (Chenoy and Kumar, 2017, p.243).

Concerns in Poland and other Central and Eastern European states were also raised by the plans to rebuild relations with Russia by the administration of the American President Barack Obama who took over the office at the beginning of 2009. Talks between the leaders of the superpowers suggested that this was at the expense of the countries of the region. Therefore, in July 2009, many politicians from the region, including former Polish presidents – Aleksander Kwaśniewski and Lech Wałęsa, sent an open letter to the American president, in which they expressed their concern about concessions to Russia. Although Polish government did not comment the letter officially, President Lech Kaczyński publicly shared his concerns about the directions of foreign policy of the new US administration (Orzelska-Stączek, 2014, p.178). The fears were confirmed because in September 2009 the American administration announced a change of plans regarding the installation of elements of the anti-missile system in Poland and the Czech Republic. This facilitated a short-term reconstruction of American-Russian relations, what had grown a concern of the Polish authorities. Despite this warming, the USA, like the European Union, including Poland, remained critical of many aspects of Russia's policy, including the recognition of the independence of Abkhazia and South Ossetia (Bindi, 2015, p.56).

3. Destabilization of Polish-Russian relations in the context of the crisis in Ukraine

At the turn of the decade, Poland and Russia tried to rebuild bilateral relations. This coincided with the disaster of the Polish government plane in Smolensk on April 10, 2010. It resulted in the death of a 96-member state delegation headed by President Lech Kaczyński. The gestures of compassion and the help offered by the Russian authorities were positively received by the Polish government. Because the disaster occurred during the flight to commemorate the 70th anniversary of the Katyn massacre, Moscow decided to symbolically hand over to Warsaw a number of historical documents in this matter (Lagadec, 2012, p.102). In the following years, there were further positive symptoms in mutual relations. Among other things, in December 2011, an agreement on small cross-border traffic was signed and discussion on joint gas projects was resumed. At that time, trade between Poland and Russia was also systematically increasing.

Polish-Russian relations have seriously degraded as a consequence of the “Euromaidan revolution” in Ukraine which started in November 2013. In individual EU countries, the approach to revolution and Russia's interference in the internal affairs of Ukraine varied. Poland, like the Baltic states, perceived Russia as a threat not only to neighboring Ukraine, but also to Central Europe. Because of that Warsaw advocated a hardening of the political course

towards Russia. In turn, numerous Western European countries, including Germany, France and Italy, initially appealed for maintaining relations with Russia as a strategic partner (Bindi, 2015, p.56). The annexation of Crimea and sending of Russian troops into the Donbas caused that the position of the Central European countries began to prevail in the EU. Since March 2014, the EU has successively started to introduce sanctions against Russia for undermining the sovereignty and territorial integrity of Ukraine and destabilizing the situation in the country. Among them was the limitation of diplomatic contacts with Russia, individual restrictive measures towards the citizens of Russia, restrictions on economic relations with Crimea and Sevastopol, sectoral economic sanctions against Russia and other restrictions on economic cooperation with Russia (European Council). From the very beginning, Poland has been in favor of sanctions in all of these areas, and is currently lobbying in the EU for the annual prolongation of sanctions until Russia's policy towards Ukraine is changed.

Poland actively solicited in the NATO to explicitly burden Russia with the responsibility for the crisis in Ukraine, to strengthen NATO's eastern flank in the face of the growing threat from Russia and to support Ukraine. During the NATO summit in Newport on 4-5 September 2014, the most important postulates made by Poland were implemented. The NATO states condemned the illegal military intervention in Ukraine and the annexation of Crimea and called for the withdrawal of Russian forces from Ukraine. Until these demands were met, the Alliance suspended military and political cooperation with Russia. Alliance also provided support for Ukraine in the area of development of its defense sector (NATO, 2014; Koziej and Pietrzak, 2014, p.21–22). What was the most important from the point of view of Poland's security, allies adopted the Readiness Action Plan, in which they decided about (NATO, 2015):

- the continuous presence of NATO troops in the region, on the basis of cyclical rotation,
- the expansion of the allied infrastructure in the region and deployment of bases with NATO equipment, which was to improve the possibility of hosting in allied reinforcement forces,
- the establishment of additional command centers in the region, as well as expansion, improvement of readiness and increasing the collective defense capability of the Multinational Northeast Corps located in Szczecin,
- the appointment of the Very High-Readiness Joint Task Force, which was to be ready to take activities within a few days, and the development of the NATO Response Force,
- the update of the contingency plans and strengthening them through assigning specific forces to them,
- the increase of the intensity of military exercises in the region.

Poland, and other states of the region, sought reinterpretation of the article 5 of the Washington Treaty, what has also been achieved. It was recognized, among other things, that a large-scale cybernetic attack on a Member State could be considered as an act of aggression against the entire Alliance, qualifying for a military response. In addition, a number of measures have been taken to counteract possible hybrid attacks against Alliance Member States (Turczyński, 2015, p.177).

In August 2015, Andrzej Duda from the party Law and Justice became the president of Poland, and three months later this party appointed the government after the winning in the

parliamentary elections. This led to even more serious exacerbating of relations between Poland and Russia. The new Polish authorities have sought for far-reaching sanctions against Russia in individual international organizations. In addition, the issue of the Smolensk disaster has come back to the foreground. Beata Szydło's government undermined official reports regarding the causes of the accident by directing a number of serious accusations towards Russia. In the area of security, the preparation for the NATO summit in Warsaw and the strengthening of political and military relations with the United States in the counterpart to Russia were priorities of the Polish government.

Being the host of the NATO summit which was held in Warsaw on 8-9 July 2016, the Polish authorities had particularly favorable opportunities for presenting their postulates. The main goal of the summit was to develop and implement the provisions of the Newport Summit regarding strengthening of the article 5 of the Washington Treaty. During the Warsaw Summit the concept of Enhanced Forward Presence on the eastern flank of the Alliance was confirmed. It was decided that by June 2017, four fully operational battalion battle groups would appear on the territory of Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia and Poland, which would station there on a rotational basis. The groups already station in the countries of the eastern flank and are led by the framework states, ie Germany in Lithuania, Canada in Latvia, Great Britain in Estonia and the United States in Poland (Larsen, 2017, p.12). During the Warsaw summit, the Newport decision on the creation of the Very High Readiness Joint Task Force was also upheld, as well as the decision to expand NATO Response Force up to 40,000 soldiers. In order to effectively receive foreign troops in the territory of NATO's eastern flank countries, establishing NATO Forces Integration Units was confirmed (NATO, 2016).

During the NATO summit in Brussels on 11-12 July 2018, Member States maintained their position on Russia's actions in Ukraine and decisions of the Newport and Warsaw summits regarding the strengthening of the Alliance's eastern flank. It was strongly supported by Polish diplomacy. Allies also kept the suspension of military and civilian cooperation with Russia and the support for the Ukrainian security sector. During the summit, the Bucharest commitment from 2008 was also confirmed that Ukraine and Georgia would become members of the Alliance in the future (NATO, 2018).

As a consequence of Russian military operations in Ukraine, the Polish authorities systematically increase the defense budget, wanting to reach ultimately 2.5% of GDP. In addition, they undertake activities to establish permanent NATO bases in Poland (Ringsmore, 2016, p.211). They are aware that the only Western country that Russia will not be able to intimidate is the United States. Therefore, they strive for the permanent stationing of US troops in Poland, which in their opinion would be the most reliable guarantee of the national security (Jurasz, 2018). During the meeting with President Donald Trump in September 2018, President Andrzej Duda suggested that the possible base should be called "Fort Trump". He also agreed initially to participate in the costs of stationing of American soldiers in Poland. The US administration is considering this proposal. It takes into account many factors, including Poland's readiness for this undertaking, as well as Russia's response to its implementation (Borger, 2018). A positive decision in this matter is not excluded. The US wants to promote the

vision of the “Atlantic” Europe with strong position of its most devoted allies like Poland (Chamorel, 2006, p.184).

4. Conclusion

The Polish political elites of the 21st century are influenced by thought of Zbigniew Brzezinski - former security adviser to the American President Jimmy Carter. According to him, Russia tries to rebuild the superpower at the expense of its neighbors, and Ukraine plays a special role in this process. He warned that Russian aggression on Ukraine and the passivity of the West would, in the long run, threaten the security of other Eastern and Central European countries, including Poland (RM Staff, 2017). Observing Vladimir Putin’s policy towards the region, it is difficult to disagree with this approach. After joining the Baltic states to NATO and the EU, Russia resorted to military instruments to prevent a spread of West’s influence in other former Soviet republics, including Ukraine and Georgia. Poland actively supported the democratization of these countries, their attempts to become independent of Russia and pro-Western integration aspirations. Poland’s actions undermined Russia’s strategic interests and therefore became the main factor destabilizing Polish-Russian relations.

According to Adam Daniel Rotfeld – former Minister of Foreign Affairs of Poland – the contemporary actions of Russia aimed at rebuilding the position and international role previously played by tsarist Russia and later the Soviet Union are doomed to failure. This is due to the fact that currently both the world and Russia are completely different. The return to imperial political philosophy and military strategy from the turn of the 19th and 20th century is a manifestation of Russia’s weakness and the intellectual helplessness of its leaders. Its strategy is based on contempt for universal democratic values, distrust of partners and feeding on the weaknesses of its neighbors. The path chosen by Russia is to lead to self-isolation and stagnation as well as internal and external destabilization (Rotfeld, 2014, p.111). This belief is confirmed by the events of recent years. The military power demonstrated by Russia has to hide its economic and political weakness. The alleged successes of this policy in practice contribute to the further weakening of Russia, through the devastation of relations with many neighbors and with the West.

For years, Russia has accused Poland of leading a false campaign aimed at creating a negative image of Russia in the West and, consequently, formulating an anti-Russian policy by NATO and the European Union (Feklyunina, 2013, p.97). In fact, Russia’s actions, contrary to the international law, present Russia as a state destabilizing international peace and security. They are perceived by the Polish authorities and the public as threat also to Poland. Geographical proximity with Russia, the contempt of the Kremlin for universal values, as well as insincerity in politics and reaching for military solutions cause that Poland must be prepared for all scenarios of Russian foreign policy. However, the Polish authorities should not use the rhetoric of confrontation with Russia. It is in their interest to de-escalate the conflict, not to inflame it. On the other hand, warming relations with Russia cannot be made at the price of concessions regarding the basic principles and values of the international community and at the cost of Ukraine and Georgia.

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THE CHANGING GERMAN FOREIGN POLICY – GERMANY’S ARMS EXPORTS POLICY BETWEEN 2013 AND 2017

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Introduction

The paper examines the changing arms exports policy of the Federal Republic of Germany from 2013 to 2017 and its drivers regarding the foreign and security policy and the German arms industry. The review concentrates primarily on the changes undergone during the third Merkel cabinet, which indicated a considerable shift in the German foreign and security policy, including the arms exports policy. Although many papers have been published about the foreign, security and defence policy of the reunited Germany – both in Hungary and internationally – which focus on the ascendant global role of the Federal Republic, not much scholarly research has been undertaken regarding the German arms exports policy in Hungary, thus ignoring an important aspect of the changing security architecture.

The subject is more than actual: the arms exports policy faces a constant protest in Germany both from the political parties and the civil society, since Germany has become one of the world’s most powerful arms exporters. According to the critics, Germany becomes a supporter of dictatorships and contributes to conflict-escalations by running ‘irresponsible’ arms exports policy. But the changing global security environment may force – and its growing economy may urge - the Federal Republic to take a more active international role, including in the NATO as well as in the forming European defence integration. The current research may contribute to a better understanding of the German and the common European defence policy, aspects that should not be ignored by the Hungarian foreign policy either.

My conclusion is that Germany’s arms exports policy has been eased, first, because of the growing pressure of the economy and industry, second, because Germany has gradually been transforming into a more confident international actor.

The primary aim of the research is to give a comprehensive picture about the German arms exports policy between 2013-2017, its current main trends and changes, including the arms exports control system, the major target countries and exported weapons systems, followed by possible alternative explanations of the exports regarding the interests of German foreign and security policy and German defence industry. Finally, the connections between the changing arms exports policy and the common European defence integration are also revealed.

As the arms exports policy is a very intricate topic, we do not want to take sides in the debate if Germany contributes to the escalation of local conflicts or not.

Sources

Researching the arms exports we predominantly rely on the annual and semi-annual reports about the government's conventional arms exports policy published by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy, that are publicly available in both German and English languages, since they represent the only reliable official sources. Other source is the database of the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (*SIPRI Arms Transfer Database*) and its analyses partly based on the information published by the media or the market actors.

During the analysis of the control system the official documents of the government and the European Union have an important role, too. More important guidelines can be found in the academic publications of German university research institutes (for example: *Bundesakademie für Sicherheitspolitik*, *Institut für Sicherheitspolitik*) focusing on the foreign policy. Some Hungarian publications provide useful additional information about the German political decision-making and the country's international role as well. Apart from the academic sources, the German online news websites regarding the topic should also be mentioned, as they frequently offer a general introduction, however, because of their superficial evaluations their deeper analysis can be questionable.

Methodology

During the research of arms exports policy we are going to take the exports of four major weapons systems into consideration on the basis of the SIPRI database. These are the armoured vehicles, artillery weapons, aircraft (both fixed-wing aircraft and helicopters) and ships (including the submarines). It is worth mentioning that SIPRI uses different terminology as opposed to the German reports, however, in their definitions they usually overlap each other.

We are researching predominantly the exports of the major weapons systems, because they are frequently accompanied by the exports of training personnel, technology, spare parts and accessories that are indispensable for the long-term operation of these techniques, moreover, by certain end user agreements, so between the exporter and importer countries arms trade contacts and security partnerships will be realized. Such a trade can seriously affect the relationship of the two countries, which is not the case when exporting solely simple small arms. The exports of state-of-the-art major weapons systems influence not only the relations of the exporter and the importer, but they also have an impact on the importer's inner balance of power and on its relations to other countries, possibly changing the regional balance of power as well. Thus we do not research the exports of small arms.

In our review we highlight such target countries or country groups, where the political system or values do not correspond with those of Germany, and are no members of the Euro-Atlantic community.

1. The arms exports control system in Germany

1.1. Legal regulation and decision-making

In Germany the exports of all kind of military equipment are strictly regulated by a complex legal system. The federal laws and constitution, the regulations of the EU and the international control are interlocked with each other.

It is important to stress that the official German regulation covers all of the military equipment (*Rüstungsgüter*), in which category we can distinguish between war weapons (*Kriegswaffen*, such as military airplanes, armoured vehicles, automatic weapons or warships) and other military equipment (*sonstige Rüstungsgüter*, like pistols, sports and hunting weapons, radar technics, explosives and semi-finished products). The exports of the two categories are regulated by two different laws. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie)

1.1.1. National regulations

During the research of the German national regulations the Basic Law, the War Weapons Control Act, the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance should be taken into consideration. These regulations apply to the war weapons and all the other military equipment, too.

According to Paragraph 2 of Article 26 in the Basic Law for the Federal Republic of Germany (Grundgesetz für die Bundesrepublik Deutschland) the whole federal cabinet is responsible for the arms exports on a matter of principle, but in practice this matter has been within the competence of the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy for a long time. (Grebe and Roßner 2013, p.13)

In accordance with the Foreign Trade and Payments Act (*Außenwirtschaftsgesetz*) and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance (*Außenwirtschaftsverordnung*) any military equipment's exports are liable to licensing. The military equipment's list is included in the appendix of the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance, that strongly relies on the European Union's common military list, just like on the list of the Wassenaar Arrangement, which was incorporated into the national legal system by the Federal Government. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017. p.7)

Some types of military equipment included in the Exports List rank as war weapons at the same time. The War Weapons Control Act (*Gesetz über die Kontrolle von Kriegswaffen*) defines what counts as a war weapon: items and materials, that combined together or with other materials can cause destruction and serve directly as tools for the application of violence. For the exports of such weapons the licence prescribed by the War Weapons Control Act (*Gesetz über die Kontrolle von Kriegswaffen*) is required and an additional permission according to the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and the Foreign Trade and Payments Ordinance should also be acquired. In accordance with the War Weapons Control Act any kind of activity related to

war weapons (their production, supply, delivery, transfer) requires prior licensing by the Federal Government. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017, p.8)



Illustration 1: Categories of military equipment and their exports regulations according to the German arms exports control

For granting or denying of exports licences, according to the Foreign Trade and Payments Act and Ordinance, the Federal Office for Economic Affairs and Export Control (*Bundesamt für Wirtschaft und Ausfuhrkontrolle*, BAFA) is responsible, controlled by the Federal Ministry for Economic Affairs and Energy. Since 2014 the BAFA provides the petitioners information about the status of the licensing process. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017, p.8)

In the case of exports intentions in which the importer country, the military equipment or the quantity of the business have special political significance, the Federal Security Council (*Bundessicherheitsrat*, BSR) is involved. Legally it does not have authority in decision-making, still its decisions are mandatory in practice. The BSR is chaired by the chancellor. (Hettyey, 2017a, pp.65–66)

The federal government controls the end usage of all exported military equipment through the BAFA, the exports are permitted only if the importer country agrees on that. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017, p.12)

1.1.2. EU and international regulations

Above all of this the national regulations are subject to further statutes by the European Union, such as the appendices of the Council Regulation for the control of exports, transfer, brokering and transit of dual-use items (COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 428/2009), and the Council Common Position of 2008 defining common rules governing control of exports of military technology and equipment. (COUNCIL COMMON POSITION 2008/944/CFSP)

Germany is a founding member of every international forum and agreement regarding arms trade. Among these the Wassenaar Arrangement of 1995 and the Arms Trade Treaty adopted

by the United Nations General Assembly in 2013 are noteworthy.¹ Germany also regularly reports about the exports to the UN Register of Conventional Arms. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017, p.12)

1.2. Political guidelines

For the last time in 2000 the German Federal Government ratified the political guidelines as an instruction for the licensing authorities. The guidelines are important guiding principles for the evaluation and approval of the requests, but as they were authorized by the federal cabinet, they are legally not mandatory. (Brzoska, 2007 p.652)

The currently valid political guidelines revised in 2000 are in short the following: (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2000):

- In every export decision the human rights situation must be considered in the importer country. In case there is a suspicion that the military equipment to be delivered would be used for inner suppression or violating human rights, the exports will not be authorised.
- Between EU-, NATO- and NATO-equivalent (Australia, New Zealand, Japan and Switzerland), and the other, so-called third countries (*Drittländer*, i. e. every country that is no member of the EU or the NATO, and not NATO-equivalent) a distinction must be made. In the case of the third countries a restricted exports policy must be followed when granting permissions.
- In the case of third countries the exports of war weapons can be permitted only in extraordinary situations, where the granting of licence is supported by Germany's specific foreign and security policy interests.
- Further criteria are the importer country's attitude to the fight against organized crime and terrorism, or to respecting international rights.

