The Balkans Dialogue
Conflict Resolution and EU Accession Politics in the Balkans and Turkey

International Conference - 8–9 February, 2013

Booklet of Abstracts

- International Conflict Resolution; Border Disputes
- Interstate Relations and Diplomacy
- Legal problems of international relations; International Law Issues
- National and Ethnic Minority Question; Ethnic and Social Issues
- Regional Security Issues
- The Role of the European Union; Pre-Accession Strategies

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International Conflict Resolution; Border Disputes I.

Europeanisation as a Tool of Border Conflict Resolution

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There are many definitions of border, frontier and boundary in the social sciences. According to the vocabulary definitions, they mean “the line that separates one country, state, province from another”; “the district or region that lies along the boundary line of another” or “a frontier of a state or of the settled part of a country”. Borders also mean “parts of cultural landscapes which often transcend the physical limits of the state and defy the power of state institutions” (Donnan and Wilson, 1999: 4). Culture reflects political and economic conditions in the borderlands. Local and regional cultures in borderlands have proactive role which encourage cooperation and conflict along international borders.

The populations who live at the border region share culture and a common past and they may have a common political future. Although this assumption can be thought as borders are markers of the peaceful relations, the other side of the coin says it can be hostile relations between a state and its neighbours. The state applications at borders are like a mirror which reflects the real image and the hidden ones that transformations of citizenship and being the population live at borders. Therefore borderlanders are more influenced by the values, ideas and customs of the other side of borders than capital cities. This unique characteristic gives them a sense of political and social separateness and otherness (Martinez, 1994; 8-14).

When the most famous symbol of the border between the bipolar system failed, some nation-states were reawakened and the effect of this dissolution wind, a series of ethnonationalist conflicts occured. Although the post-1989 transformations produced new type of border issues intensely, globalisation and internationalisation of culture and economy bring the relaxation control system especially at the movement of people, goods and capital. It is also known that integration does have a positive effect on border conflict transformations; but the real impact of integration which cannot overlook is the cross border cooperation. Especially culture plays social construction and negotiation form at the borders and the border regions.

The European Union (EU) integration policies support sustainable solutions at the periphery of the EU. Europeanisation can be understood a process which is encouraged by the EU and the key concept of border conflict resolutions. The paper explores Europeanisation as a method of conflict settlement and conflict resolution at the border regions. Especially the paper analyses the power of culture and perceptions of the population live at the border regions and their responses to the Europeanisation process.

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Building the region through cooperation in the area of justice, freedom and security: the case of Western Balkans

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Despite the recent positive trends regarding the EU enlargement policy in the Western Balkans and the overall positive political, economic and societal transformation that has occurred, regional countries still face numerous governance weaknesses, mostly deriving from the legacies of the conflicts and authoritarian regimes during the 1990s. This regional development, causing the phenomenon of weak states and societies, has been subsequently followed by the growth of organized crime and corruption, further hindering democratic and economic consolidation. Indeed, the Transparency International data regarding corruption shows that most of the Western Balkans countries are way below the EU-27 index (2012), Freedom House depicts the political stagnation in the region (2012) while Europol’s organized crime threat assessment claims that Western Balkans creates one of the major criminal hubs responsible for the drugs trade, illegal migration and human trafficking (OCTA report, 2011).

In this context, research purpose is to analytically assess building of the zone of justice, freedom and security in the Western Balkans region in particular domains of fight against the corruption and organized crime. Paper argues that this security regime in the Western Balkans region is developed as an interplay between the Europeanization process and internal dynamics of Western Balkans regions. In another words, EU-induced change in the selected domains of the Justice and Home Affairs (JHA) policies of the Western Balkan countries is being mutually constituted and reinforced through the intensified cooperation among the regional countries themselves in the areas of police, justice and intelligence cooperation. In this way, the Western Balkans’ area of justice, freedom and security is shaped both by the Europeanization (top-down) and locally-driven process of regional cooperation (bottom-up).

Namely, countries of the region, including the wider South-Eastern Europe have pooled their resources and established plethora of initiatives dealing with the JHA-related issues. These initiatives have included Regional SECI Centre for Combating Trans-Border Crime/SELEC, Migration, Asylum, Refugees Regional Initiative (MARRI), Regional Anti-Corruption Initiative (RAI), Southeast European Prosecutors Advisory Group (SEEPAG), South East Europe Police Chiefs Association (SEPCA), Police cooperation convention for Southeast Europe (PCC SEE) and others. These regional initiatives have been supplemented by the bilateral agreements between the countries on the judiciary and police cooperation, constituting a nexus of regional institutions and actors suppressing corruption and organized crime through the exchange of law-enforcement information, sharing of intelligence data and security services and joint operational activities.

This dynamics has occurred simultaneously with the EU enlargement process that has largely supported regional cooperation in the Western Balkans, naming it one of the EU accession criteria. EU-induced reforms in the chapter 24: “Justice, Freedom and Security” have helped building the appropriate institutional capacities and reforming the domestic policies of the WB countries. However, these changes of the rules and patterns of domestic policies have been supplemented with the specific regional dynamics in the WB region, building on the regional needs and peculiarities. Efforts of the WB countries in suppressing corruption and organized crime, endowed with mutual trust and confidence-building are hence part of the new regionalism endeavours or “region-building process” in the WB being marked with the principles of local ownership, solidarity, all-inclusiveness and partnership.
Post-Second World War Case of Conflict Resolution: Question of Trieste

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This paper’s main target is analysing the historical question of Trieste by its phases, causes and impacts. Depending on the consequences of WWI and taking new and fluctuating forms during the interwar period and in particular, after the Second World War, the question appears as one of the striking questions for south-eastern European and/or Balkanian agendas in the 20th century. Occupied by Royal Italian Army Troops in 1918 and officially annexed by the Treaty of Rapallo in 1920, the part of the partitioned Austro-Hungarian Empire’s Austrian littoral, this strategic region had been one of the prominent components of the Italian national projection and irredentismo. At the end of the war, Trieste was a region assessed in a differing scale from the unified Italy and newly shaped kingdom of Yugoslavia (State of Slovenes, Croats and Serbs). During the post-Second World War period, some ephemeral tensions were being substituted by the diplomatically and militarily empowered oppositions between Italy and Yugoslavia. Hence, it’s aimed to study on the question which grew after WWII and had become a vital issue for the future and security of the regional cooperation and peace.