2. Characteristics and trends of the German arms exports policy between 2013 and 2017

According to the SIPRI's summary Germany was the 4th largest arms exporter in the world after the USA, Russia and France, preceding China in the timeframe 2013-2017, sharing 5,8% in the world's arms exports. 29% of the german arms were exported to European countries, 24% to Asia and Oceania, 13% to the American continent and 8,4% to Africa. Compared with the timeframe 2008-2012 the German arms exports' volume decreased by 14%. (Fleurant et al. 2017, p.5)

¹ See also N. Rózsa and Péczeli, Initial. (ed.) 2013, pp.242–243.

It is remarkable that despite its restricted control system Germany took precedence over the United Kingdom during the years, and was on a par with France, even preceding it between 2004-2012.

Five largest arms exporters in the world	1989-1992	1993-1998	1999-2003	2004-2008	2008-2012	2013-2017
United States	28,9%	48%	34%	31%	30%	34%
Soviet Union/Russia	6,6%	11%	30%	25%	26%	22%
France	1,8%	9,4%	7%	8%	5,8%	6,7%
Germany	4,3%	6,4%	6%	10%	7,4%	5,8%
United Kingdom	1,2%	7,9%	5%	4%	3,8%	4,8%
China*	-	-	-	-	4,6%	5,7%

Chart 1: The world's five largest arms exporters and their share in the global arms exports between 1989–2017.²

2.1. Target countries and major weapons systems

In the following we look at the values of last five years' (2008–2012) individual** arms exports licences:

Year	EU-countries (billion Euros)	NATO-/NATO-equivalent countries (without EU-countries) (billion Euros)	Third countries (billion Euros)	Current years' total (billion Euros)
2008	1,839	0,809	3,141	5,789
2009	1,445	1,106	2,492	5,043
2010	2,315	1,056	1,383	4,754
2011	1,954	1,162	2,298	5,414
2012	0,971	1,129	2,604	4,704
In total	8,524	5,262	11,918	

Chart 2: The values of the individual arms exports licences between 2008 and 2012.³

* China became one of the five largest arms exporter countries between 2008 and 2012, preceding the UK.

² SIPRI Yearbook Summaries 1992, 1998, 2003, 2008, 2012.

** The German reports distinguish between individual (*Einzelgenehmigungen*) and collective (*Sammelausfuhrgenehmigungen*) arms exports licences. By 'individual' they mean the licences given for individual transactions, whereas the 'collective exports licences' refer to the production phases of military equipment, during which the military equipment is regularly exported and imported within the framework of an industrial cooperation, including the transactions regarding maintenance and repair. Collective licences are granted first of all to the most reliable partners, the EU- and NATO- or NATO-equivalent countries, but rarely to third countries. To their procedure the same rules and principles apply as to the individual licences. See also: Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017, pp.17–18.

³ Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017. p. 20

Chart 2 shows that in the last five years the values of the individual exports licences to EU- or NATO- (or NATO-equivalent) countries was more than of those aiming at third countries. Between 2008 and 2012 the total value of all individual arms exports licences was 25,704 billion Euros.

In comparison the values of individual arms exports licences between 2013 and 2017 are following:

Year	EU-countries (billion Euros)	NATO-/NATO-equivalent countries (without EU-countries) (billion Euros)	Third countries (billion Euros)	Current years' total (billion Euros)
2013	1,168	1,071	3,606	5,845
2014	0,817	0,753	2,404	3,974
2015	2,475	0,763	4,621	7,859
2016	1,353	1,827	3,668	6,848
2017	1,483	0,965	3,795	6,243
In total	7,296	5,379	18,094	

Chart 3: The values of the individual arms exports licences between 2013 and 2017.⁴

During the five examined years two things are evident: on the one hand the values of the individual arms exports licences increased, their total value being 30,769 billion Euros, the values of 2015 and 2016 were the highest in the past 20 years. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017, p. 20; Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2010. pp. 29-30)




Illustration 2 (Based on the German arms exports reports of 2010 and 2017.)

⁴ Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2017. p.20

On the other hand the value of the individual arms exports licences aiming at third countries was always the highest between 2013 and 2017: the value of those to EU- and NATO- (or NATO-equivalent) countries was 12,675 billion Euros in total, whereas in the case of third countries this amount was 18,094 billion Euros, which means an increase of 52% as opposed to the decrease of 14% of the exports licences aiming at EU-countries.




Illustration 3 (Based on the German arms exports report of 2017.)

The following chart shows Germany's ten most important exports partners and their share in the total German arms exports between 2013 and 2017:

Rank	Target country	Share of the exports to the target country within the total German arms exports (%)
1.	South Korea	13%
2.	Greece	11%
3.	Israel	9%
4.	Algeria	8%
5.	United States	7,5%
6.	Italy	7%
7.	Qatar	5%
7.	Egypt	5%
8.	Indonesia	3%
8.	Saudi Arabia	3%

Chart 4: Germany's most important arms exports partners and their share in the total German arms exports between 2013 and 2017.⁵

⁵ SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

It is evident that out of the ten most important partners only two countries (Greece and Italy) are EU-countries, three (Greece, Italy, and the United States) are NATO-countries, whereas the other eight countries are outside of the EU and the NATO. The most significant partner region is the Mediterranean region and North Africa, half of the most important target countries can be found in this area.

Contrary to this (as shown in Chart 5), between 2008 and 2012 out of ten target countries six belonged to the group of EU- and NATO- or NATO-equivalent countries, none of the Middle Eastern or North African countries were present.

1.	Greece
2.	South Korea
3.	United States
4.	Spain
5.	Turkey
6.	Malaysia
7.	Singapore
8.	Portugal
9.	Chile
10.	Austria

Chart 5: Germany's most important arms exports partners between 2008 and 2012.⁶

In the following let us examine the most important exported major weapons systems:




Chart 4 (according to SIPRI Arms Transfers Database, measured in SIPRI trend indicator value)

⁶ SIPRI Arms Transfers Database

Between 2013 and 2017 the most significant items were the ships^{*}, amounting to 50% of the total arms exports. Especially worth mentioning are the Dolphin submarines delivered to Israel, that are capable of mounting cruise missiles on, or the Type 214 submarines delivered South Korea and Greece. In the case of Israel and South Korea it is noteworthy that onto the purchased submarines conventional and nuclear cruise missiles can be mounted by conversion, providing efficient deterring weapons– in the case of Israel - against Iran or in the case of South Korea against North Korea. On the second place are the armoured vehicles, within this category the tanks (Leopard 2's for Spain, Poland, Qatar, Indonesia and Turkey), armoured personnel carriers (for Egypt and Algeria), and infantry fighting vehicles (Indonesia, Jordan). (*SIPRI Arms Transfers Database*)

Artillery weapons amounted to only 2% of the total arms exports, all of them were PzH 2000 self-propelled howitzers. Among the three target countries Qatar imported the most of them (24 in 2013), the rest was acquired by Lithuania (18) and Croatia (12). (*SIPRI Arms Transfers Database*)

When comparing the mentioned target countries to the exported major weapons systems it is evident that among the importers of these Middle Eastern and North African countries are present in significant numbers. Three of them (Saudi Arabia, Qatar, Egypt) are members of the military coalition led by Saudi Arabia, that is currently fighting against Shiite rebels in Yemen. In the Middle Eastern and North African region only Israel counts as Germany's traditional arms trade partner, which has always been arming against its regional rivals (currently mainly against Iran). (Serr, 2015)

Apart from the Middle Eastern and North African target countries South Korea has also been one of the classical importers of German weapons for decades, actively arming itself due to the North Korean threat. (Ebbighausen, 2017)

Lastly it is worth looking at Indonesia, also member of the list. Indonesia purchased in the last more than ten years weapons from Germany in significant quantities, predominantly warships. Almost half of its current fleet consists of German-made ships. Since the country's territory covers more than 18.000 islands and on its territorial waters large commercial ship traffic passes through, the protection of these waters against piracy is of essential importance. (*Indonesien*, 2017 p.17)

On the whole it can be stated, that within the timeframe between 2013 and 2017 its place among the world's major exporters is nothing new for Germany, the value of individual exports licences has increased, but the most important change is that the exports to the former primary market (EU-, NATO- or NATO-equivalent) have decreased, instead other countries came to the foreground that are

- carrying out active arming programs on the ground or on sea, developing their own military industry capacities, therefore having strong need of advanced weapons systems, military equipment and technics (Moltmann, 2012),

^{*} According to SIPRI every navy surface and underwater vehicle is referred to as *ship* uniformly.

- having authoritarian political systems in some cases,
- sometimes in regions affected by armed conflicts or tensions.

2.2. The failure of the restricted arms exports policy

In autumn 2013 the arms exports policy became one of the most discussed topics during the German elections. Merkel's second cabinet got harsh critics because it was said to be delivering arms to dictatorships as well: against this policy protested the SPD, notably the social democrat delegate Sigmar Gabriel, who was in opposition at that time. Sigmar Gabriel became later minister of economics in Merkel's third cabinet. (Pauly and Steinmetz 2018) As he entered office he declared that the arms exports should be considerably decreased, especially towards third countries. Additionally, he stated that the former routine of making exports decisions in favor of the defence industry should also come to an end, establishing a strict exports control system. (Der Tagesspiegel, 2014) The stricter exports policy was based on the coalition treaty of 2013, that took sides with a more reserved arms exports policy. Also due to the treaty the new government introduced additional semi-annual reports on the arms exports beside the annual ones. (Die Bundesregierung, 2014, pp. 12-16) The coalition treaty brought nothing new regarding its essentials though, repeating the statements of the previous treaties for the most part. (Brzoska, 2014a)

The restricted arms exports policy initiated by Sigmar Gabriel has essentially failed. He was not able to prevent the delivery of the items that had already been licensed by the former government, moreover, the arms exports control committee established by him was also criticised by the coalition parties and the defence industry's representatives. (Doll, 2016) Gabriel, who did not fulfill the SPD's earlier promises (the value of individual licences reached a 20 years' record!) was forced into a defensive position later as well. According to his argumentation the volume of the licences decreased after 2015 (in fact it really did), and due to the rise of the Islamic State the weapons sales were necessary. (Monath, 2018)

Against the restricted exports policy two arguments were continuously repeated: on the one hand the CSU and the CDU underlined Germany's interests regarding the foreign and security policy, on the other hand the representatives referred to the defence industry's own interests.

2.3. Interests of the foreign and security policy

The majority of the arguments speaking for the arms exports policy are based on strategical considerations. The foreign and security policy interests that are taken into account during the arms exports are also mentioned in the official German documents, for example in the most important German security policy document, the so-called White Book of 2016. (*Weißbuch 2016 zur Sicherheitspolitik und zur Zukunft der Bundeswehr*). The White Book lists among the German security policy's primary challenges in the changed security environment the international terrorism, the fragile statehood and the misgovernment. As in the neighbourhood

of Europe (first of all in the Middle East and North Africa) the decayed or weak statehood represents a major threat, according to the document the strengthening (*Ertüchtigung*) of the regional and local actors is especially important. The strengthening includes the supply, the exports of military equipment, for which the guidance and training are indispensable, furthermore preferably the security sector's reform and the strengthening of the government are also required. (Die Bundesregierung, 2016a, pp.34, 39, 52) Besides that the coalition treaty of 2013 refers to the necessity of achieving the stability in the world by a reserved arms exports policy among others. (Die Bundesregierung, 2016b, p.12.) In connection with the exports control we have already mentioned that according to the Political Guidelines the exports to third countries can be justified by Germany's foreign and security policy interests. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2000) Sigmar Gabriel himself wrote in the introduction of the arms exports report of 2013 that the arms exports are no means of the economic, but of the security policy. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2013 p. 2) According to the federal government's interpretation the exports of military equipment are therefore important means of securing international stability.

Greece, Italy and the United States, ranking among the ten most important partners, have clearly an allied partnership with Germany, but it is also worth examining the foreign and security policy relations with the mentioned Middle Eastern and North African countries, as they got into the ten most important arms trade partners as newcomers between 2013 and 2017. The most criticised relationship with Saudi Arabia is unpleasant but necessary from Germany's point of view. It is well known that in Saudi Arabia the human rights are seriously violated, convicts and among them Shias, who are members of the opposition, are executed on the basis of charges of terrorism. For the federal government Saudi Arabia is still a partner of key importance in the resolution of the Syrian conflict and in the fight against terrorism. Saudi Arabia, however, is not satisfied with the regional balance of power and wants to oust its Shiite rival, Iran from the region, which was also the reason for its actions against the Shiite rebels of Yemen. Accordingly, the exports of the mentioned patrol ships was licensed by the Federal Security Council only with the argumentation, that the ships are not war weapons, so they can be deployed in the Yemen conflict. (Hettzey, 2017b, pp.187–189) The matter of the German military equipment transfers was utterly dropped, when in the autumn 2018 the international (and especially the European) community turned against Saudi Arabia due to the murder of Jamal Khashoggi. Angela Merkel stated in October 2018, that no further exports are possible until the case is not clarified. (Politico, 2018)

Germany also has an interest in the security of Qatar, standing on the 7th place, because the country is a major supplier of petroleum and natural gas, and an important partner of economy as well.⁷ As the likewise 7th most important partner, Egypt got appreciation from Germany, because on the one hand since 2016 it has been taking effective measures against the ships of people smugglers, and on the other hand serious German investments (for example in the current supply) are also present in the country. (Hettzey 2017b, p.186) At the beginning of 2018

⁷ Although it falls outside the examined timeframe, it demonstrates the relationship of the two countries well, that according to its emir Qatar would be Germany's largest investor among the Gulf countries, outranking even Kuwait. See: Brüggmann, 2018.

the government called a halt to the arms exports to countries directly involved in the Yemen conflict (although the countries were not mentioned by name). During Merkel's visit of 2017 in Riyadh Saudi Arabia expressed its intention not to make more arms deal with Germany. (DW, 2018; Zeit, 2018)

Algeria is also an important partner in the fight against terrorism, drugs and people smuggling, its stability is a European interest, too. For the German frigates delivered in 2016-2017 the Algerian personnel is being trained by the Bundeswehr. (*Algerien*, 2017, pp.31–32) Germany's relationships with Israel, standing on the 3rd place, have shaken considerably in the recent years. As a leading EU-country, Germany has an interest in settling the Palestinian-Israeli conflict, but Germany supports the two states solution, which means a bone of contention. The relationships are also burdened by Germany's active involvement in the nuclear agreement of Iran, which was disapproved by Israel. (Hettzey, 2017b, pp.181–182) Earlier Germany delivered weapons mostly to Israel, whereas the United Kingdom and France supplied the Arab states. (Brzoska 2007, p.656) According to the arms exports of 2013–2017 the German foreign policy now seems to have a more balanced attitude to the Arab-Israeli issue, as Qatar, Egypt and Saudi Arabia have shown up among its major target countries. However, it is also important to stress, that this does not mean any contradiction, because Saudi Arabia and Israel are both Iran's rivals, so Israel did not object to the arms deal made with Saudi Arabia, either. (Caffiero and Wagner, 2013)

Lastly Turkey is worth mentioning as well: although it was only the 17th most important target country, in the examined timeframe it still caused a great scandal, that since 2016 Turkey has deployed the Leopard 2 tanks purchased from Germany against Kurds during the offensive of Afrin, referring to the protection of the southern wing of the NATO. The government recognized Turkey's rightful security interests, but underlined also, that the operation should not hinder the fight against the Islamic State.* Turkey has been purchasing war weapons (AFV's too) from Germany since the 1980's, but after the attempted coup of 2016 Berlin cancelled several arms exports licences intended for Turkey. To the restrictions also contributed the arrest of some German citizens of Turkish descent in Turkey. (Werkhäuser, 2018; Fuchs, 2018) Turkey's role became more significant for the German security policy in the last years, because it is an unavoidable partner in the resolution of the migration crisis and the Syrian conflict, and in the fight against terrorism as well. (Egeresi, 2017, p.3)

All of the above mentioned countries are located in the Middle Eastern and North African region, their role in Europe's and Germany's security is unquestionable, especially nowadays. The security policy aspects considered in these cases are the securing of the oil supply, the actions against terrorism, and accordingly the strengthening of the local and regional actors against inner and outer threats by exporting state-of-the-art weapons systems. These apply

* The deployment of German tanks against the Kurds has arisen as a sensitive topic in the German-Turkish relationships not for the first time. Germany ordered a 3 months long embargo against Turkey in 1993, then in 1994 and 1995 the arms exports were again suspended, while Berlin was investigating the deployment of Leopard tanks against Kurds. See: Ron, 1995.

equally to Saudi Arabia, Turkey, Qatar, Egypt and Algeria. The security of Israel is of key importance and in the interest of the German state, too. (Wulf, 2012)

According to the White Book of 2016 Germany wants to be a leading but responsible international actor. The interests listed above are understandable in regard to the changed German foreign and security policy perception. It is thought-provoking however, how effective the arms exports can be as a means of foreign and security policy, and how they can conform to the responsibility. The arms exports can affect the foreign affairs in two ways: on the one hand they change the balance of power between the importer country and its neighbours, and they strengthen the state from the inside against the non-governmental actors. On the other hand the exporter draws the importers by the transactions and their conditions under its influence. The arms exports are a malleable means of the foreign policy, its measure can be adjusted easily. A further asset is the low cost, as opposed to the direct military presence. (Thrall and Dominey, 2018, pp.9–10) The latter is especially important for Germany, as its army can be deployed abroad only with the approval of the Bundestag.