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The relationship between two neighboring countries, Turkey and Greece, is always disrupted by the disputes over Cyprus and Aegean Islands. The disputes over Cyprus and Aegean Islands shape the foreign policies of both Turkey and Greece towards each other. However, especially after 1990s, it is seen that there is a rapprochement between two countries in bilateral relations. At this point, it is true to say that the rapprochement is mostly based on “low politics” issues while “high politics” issues remain unsolved. Due to the fact that “high politics” issues touch the very nature of principles of “national security”, “sovereignty rights” and “national interests”, which are sensitive issues to states, both two countries proceed cautiously towards each other. In addition, it should be said that European Union plays strategic role in Turkish-Greek relations in certain ways. It is true to say that both Turkey and Greece have a similar process in the way of EU membership. While Greece became member of EU in 1981, Turkey is still waiting for membership. It should be added that Greece uses the advantages of being member of EU over Turkey by using its veto power in order to block the membership of Turkey. EU also comes up with some preconditions for Turkey in terms of settling the disputes with Greece by saying that otherwise, the membership will not be possible. The Helsinki Summit in 1999 was important turning point for Turkey in the relations with both EU and Greece. Turkey was given candidate status in Helsinki Summit in which Greece decided not to block Turkey. It was important in terms of transforming the relations between Greece and Turkey from bad to good one. However, it should be said that the disputes over Cyprus and Aegean Islands remain unsolved. With the membership of Cyprus to EU, Cyprus becomes a veto against Turkey for membership in addition to remaining dispute with Greece. On the other hand, it should be said that the relationship between Greece and Turkey develop in terms of economically and socially while disputes remains unsolved and as obstacles for Turkey in the way of EU.

After giving background information for the issue, in this paper, I will firstly analyze major disputes between Turkey and Greece, which are Aegean Islands and Cyprus. It should be said that the disputes should be analyzed briefly in order to understand basic concerns of two neighboring countries. I will also analyze the transformation of the relations between Greece and Turkey after 1999, which creates a new era for both Turkey and Greece and their relations with EU. In the following part, I will present the EU’s role in the relationship between Greece and Turkey and how the disputes between two countries affect the EU’s perspective towards Turkey. Considering all these information, I will argue that EU cannot be considered as a solution in settling the disputes between Greece and Turkey. Because Greece has a power of being EU member over Turkey, who is waiting for membership for 47 years, Greece wants to use its advantage in settling the disputes in favor of him. Both two countries look the disputes over Cyprus and Aegean Islands as “national interest” and “national security” issues. In this way, I will discuss that while Greece uses its membership as bargaining power vis a vis Turkey, it will be hard for both countries to settle the disputes. With the membership of Cyprus to EU, it is true to say that the issue becomes more complicated for Turkey in the sense that Cyprus also uses its veto power against Turkey membership due to Turkey does not recognize it as a state. It should be mentioned that it is hard to solve the conflicts between two neighboring countries within EU while one is member, other is not. My emphasis will be on Greece and Turkey relations within the framework of EU by excluding Cyprus as a state in my argument. Because the issue is very broad, I will mostly focus on the disputes and the reasons of why they cannot be solved within EU. As a conclusion, I will summarize my paper and make an overall statement.
The Impact of International Mediation on the Armenian-Azerbaijani Conflict

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The post-cold war era has been marked by ethnic conflicts, the legacy of years of beign neglect by communist regimes, and unresolved ethnic tensions. The longing of contending parties to resolve their conflicts on the battlefield led to many fatalities, thus creating hurting stalemates. The Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict has been “the first and arguably the most violent conflict” (Mooradian & Druckman, 1999, p. 709) since the collapse of the Soviet Union. Six attempts of mediation by the leaders of Iran, Kazakhstan, Russia, and intervention by the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) failed to persuade the disputant parties to seek a solution around negotiating tables (Mooradian & Druckman, 1999). My research will explore the conflict between Armenia and Azerbaijan, focusing upon the impact of the OSCE Minsk Group in the resolution of the conflict. I will evaluate the efficiency of the negotiations that occurred through the mediation of the Minsk Group from 1995 until 2010. Relying upon primary data, I will employ an in-depth interview method of qualitative research. My thesis will follow the case study approach in order to determine the overall behavior and attitude of the OSCE Minsk Group towards the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict. The project will contribute to the development of the research with its different method, which has not been employed in the field of international mediation.

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The Mediterranean Security in the Light of Cyprus Issue and Turkish Cypriot-Greek Cypriot Relations

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The island named Cyprus in the midst of the Eastern Mediterranean is supposed to be the island of the problems and the immigrations throughout the history. Once upon a time the island seemed to be an aircraft carrier. Taking the happenings and the strategical disputes today into consideration, the island has to turn into not only one, but at least 50 aircraft carriers. Especially starting from 1963, the island is the essence of the turmoil, and the chaos for the UN, Western countries, and the guarantor countries on the island; Turkey, Greece, and the United Kingdom. Today Greek Cypriots (Republic of Cyprus as accepted by the entire world and the EU) is the member of EU, and President Hristofias used to be the chairman of the EU up to 31st December 2012. As American naval strategist Alfred Thayer Mahan has pointed out the Mediterranean and the island there has a great strategic importance for the countries so as to enlarge and locate forward posts in the Mediterranean and especially in the Middle East territory. French aircraft carrier mostly anchors off Zigi village in the southern Cyprus in addition to the British bases located in Episkopi and Akrotiri. Those military bases house the American marines as well. Considering 6th March 1964 to start United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) on the island, the island and the Mediterranean is nothing but a military area for the local, continental and global forces. Out of the global issues, the local problem in the area is the Turco-Greek relations mostly depending on Cyprus issue. Being the member countries in NATO, Turkey and Greece have a very flexible and disturbing relations subsequent to 20th July 1974 military operation on the island. Continental shelf, territorial waters, FIR line, NOTAM, acceptance of Turkey to EU, the isolation upon Turkish Cypriots are some of the problems expected not to be solved so easily in near future. The strategic position of the Mediterranean, the problems between Turkey and Greece, bankruptcy of EU financially, disputes between Greek and Turkish Cypriots make Mediterranean very sensitive and ready to explode position. This scientific study will focus on security problems and some analysis for the future basing upon the relations of the neighbouring countries there.

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The Role of the EU in the Conflict Resolution in the Western Balkans. The case of Bosnia and Herzegovina

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The present paper will be presented at the international conference The Balkans Dialogue: Conflict Resolution and EU Accession Politics in the Balkans and Turkey, taking place in Budapest during 8-9 February, 2013. The paper will show Johan Galtung’s theory of Positive and Negative Peace that comprises a part of the theoretical framework of the Scandinavian conflict resolution and peace research can help us better understand the challenges involved in peace-making in Bosnia as well as the role the European Union can play therein.

My PhD thesis aims to shed light on the role of the European Union in resolving the conflict of Bosnia and Herzegovina. It can be argued that 17 years after the ceasefire agreement the conflict in Bosnia is still an unresolved outstanding problem. The social-political situation is unstable in the country despite the end of the war, because the structural psychological triggers and conditions for future violence still exist. The theory of Johan Galtung about negative, positive and cultural peace will be applied and should help us measure the level of peacefulness as well as explain why positive peace still has not been achieved de-spite the numerous efforts and engagements of the international community, represented by the UNO and NATO, in the region. In 2003 the EU took over the stabilization and further peace-building process in Bosnia and Herzegovina.