However, according to several experts it is questionable that Germany really has a definite arms exports strategy. As per the argumentations this stems from the discrepancies of the Political Guidelines, because they are incompatible with the practice. It is questionable how responsible Germany is as an international actor, when it supports countries, that do not share the values of the western world, nor they respect human rights and are pursuing a 'maverick' policy. (Grebe, 2014, p.6) Concerning the arms exports as means of foreign and security policy, the well-known security dilemma of John H. Herz can arise again, stating that increasing of a state's military strength can cause other states to arm themselves, thus achieving contrary effect which leads to further escalation, therefore the aimed stability gets lost.

Although the German foreign policy concept is undoubtedly not settled, the aims of the White Book of 2016 and the changes in the arms exports policy show that Germany is becoming a more ambitious and active international actor.

2.4. Interests of the defence industry

The other arguments for the loosening arms exports policy are related to the influence of the defence industry. However, the interests of the security policy and those of the industry can not be separated from each other, as the German security policy considers the maintenance of the domestic defence industry an important aspect, so that it can be avoided that the Bundeswehr would fully depend on foreign suppliers. (Mölling 2013, p.2) The arms trade is not only a factor of politics, but of the economy as well. The government affects the actors of the economy by controlling the exports, but the actors of the economy (companies, trade unions, departmental organizations) are also lobbying, thus influencing the arms exports policy. (Brzoska, 2007, p.657) The argumentation of the actors of the economy is generally based on structural reasons (jobs, weak sectors or regions), but they also make use of their relationships with politicians. (Brzoska, 2014b)

One of the most important interest groups of the German economy is the Federation of German Industries (*Bundesverband der Deutschen Industrie*, BDI), that integrates the interest groups of 30 industrial sectors and played a serious role in the eastern EU enlargement, too. (Hettzey, 2017a, p.71) The Federation of German Security and Defence Industries (*Bundesverband der Deutschen Sicherheits- und Verteidigungsindustrie*, BDSV) is a member of the BDI, it incorporates 220 firms, including the affiliated companies. Its members are among others such firms of the defence industry that are important suppliers of the Bundeswehr, like the Heckler and Koch, the Rheinmetall, the Kraus-Maffei Wegmann, the Thyssen-Krupp Marine Systems or the Diehl Defence. (BDSV.eu)

The sales of the German military industry firms increased continuously between 2013 and 2017, though in a varying pace. They increased in 2014 by 9.4%, in 2015 by 7.4%, and in 2016 by 6.6%, compared with the previous years. (Fleurant et. al., 2014–2016)

In the discussed timeframe among the SIPRI's 100 largest arms producers the Rheinmetall stepped forward steadily (in 2014 from the 31st place to the 32nd, in 2015 to the 30th and in 2016 to the 26th place), and the Thyssen-Krupp moved spectacularly from the 59th to the 42nd place in 2014, while the Krauss-Maffei Wegmann from the 88th to the 78th place. (Fleurant et. al., 2014–2016) The production of the German producers is increasing, but due to the weak European market the majority of their products are directed to countries outside of Europe.

Since the past years it has been a constant problem for the defence industry's actors, that the few orders made by the Bundeswehr, the EU- and NATO-countries do not help to keep the high-tech capabilities, so the companies need exports. (Weber, 2018, p.3) In the decades after the end of the Cold War the European countries, that possessed a traditionally strong base of defence industry, did not increase the defence expenses, as opposed to the region of South-East Asia, for example. The economy world crisis of 2008 caused further restriction of the defence expenses, thus the inner markets of the European defence industry were stagnating, and due to the constraints in the military security sector no major weapons system development programs were undertaken. After the NATO summits of Wales and Warsaw the defence expenses' increase did not necessarily lead to the starting of arming programs and technologies, for which particularly political will and appropriate strategical planning would be needed. Owing to the limited inner markets of the European defence industry the defence syndicates are obliged to make profit by exports, because the European military forces do not offer such a spending power that would be able to provide for them. In the outer markets, however, the European arms producers compete not only with the companies of Russia, the United States or the developing countries (for example China), but with each other as well. (Etl, 2017, pp.28–30) The taut competition demands the development of state-of-the-art technologies, but in this global competition the strict regulations put the German firms at a disadvantage, as opposed to the companies of other nations, that are considerably lesser restrained.

The German arms exports reports show, that the demand by the German arms producers' traditional markets, first of all by EU- and NATO-countries has decreased, cutting down their market share. On the other hand the increased demand in the Middle and Far East is being satisfied by American, Russian and Chinese suppliers. The German firms also have to orientate

towards regions with more favourable market conditions, where their products are demanded, in order to avoid a disadvantageous position in the competition. (Bundesministerium für Wirtschaft und Energie, 2013, p.35)

The common position of the BDSV and the BDI underlined the same problem. As the governments of the USA, Russia and other countries considerably support exports, the German military industry is at a disadvantage. According to the common position no further restrictions are necessary in the current exports control system. (BDSV and BDI, 2016, pp.11–12)

In 2014 the representatives of the military industry drew the government's attention to the fact, that the significance of the sector has been shaken to such an extent, that numerous international development projects are already being carried out without any German contribution. According to the president of the BDSV, Armin Papperger, who is also the chief executive officer of the Rheinmetall, the government's reluctance endangers the firms' capability of producing state-of-the-art technology. Due to the worsening business prospects the medium-sized firms got into a particularly difficult situation, because their banks rose the credit financing expenses, referring to the higher risks. (Kitekintő, 2014) Papperger reminded of the danger of losing key technologies in an other interview as well. He stated that in the future the classic AFV's and submarines may lack German technologies. (Hegmann, 2015)

The representatives of the military industry argue for the support of arms exports with reference to the changed security policy environment also mentioned in the White Book of 2016. According to this, if Germany really wants to take a more significant international role, it needs a productive and competitive defence industry in order to ensure its capacity and to support its allies and partners. Therefore the maintenance of key enabling technologies is also an interest of the security policy. Moreover, the BDSV and the BDI are referring to the *Strategy Paper of the Federal Government on Strengthening the Defence Industry in Germany*, approved by the federal government in 2015, in which the government expressed its commitment to the preservation of key enabling technologies of the defence industry. (BDSV and BDI, 2016, p.8) The document sets that the government is going to support the defence developments in the future and help the firms by bilateral relationships. (Die Bundesregierung, 2015) As national key enabling technologies mentioned above the government defined first of all cryptography technologies, sensors, technologies of armoured and underwater vehicles as well as protection technologies. (Die Bundesregierung, 2015)

The index-numbers of the arms exports between 2013 and 2017 imply that mostly due to the arms industry's interests and in part because of the change of the foreign and security policy attitude (supporting the industry's aspects) the German government has begun to pursue a policy that is more favourable to the actors of the economy. The consolidation of the defence industry's position is also a security policy interest of great importance, as Germany needs a steady background of military industry for international cooperations such as the PESCO (*Permanent Structured Cooperation*) in the European Union or the framework nations concept in the NATO.

3. The German arms exports policy and the European Defence Integration

An obvious solution for consolidating the arms industry would be an increase of the orders made by the European military forces, but the growing industrial capacity still would not be utilized enough in this case. (Grebe, 2018, p.1) Possible solutions could be the common European defence cooperations, as by these the pressure on the defence industry could be relieved and the accusations against the arms exports policy avoided at the same time.

There is a consensus among the German green, liberal, social democratic and conservative parties in the opinion, that Germany is in need of a common European defence policy. (Major and Mölling, 2017) It was suggested both by the political parties and the foreign and security policy experts that a solution to the military industry's concerns would be the European defence integration. Due to the changes of the security policy in the past years the discussion about the 'Europeanisation' of the armed forces, the defence industry and the arms exports, namely about the establishment of a Defence Union came into the limelight. Regarding the implementation the European Union is currently unable to come to an agreement, yet measures have already been taken in this direction. On the one hand the PESCO and the European Defence Fund have been established, and on the other hand defence industry cooperations like the Airbus-group, or after the same model the main battle tanks producer KNDS-group were founded by the fusion of the German Krauss-Maffei Wegmann and the French NEXTER Defence Systems companies. (Grebe, 2018, p.5) An agreement on starting further Franco-German projects was made by Angela Merkel and Emmanuel Macron in 2017, including the development of a common next generation fighter jet (*Future Combat Air System*), artillery system and military satellite projects. (Altmeyer, 2018) As an other solution the establishment of an open market within the NATO (supported also by the US government) was suggested earlier, but in in this case the American companies would soon enjoy a monopoly situation, while the European arms industry would be put again at a disadvantage. (Brzoska, 2014a) The strengthening of the European defence industry is urged by the White Book and the Strategy Paper of 2015. According to these the obvious goal of the German Federal Government is to make the European common foreign and security policy stronger. If Europe wants to take a greater responsibility in security policy, it needs an efficient and competitive defence industry. The documents state that the current European defence industry is very fragmented, parallel armament development projects are in progress, which means a disadvantage in the international competition. They also underline that the interoperability of the European armed forces should be increased and the national key enabling technologies retained. The Federal Government commits itself to the maintenance of the military capabilities, the supply security of the Bundeswehr, Germany's role as a trusted ally, and the common norms of arms exports control. (Die Bundesregierung, 2016a, p.74; Die Bundesregierung, 2015, pp.1–3)

The common standpoint of the BDI and the BDSV also supports in accordance with the German security policy documents the European defence cooperation and the common harmonisation of the exports licensing practice, which are according to the BDI and the BDSV all prerequisites of a common European security and defence policy. As per the argumentation the German arms exports policy has to be reliable too, so that the German companies could be trustworthy business partners. However, a further restriction of the German arms exports policy can

endanger the European defence cooperation projects. (BDSV, BDI, 2016, pp.6–7) According to Dieter Kempf, president of the BDI, the German regulations render the deliveries even to EU- and NATO-countries more difficult and delayed. (Doll, 2017) Hans Christoph Atzpodien, chief executive of the BDSV reminded that the European governments should clearly support the joint armament programs, including the exports control as well, because the different exports regulations make the cooperation more difficult. According to the BDI, the research and development investment in the arms industry is currently lacking the European political will, too. In the American market the armed forces are buying in such a large quantity, that the prices are getting lower, and due to that it is also cheaper for European armies to purchase American weapons systems. As stated by a leader of the BDI: “sovereignty costs money”. (Doll and Hegmann, 2018) This statement reflects the current situation very well: as long as the European states are not willing to spend more on defence, the rhetorical manifestations remain futile, and the dependence on outer powers (first of all on the United States) is not going to decline.

The European joint projects are of great importance for the European defence industry without doubt. In the sector of the fighter jet planes the joint projects have had an advantage over the exports for years. However, these projects have not always proven to be successful, because their progress has been rendered difficult by the enterprise processes. In the case of the Eurofighter according to an estimation the expenses were by 96% higher, than they would have been if the program had been carried out in a national framework. During the development of the A400M cargo airplane the delays were usual, the budget became persistently exceeded. (Etl, 2017, pp.33–34) Therefore the joint European projects do not always provide a solution for expanding the European defence market. The success of the newly started main battle tank project, the KNDS can not be estimated yet. In the sector of the warships no serious progress has been made, currently the corporate groups of five European nations (the Italian Fincantieri-Cluster, the French Naval, the Dutch Damen-group, the Spanish Navantia and the German Thyssen-Krupp, Lürssen and German Naval Yards) are competing with each other. Concerning the submarines a German-Italian-Norwegian joint project has been launched for the Typ 212 submarines with German leadership, which proves that in this sector the German arms industry is still holding a technological record, and it is able to retain its position by cooperating with European partners. Although in the production of submarines Germany’s supremacy is obvious, the German capabilities are not so prominent in other sectors. The recognition and strengthening of the own national capabilities is a responsibility of the politics, including the support of the exports. Furthermore, it is also a political task to estimate if the arms industry’s goals can be implemented easier on a European level. As stated by the representatives of the defence industry, without political willingness the ‘Europeanisation’ remains an empty word. (Weber, 2018, pp.3–4)

In the transeuropean projects France could be an obvious partner for Germany, as it is going to become the leading military power of the EU if the Brexit really occurs. The major obstacle of the cooperation is that for France the European integration has always meant the preservation of its own status as a Great Power, which was especially true in Charles de Gaulle’s concept and is now in Emmanuelle Macron’s. There is a probability that France would use the defence

cooperations for pursuing its own geostrategical goals, and the German arms industry would be solely a provider of the French ambitions. (Weber, 2018, p.4)⁸

In the European cooperations, such as the Franco-German KNDS, the involved states should establish a common arms exports policy and agree on the exports regulations, as in order to maintain these projects the common products should also be exported due to the still limited European market. (Major, 2017) Although measures have already been taken by the EU regarding the arms exports regulations, the Member States are still acting according to their own security interests. In 2013 the European Council's initiative about the prohibition of arms deliveries to Egypt failed due to the resistance of the United Kingdom, because Egypt was an important business partner of it. Saudi Arabia is also a primary target country for the United Kingdom, even though it is actively taking part in the conflict of Yemen. The arms exports policy of France is determined by its national identity and global ambitions to an even larger extent, which makes the arms exports policy and the moral questions arise only marginally in the political and social discussions. As opposed to this, the arms exports policy of the Netherlands (similarly to that of Germany) is strongly influenced by the pacifism, the political leadership pursues a strict exports control policy, that is actively shaped by the Dutch society and parliament. (Cops and Duquet and Gourdin, 2017, pp.58–59, 62, 65–66)

The arms exports policies of the leading European countries differ greatly from each other, in which the historical background, the national identity, the foreign policy role and the security perception are crucial factors. Therefore a common European arms exports policy is hard to imagine, it would require the establishment of the European Defence Union, that would be able to overwrite national limits as tightest defence integration.

4. Summary

Looking upon the German arms exports policy after 1945 from a historical perspective, it can be noticed that its characteristics and directions have always been constant, the examined five years were no exception, either. At the time of their establishment the new federal governments have generally committed themselves to a strict, reserved and responsible arms exports policy, in this matter there has been a consensus among the political parties and the society alike. However, these commitments remained frequently on a rhetorical level, and in practice the governments pursued a freer, less strict arms exports policy than promised due to the influence of the arms industry and referring to foreign and security policy interests. (Brzoska 2007, p.658) Among the target countries there have always been some, where the political or values system did not correspond with the democratic values and human rights represented by the western countries and Germany (earlier West Germany). The governments frequently tried to hush up the arms exports – like in the case of Israel – (Serr, 2015), but they were not able to avoid the harsh critics of the opposition and the civil society. It demonstrates the all-time dynamics of the German arms exports policy well, that in 1981 the social democrat Helmut Schmidt as chancellor discussed the exports of Leopard tanks and other weapons with the

⁸ About the French strategical ambitions see also Nádudvari 2018, pp.11–12.

foreign minister of Saudi Arabia, but in 2013 he already demanded a reserved arms exports policy. (Spiegel Online, 2013; Der Spiegel, 1981) As written by the German researcher Joachim Krause, in the German arms exports policy there has not been any fundamental paradigm shift. (Krause, 2013)

The system of the German arms exports control can be considered to be strict by international standards. The control is regulated by the Basic Law, two further acts and an ordinance on national level. The transparency is certain, in this respect it is a positive achievement, that thanks to the third Merkel-cabinet beside the annual exports reports semi-annual ones are now also available. As a 'civilian power', Germany has always been an active, cooperative member of the international treaties concerning the restriction of conventional weapons. The legal regulation is supplemented by the Political Guidelines, that can be criticised in more respects, though. First of all, they do not provide a definite guidance for the arms exports licensing: they try to assert the human rights principles and the aspects of the foreign and security policy at the same time, while these are not always compatible with each other in practice. Although according to the Guidelines the arms exports towards third countries are possible only in special situations, they became almost a routine in the past years.