EU can contribute to building positive peace via the reduction of the structural violence indicators in Bosnia, adopting the Galtung’s approach of conflict transformation by peaceful means. Structural violence indicators in Bosnia are: division in the party structure (Croat, Serb and Bosniak parties: SNSD, SDA, SBB, etc outnumber the united parties like SDP); decentralized institutions (separate institutions of Republika Srpska and Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina, and the status of Brcko is diffuse); territorial-administrative organization, fostering the ethnic division in the country; disrespect for human rights (to mention the problematic status of the local Roma and Jewish minorities, and Muslims according to Human Right Watch); high morbidity rate according to local medical archives; high unemployment rate according to Index Mundi; low level of life expectancy; violence against media according to the Bosnia news agency; and preservation of cultural and religious material culture (buildings, churches...(Ramet, 2002; Chapman, 1994, Galtung, 1990).
The European Union’s crisis management activity in Bosnia and Herzegovina

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After the incompetence during the Bosnian war, the European Union wanted to support the Bosnian peace process in the framework of the common security and defence policy, which was established in 1999. My paper concentrates on the European Union’s first crisis management operation, the EUPM Bosnia, which started in January 2003 and focused on the issue of creating a Bosnian police service in accordance with the European and international standards and practice. Towards this the mission’s mandate included the following activities:

- mentoring, monitoring and inspecting, to establish in BiH a sustainable, professional and multiethnic police service;
- assist local authorities in planning and conducting organized crime investigations;
- improve the functioning of the whole criminal justice system, enhancing police-prosecutor relations in particular.

The other pillar of my paper is the military operation of the EU, EUFOR Althea, which started on 2nd December 2004. The decision to launch this still ongoing military mission followed the decision by NATO to conclude its SFOR-operation and the adoption Resolution 1575 by the UN Security Council to authorize the deployment of an EU force in BiH. The EUFOR Althea has two types of activity. On the one hand key military tasks and on the other hand key supporting tasks belong to its mandate. The main goal of key military tasks is to maintain a safe and secure environment in BiH. Key supporting tasks embrace two fields of activity. First, conducting regular operations designed to catch persons indicted for war crimes and to disrupt to their support networks. The second essential key supporting task is fighting against organized crime.

In my paper I would like to survey the mandate, structure and activity of the EUPM and EUFOR Althea, the relationship between the two crisis management operations, and the experiences of the closed EUPM and the ongoing EUFOR Althea.

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When international intervention meets the local context: state-formation, ethnopolitics and local ownership in the Bosnian way

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As Benjámin Kállay wrote in his Memorandum in 1877, one year before the Austrian-Hungarian occupation of Bosnia-Herzegovina: “all kind of theoretical doctrinarism should be avoided [...] administrative, legal and financial relations should be transformed by taking into account the existing local customs and practices”. International intervention and statebuilding never happens in a tabula rasa context, it has to be based on the local social, historical and economic realities. The outcome of international intervention is often contingent and unintended, and dependent on the one hand on local actors who actively use, manipulate or adapt to the opportunities made available by international actors, and on the other hand on the structural and organizational constraints of the heterogeneous and divided international community. Focusing on the interactions and interdependence of international and domestic political actors can prove to be a fruitful way of explaining the limits of the EU’s transformative power and external statebuilding in the case of Bosnia-Herzegovina. The purpose of the paper is to illuminate the causes of why seventeen years of international statebuilding efforts have only partly resulted in a state which is capable of providing social trust as a basic public good and ownership to its citizens. Indeed, they reinforced ethnic identities and left Bosnian citizens disempowered. I will argue that inter-nationally led statebuilding has not been able to address the root cause of the Bosnian conflict, especially competing and unreconciled claims concerning the nexus of territory and identity. The aims of the local ownership approach have been hijacked by the local ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’ who use fear and distrust as political currency, apply politics of division against inter-ethnic cooperation and prefer selectively adopting to EU conditionality, satisfying the needs of their clientelistic networks. Therefore, EU accession process could only have limited leverage over domestic poli-tics in Bosnia. I would also like to share some lessons learnt from my field trips and interviews concerning a more realistic international strategy on Bosnia-Herzegovina.

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In the past two decades the Bulgarian-Macedonian relations undergone some radical changes, the 1990s where marked by a warm and cooperative atmosphere, however the first decade of the new millennium brought estrangement and tensions in the relations between Sofia and Skopje. From being one of the main supporters of Macedonia’s international integration, today Bulgaria became one of the sharpest critics of its’ western neighbour. Behind the radical change of attitude there lies Macedonia’s controversial usurpation of Bulgarian historic values and heritage and furthermore the hostile policy dictated towards each other by the two governments. On the one hand Sofia is critical towards Skopje due to the Macedonian interpretation of some key moments and figures of their shared history; on the other hand the Bulgarian government condemns the discriminative processes launched by the Macedonian authorities against the Bulgarians living in Macedonia and the Bulgarian investors.

Macedonia accused the Bulgarian governing party, the Citizens for European Development of Bulgaria (GERB) with imposing populist political sanctions, similar to those introduced by Greece which are trammelling Skopje’s Euro-Atlantic integration for more than two decades, in order to gain political benefits for the upcoming parliamentary elections in 2013. In 2012 a drastic change in the Bulgarian foreign policy guidelines triggered a greater attention from Sofia towards the regional and neighbourhood political relations. The government’s decision not to support Macedonia’s accession negotiations during the European Council’s meeting in December 2012 was welcomed in an ambivalent way in Bulgaria. The government stood out for its position and affirmed that Macedonia has its place in the European Union, but prior to the accession all bilateral relations with Sofia must be straighten out.

Although the aggravation of the Bulgarian-Macedonian relations would not pose such a risk for Skopje’s EU-accession as the infamous Greek-Macedonian name dispute, but nonetheless it would hinder all Macedonian ambitions for a long period of time. The bilateral negotiations initiated by the Bulgarian foreign minister, Nikolay Madenov indicate that Bulgaria still remains a strong ally, but in the future it would not tolerate the clearly anti-Bulgarian attitude of the Macedonian leaders. Macedonia’s identity-building policy remains one of the most controversial regional political factors, which may lead to an even greater conflict in this region of Southeast Europe. The road for Macedonia towards the European Union leads not only through Athens, but via Sofia as well.