The fundamental characteristics of the arms exports policy have not become different, yet in the recent years changes not seen before occurred. Most importantly, the value of the individual arms exports licences greatly increased, reaching a historical record in 2015-2016. It is a further significant tendency, that the exports outside of the EU- and NATO- (or NATO-equivalent) countries also increased, and among the target countries there are more that are taking part in conflicts or carrying out active arming programs, especially in the Middle East and North Africa, so the arms exports policy loosened compared with the previous years.

According to our analysis this change can be traced back to two factors. On the one hand a change of attitude is noticeable in the foreign policy: Germany's international role and security perception is becoming more determined, and it is making use of the arms exports accordingly more boldly now as a means of foreign and security policy. The strengthening of the allies and regional actors by arms and military equipment is mentioned by the new German official documents as well and implemented by the German policy in practice, too. The arms exports to North African and Middle Eastern states are also part of this concept. The other factor is the role of the defence industry, the production of which is increasing, and the preservation of its competitiveness is an interest not only of the companies but of the German government as well. The German arms industry is in need of exports due to the limited local and European markets. The loosening arms exports policy can therefore be explained from two aspects, that are closely connected with each other, though.

As a solution for replacing the exports, the stimulating of the European defence market by defence integration and European cooperation has been suggested. However, these argumentations leave out of consideration, that these possibilities are limited yet due to the different foreign policy concepts and practices, moreover, they are also difficult to carry out because of the political changes.

The tendency of the loosening German arms exports policy will expectedly continue in the next years. The exports of war weapons will always be without doubt subject to critics from a moral point of view, and it depends on the politics, how the pacifist German society could be persuaded of its expediency.

* * *

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IDENTIFYING THE CHINESE DREAM: XI JINPING AND CHINA'S SOFT POWER

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Abstract: *The concept of the Chinese Dream has become a central principle around which China's foreign policy in general and cultural diplomacy specifically is, in theory, oriented. Drawing upon historical analysis and discourse analysis, this article aims to provide a comprehensive clarification of the Chinese Dream through exploring the content and the mechanism of the Chinese Dream within Xi's foreign policy context. It argues that Xi's Chinese Dream patriotically emphasizes the bond between the development of individuals and the prosperity of the nation, which is based on a traditional collective top-down relationship between the state and the individual. More importantly, by using the word 'rejuvenation', it demonstrates that there is a process of self-acknowledgement and self-awakening based on an understanding of Chinese history and Chinese culture within Xi's Chinese Dream.*

Keywords: *the Chinese Dream; soft power; China's foreign policy*

The Chinese Dream: states of the art of existing literature

Soft power, or "the ability to get what a country wants through attraction and persuasion rather than coercion or payment" is not a new concept in International Relations (Nye, 2004, p.256). It has been widely used for more than twenty years since first coined by Joseph Nye in 1990. Nye's narrative of soft power has captured the imagination of the global distribution of power and provided a significant insight for scholars of International Relations (IR). According to Nye, wielding soft power, which "involves framing the agenda, persuasion, and positive attraction" would possibly contribute to a friendlier cooperative relationship between countries (Nye, 2011, p.19). Nevertheless, while the concepts and mechanisms of soft power remain contested in the context of the ongoing transformations of international society, this idea will continue to "play a crucial role in influencing the outcomes of inter-state relationships, as the use of hard power by state actors has been increasingly reduced" (Gallarotti, 2011, p.26).

Nye's initial theoretical framework of soft power was developed in the context of America's foreign diplomacy. However, it is noticeable that soft power has become a buzzword within

Chinese official and academic circles in particular over the past decade. Despite having been mentioned by Chinese leaders several times in speeches and interviews, it was in the 17th Central Committee of the Communist Party of China National Congress where the concept of soft power was first launched officially in October 2007. In president Hu's work-report delivered at the Congress, he addressed that, "China must enhance the country's cultural soft power" in his work-report. (Hu, 2007, p.17) Likewise, Xi Jinping also emphasized again that "enhancing China's soft power matters the achievement of the Two 100 Years goal as well as the Chinese Dream"¹ in a speech at an internal CCP conference in 2013 (Two 100 Years: the goal of becoming a "moderately well-off society" by 2020, the Party's centennial, and the goal of China becoming a fully developed nation by 2049, the PRC's centennial). The term 'soft power' has received increasing attention within the Chinese political and academic spheres since it was first introduced to China.

Since that statement in 2007, the term 'soft power' has received increasing attention within the Chinese political and academic spheres (Men, 2007; Yu, 2008; Zhao, 2012; Yan, 2014). Chinese academics have repeatedly emphasized the important role that soft power could play in promoting a more favorable image of China abroad and thus, enhancing the external legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). Yu Xintian, director emeritus of the Shanghai Institute of International Studies (SIIS), points out that "the more fashionable the ideology is, the more people will accept it and the greater the possibility to build the country's soft power" (Yu, 2008, p.57). As one of the members of a Chinese think tank, Wang Huning states that, "if a country has an admirable culture and ideological system, other countries will tend to follow it... It does not have to use its hard power which is expensive and less efficient." (Wang, 1993, p.11) In other words, the Chinese officials have welcomed Nye's appeal of the important transition of power from 'hard' to 'soft'. Having realized the importance of soft power in international society and China's weakness in its use, the CCP demonstrated its ambition in enhancing China's soft power by first putting it into the national agenda.

The Chinese Dream was first proposed in Xi's visit to the National History Museum in Beijing in November of 2012. Since then, considerable efforts have been made to publicize China's new thoughts about world affairs centered on the idea of the Chinese Dream. The phrase "Chinese Dream" has been frequently emphasized in the speeches and documents of policymakers and leadership. Between 2012 and 2016, Xi has mentioned the Chinese Dream discourse in more than 15 important speeches and documents, both inside of the party and abroad. A great deal of attention has been drawn to the Chinese Dream, particularly within International Relations academia (Mohanty, 2013; Link, 2015; Liu, 2015; Zhao and Gan, 2015; Kerr, 2015; Barr, 2015; Callahan, 2017; Ho, 2018). It has also captured much attention particularly among Chinese academic literature. According to the CNKI, a Chinese mainstream academic research database, within the four years between 2012 and 2016, more than 66,000

¹ Xinhua, 2013. Xi appealed to enhance China's cultural soft power [online] Available at: <http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2013-12/31/c_118788013.htm> [Accessed on 17 October 2017]

articles with the key words “the Chinese Dream” (Zhong Guo Meng) in their titles had been published within Chinese academics.²

Zhao and Gao examine how the system of Chinese diplomacy has changed within Xi’s Chinese Dream era since the 18th CPC National Congress within Xi’s Chinese Dream era by looking into Xi’s key statements and strategic ideas. They argue that there have been three major changes to China’s diplomatic system since the 18th CPC National Congress: top-level design, strategic coordination and multi-dimensional diplomacy (Zhao and Gao, 2015, p.43). Deng explores China’s economic rejuvenation and its consequences by focusing on China’s long path towards modern growth and development (Deng, 2015). Kerr explores China’s development of a modern civil society in terms of internal and international dynamics and their consequences. He argues that the Chinese state’s unwillingness to share political and legal authority with a civil society is the largest single barrier to achieving the goal of good governance on which the goal of national rejuvenation will depend (Kerr, 2015, p.5).

Zheng compared China with three neighbouring countries Japan, Russia and India. He looked at the systems of performance assessment, which cover the areas of government effectiveness, economic confidence, foreign direct investment confidence, intentional homicide, gender gap, international tourism, and global competitiveness, therefore exploring the dynamic of the Chinese Dream and national identity (2013). Furthermore, assessment is another focus of relevant Chinese Dream studies: some researchers argue that slogans like the Chinese Dream can be problematic as they don’t resonate with the broader public (Servaes, 2016; Callahan, 2017). Barr argues that there is little prospect of bringing back traditional Chinese values as a living force given that China’s people are now part of the modern world, and therefore the promotion of Chinese traditional values is more to do with managing the manifold problems and dislocations of Chinese modernity (Barr, 2015, p.7). More recently, Ho examines how music and songs can be instruments of power and dreams in their own rights, stating how the Chinese Dream has been reflected in music education in China (Ho, 2018).

The idea of the Chinese Dream is not something new, as Wang pointed out; it is like old wine in a new bottle.³ However, a historical approach based on a comprehensive understanding of traditional Chinese values is often under-appreciated in existing literature. Early classic schools of thought made various interpretations surrounding this notion within different periods and circumstances throughout Chinese history. Since the Chinese Dream is perceived as being a manifestation of Chinese soft power across the globe within Xi’s presidency, it is essential to identify the key content and mechanism of this overarching foreign policy guidance. Drawing upon historical analysis and discourse analysis, this article contributes to existing studies by providing a historical analysis of the Chinese Dream regarding the content and the mechanism within Xi’s foreign policy context.

² CNKI official website [online] Available at: <http://kns.cnki.net/kns/brief/default_result.aspx> [Accessed on 17 October 2017]

³ Zheng W., 2013. The Chinese Dream from Mao to Xi. *The Diplomat* [online] Available at: <<https://thediplomat.com/2013/09/the-chinese-dream-from-mao-to-xi>> [Accessed on 28 October 2017]

The seeds of the Chinese Dream: the content and the mechanism

The content of the Chinese Dream: Commonwealth of Great Unity

After the establishment of the Qin dynasty in 221BC, China became one of the most economically and culturally prosperous feudal countries in the world. The views of Confucianism, Daoism and Legalism had a dominating influence on the feudal system of a decentralized social structure. For example, Taoism is known for the intriguing prose depiction of a place called Peach Blossom Spring, hidden from the outside world (Taoyuanming, 421). In the description of this utopian society, people lead an ideal existence in harmony with nature on a peaceful land, an ideal society without exploitation, oppression or wars. As the most influential traditional Chinese political schools of thought, Confucians envisage the ideal status of Chinese society as Great Harmony of the World or Commonwealth of Great Unity (Tianxia Datong); this is an economically strong, culturally attractive, and harmonious society worthy of neighboring states emulating its culture and values. This ideal society was clearly explained in the book Liji-Liyun at the end of the Warring and States period.

大道之行也，天下为公。选贤与能，讲信修睦。故人不独亲其亲，不独子其子，使老有所终，壮有所用，幼有所长，矜寡孤独废疾者，皆有所养。男有分，女有归。货恶其弃于地也，不必藏于己；力恶其不出于身也，不必为己。是故谋闭而不兴，盗窃乱贼而不作。故外户而不闭，是谓大同。

While the perfect order called the Great Dao prevails, the world belongs to the public. Virtuous and worthy people should be elected to public office while capable people hold posts and contributing employment in the society. Integrity and trust should be highly valued by the society, which contribute to social peace and harmony. Therefore, everyone loves and respects his or her own parents and children, as well as the parents and children of others. There are caring and protection for the old until their last days; there is appropriate employment for the able-bodied; and there are nourishment and education for the children and youth. There is kindness and sympathy for the widows and widowers, for the orphans, for the childless and for all who find themselves alone in the world, as well as for the disabled and sick. Every man/woman has an appropriate role to play in the family and society. Although nobody likes to see natural resources and wealth wasted on the land (people don't like wealth to be wasted), no one necessarily needs to keep them for oneself. Although nobody likes wealth, which is not the creation of one's own labour (all people want to make a contribution), no one does things just to benefit oneself. A devotion to public service leaves no room for idleness; intrigues and connivances for ill gain are unknown. Villains such as thieves, robbers, rogues and rebels no more exist. The door of every house needs not to be locked and bolted during day and night.

This narrative of an ideal society may be interpreted as a form of utopianism. However, the idea of Datong that represents the spiritual aspiration of Chinese people has brought historical significance to the development of how China conceives the ideal status of itself. More broadly, classical Chinese philosophy, particularly Confucianism, has set a solid foundation for the further development of political values and thoughts (Fang, 2011). This can be seen from the subsequent social mainstream ideologies from throughout the history of Chinese civilization.

In brief, the ancient interpretation regarding the Chinese Dream can be seen as an ideal status of Chinese society.

The mechanism of the Chinese Dream: the relationship between the state and the society

Since the Chinese Dream is such a cultural discourse, which has been deeply rooted into Chinese history and Chinese identity, observers who know little about this cultural background or do not necessarily link the historical paths with current affairs might be confronted by misunderstandings. How do we understand Chinese Dream discourse in a cultural context? How have China's self-perception as great power and its changing role within the international system, at a broad level, interacted with domestic and foreign audiences? In order to reveal these questions, we firstly need to understand the dynamics between the state and the society in China. From the perspective of the Chinese ruling class, most of the regimes got strong influence from Confucianism doctrine, which offers a type of moral guide and prescription, including hierarchy, group orientation, and respect for age and tradition. Confucians' principles regarding morality and ethics, with 'goodness' as the core and 'rites' as the norm, served as the dominant traditional Chinese political school of thought. Like Sin argued in his book, "early Confucians not only stressed the importance of strong families for strong government but also advocated a patriarchal theory of government" (Sin, 2011, p.109). In fact, with the influence of Confucianism, the relationship between the ruling class and the common people in China is understood as a paternalistic relationship.

Therefore, as it is in a family, both the rulers and the common people should follow a paternalistic hierarchical model, with the government as the authority on one side and the people as the acquiescence on the other. This could be seen from the term Xi Dada (Uncle Xi), which refers to the fifth generation of Chinese leadership Xi Jinping. This term is used in Xi's hometown to show respect and admiration for a male, especially a father on an uncle, who plays a supportive and important role in a family. In this case, the president is not just a leader of the country or a party, but more like an important family member who is obligated to support and take care of the whole family. Simply put, the Chinese leadership must adopt the role of protector or guardian as a spiritual symbol of the civilization due to thousands of years of Feudal heritage. "A ruler had absolute authority over his subjects but was morally bound to treat them properly. If he did not, they could flee or rebel, and the ruler might lose his 'heavenly mandate' to rule" (Link, 2015, p.25).

Another factor that we need to understand is that unity has always been the most important political priority in Chinese history, both for the state and the society (Bislev and Li, 2014). China has had a single writing system since the beginning of Chinese literacy, a single dominant language for a long time, and substantial cultural unity for 2,000 years." There is a strong demand from the society for a powerful government that can unite the people together and bring prosperity to the society. Throughout ancient Chinese history the people have suffered from natural disasters and border invasions. A powerful regime wins people's hearts through demonstrating their ability to solve problems that are of the biggest concern to society, such as food, health and education. History suggests that Chinese people require a strong government

led by a strong leader. The Great Wall is more than just a cultural relic that has played a spiritual role for the Chinese people, but has also helped defend the country. Similarly, The Grand Canal reminds Chinese descendants of how important a powerful government and unity meant to this nation. The rich history of more than two thousand years makes the Chinese people believe that a powerful centralized government has great potential for making a huge country with a considerable population prosperous. Nowadays, large scale projects like the Three Gorges Dam, the Qinghai-Tibet Railway and the proposal of One Road One Belt have played the same role in the continuation of this tradition between the government and the society.

More importantly, the suffering that China has faced over the prolonged period of wars and chaos that lasted more than one hundred years (One Century Humiliation or Hundred Year Humiliation of the Chinese Nation, Bainian Guochi) has made Chinese society desire a peaceful environment to live in more than anything else. This history is not just told by the media or the government, but also through the experiences and stories told by the older generations who are the most respected in a family. People are convinced that wars and infighting within the country would only lead to a poor and backward Chinese nation. Furthermore, “there is often genuine concern, based upon recent historical memory with colonialism and imperialism, that opening up China to interference by foreigners will open a Pandora’s box, with China plunging into civil war, poverty and chaos” (Bell, 2009, p.21). In this case, national stability is the highest priority in terms of policy-making. This means that people would give way or sacrifice other interests if it contradicts with the wider picture, such as factors deemed potentially hazardous against the unity of the country and society.

In brief, the ancient interpretation regarding the Chinese Dream can be seen as an ideal status of the society. With the influence of Confucianism, the relationship between the ruling class and the common people in China is understood as a paternalistic relationship. Unity is a consensus between both the government and the society that functioning as a cornerstone for understanding the Chinese Dream discourse.

Modern interpretations of the Chinese Dream

With the beginning of the First Opium war in 1840, the Chinese social system gradually became a semi-colonial and semi-feudal social structure, which led to dramatic social and ideological transforms. As noted in last section, the Chinese dream symbolizes the goal of achieving an ideal status within Chinese society. Over the past one hundred years of contemporary Chinese history, there have been a few outstanding modernizers, such as Kang Youwei and Sun Yat-sen, who proposed their own conceptions and designs for future of the Chinese nation regarding the Chinese Dream.

In Kang’s best-known book, *The Book of Great Harmony* (Datongshu, officially published in 1919), Confucianism’s Datong society has been adopted as a prototype for the state, as well as modified for contemporary China. Kang described an ideal Chinese nation, Datong as a utopian future world, economically based on a public ownership system and democratically ruled by a central government. Although adopting an unaggressive internal reforming approach to achieve

this ideal Chinese dream has proved his conception to be a fantasy, Kang's political view of a Chinese dream Datong played an important role in promoting Chinese traditional political heritage and influencing the perception of the Chinese dream from the society. Furthermore, the slogan Revitalization of China (ZhenXing ZhongHua) was first proposed when Sun Yat-sen formed a small bourgeois revolutionary organization in Honolulu, called the Xingzhonghui (Society for China's Regeneration) in 1884. Sun's conception of a Chinese dream can also be reflected from the proposal of Three Principles (Sanmin Zhuyi). As the continuation of Confucianism, Sun combined both Western and traditional Chinese political values into his blueprint for future of the Chinese nation. He stated that the foremost goal of the Chinese nation at that time was to oppose imperialist aggression against China in order to gain state independence and sovereignty. He also called for protecting and saving people from the backward governance of the feudal Qing regime, and suggested this could be achieved through adopting western economic and political systems.

However, with the failure of their bourgeois revolutions, neither Kang nor Sun's strategies led China to the ideal destination depicted in their conceptions. During the New Democratic Revolution Period (1919-1949), when the CCP gradually became a dominant party in China, the realization of socialism and communism had become the focus of political agenda. Under Mao's leadership, Chinese national history, especially the national humiliation narrative, was not particularly addressed as a major ideological tool or source of legitimacy. Instead, Mao used the class struggle theory to explain the Chinese revolution, the foreign imperialism, and the civil wars (Wang, 2013). Influenced by Marxism and Leninism, Mao announced that the goal for the Chinese nation in this period was to be independent against internal feudalism, as well as external imperialism and capitalism through political revolutions. Economically, Four Modernisation (Sige Xiandaihua) was also set forth to strengthen China's economic power in the areas of agriculture, industry, national defense and finally science and technology. Mao also put forward ten Five-year Plan (Wunianjihua) which aimed to boost a backward China to a highly industrialized modern socialist country in the beginning of the 21st century. The outcome of the Chinese dream under the first generation of Chinese leadership has constructively pointed out the direction of China's future. By setting Invigoration of China (ZhenXing ZhongHua) as the slogan orienting the development of China, the second generation of Chinese leadership switched the priority of development from political to economic. Noticeably, socialism with Chinese characteristics has become a popular term, which targeted the legitimization of the CCP to modify and develop Marxism according to the domestic and international situation. As a result, Four Modernisation was formally enacted during the Reform and Opening policy, which dramatically boosted China's economy.

In contrast with the first generation, the second generation has paid much attention to absorbing ideas from classic Chinese political values. Inheriting the legacy of traditional Confucianism and contemporary modernizers, Deng stated that the goal for the Chinese nation was to achieve a Xiaokang Society (XiaoKang SheHui, a moderately prosperous society) at the end of 20th century and become a moderately developed country. Originally from Confucianism the book named Liji, Xiaokang refers to a lower developing stage of the ideal Datong status, as mentioned in previous paragraphs. It can be loosely understood as a "well-off society" in which

most people are able to live a comfortable life. Different from the first generation of Chinese leadership, Deng went back to traditional Chinese political classics to design and legitimize the vision for the future of China. Consequently, it has influenced the development of ideological guidance within the later generations of leadership to a great extent.

Under the third generation of Chinese leadership, the Great Rejuvenation of the Chinese Nation was first proposed as a continuation of the Invigoration of China narrative in Jiang Zemin's 2001 and 2002 speeches. Jiang also stated that the CCP should be representatives of the advanced social productive forces, the advanced culture, and the interests of the overwhelming majority, which are called the Three represents (Sange daibiao). It sought to make the CCP more representative of Chinese society at large. "Unlike his predecessor's campaign, Jiang's narrative focused on Western powers as the source of China's backwardness and suffering" (Wang, 2013). Rather than the attainment of economic development, the legacy of the fourth generation of Chinese leadership is Harmonious Society (Hexie Shehui), which also dates back to the Confucius classics. The concept of harmony came from Confucians' understanding of music, which is powerful in creating balance within nature, individuals and society as a whole. Given the increasing number of serious uncertain factors, this proposal is also viewed as a response to balancing social problems such as the wealth gap, social injustice and environmental pollution after the dramatic increase in China's economy. "He (refers to Hujintao) would be inclined towards a more humanistic centralism and would help alleviate some of the tensions that had risen during Jiang's tenure... It would be the role of the populist Hu to salve the wounds, to rebuild China's welfare system and where possible, promote social justice" (Mahoney, 2013, pp.22–24).

In sum, it can be concluded that early political schools of thought and the historical path of contemporary China have left a rich legacy that has influenced the design processes of the Chinese Dream for the contemporary generations of Chinese leadership. In the contemporary context, the Chinese Dream focuses on improving the lives of common people through state's prosperity and building up people's confidence in the Chinese nation.

Identifying Xi's Chinese Dream

In Xi's 8 minutes speech at the National History Museum, he clearly stated that the greatest Chinese Dream of Chinese people in the modern day is to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation, which has been a long-cherished dream for many Chinese generations. In the long run, the core of the Chinese Dream is to achieve the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation. In order to achieve the Chinese Dream, the CCP made two milestone goals for the Chinese dream – a "double anniversary" (Two 100 years). According to statements from Chinese officials, the key idea of the Chinese Dream is to achieve the great rejuvenation of Chinese nation by accomplishing the 'Double Anniversary' goals. More specifically, the short-term goal of the Chinese Dream is to build a moderately prosperous society in all respects by 2021, while in the long run it is to build a strong, civilized and harmonious modern socialist country by 2049. Put simply, the main content of the Chinese Dream is to build a moderately prosperous society and eventually accomplish the national rejuvenation.

Since the “socialism with Chinese characteristics” was first noted by Deng Xiaoping, the term has been constantly adopted and addressed in the CCP’s political guiding principle. However, its complex content didn’t make it a popular and well-known phrase. Unlike the complex political concepts and terms, which highlight the party doctrines or theoretical principles, Xi’s Chinese Dream has chosen a pragmatic approach. By being associated with factors contributing to wellbeing, such as better jobs, better education, better life etc., Xi’s Chinese Dream carries more positivity and simplicity, making it relatable and easier to understand for most Chinese people. In his speech at the 2015 Global Poverty Reduction and Development Forum, Xi stated, “to build a moderately prosperous society, to achieve Chinese Dream, is to improve people’s wellbeing.” Another example is the release of “The Chinese Dream-365 Stories” into the global market. “The Chinese Dream-365 Stories” is a 100 episode documentary series created in Beijing. It captures how common people of different professions are chasing their dreams in their own modest ways. There are also a number of events and stories relating to the Chinese Dream that focus on similar themes, which is the lives and wellbeing of ordinary people. From the very start, Xi has put emphasis on paying attention to people’s concrete day-to-day problems, such as jobs, housing, education and healthcare (Mohanty, 2013, p.38). Consistent with Xi’s pragmatic diplomatic style, the Chinese Dream focuses on concepts like better lives and better futures, which makes it more positive and much easier for the whole society to understand and relate to.

Another core feature of Xi’s Chinese Dream is that it patriotically emphasizes the bonds between the development of every individual and the prosperity of the nation. There is an old saying in Chinese culture that originated from the book *The Spring and Autumn Annals* (an ancient Chinese chronicle that covers a 241-year period from 722 to 481 BC), which is “TianXia XingWang, PiFu YouZe”. It can be translated as: the rise and fall of a nation rests with every one of its people. This saying implies that it is the duty of every citizen to ensure the prosperity and security of the motherland. In 2016, the Chinese Ministry of Education released a policy for the implementation of patriotism in education. At the end of this policy, it states that in order to enhance the promotion of the Chinese Dream abroad, a three-dimensional network of “the motherland, the embassies and consulates- international students societies – the individual students studying abroad” should be built at home and abroad”. This again proves that Xi’s Chinese Dream is derived from Confucian’s paternalistic top-down relationship between the government and the society. It also echoed with the consensus that unity is privileged in this relationship, as was argued before.

At Xi’s Chinese Dream speech, he highlighted the core feature of this notion by stating that, “History tells us, the destiny of every individual is closely connected to the destiny of the country and of the nation. Only when the country is doing well, and the nation is doing well, can every individual do well...it requires every generation of people to strive hard to achieve this great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation” (Xi, 2013). In one of Xi’s letters to the students from Beijing University in 2013, he replied that, “the Chinese Dream is a dream of a country, a dream of a nation, as well as a dream for every Chinese including the young people. Only when a person integrates his/her own dream into the whole dream of the nation, can he/she accomplish great things eventually”. It can be seen that Xi’s Chinese Dream ties the

government and society by highlighting the important connection between the prosperity of the nation and the wellbeing for the people.

The promotion of the Chinese dream as a continuation demonstrates the consistency of the CCP's administrative strategy. However, there is a slight modification that distinguishes the Chinese Dream from the previous political slogans. The concept of the Chinese dream repositions China's identity in international society by using the word 'rejuvenation', which is deeply rooted in Chinese history and Chinese culture. As Wang pointed out, "the use of that word underscores an important point: the Chinese view their fortunes as a return to greatness and not a rise from nothing." Early cultural exchanges show that China was a prosperous country during the Han, Tang and Early Qing dynasties, both culturally and economically. However, from the beginning of the First Opium War in 1840 to the end of the Sino-Japanese War in 1945, China had experienced one hundred years of foreign invasions, extreme poverty and a dramatic decline in both economics and culture. Given the previous influence that China had achieved in ancient times, this period of time in modern history is also called the hundred-year humiliation of the Chinese nation (Bainian Guochi), which is a key element within Chinese national identity.

This memory has been passed down through the generations as part of Chinese history. "There are textbooks, novels, museums, songs, and parks devoted to commemorating national humiliation" (Callahan, 2004, p.199). More importantly, young generation not only learn it from history classes, museums or other forms of patriotic education, but also from their older family members' personal experiences, pictures and their childhood memories. "For the Chinese themselves, historical memory of past humiliation is not just a psychological issue, or something only related to perception and attitude. It is a key element of constructing the Chinese national identity... After suffering a humiliating decline in national strength and status, the Chinese people are unwavering in their commitment to return China to its natural state of glory, thereby achieving the Chinese Dream" (Wang, 2013. p.4).

Simply put, the consensus of Chinese history shared within Chinese people plays an essential role in understanding the meaning of rejuvenation in the process of shaping Chinese identity. The more than two thousand years of history is the backbone of the Chinese identity, bonding bonds every Chinese person together in clarifying who the Chinese people were in the past, who Chinese are now and who they will be in the future. For example, "contrary to how the recent Chinese actions in e.g. the South China Sea and in relation to the Diaoyu/Senkaku Islands dispute in the East China Sea are seen as aggressive by many Western observers, the Chinese leaders thus present these as reactive or defensive ways to try to protect territory that, based on history, are rightfully Chinese." (Sørensen, 2015, p.62) Actually, the consensus that Diaoyu Island has been China's territory since ancient times has been deeply rooted in Chinese people's wider context of China's long history. This voice is not just from the government, but also from the society. There has been dissatisfaction and criticism from the public towards the government for being too soft on a number of international affairs and diplomatic conflicts since the 1990s. That could explain why Chinese ambassador Liu's high-profile criticism of Japan in a BBC interview in 2014 was seen as very successful in Beijing.

Therefore, ‘rejuvenation’ does not simply mean becoming a rising power in the international system, but a process of self-acknowledgement and a self-awakening of its past achievements and failures, based on the understanding of Chinese history and Chinese culture; this is also not purely global, but individualistic with people’s aspirations and expectations for the future of China taken into consideration. Rejuvenation reminds Chinese people that the final goal of the Chinese dream is to revive the country in every aspect, bringing back the prosperous state that China used to be in ancient times. As Ding and Saunders stated, “for much of its history, China was the strongest country in the world—not only in the economic and military terms, but also in the cultural sphere” (2006, p.13). “The Chinese Dream is an attempt to restore China’s ideational greatness while not losing the material gains of the past 35 year (Barr, 2015, p.191). The purpose of Xi’s Chinese Dream is not to make it better from nothing, but to be as strong as it used to be in the past, both economically and culturally. As Sørensen noted, “the ‘Chinese Dream’ is thus not only the narrow, aggressive and anti-foreign version that hinges on the ‘century of humiliation’ discourse. Rather than on foreign invasion and exploitation, focus is on the positive elements and strengths in Chinese history and in Chinese ancient civilization with strong calls to revive and be proud of Chinese cultural values, strengths and achievements” (2015, p.64). It encourages Chinese people to have faith in the CCP and their approach, to have confidence in Chinese traditional culture and values, and to have determination in the Chinese nation on its way to rejuvenation.

To conclude, consistent with Xi’s pragmatic diplomatic style, the Chinese Dream patriotically emphasizes the bonds between the development of every individual and the prosperity of the nation, which is based on a traditional collective top-down relationship between the state and the individual. More importantly, by using the word ‘rejuvenation’, it demonstrates that there is a process of self-acknowledgement and self-awakening based on an understanding of Chinese history and Chinese culture within Xi’s Chinese Dream.

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**THE RIDDLES OF CITIZENSHIP: UNDERSTANDING THE
NATIONAL REGISTRAR OF CITIZENS (NRC) IN INDIA:
A THESIS WITHOUT A SYNTHESIS?**

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Abstract: *Amidst massive controversy and long debates under the orders of the Supreme Court of India, the publication of the final list of the updated National Register of Citizens (NRC) of the border state of Assam has been proved to be an important milestone in dealing with the influx of illegal migrants from Bangladesh into Indian territory. Even though the Supreme Court in its order of 2014 had instructed the Government of India to have discussions with Bangladesh on the deportation of illegal Bangladeshis, nothing has developed on the ground as New Delhi is unenthusiastic to lift this complicated issue lest it jeopardises its relations with Dhaka. There is no denying the fact that an undercurrent of tension exists in Assam's society between Assamese and non-Assamese people. This is indeed linked to the anti-Bangladeshi/Bengali movement in the 1970s and 1980s. All these issues have serious socio-economic concerns like confiscation of lands and jobs by the 'outsiders'.*

The North-Eastern region is a true frontier and diverse region of India. It has over 2000 kilometre of border with Bhutan, China, Myanmar and Bangladesh and is connected to the rest of India by a narrow 20 kilometre wide corridor of land. Ecologically this region is somewhat unique in comparison to other parts of India. The North-East India with over 220 ethnic groups and tribes as well as equal number of dialects makes it a hugely diverse region. All these people have their unique style of living. They have different types of settlements, different livelihood patterns, different systems of social structures, life-cycle patterns, and different systems of social control, different regions and ethics. (Barjapuri, 1998, p.30) Eight states constitute India's north east: Assam, Nagaland, Mizoram, Manipur, Tripura, Meghalaya, Arunachal Pradesh and Sikkim. The region is officially recognized as a special region of India. The North East Council (NEC) was constituted in 1971 for the development of North-East India in the Economic and social sense. The North Eastern Development Finance Corporation Ltd (NEDFC) was incorporated in Aug 9, 1995 and the Ministry of Development of North-East Region (DONER) was set up in the year 2001 for the progress and development of the entire region. Illegal migration has been a burning problem in the Indian state of Assam. (Baruah, 1986, p.1187) Assam shares nearly 272 km-long border with Bangladesh. The north-eastern

state has 95-km long 'river border' with Bangladesh and it is this area which is at the core of illegal infiltration. Right from the British period numbers of land hungry people entered into Assam from eastern part of Bengal and settled there as illegal immigrants. It agitates the minds of the people of North-East region and the situation becomes so much serious that it creates a feeling of fear psychosis in the minds of every indigenous people. After the partition of India in 1947, the immigrants from erstwhile East Bengal, who in the preceding decades came to Assam in large numbers, became illegal immigrants as their migration continued unabated (Sharma, 2012). In the post partition period, when East Bengal (highly Muslim dominated) and Shyllet district of Assam became part of Pakistan, a large number of Hindu entered into India.

After the independence of India, several insurgent groups emerged in the North-East which resulted in the forcible inclusion of North-Eastern States within India at the time when a few insurgent groups of other North-Eastern States demanded separate statehood, a larger Assamese population demanded the deportation of foreign nationals from the state. Since 1979, the Assam movement started by two political organization namely, All Assam Students Union (AASU) and All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP). In this period, the emergence of pressure groups in Assam and North-Eastern States created pressure upon the Government and other political parties of those respective states. (Mahanta, 1982, p.262) Immigration has been a matter of concern in the politics of Assam.. Immigration problem has been viewed more of a "Security Threat" as it created problem not only for personal security and human rights issues but also created internal and international security problem. Illegal im9gratin had caused severe psychological pressure on the Assamese people who apprehended to become a minority in their own land. It also created enough disturbances in the social, economic and political affairs of the state since the question of communalism arrived at a point of extreme tension between the Hindu and Muslim migrants in the state. The indigenous Assamese people found their identity in jeopardised condition when they found that the Bangladeshi migrants reached in a position to influence the results of the elections in a large number of constituencies in the North East, partly encroaching land and resources of the land. (Baruah, 1986, p.1189) Side by side the gradual infiltration of the illegal Bangladeshi migrants already posed serious threat to question of national security because the strategic position of Assam has tremendous importance to the ultra-radical groups working in the north-eastern borders of India. It was apprehended that the process illegal migrants to Assam as well as in other states of northeast India would encourage other forces like China and Pakistan to interfere in this region because it has already been noticed that the militant radical groups in the northeast were being fed by the anti-India forces to create internal political turmoil in that area.