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Since the end of the cold war, both Russia's role in the Balkan and their relations have been progressively decreasing in significance. However, Serbian public thought have largely ignored this tendency. In fact, since the Serbian change of system, the Russian connection has become a sort of alternative to the EU-joining. Based on a somewhat exaggerated cultural and religious fraternity, Serbian political agents regard Russia as a savior and they tend to handle Russia's interests as a primary factor, superior to their own interests. In return, they expect the “bigger brother” to protect Serbian interests in the larger international scene - a situation from which Russian diplomacy tries to take as much advantage as possible. Unlike China (as it can be seen in the revival of the so-called 'vassal gift' model), Russia does not follow a traditionally more oriental, feudal lord-vassal relationship model. Asymmetric opportunities are used by Russia's politics in a more western system of relations that is based on economic rationality, in order to regain its weakened Easter-European positions at least in the Balkan. In other countries of the region (e.g. Montenegro, Croatia), this manifests in economical matters only. But in the case of Serbia, an asymmetric model is present which is in some way the opposite of the Chinese example. Here, the weaker party of the relationship, Serbia takes a relatively bigger burden, in the hope that the stronger party will stand up for Serbian interests in international organizations. Due to the aforementioned attitude of a perceived and probably overrated cultural fraternity, the Serbian political discourse is dominated by the false dilemma of Russia or Europe, even after the change of system. Russia never actually caused or facilitated this dilemma in an explicit way, but its behavior has assisted the survival of such interpretations. Recent political events has brought about a significant change in Russian foreign relations (compared to the tendencies of the last one and a half decade). This can be summarized as follows: mainly for military and energy reasons,

Russia has interests in maintaining the aforementioned false alternative, since this enables Russia to optimize its positions in the Balkan. Our lecture discusses the most recent turns in the Belgrade-Moscow relationship - with a regional political context that includes the EU and the NATO as well.
A Neo-realist Analysis of Turkish Foreign Policy Towards Balkans

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The primary concern of this paper is to find out Turkish foreign policy towards Balkans with respect to the premises of neo-realism based mainly on the changing structure of international system. There are signs and symptoms of a shift from unipolarity to another structure in which some major European powers may have potential to become great powers. As it was clearly depicted in previous historical examples, Balkans has a distinct role in a structural transformation since there have always been particular national interests of various great powers.

The paper initially describes the current structure of international system from a neo-realist point of view. The discussions on changing structure of the international system are also evaluated briefly in order to understand the importance of Balkans for the major powerful actors. Among them Russia takes precedence over other powers for several reasons. The European powers and the US also have considerable reasons to pay attention to the Balkans.

In such an intricate political setting the roles played by major regional actors have also become critical in terms of global power balance. As one of the emerging middle powers, Turkey has particular interest in the Balkans. Furthermore, Turkey has security concerns in its close land basin in the west since there is a lack of stability in the Balkan region. For this purpose, Turkey tries to utilize a more active foreign policy in this region, which conversely causes a defect in Turkish foreign policy since some regional actors perceives Turkey’s intention in terms of hegemonic influence.

This paper confirms that Turkey tries to increase its ability to influence the regional actors in the Balkans while argues that Turkey’s efforts are primarily concentrated on increasing political and economic stability in the Balkans rather than dominating the region. Therefore, this paper concludes that Balkans may keep stability in a multipolar world where great powers may try to increase their influence on different regional actors. The paper further argues that Turkey should take necessary steps to convince regional actors that the real intention of Turkey is not to dominate Balkans politically, but to support stability in this region in order to weaken the influence of non-regional great powers in a possible multipolar world.

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Turkey and the Armenian Question: 1915’s perception in Turkey and around the world

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The question of whether the Ottoman government committed a genocide or not during the World War I is still one of the most controversial agenda in Turkey’s foreign policy. The destruction of the Ottoman Armenians between 1915-1917, which was called by the Triple Entente in 1915 as a “crime against humanity”, was recognized as genocide in many countries all over the world. The politically motivated recognitions or non-recognitions were mostly due to the actual geopolitical needs, therefore Turkey, the “bulwark of the West”, could extremely exploited her important situation during the Cold War, while after the fall of the Iron Curtain the standpoint of the Western Powers has suddenly changed. Many EU member and the EU itself has recognized the genocide several years before, risking their diplomatic and economic relations with Turkey, but Russia did the same as well during the 90’s. The two most important exception are the USA and Israel, where the process of the recognition was usually undermined by political intrigues and lobby activities, and, of course, by the fear of loosing Turkey as an important ally in the region.

In my presentation I attempt to show this very interesting and complex scene, describing the evolution of the different interpretations regarding the Armenian Question in the Western and Turkish historical science. I will outline the three phases of the Turkish, and the five phases of the Western perception, defined by the well-known genocide researcher, Donald Bloxham, and the Swiss historian, Hans-Lukas Kieser, and finally, I would like to say some words on the actual situation and the expected developments in Turko-Armenian relations.

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Cross border co-operation between Bulgaria and Turkey: example of Burgas and Kirkraleli region

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Cross border cooperation (CBC) is a form of international cooperation exercised bilaterally or trilaterally among nations who share common borders and distributive policy that provides funds to the Union’s border regions (Heidbreder, 2011; Ozerdem, 2011). In September 2004 the Euro-pean Commission (EC) proposed two new instruments that meant a far reaching reform of the cooperation practice with accession countries and countries outside the European Union (EU) external borders. The Turkey - Bulgaria Cross Border Cooperation Programme’s main objective is to promote sustainable and equal socio-economic development in border regions to make it competitive for economical and business development and attractive for living and visiting (Joint Programming Document, 2004). Research area in this theoretical description is characterized in example of Kirkraleli and Burgas region where lives accordingly 332791 and 415,817 inhabitants (Turkish Statistical Institute, 2011; Burgas district development strategy 2005 - 2015, 2010). The total budget of the programme for the 2007 - 2009 programming period is 11814525 Euro, of which 10042346 Euro is represented by EU contribution. The remaining 1772179 Euro are national contributions from national budgets of partnering countries (Joint Programming Document, 2004). This paper aim is to made comparative description between cross - border cooperation between Bulgaria and Turkey in Burgas and Kirkraleli field studies region. Data is used from Bulgaria’s and Turkey’s state statistical bureau’s.

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Cross-border cooperation between Macedonia and Greece as an instrument for good neighbourhood relations

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Cross-border cooperation of the Republic of Macedonia with Greece is quite specific and complex, not because the program structure, institutional features and characteristics of the population in the border area, but because of the historical and political relations of the two countries, outstanding national issues and subtle interstate problem that concerns the constitutional name of the Republic of Macedonia, which gained international dimensions. For these reasons, the study and analysis of cross-border cooperation between Macedonia and Greece is a major challenge, given the fact that its successful development and effectuation may contribute to the approximation of the two countries and peoples, increasing multi dimensional and multi-faceted cooperation, and mutual approximation to the actual values that characterize the European Union.

The subject of this paper will be the cross-border cooperation between Macedonia and Greece as an instrument for a better neighbourhood relations. The main goal of this paper will be to explain how the cross-border cooperation can influence on the improvement of the mutual relations, as well as for creation of better relations between the people from different countries. The methods which will be used in this paper: descriptive method, comparative method, content analysis method, historical method, etc.
Despite the growing interest on the issue of minority rights and protection of national minorities among EU studies scholars, especially in relationship to the recent Eastern enlargements, the impact of exogenously-sponsored minority legislation on the development of the accession negotiations still represents a relatively unexplored ground.

Our study aims to addressing this phenomenon in the Balkan region by conducting a comparative analysis including a wide sample of countries. More specifically, the proposed analysis will trace the developments of the EU’s candidate countries and potential candidate countries of the Balkan area: Albania, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Croatia, Kosovo, Macedonia, Montenegro, and Serbia starting from year 2002, when the Commission started to yearly report the progress of each country within the framework of the Stabilization and Association Process (SAP).

In particular, countries’ progress in adapting national legislation safeguarding minority rights represents our dependent variable. The assessment of the quality of national regulations and the developments overtime are based on the EU country reports published yearly by the European Commission. The tangible progress in the EU accession negotiations constitutes our independent variable. To determine the proximity to the EU membership we look at the state of the SAP negotiations and at one country's status as candidate or potential candidate (formal recognition, de facto recognition, absence of recognition).

The final discussion will be based on a typology of the Balkan countries addressing their degree of adaptation to the EU-sponsored legislation on minority rights as reflected by their relative proximity to the EU membership.
The activities of the ICTY as an intervening variable in the EU enlargement processes in the Western Balkan region

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The starting point for the analysis is the observation that the ICTY sentences and acquittals result not only in several days of enthusiastic celebration or violent demonstration on the main squares in the Balkan capital cities, but also have far reaching consequences for the inter-ethnic dialogue and reconciliation, regional and international stance towards the ICTY, development of the historic narratives in the Western Balkans and finally regional cooperation, which was referred to as one of the principles of the highest importance by the EU member states on the 2003 Thessaloniki Summit on the Balkans and still seems to be one of the crucial premises for the inclusion of the region into the European and Euro-Atlantic systems.

The above mentioned observation led the author to formulation of an hypothesis that the cooperation of the Balkan states with the ICTY does not only influence the fulfilment of one of the European Commission’s crucial requirement, being simply the full cooperation with the inter-national justice system, but indirectly influences potential fulfilment of numerous other requirement, both general, such as the regional cooperation, as well as state-specific, such as the normalization of the Belgrade-Pristina relationships.

The aim of the paper is to define the areas of influence and its potential consequences, as well as to indicate how the negative impact can be overcome. The study is based on an analysis of the crucial ICTY verdicts, as well as societal and political reactions to them. The reactions will be studied mainly by media and political discourse analysis, mainly on the intra-regional Balkan level.

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Violated Human Rights and Freedoms near the EU: Analysing the Turkish Alevi Community’s Human Rights Position in the Process of EU Accession

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In an international legal framework where the rights of minorities in each State have long been decided on an ad-hoc basis, the unique source of the minority regime in Turkey has been the 1923 Lausanne Treaty. Although the Treaty gave minority status only to some non-Muslims in Turkey, developments in the international law on human rights, and liberal theoretical approaches could provide an opportunity for groups like the Alevis to be treated on equal citizenship basis. As the largest ethno-religious and cultural group/minority in Turkey, the Alevis comprise approximately 15 million persons, most of whom face with human rights violations and non-recognition in Turkey. Alevis have traditionally been regarded with suspicion by Turkey’s Sunni Muslim majority and suffered both discrimination and occasional pogroms (Jenkins 2007, 189). Within the Turkey’s borders, Alevis constitute a much smaller part of the population than the Sunnis (Olsson, Özdalga and Raudvere 1999, 64), and about 20 per cent of Alevis are Kurds, equal to about 25 per cent of the total Kurdish population of Turkey (Buck 2008, 646). If Turkey is accepted into the European Union (EU), Alevis and Kurds would be the largest minorities of the EU, even larger than the whole Roma population within the EU’s current borders (Akbulut and Uysal 2008, 438). As this religious sect and their rituals become more distinct, they may even start to be perceived as different religions whose members might rightfully require to be recognized as such. Beyond this recognition problem, the issue has become a problem of EU accession of Turkey and human rights, which have failed to address adequately the merits of religious rights (Lerner 2003, 76).

A pluralist democracy in a multicultural environment in conditions of peace in one way can be established through empowering and protecting non-dominant groups that do not benefit from the same opportunities as the majority. Developments regarding minority rights, equal citizenship and rights will be examined to understand Alevis position under the framework of human rights protection and the accession-wish of Turkey to the EU. The question of the study will be shaped around the topic of developments in Turkey regarding human rights protection, and a specific investigation within the Alevi community. Furthermore, the question will be how the Alevi community’s human rights violations can be understood in the framework of human rights protection and Turkey’s accession-wish to the EU. Problems that Alevis face in exercising the human rights will be one of the main issues. By taking on EU values and human rights perspectives, a candidate country passes through the modernization process towards equal citizenship.

Several points, which will be underlined within this theme, are highly critical in explaining the Alevis’ opportunities and positions in enjoying their rights and freedoms under both collective and individual concepts of human rights within the EU accession process.

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The Greeks of Istanbul and EU harmonization

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I would like to present current ESI research on the problems facing religious minorities in Turkey, taking the Greek Orthodox in Istanbul as an example.

Some of these problems are directly related to the fact that religious communities in Turkey cannot attain legal personality. That is why the Ecumenical Patriarchate as such does not exist, the state only recognizes individual believers and foundations. This situation has been criticized many times by the EU, especially by the European Commission in its progress reports, but also by the Council of Europe’s Venice Commission, which published a report in 2010 offering Turkey four possibilities to introduce a legal personality for religious communities as they exist in different European countries. Ecumenical patriarch Bartholomeos during a presentation to the constitutional commission in the Turkish parliament in February 2012 referred to both EU standards and the recommendations of the Venice Commission. With a legal personality, religious communities could register and run strictly religious activities such as education of priests, church services and finance this through rent income of apartments and houses and donations.

However, besides the issue of legal personality, the situation for Christian and Jewish communities has improved in recent years in the course of the EU process. Most strikingly are the changes to the foundations’ law, which was reformed several times since 2002. These foundations are so important, because they finance the minority institutions like schools, churches, hospitals etc.. Through changes, these foundations now can sell and acquire property without problems and can claim back confiscated property, a process, which is ongoing. Not all problems are resolved, but amendments to the law are expected to overcome them. The same is true for the situation of minority schools. They faced many restrictions concerning their pupils, which have been partly addressed but the reform process needed to continue. For all these questions the EU process has proven to be a very useful tool to address them. This is why patriarch Bartholomeos and other leaders of religious minorities have been supporting Turkey’s EU membership.

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Home Sweet Home?: The Right of Return in Post-War Bosnia and Herzegovina

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Integral to the Dayton Peace Accords, aimed at ending the war in Bosnia, was meeting the needs of the 2.2 million Bosnians displaced by the war. Yet, the approach taken—to grant all Bosnians the Constitutional right to return to their pre-war home—focused only on the physical reconstruction of ruined houses and communities. This approach assumed that the return of displaced individuals would begin undoing the ethnic cleansing campaigns of the war. This paper argues that in defining both home and community as inherently physical spaces, the Accords overlooked the war’s destruction of social and personal relationships, instead emphasizing only the physical damage. Drawing upon fieldwork conducted in Northwest Bosnia in the spring of 2011, this paper shares personal narratives of returnees which problematize many dominant narratives of post-war return through highlighting return as a process not as a fixed end-goal. My interviewees illuminate the importance of the reconstruction of social and personal relations, another casualty of the war, as equally integral components of the process of return. Success of return, as defined by the Accords, rests on the number of returnees. While these numbers fail to reflect quality of life of returnees, they also mask the sustainability of return, especially to rural communities, where few opportunities exist for youth to root themselves in their community or country and the majority of returnees are elderly. As they die, these communities also die. This reality remains largely unexamined by programs facilitating return and, thus, unprepared for.