Sixty seven years ago, in 1951, Assam became the only State India to get a National Register of Citizens (NRC). Prior to that the Nehru Liaquat Pact of 1950 declared that the people who left Assam after partition would be taken back in the state and the immovable property of a migrant shall not be disturbed and the same will be restored to him. This pact encouraged almost all the displace people to come back in Assam and it had changed the demographic profile of the state. The pact set a time limit of two ears for the displaced persons to return to the state, however, in between the first NRC process was completed in Assam. The NRC was retained all over the country on the basis of the census of 1951 but it was incomplete in the sense that

neither it covered all the places, nor did it count those natives who fled Assam in the wake of the communal disturbances following the years after partition. So when good number of people came back to the state after the Nehru-Liaquat was signed, their names got dropped out from the NRC list of 1951 and it became too difficult to identify the actual citizens and the non-citizens. The influx of people of East Pakistan continued to grow throughout the years and the indigenous people of Assam took it as a prime threat to their safety and security. In 1970s Assam witnessed violent upsurges on the issue of deporting illegal migrants from the state. The matter became more critical when the radical organizations those who were fighting long for the cause of sub nationalism in the north-eastern part of India, joined hands with the local pressure groups on the issue of illegal migration from Bangladesh.

All what they wanted an up gradation of the NRC to identity the citizens and the foreigners in the state. According to the United Nations Human Commissioner for Refugees, somewhere between 7.5 and 8.5 million⁴⁹ people crossed into the Indian side of the border. Many among them sought shelter in Assam. After the end of the war and the liberation of Bangladesh in 1971, a process to repatriate the refugees began. In 1972, an agreement between India's Prime Minister Indira Gandhi and the President of Bangladesh, Sheikh Mujibur Rahman, the two countries decided that those who crossed the border before 1971 were not Bangladeshi citizens. In the 1980s, local pressure groups like the All Assam Students Union (AASU) and All Assam Gana Sangram Parishad (AAGSP) jointly propped the central government that they would consider accepting the entrants coming between 1951 and 1961 if the Government agreed to deport those who migrated between 1961 and 1971. In order to resolve the problem the whole issue was referred to the NRC and the saga of the protest from the people of Assam resulted in the signing of the Assam Accord – an agreement: which had been reached in course of prolonged negotiations and exchange. The accord proposed that all those foreigners who had entered Assam between 1951 and 1961 were to be given full citizenship, including the right to vote. Those who had done so after 1971 were to be deported; the entrants between 1961 and 1971 were to be denied voting rights for ten years but would enjoy all other rights of citizenship. As per the Accord, all those who entered the state before 1966 would be regularized. Those who entered between 1966 and 1971 – the time when migrations from East Pakistan intensified during the Mukti Bahini liberation struggle against the Pakistani state – would be deleted from the electoral rolls and lose their voting rights for 10 years. And finally, those who entered on or after March 24, 1971, would be considered foreigners and deported. (Chakraborty, 2018) The central government also declared to provide 'legislative and administrative safeguards to protect the cultural, social, and linguistic identity and heritage' of the Assamese people. Though the accord brought an end to the agitation, some of the key clauses are yet to be implemented, which has kept some of the issues festering. The ruling Congress government of the time – in an effort to appear pro-Muslim migrant – had, in 1983, enacted the Illegal Migrants (Determination by Tribunal) Act (IMDT Act). According to it, no one could be effectively deported even after they were detected as being foreigners. Even though the Assam Accord of 1985 was enacted two years after the IMDT Act and allowed the police the freedom to search, seize and arrest, it was never implemented in spirit. The result was that while over 300,000 migrants were deported from Assam between 1962-84, in the decade post-1983, a mere 1500 were deported (Jain, 2018).

After long interval, at midnight of December 31, 2017, Assam published the first draft of an updated NRC. Although the cut-off date is the midnight of 24 March 1971, there are individuals, whose names are not in the final draft list, who claim that their ancestors came to Assam in the 1800s. There are also many whose names are not in the draft list but their ancestors' names are there in the 1951 NRC. The situation got more critical when it was found that most of the people whose names were not the list are poor working class people either Bengali Hindus or Bengali Muslims. The poor and less-privileged became the highly affected in this bureaucratic citizenry chaos. Though the central government assured that the people whose names are not in the final list, will get an opportunity to approach the Foreigners Tribunal, there is an apprehension among civil liberty groups that the process of updating NRC may not be fair and would result in non-inclusion of the Muslim minorities and Hindu Bengalis who are often suspected to be illegal citizens. This apprehension looked more feasible particularly because of the fact that the Hindu Nationalist political parties had started already started pushing for the passing of the Citizenship (Amendment) Bill, 2016, which seeks to grant citizenship to Hindu Bangladeshis and other non-Muslim minorities from Bangladesh, Pakistan and Afghanistan. The NRC debate in fact boosted up communal undercurrents encompassing the dangers of a majoritarian notion of citizenship and put forward the paradox of constructing citizenship on the contested terrain of bureaucratic documents – an instrument of coercion and exclusion used in this case to make millions provisionally stateless particularly when numerous errors in data entry have led the state to view its own documents with deep cynicism. Given that Assam is the gateway to the Northeast and can be a veritable connectivity hub for India's Act East policy towards building linkages with Southeast Asia, the subsequent shifts in Assamese identity from 'language/ethnicity to 'religion 'has opened the Pandora's box especially when the safety and security have already been threatened over the borders in South and South East Asia.

In the last decade India and Bangladesh have reached a steady bilateral relationship after many decades of diplomatic ups and downs. . On a positive note cross-border terrorism has been reduced and the separatist leaders from India's northeast have been kicked away by Bangladeshi agencies at a great extent. Bangladeshi journalist and political commentator Saleem Samad believed that, Prime Minister Sheikh Hasina is committed to making Bangladesh free from cross-border terrorism. Because of Dhaka's relentless crackdown on terrorism, the North-eastern militants have fled the country. Many of the separatist leaders were pushed back into India. Samad, however, admitted that the recent rise of Islamist extremism has been posing a serious threat to his Muslim majority country along with its neighbouring Indian states like West Bengal, Assam and Tripura. Citing how a network of Jamaat-ul-Mujahideen Bangladesh was busted in West Bengal few years ago, Samad urged the North-eastern region to remain alert about jihadi elements after the ongoing crackdown on Islamist forces. Thousands of Bangladeshi youths had joined various militia groups in Syria, Iraq, Chechnya, Indonesia, Philippines, Afghanistan, and Pakistan to fight alongside the jihadist there. (For a greater understanding: Nava Thakuria, October 15, 2018, The Statesman, retrieved on 31 October 2018)

The supporters of NRC especially the Hindu political forces in India banked on the security issue to validate their claims on the importance of NRC. Relating the security crisis in Assam

with the illegal Bengali Muslim immigrants, Indian Army Chief General Bipin Rawat said: “I think the proxy game is very well played by our Western neighbour (Pakistan), supported by our northern border (China) to keep the area disturbed. The solution lies in identifying the problem and holistically looking at it.” Recently, National Security Advisor to Prime Minister of India Ajit Doval visited the US and sought to balance against an assertive China in the Indo-Pacific region. After his US visit, Doval visited Bangladesh for participating in the BIMSTEC (Bay of Bengal Initiative for Multi-Sectoral Technical and Economic Cooperation) summit. It was assumed that Doval conveyed some necessary messages which were decided in Washington for the stakeholders in relation to South Asia and Bangladesh in order to address the alleged Chinese assertion in South Asia. Assam is a geostrategic pressure point against Bangladesh, therefore, the timing of Doval’s Dhaka visit and the “million Muslim Bengali deportation from Assam” threat signify that the Assam deportation issue is being used by the US-Indian strategists to limit Bangladesh’s rapprochement to China. This is a clear path to increase the geopolitical crisis in the region i, contradiction India’s Act East policy. Such unwise US-India synchronized geostrategic push would also misbalance the harmonious relationship between the South Asian countries. It is believed that India should not alienate herself from the South Asian regional politics, rather those alleged challenges involving China can be addressed and solved collectively with the help of her friendly neighbours. (Rajeeb Ahmed, Dhaka Tribune, 8 April 2018, retrieved on 31 October 2018) There is another tension that what would happen in the Bangladesh elections in 2019. Hasina has little control over external enemies – like hostile foreign governments, such those of US, UK and EU – and the hardliner political Islamic lobby within Bangladesh. If these hostile foreign governments join hands with the Islamists then it may become difficult for Hasina’s Awami League to come back to power. For India, if Hasina is unable to come back to power in 2019 and a hostile dispensation (like the earlier anti-India government of BNP and Islamist coalition) comes, it will easily make sense to push the illegal immigrants – as deemed by the NRC – back into Bangladesh.

Notwithstanding the smoothness and fairness of the NRC exercise, Assam is now beginning to realize that NRC alone cannot suffice in bringing it justice. NRC is simply the first, basic step in identifying and clamping down on illegal immigrants. Many of these infiltrators had, according to the Home Ministry reports, already fled the state after 2015 – when the NRC was announced – to other states, and have thus necessitated the Home Ministry proposal that NRC be conducted in other states too.

From historic period Assam as well as North-East has been facing conspiracy organized by separatist force. Therefore a hidden agenda behind this large amount of infiltration or immigration over north-east cannot be denied. For first time it was noticed in a report (Sinha, 1998) on illegal migration from Bangladesh into Assam by the then governor of Assam Mr S K Sinha, which had been sent to the then President of India Mr K R Narayanan. He wrote in article 24 of this report, “The influx of these illegal migrants is turning these districts into a Muslim majority region. It will then only be a matter of time when a demand for their merger with Bangladesh may be made. Foreign conspiracy over north-east India is not a new phenomenon. Therefore, the nexus between illegal migration and foreign conspiracy (discussed earlier) cannot be denied.

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THE IMPORTANCE OF TURKEY'S NATO MEMBERSHIP

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Abstract: *In the 21st century, NATO faces a number of new challenges, particularly in security policy and international law. Turkey is one of NATO's most important members because of its geographic location and its participation in other federal systems; not only because it is a regional power, but because it is the closest member of the Western Alliance to the crisis regions with the most flagrant conflicts facing the world peace. My purpose is to show how important Turkey is to NATO.*

After the Cold War, in the post-bipolar world, the role of the UN Security Council and NATO in resolving armed conflicts fundamentally changed, which also affected Turkey's role and significance. Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. The importance of Turkey is demonstrated by the fact that Turkey has, after the United States, NATO's second largest military force, ahead of European states. Turkey has become to the focus of international observers and politicians of the EU due to three different facts. First, after an attempted military coup in July 2016, EU has highlighted some concerns. Second, Turkey has been involved in the civil war in Syria with its many consequences. Third, a new constitution was voted by a referendum in April 2017 which fundamentally changed the political structure in Turkey. The European Union has to deal with all the three aspects.

Nowadays, Turkey plays a key role in tackling the European migration crisis and the fight against terrorism, which is an extraordinary legal and security policy challenge both for Europe and for NATO. In this area, we can refer not only the Turkey-EU Common Statement, which has largely reduced the number of illegal immigrants to Europe, but also Turkey's diplomatic and military efforts to accommodate Syrian refugees and to eradicate the Middle East, particularly Syrian and Iraqi terrorism.

Keywords: *NATO, Turkey, EU law, international law, refugee crisis*

Introduction

In the 21st century, NATO has to face a number of new challenges, predominantly stemming from security policy and international public law, where Turkey's role is extraordinarily determinative; I believe both parties are mutually in need of each other. Turkey – thanks to its geographical location and its participation in other alliances – is one of the most important members of NATO: not only because it is a regional power, but because it is the Western

alliance's closest member to the crisis regions which are laden with conflicts that are amongst the most threatening to world peace.

The Agreement between the Parties to the North Atlantic Treaty regarding the Status of their Forces, signed in London on 19 June 1951 – to which the Hungarian Republic joined in 1999 and be promulgated with Act CXVII of 1999 – provides an important regulation on the legal aspects of the NATO operations. The necessity to regulate the legal status of the allied forces already arose as an important question after NATO's inception, since in any event an incidental transit or stationing of foreign forces in a state's territory constitutes a security challenge, even in the event of the country's consent. (Horváth, 2011, p.48)

Lord Hastings Ismay, NATO's first Secretary General defined the essential role of NATO as follows: "to keep the Germans down, the Russians out, and the Americans in" Europe. (Wheatcroft, 2011) The military alliance formed on 4 April 1949 was established thanks to the Cold War's circumstances, and its main objective was to halt the Soviet Union's advance in Europe and – after the dissolution of colonialism – in Asia and Africa, in defence of the Western democratic, capitalistic systems. Following the Central European regime changes, after the dissolution of the Warsaw Pact and the Soviet Union, it became clear that NATO is not only a military defence alliance that had lost its function, since multiple articles of its founding document, the Washington Treaty, provide new goals for the organisation in the event of a changed geopolitical situation. The democracy, individual freedoms, the rule of law, stability and welfare, the economic cooperation between the states, that is, NATO's political engagement came into prominence after the end of the Cold War. (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949)

Turkey has been a member of NATO since 1952. At present, its accentuated relevance is shown by the fact that Turkey possesses NATO's second largest military force after the United States, and the largest one among the European states. The Turkish Army, based on Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's idea, operates along the principle of "peace at home, peace in the world", but if Turkey's sovereignty is under siege (or – as shown by Cyprus' example – if an area populated by Turks is attacked), (Ht, 2014) the military force will intervene. (Kitekintő, 2010)

Turkey has been waiting for its accession to the European Union for the longest time. The negotiations started in 2005, the accession, however, has not taken place to this day; for the first time in the history of the European integration, the negotiations are open-ended, that is, the end result is not guaranteed. (Csicsmann and Nagy, 2013, p.64) Despite several member states of the Union saying that Turkey's accession is hopeless, we must not forget the fact that the European Union has never stated that Turkey may not join, as evidenced by the annual reports of the European Commission.

Currently, Turkey plays a key role in the handling of the European migrant crisis and also in combatting terrorism, which present extraordinary challenges in the field of law and security policy, both for Europe and for the NATO in general. In these respects, not only the EU-Turkey Common Statement on Syrian Refugees is relevant, which has helped decrease the amount of illegal immigrants to Europe, but Turkey's reception and care of millions of Syrian refugees,

as well as diplomatic and military efforts those are directed at eliminating terrorism in Syria and Iraq.

The change in NATO's objectives and new challenges

After the end of the Cold War, in the era following the bipolar world order, the role that the United Nations Security Council and NATO played in the settling of armed conflicts changed fundamentally, and it affected Turkey's involvement and significance as well. The role of a new method for settling armed conflicts, independent of the UN Security Council, irrespectively the inherent international law disputes about it, especially in crisis zones like the Middle East and Central Asia, where Turkey, as the closest NATO member state, plays an ever more active role.

Following the terrorist attack in New York on 11 September 2001, combatting terrorism became the central element of NATO's most important activities. Due to the terrorist attack, Article 5 of the North Atlantic Treaty, regarding collective defence, came into effect for the first time. Under the Article, the Parties agree that an armed attack against one or more of them shall be considered an attack against them all. (The North Atlantic Treaty, 1949) The principle of the so-called pre-emptive strike appeared in the American foreign policy in the 2000s, and has so far been put into practice by the Americans in Iraq, by the French in Mali, and by the Turks and the Americans in Syria. The doctrine's international acceptance is questioned, especially by Russia, China and Iran, as according to Article 42 of the UN Charter, only the UN Security Council may authorise the commitment of armed troops in an international conflict, while doctrine users consider it acceptable regarding to Article 51 of the UN Charter. The root of the problem is that the right of veto of the permanent members of the UNSC often impedes united action (that is, its authorisation by the UNSC) Russia and China defend also the role of their right of veto, when they contend the principle of pre-emptive strike. NATO played a significant role in the wars against Afghanistan and Iraq as well.

In the 21st century, new challenges make necessary the closer cooperation of the NATO member states. NATO's role in the process of the so-called Arab Spring held great significance. On 19 March 2011, an international military operation took place in order to enforce the no-fly zone, as decreed by the UN Security Council, against the military force of Libyan dictator Muammar Gaddafi. NATO's involvement is also important in the Syrian conflict. The conflict's inception in 2011 may be as a part of the Arab Spring, however, while the swift NATO intervention in Libya overthrown the former regime, such a thing could not have taken place in Syria, as Russia and China expressly opposed the Western action. (Prieger and Mátyás, 2014, pp.271–293) They attempted to discredit the Syrian government on the same pretext as they did with Iraq in 2003, namely, they stated that it has possessed and utilised internationally banned chemical weapons. Thanks to it being approved on the highest level that no chemical weapons were found in Iraq, public opinion was sceptical about the reports on the Syrian incident. It soon became apparent: armed groups fighting against the government were likely the ones utilising the banned weapons. (Prieger and Mátyás, 2014, pp.271–293)

Among present challenges, it would be important that NATO not only strengthen its relationship with international organisations like the UN or the European Union, but also with elements of the private sector like the energy and information technology industry. (Iklódy, 2010) Cooperation with the private sector may prove helpful in lessening the security difficulties stemming from globalisation.