Furthermore, the goal of reversing ethnic cleansing demands active projects, such as forums for interethnic exchange between individuals, to breach the ethnic divides the war created. The recreation of ethnically diverse municipalities will not inherently restore the multiethnic communities pre-war Bosnia was known for. Promotion of return, while an important step towards post-war recovery, may not create the enduring communities or interethnic relationships necessary to build peace in Bosnia.

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The social model and the economic security in Europe

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The economic security has to be understood, in our opinion, as the essential factor of security, the one that ensures the resources and the dynamic balance of the other components who belong to this system. The limited character and the uneven allocation of the resources - even if it’s about energy resources, raw materials or food and water, the irreversible damage of the Earth’s natural balance by the environment degradation, the asymmetric evolution of the re-sources, illnesses, extreme poverty, poor education or the lack of it, the lack of balance between the rich states and the poor ones on the north-south axis of the planet are all vulnerabilities, with an insufficiently evaluated explosive potential. These are manifested in two ways: internally, the consequences can mark a sharp instability and externally, their export can not be stopped, but, at best, only managed. The economical dimension of the security will be determined and the national interest will function just like a bed of Procust.

The social European model is the one that consolidates the economic security which is the result of the interaction between the internal and external factors that enhance the distribution and consumption of the goods and services produced in a national economy. Thus, making a successful social model involving performance in the labor market, in education, in health and in the social services area sets the foundation of stable economic security and ensure appropriate economic policies. An efficient social model shall reduce economic insecurity, risks and vulnerabilities.

However, the European social model is a concept that has caused much controversy after the fall of the iron curtain. This concept includes a combination of processes and highly democratized institutions on one hand, and on the other hand a high level of social protection, a competitive economy, the existence of social dialogue, promoting equality, a performant education system and a health system that can cover the population’s needs as well as possible. Analyzing social policies and social protection systems in each European country we can better understand the role played by the European social model.

Before the end of the Cold War, economic models were based on national economies, leading to partial isolation. Security models were focused on the balanced confrontation between powers or super powers and their allies. After the Cold War, economic liberalization has also led to the changing of the security model. Currently, achieving security is increasingly based on interdependence and cooperation among states, for both internal and external problems. The question then arises, “Does Europe need a social model?”
The Ohrid Framework Agreement as a preventive document for the stability of Macedonia

Xhyla Çeliku - Prof. Dr. Fehari Ramadani (State University of Tetovo)

When analyzing the history of Macedonia, we always find it as a country that consists of a population with different ethnic backgrounds. When this population was under the Ottoman rule, it was less nationalists because there was a more religious than a national imposition and the people themselves had a foreign ruler. With Macedonia’s independence national feelings began to awaken, which crossed the border by not respecting the rights of others who also possessed the citizenship of the Republic of Macedonia, occasionally even with harassment, insults and prisons, violating the right to education in their native language of other ethnicities which population belonged to the majority in Macedonia. The situation got worse since the rights of other ethnicities were violated every day more and more, and as a result of this condition we have the armed conflict in Macedonia in 2001.

The armed conflict in Macedonia could have even escalated if it did not reach an agreement in Ohrid by both political representatives of the ethnic Albanian and Macedonian parties and thereby signed the Ohrid Framework Agreement in 2001. The Ohrid Agreement was considered as the strongest weapon of peace and stability in Macedonia and is considered even to this day as a preventive of other ethnicities in Macedonia for a stable and multi-ethnic country, and as a catalyst for Euro-Atlantic integration.

From the analysis of the content of the Ohrid Agreement it is clear that democracy must be respected, as well as the rights of every citizen, good inter-ethnic relations development, the internal stabilization of RM, the justice-administration and police reforms, the rights of the citizens who represent minorities in the Republic of Macedonia, the market economy, regional and international cooperation, etc... These points are not just to be respected because they are already listed in the OA but with their implementation our state will be a EU and NATO member, thus these are the conditions which are required from us by the internationals. Only in addition to fulfilling all the principles of the OA there will be stability and peace in Macedonia, this document itself is the prevention of any conflict, insecurity and instability in the country.

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Kosovo is an integral part of Serbian identity, which is important for the Serbian statehood. In this context, the problem of Kosovo is an important part of Serbian political parties and electoral campaigns agenda, which dominated after Slobodan Milosevic regime change in 2000. The beginning of democratic changes gave hope that the issue of Kosovo, which was mostly employed for the purpose of ethnic mobilization, would be dropped as the most important element of the regime strategy.

Nevertheless, the transformation of the political regime did not lead to fundamental changes in party politics with regard to Kosovo. Strongly supported by the former president (2000 - 2003) and Prime Minister (2004-2008) Vojislav Kostunica Kosovo policy was established in current Serbian constitution, which was approved in 2006. The appeal to national values, which one of the most important is keeping hold of Kosovo, can be understood as ancient regime heritage that is deeply rooted in Serbian society. This in turn encourages further escalation of territorial problem. Thereupon, it may be alleged that institutional value patterns adopted in the past determine how current Serbian parties operate, while changes in current policy are limited by political costs, such as potentially negative reaction of Serbian society and the decrease of electoral success.

As a result, Kosovo has long been and still remains a powerful tool for political mobilization. In this context, party policies on Kosovo determine that Serbian society continuously sees the issue of Kosovo as one of the most important domestic policy issues. Despite the ongoing rational maximization of benefits pursued by Serbian political parties, it cannot be denied that Kosovo, as an integral part of national identity, influences the operating strategies of all Serbian political actors. It follows that, in order to evaluate the political parties’ position on Kosovo, it is important to analyze the impact of rational actors and cultural factors, which are both emphasized by theoretical perspective of historical institutionalism.

This article examines the largest and most popular political parties in Serbia: Democratic Party, Democratic Party of Serbia, Serbian Socialist Party, Serbian Radical Party, Serbian Pro-gressive Party, New Serbia, G17 Plus (United Regions of Serbia) and Liberal Democratic Party.

The object of the article is the analysis of political parties’ public discourse on Kosovo that developed after S. Milosevic presidency. In accordance with historical institutionalism the author aims to evaluate Serbian political parties’ positions towards Kosovo in the period 2000-2012. In order to implement the latter purpose, the author analyzes election campaigns and what part the issue of Kosovo gets in those campaigns. Historical institutionalism theory’s emphasis on ideational aspect of party policy, consisting of values and discourse, provides a promising analytical tool for studying the Kosovo policy pursued by Serbian political parties.

Considering the importance of institutional environment and value system in analyzing Kosovo issue the paper is based on several sets of indicators: political texts and documents, mass media and sociological studies. The main focus is on public speeches of party representatives. The analysis is also based on opinion polls, which may indicate the public opinion on Kosovo. Using these entire methods author develops the extent of Kosovo issue establishment in Serbia.
Instabilities in Slovenian Society: Towards the Past or the future?

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In the beginning of transition Slovenia was often addressed as the story of success, which started splitting along the seams after 2008, and it seems it now fell into dust. For more than two decades Slovenia was performing well as an independent state and a new democracy and was seen as a role model for many counties, which started the transition at the same time. However, in recent years development and progress stopped. It seems that Slovenia hit the rock bottom, since the question whether it will end up like Greece is rising more and more often. Despite modernization and transition, Slovenia is facing conflicting elements, on one side Yugo nostalgia and desires for socialism are constantly emerging, but on the other, there are desires of belonging to the West and enforcing market oriented economy as the dominant economic force. Protests, which Slovenia witnesses at the end of 2012, point to an alarming political and economic situation in which Slovenia has found itself.

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National and Ethnic Minority Question; Ethnic and Social Issues II.

Multicultural education as a reality: psychological premise

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Multiculturalism is a reality based on the nature of the human being. Recent is common in almost all campaigns for human rights, to promote respect for cultural diversity. Such a trend obviously results in a reduction of non mutual tolerance between cultures that can bring the (separated) parallel worlds in a multi-ethnic society. In this paper is made an effort for theoretically elaborated the basic premise of cultural pluralism within the school context.

Initially we first discussed multiculturalism as taboo, as the bitter experience of the past in totalitarian systems against current transparent handling of this issue. Following is analyzing the concept of multiculturalism. Special attention in the paper is dedicated to passing of multi-culturalism in interculturalism and complexity of this process. In conclusion we emphasizing the psychological premises of interculturalism in the field of education, referring to the theory of Piaget (decentered thinking) and suggestions to the American psychologist Banks on equal pedagogy. In order to encourage intercultural dialogue we elaborate two key concepts to prac-tice multiculturalism in the school environment: 1.ability to watch things from the perspective of the cultural opposition , and 2.equal pedagogy in a pluralistic environment. Then we describe how to get qualified children to harmonize their views with those of others and to build equal involvement of students, regardless of their ethnic, religious and national backgrounds. Finally we conclude: to have a multiculturalism it’s not enough only to accept other cultures but is necessary to develop relationships - empathy with them.

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The learning of the other’s language and cultural corpus, a premise for a successful interethnic communication in Macedonia

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Macedonia is a distinctively multiethnic country, meaning that it is also a multilingual country, where different ethnicities live: Macedonians, Albanians, Turks, Serbs, Vlachs, Roma, Bulgarians and where also different languages are spoken: Macedonian, Albanian, Turkish, Serbian, Vlach, Bulgarian, and Romany.

Unfortunately, this linguistically and culturally diverse landscape is not used for the benefit of the internal interethnic communication and cohesion in Macedonia, but is often instrumentalized for low political purposes, leading to feelings of hostility between the ethnic communities in the country. The most recent cases, after the conflict in 2001, are the daily fights of young people in schools, urban buses, racist chants during football matches, the circulation of hateful songs about members of other ethnicities on the internet, and so on.

Although Macedonia is a multiethnic country, we find that its ethnicities within know very little or do not want to know about each other. If every third Albanian speaks Macedonian, on the other hand, one in ten Macedonians speak or speak only a little Albanian, which clearly shows the ignorance of others. To prove this, in this case, a survey was conducted with young Albanians and Macedonians from Kicevo, Gostivar and Tetovo, which has led to disastrous re-sults in terms of inter-ethnic communication in Macedonia, results which will be presented during the conference.

We conclude that working towards the recognition of one another’s language, culture, customs, traditions and history can help in overcoming the gaps between the different ethnici-ties.
Social trust, democracy, and the Kurdish issue in Turkey

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Despite the initial upsurge of hopes for a genuine solution to Turkey’s century-old Kurdish issue after the Justice and Development Party’s rise to power, since 2009 Turkey has rolled back to a cycle of securitization, violence, and polarization regarding the Kurdish issue. In this paper, I aim at providing a partial explanation to what it is that prevents Turkey from effectively addressing the Kurdish issue. I argue that low social trust among Turks is one of the major social factors that impede the solution of Kurdish issue.

I first outline the relationship between social trust and democracy. Social trust is one of the factors help build stronger and more effective democratic societies. Whether and how much people within a society trust other people in that society significantly shapes social and political relations within that society. First and foremost, social trust help develop social ties and social solidary, which strengthen the foundations of a democratic system (Almond and Verba, 1965; Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995). Societies with higher social trust are also found to have a better functioning democracy (Putnam, 1993; Inglehart, 1997; Cusack, 1999), which increases citizens’ satisfaction with the democratic system (Cusack, 1999).

Then, using recent surveys of Turkish public opinion, I demonstrate the widespread social distrust in Turkish society. Recent surveys reveal that Turkey is one the countries with lowest social trust in the world. Next, I provide specific examples of how low social trust impedes genuine steps that are required for democratization in general and solution of the Kurdish issue in particular. Lastly, using relevant findings in the literature and examples from comparable cases, I provide some suggestions as to how to improve social trust in Turkey.

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Ankara’s unorthodox liberal attitude towards the Kurdish issue under the rule period of post-Islamist Justice and Development Party (AKP) displayed many paradoxes that aggravate Turkey’s dilemmas and the challenges in terms of national security. Regardless of the fact that AK Party, in comparison to previous Turkish governments, adopted a more democratic discourse under the frames of its EU full membership agenda, Kurdish separatist movement, PKK, seriously challenged Turkey’s national security concept as a whole due to provocative terror acts significantly by the time when hopes for a peace appeared in public view. Respectively, AKP as a political party trying to increase its vote percentage profoundly squeezed between conservative Kurdish voters residing in the East of Turkey and nationalists of Central Anatolia. Under the turmoil atmosphere of the region with the reflection of so-called Arab Spring and Syria AK Party decision makers restrained historical democratization process that ameliorated Turkish-EU relations while shifted to a more security based policy as its predecessors.

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Turkey’s Kurdish Paradox under AKP: EU Processes versus Emerging Security Challenges

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Witness Protection and European Security

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The witness is universally considered to be one the most instruments to ascertain the truth in criminal proceedings or as Bentham says “Witnesses are the eyes and the ears of justice.” The witness protection remains a challenging issue with the potential to seriously jeopardize the efficiency of the transnational criminal proceedings as long as they are entitled to the protection not as a party but as in instrument to produce evidence.

Yet as the French Professor of International Criminal Law, Claude Lombois stated “Sur une base fragile, on n’édifie rien de solide”. By identifying the problems and failures in post-conflict countries, national and international courts should take further measures against intimidation, coercion, corruption or bodily injuries.