Turkey also plays a significant role in the field of the migrant crisis and combatting terrorism, which present extraordinary legal and security challenges for both the whole of EU and NATO. The multitudinous immigration, which was brought on by the Syrian Civil War that's been underway for seven years, is a completely new phenomenon in 21st century Europe, which also entails new types of security policy challenges, which are unmanageable with the traditional tools of the police, security policy and the military. (Méltányosság, 2010, pp.20–22) The number of Muslims living in Europe has increased significantly, and the appearance of Islamic fundamentalism in Europe can be seen as a new phenomenon, which calls the attention of both the European Union's and NATO's leaders to the fact that in the globalised world, politics are ever-more influenced by cultural aspects as well. (Méltányosság, 2010, pp.20–22)

The beginnings of Turkey's NATO membership

Turkey has been a full member of NATO since 1952, which means that the country provides every possible form of assistance to Europe in relation to issues of war and peace in both Europe and Asia. From a strategic standpoint, Turkey's accession would be an extraordinary opportunity, because of its stable and strong army. A lengthy discussed question comes to mind: for a European country, being a member of NATO, results automatically and legally European integration? Experts' opinions differ on this. It is also important to note that NATO was originally intended to only include states in the North Atlantic area. This is not true in the case of Turkey, though it could become a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. From this standpoint, the Turk state's geographical location cannot be an obstacle on the path to accession to the EU. It must also be taken into consideration that Turkey was accepted as a member of NATO on grounds of a Soviet proposal. (Gazdag, 2016, pp.10–65)

Turkey and Greece applied for and obtained NATO membership at the same time, but Turkey's significance has always been greater in this organisation, and that is because of its geographical location; thanks to its aptitudes, as its militarily favourable position, among other things, Turkey was able to control the passes, it shared borders with Asia and the Soviet Union as well. Greece's 1981 accession to the EU gave an opportunity for Greece to more effectively assert its interests against Turkey; these attempts, however, bore no fruit within NATO, thanks to the aforementioned Turkish advantages. (Nagy and Póti, 1999, p.167)

Even today, Turkey is characterised by active NATO-involvement. At present, 1500 American soldiers are stationed at Incirlik Air Base; this air base was used by NATO during the operations to Iraq and Syria as well. In addition to this, a significant portion of NATO's ground forces is stationed in Izmir and Istanbul. (Péczeli, 2016, p.224)

In a NATO framework, the United States of America has been stationing tactical nuclear weapons in the member states; the United States entered into “nuclear sharing contracts” with the recipient countries concerning the installation of these weapons (the first of these contracts was made with the United Kingdom). (Péczeli, 2016, p.225) Turkey is one of the five NATO member states (the others being Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Italy), where there are still American nuclear weapons (at Incirlik Air Base). The fact that while the number of nuclear charges installed in Europe currently totals 180, most of these (60-70 nuclear charges per member state) can be found in Italy and Turkey (in the other three countries, the ratio is 10-20 charges per member state), proves the magnitude of Turkey’s involvement. (Kristensen, 2012, p.16) These charges are Mod 3 or Mod 4 versions of the B61 freefall bombs, whose blast yield is between 0.3-170 kt, and 10-50 kt. (Kristensen, 2012, p.17, 20–21)

The Deterrence and Defence Posture Review (or DDPR for short) became NATO’s revision document on its general defence and deterrence system. This document took several elements from Barack Obama’s 2010 American nuclear strategy (Nuclear Posture Review, NPR): it emphasised the vision of a world without nuclear weapons as a long-term goal, and acknowledged the significant value of the negative security guarantees made by states possessing nuclear weapons. (Péczeli, 1999, pp.227–228)

The significance of Turkey’s NATO membership today

Turkey’s regional significance is outstanding, as a result of its influence in the Middle East, the Caucasus and the Balkans. The intensification of the Neo-Ottoman shift, a geopolitical and foreign political line, could be noted in today’s Turkey, that is, the strengthening of relationships between Turkey and the countries in the Middle East and the Balkans. In these areas, Turkey is able to employ more effectively the soft power, and in these regions there is no need to be afraid of criticism concerning the political institutions. What’s more, Turkey could even lean on the tradition that, in spite of four military coups, multiple coup attempts and the current authoritarian leadership, it is still the country with the most democratic traditions in the Middle East that is ready and able to face the terrorist threat of the Islamic State.

The geopolitical significance of the Middle East is exceedingly worthy of attention, since five of the world’s nine great commercially and militarily pivotal straits (the Bosphorus, the Dardanelles, the Suez Canal, the Gulf of Aden, the Strait of Hormuz) can be found in this area, which is why the relationship between the Middle East and the European Union is a geopolitical and geostrategic question during the formulation of the European Union’s common foreign and security policy. Turkey’s bridging role is eminent in this respect as well. The military engagement in Syria and the fight against terrorism have made a significant impact on Turkey’s domestic and foreign policies. In 2018, Turkey’s intervention in Syria also took place. Rockets from Syria hit the province of Kilis in South Turkey, and after that, the Turkish Army began military operations in Afrin, which was under Kurdish supervision. Turkey referred to Article 51 of the UN Charter (resistance in case of armed attack) to support its right to carry out military operations. (Egeresi, 2018)

In the 1920s, Mustafa Kemal Atatürk put the country on the road to becoming closer to Europe. Turkey's NATO membership, as well as the need for the country's EU membership, was a logical continuation of this.

Today, Turkey participates in the Standing NATO Maritime Group and Operation Ocean Shield against piracy as well. NATO's Center of Excellence (CoE, dealing with defence against terrorism) and the Partnership for Peace Training Center operate in Ankara. In addition to these, the early-warning radars of the European Phased Adaptive Approach (EPAA, a ballistic missile defence system) were also installed in Turkish territory. (Péczeli, 1999, p.224) It is easy to see the significant involvement that characterises Turkey within NATO.

The EU has been dealing with the mass of refugees coming from war-ravaged and/or poverty-stricken countries (such as Syria, Afghanistan, Iraq, Somalia, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Libya or other countries of different commercial status and political arrangement) since January 2015. Since March 2016, more than one million immigrants have tried to enter EU territory through Turkey. A large portion of the refugees used the path leading through the Mediterranean Sea, and this has, according to the International Organization for Migration, claimed the lives of several hundred people so far. (BBC News, 2016)

The increasing waves of refugees have been recognised as Europe's greatest crisis since 1945. (FT, 2015) Due to the Civil War, Syria has been drifting towards a social, commercial and legal crisis. The continuous influx of masses of people is overwhelming and so divisive that even the EU has been unable to formulate a unified standpoint on the handling of the refugee issue. The fundamental problems are how to identify and differentiate the real refugees from economic immigrants, and how each country accepts people who are actually in need of help. The EU proposed a mandatory central quota among the member states, (Economist, 2015) however, not every member state was pleased with it, predominantly because it merely offers a surface treatment for the problem, as it is unable to exhaust the flood of immigration.¹

Despite the ever more stringent measures, asylum seekers are continuously arriving at EU's external borders. In 2016, prior to the conclusion of the Turkey-EU Statement, more than 143 thousand people arrived. In the midst of the growing pressure from all angles, the EU formulated an agreement with Turkey, whose main objective was to consolidate the extraordinarily difficult situation. The agreement, which held great significance for both parties, was concluded in March 2016.

The Statement includes that all refugees that illegally enter Greece through Turkey after 20 March, 2016, will be returned. Although each request for asylum will be processed and judged individually, this means that every refugee arriving by sea (they are the bigger portion of those who arrive) will be sent back to Turkey. In the framework of the Statement, the two countries work together in order to return every refugee to Turkey who, despite arriving in Greece while respecting the law and international conventions, fails to submit a request for asylum, or whose request is rejected. As a compensation, for every Syrian refugee sent back to Turkey, the EU

¹ German Foreign Minister Heiko Maas suggested in September 2018 that other Member States of the European Union who do not want to take refugee should take on another task. See: Mandiner, 2018.

would receive one. It is also important to note, however, that the maximum amount of people switching places in this manner cannot exceed 72,000, (BBC News, 2016) a number that is dwarfed by the amount of refugees wishing to immigrate into the EU, which is several million people. Nevertheless, the agreement has an automatic deterrent effect to those who would attempt to enter EU territory illegally by sea in hopes of finding asylum or a better life. (BBC News, 2016)

From the EU's perspective, the significance of the measures included in the statement is clear, but the promises defined as compensation are critically important for Turkey as well, in order to get closer to its long-sought goals. One of the important clause in the statement is the visa-free travel for Turkish citizens, in other words, the Schengen Area becomes accessible for them from June 2016. The other important part of the agreement is the speeding up of Turkey's EU-accession process. As part of the agreement, the EU opens new chapters which are necessary for the accession process. The previous two clauses are promises which have been sought by Turkey for two decades, that is, the ability to cooperate better with the EU, and to become a member of it: to conclude the accession process, which was officially started in 2005. (Rankin, 2016) The bargain has helped decrease the amount of refugees flowing into the EU.

Terrorism and NATO

NATO has to face such security challenges as Al-Qaeda, international terrorism, or the fight against the Islamic State, where Turkey is a highlighted player.

Haldun Solmazturk, lead researcher from Ankara, shared his opinion on the terrorist network hidden in Turkey, and on what kind of threat it presents for the country. (LPR Noticias, 2017) He emphasised that the forces of Turkey and NATO concentrated too deeply on overthrowing Assad, the Syrian president, they supported his adversaries for this reason, and this power vacuum allowed the terrorist network to strengthen, and society to become radicalised. This countrywide terrorist network plays a role in human trafficking directed to Iraq and Syria, and from there, at Turkey. (Jones, 2017)

Similar processes happened in every country where the USA and its allies attempted to "export democracy", and to that end, overthrew political leaders who were considered legitimate based on the given country's laws, with military force.² Global cooperation is necessary to solve the security challenges created by the Islamic State, which practically appeared from thin air. Due to this, Turkey will increasingly depend on its military partners in NATO, especially on the United States.

However, the Turkish intervention in Syria can be attributed to multiple factors. Firstly, refugees have flooded Turkey due to the war in Syria and the threat posed by the Islamic State. Secondly, the country was riddled with assassinations, carried out with bombs or otherwise, which were ascribed to the Islamic State and the Kurdish separatists; as a consequence of these

² Examples are Afghanistan, Iraq and Libya. This scenario was also available in Syria, but Russia's action has deterred the Atlantic forces from direct interference. For democracy exports see: Mátyás, I., 2015.

attacks, the Turkish population has lost its sense of security, tourists no longer choose their favoured holiday resorts as their destinations. Thirdly, Ankara wishes to prevent the Kurds living in Northern Syria and North West Iraq from assuming control over a unified territory at all costs, and from beginning to organise it into a state. This would encourage the Kurds living in neighbouring Eastern Turkey to join their new state, which is considered unacceptable by Turks.

Following the elections in Turkey on 24 June 2018, Jens Stoltenberg, NATO's Secretary General, congratulated President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan for winning the elections. Erdoğan told him that he agrees to fulfil his obligations stemming from the NATO membership, and promised to contribute a greater deal to NATO's efforts. Stoltenberg stressed that Turkey is a very important member of the alliance. During the conversation, it was mentioned that the NATO Summit in July would provide an opportunity for them to meet in Brussels in person. (Anadolu Agency, 2018a) This meeting occurred during NATO's 28th Summit in Brussels, between 11 and 12 July. On 26 June 2018, US President Donald Trump congratulated Erdoğan for being elected president, and it was already mentioned at this time that they would meet at the approaching NATO Summit.

The Summit proves that Turkey intends to remain an active member of NATO even today. During the meeting, it was sharply accentuated that the current security situation is unpredictable. Because of this, it is imperative that NATO attempts to prepare for a wide range of challenges, such as Russia's foreign policy and disinformation warfare, the peacekeeping operations in the Middle East, and the challenges posed by the Islamic State and the fight against it, in order to maintain global stability. New concepts and initiatives were discussed, the strengthening of the command system, the development of strategical mobility, and the establishment of new leading military bodies. (BSZK, 2018) U.S. President Donald Trump criticised the European allies because of their low expenditure for defence. This was the first important event in Brussels since the election of President Erdoğan that President Trump took part in.

Among the NATO members, Turkey is situated closest to the current crisis areas (Ukraine, Iran, Russia, Iraq, Syria), which is why Turkey can be considered a front country. (Yetkin, 2018)

The 2018 NATO Summit was a place for diplomatic crises and for several new decisions. President Trump emphasised that expenses for the defence of NATO member states should be increased. Turkey stated the following during the summit: "We are NATO's host here, and we are going nowhere." (Olay.com, 2018) This also shows Turkey's commitment to NATO.

Curtis Scaparrotti, the current Supreme Allied Commander Europe (SACEUR, highest NATO military function in Europe), visited Turkey on 1 August, preceded by his discussion on telephone with Hulusi Akar, the Turkish Minister of Defence on 27 July. During the visit, they talked about security issues concerning Northern Syria. The Commander also visited Incirlik Air Base. (Anadolu Agency, 2018b)

Conclusion

Turkey has ever been an important player of NATO since the inception of the alliance. At the time, its defining role was in counterbalancing the Soviet Union's military position. Turkey's participation in the Korean War on the side of the United States made possible Turkey's entry to the alliance. Since then, NATO's roles have changed, Turkey's relevance, however, has not diminished. NATO's engagement lacking the authorisation of the UN Security Council, including Turkey's military operations in Syria, raises problems of international public law nature.

We can observe that Turkey's significance has increased in the last few years, especially with the advent of new security, military and legal challenges with respect to the wave of migration. The country is important, not only because as a country of almost 80 million people it denotes a serious market in the global competition, but also because it is at the centre of events from a geopolitical standpoint. Today events, that define the world's future the most, happen in Syria, where Russia and the USA face each other. The conflict of interests between them is sometimes interrupted by Turkey, who presents his desire to not be ignored, with regard to both the conflict's solution as well as the settling's formulation. (Prieger and Mátyás, 2017, pp.325–340)

It was possible to decrease the influx of refugees to Europe thanks to the refugee Statement, but as a peculiarity of the bargain, Turkey may terminate it at any time, once again flooding Europe with several hundred thousands of illegal immigrants. (Prieger and Mátyás, 2017, pp.325–340)

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THE ROLE OF THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL IN ARMED CONFLICTS OF THE XXIST CENTURY

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Abstract: *With the development of a society and technological progress, new challenges have arisen consequently. Nowadays the world is facing new kinds of threats to a global security. Being non-chaotic and mutually dependent, these issues should be treated in a special and cautious way on account of their dangerous and far-reaching impact. Armed conflicts have a new dangerous nature and gain a global scale, hence it is vital to note that dealing with them on a higher level becomes crucial. The problem of saving succeeding generations from the scourge of war has been important and essential since the First World War. Any regional conflict can become a burst bubble for a collective security, and consequently the efficiency of an organisation, which controls the processes and crises all over the world, becomes a primary source of analysis. My paper attempts to discuss the efficiency of the United Nations Security Council at the field of maintaining the collective security system. The research includes analyzing ongoing emergencies and the reactive actions taken by the body to cease the conflict at the certain stage. At the final stage of the investigation conclusions will be drawn as to the performance of the United Nations Security Council and what reforms in the United Nations system are required to transform the organization into more productive body.*

Along with the social progress and technological change, new challenges to global peace and security have emerged. In the era of globalization, when the world became much more interconnected and interdependent, they quickly acquired a universal character, effectively threatening regional, and often international security and stability. Hence it is vital to note that dealing with them on an international level becomes crucial. Any regional conflict can become a burst bubble for a collective security system, and consequently the efficiency of an organisation, which deals with the processes and crises all over the world, becomes a primary source of analysis. For the aforementioned reasons my paper is dedicated to the Security Council of the United Nations. My goal is to study the factors that affect the effectiveness of the Security Council in the current conditions in the light of its competencies, history and methods of work.

In order to conduct a comprehensive study on the UN Security Council a theoretical framework should be analysed.

Security, as a term, has originated from the Latin word *sine cura* (“without care, carefree”), which refers to the state of certainty, serenity, safety and the feeling of being protected. In the system of social and political sciences security is generally perceived as the need to fulfil such needs as existence, survival, integrity, identity, independence, peace, certainty in development, and most importantly – the absence of threats. Actions taken to eliminate them can be directed both internally and externally, hence two types of security can be identified.

The oldest form of providing the discussed good to the actors of international relations is the concept of national security. National positions, needs and interests in the field are promoted and enforced primarily by the state. Due to the fact that security of the state is usually perceived as dealing with external threats, national security becomes an integral part of foreign policy of the country. It expresses and projects the internal needs, interests and values of a given society and its political system on the international environment.

As it has been mentioned before, external environment can be the source of potential threats to the national security of the state, however, on the other hand, it can be as well the guarantor of the peaceful coexistence. Due to the noticeable relation between security and safety of all of the actors of international relations, the other type of security has evolved – international security. The level of trustworthiness of the aforementioned guarantees in the field of international security strongly depends on the level of institutionalization of international relations.

The basic tool that guarantees the maintenance and endurance of international security is a principle of collective security, that has been introduced as an approach for the first time already in the XVII century (Skirbekk, Gilje and Worley, 2001). Generally speaking, this, as it can be called, device excludes the violation of universal peace or the creation of a threat to the security of peoples in any form and is executed by the efforts of states on a global or regional scale. It is a mechanism that involves the collective response to the threat and breaches to peace and provides the punishment of the aggressor by the international law (Williams, 2008). Inis Claude underlines that collective security “represents the urge for systematization, the institutionalization of international relations”. To the certain point this is very accurate, as the principle of collective security gives the rationality to numerous international organizations and of course, the United Nations. It must be noted though that collective security can be provided in different forms. According to the concept any nation regardless of its regional affiliation should react immediately to any menace no matter where the threat originates from. The concept of collective security has a global scope and covers all the nations. By the same token the principle works the other way round. Any nation that has become the victim of the aggression can use its genetic right to self-defence and call for help. The inherent right of states to individual and collective self-defense is one of the fundamental rights enshrined in the United Nations Charter. Along with the military sanctions authorized by the UN Security Council, this right is an exception to the principle of non-use of force in international law. Collective defense doesn't have the inclusive character that in the system of collective security, though it involves regional defence systems. Exercising this right to collective self-defense states unite into exclusive military alliances to reassure they will have a necessary support in the case of the crisis.

Despite the notable and impressive research base it is comparatively challenging to define exactly what military alliance is. According to George Liska it is a formal agreement between states against the possible threat from the third party. Ole Holsti, Terrence Hopmann and John Sullivan propose three basic elements that are essential when speaking about alliances. First of all, there should be a formal treaty – open or secret. Secondly, the issues that lay in the center of the activity should concern national security. And the last but not least, the contracted parties should be national states.

Stefan Bergsmann in his “The Concept of Military Alliance” underlines that the Alliance is principally a mutual promise to assist, to “use of one’s own recourses for the defence of the other”, wherein the occasion that leads to the possible assistance is unforeseen and unknown.

When trying to define what military alliance is we can use three key factors, that are construing the form of security. There should be two or more states members, the promise of reciprocal assistance, and the so called “casus foederis” – the situation that requires the launch of allied commitments. Based on this, three basic functions of alliances can be distinguished: shaping and maintaining the balance of power by strengthening the participants' defence abilities; stabilization of the international environment, integration within the alliance.

The key factor in the formation of alliances is the existence of an external threat to the members. At the same time, nowadays, due to the clear asymmetry of the military power distribution in the world and accompanying dominance of the US and their partners, the mechanism leading to the formation of alliances is also the mechanism of the so-called bandwagoning, which implies the formation of alliance with a much stronger entity, not necessarily under the influence of a clearly defined external threat.

With the advent of the idea of collective security, i.e. security for all, the existence of military alliances, whether permanent or temporary, is a sign that the world as a whole or some region in particular is not ready for a collective, that is, indivisible, security. Since the collective security system is designed to minimize the use of force in international relations, it is extremely important to exclude all legally controversial aspects related to the realization of the right of states to individual and collective self-defense so that the implementation of this right does not undermine the foundations of the collective security system.

One of the most effective and corresponding to the present-day reality is the cooperative way of providing security, also known as cooperative security. According to Remigiusz Bierzanek the essence of collective security lays in the gradual increase in political, economical and cultural interdependencies, so this completely reduces the risk of the use of force and aggression, making it an irrational decision. This way of establishing security, based on cooperation in different areas of international relations, has been conceptualized into “cooperative security”.

According to J. Czaputowicz the concept has originated from disarmament negotiations conducted between two blocks during the Cold War. In 1982 former Swedish Prime Minister Olof Palme introduced a new concept which was meant to replace the doctrine of mutual deterrence, named common security. It underlined the need to build security in the interest of all members of the international community, and not against any of them in particular in the

nuclear era. Palme criticized the superpower rivalries and suggested addressing global security issues and threats commonly. The concept of common security boils down to common prevention of common threats, respect of the other party's position, searching for compromise solutions, joint agreement on the reduction of armaments and the development of mutual confidence building measures.

Former Australian Prime Minister developed the concept of common security to the conceptual whole and introduced the idea of cooperative security. In a wider context, the postulate of cooperative security appeared in 1987 in a report presented by the Norwegian Prime Minister Gro Harlem Brundtland, in which she called for the creation of conditions for global peace based on cooperation of all states. This has been complemented by the "Stockholm Initiative on Global Security and Governance" published in 1991, which was chaired by Swedish Prime Minister Gunnar Carlsson. In a favorable atmosphere of political changes, a group of Swedish experts called for the creation by all members of the international community based on new international security system founded on broadly understood cooperation on a global and regional scale. Only this form of cooperation could effectively counteract the threats posed by new times.

According to the authors of the concept, unlike collective security that is aimed at stopping aggression after its beginning, cooperative security ensures that needed preventive measures have been taken. These measures include strict control over nuclear weapon and ensuring nuclear safety; conversion of the defense industry, the excess capacity of which can lead to unjustified proliferation of global arms and, consequently, to increased international instability; effective and legitimate intervention, in which the use of force is always multilateral and is chosen as the last resort; transparency of military organizations and military activities of states. Nevertheless, the concept suggests using soft measures of control that have a relaxing and tension release effect on international relations.

One of the measures that have the aforementioned impact and interconnect with the concept of cooperative security are arms control and non-proliferation treaties and regimes as well as confidence and security building measures.

The League of Nations, by reinventing the security system and introducing collective security system, at the same time failed to execute its main power to maintain global peace and security which consequently led to another hard-fought and ferocious war. The Second World War has shown the world the weakness of its former security system and how fragile peace can be. Therefore new resolutions for the future postwar security system that would have been sought already during the war. The search has resulted in signing the UN Charter in 1945 and establishing the United Nations (Un.org, 2019). Having analyzed all the theoretical aspects, it becomes possible to take into account the practical experience of creating an effective system of collective security in the world.

In Article 1 of the UN Charter we may find four fundamental purposes of the United Nations identified. The Charter in Article 1 gives the United Nations a legitimate right and a main role in harmonizing the actions of nations to achieve the aforementioned goals. These standards are at the groundwork of the international order established after the Second World War. The next

Article gives a more precise outlook on the way the main purposes, named in the first one, should be achieved. The article underlines that all the Members of the United Nations have the sovereign equality, which means that every state must be treated equally, particularly before the law, and territorial integrity should be respected. It does not cover functional equality though, as five victors of the World War II have a special status in the UNSC. It also refers to the responsibility to "...refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the Purposes of the United Nations." Though the Charter still provides two exception to the rule: the right of individual or collective self-defence (as per Art. 51) and the military sanctions imposed by the UNSC (as per Art. 42). In order to ensure the efficiency of prohibition to use the force, Article 2 introduces the principle of collective security, which provides that the Member of the United Nations will give the organization any support in actions taken consistent with the purposes, mentioned in Article 1 (Un.org, 2019).

When one looks through the main principles of the United Nations mentioned in the Charter, any dramatic change in its principles or goals cannot be noticed. By origin, they had been established and defined by the United Nations Charter in 1945, and since then they remain constant.

The Security Council has primary responsibility for the maintenance of peace, security and for the aforementioned principles, as it is the main executive body of the United Nations. A major role in the peaceful settlement of disputes is assigned to this body and it acts on behalf of all UN member states. The immediate content of the Security Council activity to maintain an international peace and security is determined by its competencies, and therefore the analysis of its forms, the essence and importance is an integral part of a comprehensive study.

All the powers of the Security Council can be divided based on the criteria of the legal nature. According to this approach, powers of the Security Council are arranged into the following groups: 1. Powers for peaceful resolution of disputes. 2. Powers for action with respect to threats to the peace, breaches of the peace and acts of aggression. 3. Other powers regarding the maintenance of international peace and security, the acceptance of new UN members, the amendment and revision of the UN Charter; executive powers; establishment of new UN bodies; implementation of the principles of the international trusteeship system (Rousseau, 1983). The only restraints in this case can be the authority conferred by the member states. A deep explanation can be found in a situation when a state violates the human rights or commit a crime against humanity. That way it stops to be an individual concern of the state and the Security Council may apply measures under the Article 39 of the UN Charter even in case of an internal conflict. The sovereignty of the state, where the body determines the existence of a threat to the peace, becomes contravened since the enforcement measures are applied. Hence, the primary task of the Council is to restrict itself in demonstrating its powers without a valid reason, in order to perform its fundamental functions with regards to the Charter – an agreement made by the member states to give such an authority to the Security Council (Schweigman, 2001).

Not only the powers given to the Council by member states legitimize its activity, but also its composition, as the main decisions are carried out by its permanent and non-permanent members. The Security Council consist of fifteen Members of the United Nations. Five of them have a permanent membership in the Security Council and primarily that's because of their dominant economic and political weight. These states were at the origins of the organization and have the status of nuclear powers. On the contrary, non-permanent members are elected by the General Assembly in accordance with the principle of equitable geographical distribution, taking into account their involvement in the maintenance of international peace and security, and their devotion to the purposes and principles of the organization. It is obvious that due to such an unstable structure and variety of member-states, the decision making process is far more complicated than it may seem (Un.org, 2019).

On the basis of Art. 27 of the Charter of the United Nations, decisions of the Council are taken by voting. The Security Council decisions on non-procedural matters (imposition of sanctions, preventive diplomacy, peacemaking, peacekeeping and security) are binding on all UN member states. The key thing to remember here is the veto power of five permanent members. The right of veto is established by Article 27 (3) of the Charter and means that the permanent Security Council members can reject the project of any UN resolution, regardless of the level of support that the project has. In reality, the great powers use the veto in order to protect their national interests or to promote their view on the issue. Overall, the veto affects the work of the body even without its actual usage. In particular, many draft resolutions were not even submitted because of the threat of the veto.

As the theoretical framework have now been investigated, it is time to see how the theory turns into practice by analysing the United Nations Security Council's activity during the dramatic events of Arab Spring.

The events of the "Arab Spring" (The Merriam Webster dictionary) were of a mass character and brought to the front a wide range of issues that originated already in the previous century. The broad base of uprisings and protests precipitated a revolution. The protestors demanded social and economic changes, the fight against corruption, overcoming social inequality and housing crisis (Ilo.org, 2019). The revolution has began with peaceful demonstrations, demanding fundamental freedoms and overall democracy in different areas of the public life. The world was taken by surprise when it turned out to be one of the most violent conflicts on the planet with more than 185,000 casualties only in Syria (Violations Documentation Center in Syria, 2019).

The United Nations have been observing the situation in the region closely since the beginning of the XXIst century. There were numbers of reports released by UN Development Programme between 2001 and 2005, underlining the deplorable situation in those countries and desperate need for social and economic reforms, which if were not addressed would lead to serious uprisings and violence in the region (Graham, Al-Krenawi). Though a little or no attention has been paid to this information and no preventive action has been taken until the actual uprisings have happened.

Primarily Security Council has supported the idea that peacemaking efforts and peaceful settlement of disputes should be initiated by Arab League. As it has been stated in the presidential statement in September 2012, Security Council strongly supports the idea of Arab League taking the lead role in addressing region's most delicate challenges (United Nations, Meetings Coverage and Press Releases, 2019). Though during the meeting members of the body expressed various opinions and stressed different points, which sometimes were even contradictory. Developing states were apprehended of the Western superpowers acting serving their national interest. Those, on the other hand indicated immediate actions need to be taken in order to avoid the escalations of the conflict.

Still, the body has not reacted in the proper way to any of the potential threats to the stability and security in the region. In Bahrain the protests of 2011 quickly acquired a threatening scale for the authorities: in a country with just 500,000 citizens, 100,000 protesters demanding equality or a constitutional monarchy gathered at the Pearl Roundabout in the capital of Manama. The King responded to demands by dispersing the camp of protesters on the deadly night of the 17th of February 2011, called "Bloody Thursday". Protests did not stop, and in March 2011, Saudi Arabia and the UAE, at the request of the authorities, introduced a joint military-police contingent to Bahrain. Together with the Bahraini police, the Saudi-Emirate forces, acting quite harshly, defeated the protesters. It is reported that at least 89 people died in the struggle of the Shiite opposition for reforms in Bahrain. Hundreds, if not thousands, were wounded. Protests took place almost daily, though it seems like the events have been ignored by the United Nations Security Council, receiving no response from the supranational body. The major split between Western veto-holding superpowers and their Eastern opponents has led to undeniable inability of Security Council to address the conflict in Syria at the beginning. Resolutions drafts S/2011/612, S/2012/77 and so many others on Syria has been vetoed by Russia and China (Security Council Report, UN Documents Middle East, 2019).

Moreover, it is hard to identify clearly the success of Security Council as well as UN in general, like in case of Yemen that is undoubtedly a coin, which has two sides. Peace deal reached in Yemen with the support of Security Council, that on the one hand resulted in political transition and presidential elections in the country, on the other hand has never been implemented (Reinl, 2019).

Overall, after looking briefly on the events of Arab spring, and their aftermath, called as well Arab Winter, I would like to stress the main point: Security Council failed at the stage of peace operation letting the uprisings turn to ferocious civil wars in case of Libya and Syria. The main role in peaceful settlement process played regional organizations such as African Union and Arab League. The events of the Arab Spring demonstrated the weaknesses of the Security Council and created a bad precedent within a body that has already encountered numerous complications in speaking with one voice, expressing a unified opinion.

The failure in different cases of the United Nations, as the most influential international security organization, to stop the violence in Middle East, once again makes the issue of reforming the heart of this organization – the Security Council relevant. Despite the divergent viewpoints on

how to move this forward, generally the Security Council reform must meet strictly identified criterias.

First and foremost, due to a lack of a real responsibility for the violation of the international law, there is a problem of using this gap consciously by the states. Therefore, there isn't enough protection for the UN members, especially the small and less powerfull ones, which are afraid to rely completely on the international enforcement measures.

This follows another controversial problem closely interconnected with a special status of the five permanent members of the Security Council. The United Nations with all its genious conception, is completely helpless in cases when the great powers, who hold a permanent honorific chair in the Security Council, choose the wrong way of violation of the international law. Selfwithdrawal of the Security Council in particular cases of solving international conflicts and suppression of acts of aggression, examples of abstainig, nonparticipation or blocking of a number of significant decisions violate the Charter and international law. All in all this creates a permanent threat to other members of the United Nations, which are unable to protect themselves when the lack of compulsion against the prosperous and influential states exists in the system. The potential solution for the issue has been searched for and France took the initiative to introduce a mechanism of blocking a veto of permanent members of the UN Security Council in matters of genocide or mass atrocities (The Local.fr, 2019). Another approach would be to cancel the veto at all. The problem with the first concept is that its cancellation requires the consent of all members of the Security Council. For such a decision 2/3 of the General Assembly should vote, and five permanent members of the Security Council. So in other words, the country should vote against itself to be deprived of the veto and in practice it is almost impossible (Ibid.).

It is an extremely controversial issue, whether the number of members of the Security Council will be increased, however the change is needed for the body to proceed legitimately on a large scale. Unfortunately, the reform of this kind is suspended due to national interests of the permanent members, who are unwilling to share their power. But still even if states would agree on raising the number of permanent places, there is a significant dispute within the regional groups concerning the point, which state should get the status of a permanent member. What is more, they can not agree on the establishment of the objective political criteries, required to become a permanent member. The evidence suggest though that increasing the number of permanent members would have increased the possibility of disagreements and would pose additional challenges to the prompt decision-making.

When it comes to the permanent members' attitude towards a reform there is no unanimity. Generally, China supports the reform of the UN Security Council. In a statement, made by Deputy Minister of Foreign Affairs of China Wu Dawei, it was said that China doesn't want to see the United Nations split. The diplomat stated that China supports the reform of the organization and expansion of the Security Council. Furthermore, at a press conference on May 20, 2005 Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesman Liu Jianchao said that the primary task is to eliminate the imbalance in the body, arguing that the Security Council should adhere to the

principle of equitable geographical distribution of seats in the UN. Also he stated that an increase in the representation of developing countries is needed.

The USA position on the Security Council's reform is also thought-provoking. When India, Brazil, Germany and Japan have proposed to provide six new permanent members of the Security Council with the same rights as the current members, including the veto power, this statement immediately sparked a protest from the US. The US reluctance to support such a reform option has been announced by the U.S Mission to the United Nations.

A. Belonogov argues that the expansion of the Security Council will lead to further erosion of influence of the Russian Federation in Security Council and the organization as a whole, especially if the permanent members of the Security Council will be economic superpowers - Japan and Germany. He also noticed that the will of the Russian Federation to reform the body is effected by its fear to lose a leading position in the creating of world's order.

"I think that for Russia the United Nations are more important than for the Soviet Union. Just because Russia is now much weaker. UN for it – a kind of float in the form of permanent membership in the Security Council, through which Russia politically keeps much higher position than otherwise Russia could count on. Many other countries have to build a relationship with us politically differently because we are necessary for them as a permanent member of the Security Council."

Regarding the official position of Russia, basically it is not opposed to the idea of rotation of the states on the new permanent places. Concerning the granting of veto power to new permanent members, the decision on this matter should be taken only after agreement is reached on the specific structure of an expanded Security Council. However, the number of members of the reformed Security Council should not exceed 20-21, as going beyond these quantitative limits will adversely affect the effectiveness of the institution.

However, apparently, despite all attempts to push forward the reform of the Security Council, it still remains in place. Moreover, it seems that a group set up in 2005 by Kofi Annan, which included 16 influential international figures together with their two versions of the Security Council's reform, failed to solve the problem. Kofi Annan and his supporters provided two options of reform: the first option – enlargement of the Security Council on 6 permanent members and three non-permanent, where 2 permanent members should be elected from Africa, 2 – from the Asia-Pacific region, one permanent member from Europe and - one from America. And the second option - under which the Security Council should include members that would be called semi-permanent, which should be elected for a 4 years term with possible re-election.

In 2005 one more project have been presented by the so-called Coffee Club, represented by Italy, Canada, Pakistan, Argentina and Colombia. The initiative proposed to keep 5 permanent members and to increase the number of non-permanent to 20. In 2011 a special meeting was held, where 120 of UN members took part.

All things considered, the Security Council together with the international community continues to improve legal mechanisms to respond effectively to new challenges that it is facing

with, in order to provide timely assistance and of course to maintain global order and security. However, coupled with problems in the coordination of the Security Council's actions, decentralisation and unequal power distribution creates a situation in which a legitimacy of the institution is being questioned. Crisis that appears to be profound can not be ignored by the international community anymore. Certain measures are need to be taken in order to prepare the body to face the challenges of XXIst century.

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