This research aims to develop distinct perspectives on the present status of witness: its development in national, regional, European Law, the stress put on it in times of emergency, its problematic exercise in the case of violations of the law of war, its application to torture victims, its development in the case law of the UN Human Rights Committee and of the European Court of Human Rights, its application to the emerging field of environmental justice, and finally access to justice as part of fundamental rights in European law and international legal instruments. Protection of witnesses is a complex and demanding task for any criminal jurisdiction especially for the international jurisdictions. The question is: Which is the relation between witness protection and European Security? What are the main challenges of witness protection measures nowadays in the European Union agenda and further protective measures which will be taken in the future? Procedural equality, adversarial process and disclosure of evidence, thus the ‘equality of arms’ (égalité des armes) requires a fair balance between the parties in respect to the rights of the accused and keep it in a progressive development of human rights law especially toward the rights of the witness who is considered to be an instrument to achieve the truth but still not a party in the proceedings. However, when we talk about the accused rights and balance of rights to have a fair trial the question arises: Do the witnesses have rights? I fully support the argument that they should be a have the same rights that enjoy the parties in the Court on the bases of ECtHR and ICTY cases.

In the end recommendations aim at improving the fairness and effectiveness of operations regarding witness protection by establishing a fair balance between the rights of the accused and the rights of the witnesses, to strengthen further cooperation to support the fight against the serious crimes and terrorism at regional, European and international level.

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Hungarian role in the Western Balkan security issues

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Hungary functions as a gate between Western Europe and the Balkans. As a respected member of the EU and the NATO, Hungary’s role is considered to be wider than those entailed by the relationships, expectations and obligations ensuing from the “neighborhood”. The reactions and answers furnished to the challenges regarding security policy, in a wider sense, is marked by the active presence on the ground (Kosovo, Bosnia and Herzegovina). Hungary’s historic connections to the Balkans assert us to play roles that can only be fulfilled by close and mutual cooperation with the Balkan states, last but not least in regard the Hungarian minorities in the Balkans. All these necessitate the expansion of our relations with the Balkan states, as well as raising awareness of the Balkans in all of the spheres (economy, finance, education,) in the Hungarian society.

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The Cost for Peace: 
Military Expenditure and Economic Growth in Western Balkans

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This paper re-examines the long run effects of military expenditure on the growth path of Western Balkans for the period 1990-2011 within a panel cointegration framework. Western Balkans embrace a combined inheritance of controlled economies and armed conflicts. This bequest was characterised by a poor public sector with non transparent budget processes, a significant external funding, fiscal deficits and a crutch of debts. Additionally, ‘...their armed forces are over-developed for peace time conditions’ (Sipri, 2004:251). The study first establishes whether there is a long-run relationship between military expenditure and economic growth in the seven countries by using a panel unit root and panel cointegration framework and then proceeds to estimate the long-run and short-run effects of military expenditure on income. Results report the presence of a positive relationship between the variables on the long run and a positive impact on the short run.
About the current aspects of the EULEX Kosovo mission

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The EU is a community of values. In my opinion, its was a community of values from the very beginning, but after the amendments reached in Amsterdam, Nice and even more in Lisbon, there is no doubt about that. Moreover, as time passed, it has got the ability and intention to protect its values outside its borders too in order to achieve a peaceful environment outside the EU.

After the failure of the common foreign and security policy on the Balkans in the 90s, the EU became the most important actor in maintaining peace and rule of law in countries of the former Yugoslavia.

The EU launched its largest civil crisis management mission in 2008 in Kosovo by taking over the competences and tasks of the United Nation Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK). The European Union Law Mission in Kosovo (EULEX Kosovo) began fully operational in December 2008 and has a many times extended mandate till 14 June 2014. There are many attributes which make the EULEX an unique mission of the EU, especially the number of the staff, its evaluation system and the competences of the international judges and prosecutors working in the mission. In addition, it has to be mentioned that the EULEX Kosovo can proceed even if many EU Member States did not recognized Kosovo as an independent state.

Nevertheless, the work of the EU in Kosovo seems to be much more difficult as it was expected before. The European Court of Auditors claimed in its Special report No 18/2012 that the efforts of the EULEX in Kosovo related to the rule of law proved to have been less efficient. On the other hand, more and more opinion are coming from the staff side complaining about the high level of the organised crime and corruption in Kosovo no matter what the EULEX does. What it going on in Kosovo recently? What are the reasons of the EU deployment in Kosovo? Does the Kosovan authorities contribute to the succes of the work of the international community? Do we have a real chance to build up the rule of law in Kosovo at all?

This essay gives a brief overview of the recent aspects and consequences of the work of the EU in Kosovo.

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The EU Common Security and Defence Policy Achilles´ heel: North Kosovo

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The European Union Rule of Law (EULEX) mission in Kosovo is the ever largest civilian operation deployed so far. It remains, however, that after almost four years of EU presence on the ground neither rule of law nor multi-ethnicity, as per EULEX´s mandate, has been achieved in the north of Kosovo. The issue is not something marginal to the extent that a failure to bring about rule of law and multi-ethnicity there would imply heavy consequences for the stability not only of Kosovo but for the whole region. The current scenario is not encouraging at all. De facto the north of Kosovo keeps escaping Prishtinë/Priština´s control and it is a proof of EULEX´s fallacious in theatre commitment. This latter is to be attributed to various reasons. Firstly EULEX underestimated its embedded deployment into a context of de facto opposing nationalistic views between Albanians and Serbs; secondly it neglected that it does exist an intertwined relationship between rule of law and multi-ethnicity in Kosovo; thirdly it did not develop a strategy for the north. On the whole EULEX lacked of a holistic approach.

If its predecessor, the United Nations Administration Mission (UNMIK), ruling Kosovo for almost ten years was incapable of integrating the north expectations that the European Union (also) via its ever largest civilian operation would reach this goal were high. Unfortunately they have not been met so far. EULEX´s main charge lies in that it missed the opportunity to remedy this situation with the consequence that Kosovo is still divided and far from a positive peace. EULEX has been merely equipped as a technical mission while the context, its mandate and the EU´s overall responsibility in the youngest Balkan State are (were) indicative of the need over a holistic approach.

Are there any lessons learned? The assumption that exporting rule of law is a question of a rule-book simply to be reproduced elsewhere does not work into a high-ethno politicized envi-ronment like Kosovo. To be said in other words, it is highly improbable to achieve rule of law by solely co-locating lawyers, customs´ officials and policemen who dictate how to rule. In the same way multi-ethnicity only if framed in official documents does not guarantee per se that it is to be achieved in the practise at the very hand. The holistic approach, briefly aforementioned, requires taking into account of three dimensions to be listed as follows: historical; geopolitical and common position. By failing to consider these three perspectives, EULEX´ performance did not bring about the desired results because it did not develop a unitary strategy for the north.

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In accordance to the Stability Pact that was launched in 1999 to provide conflict prevention net for South Eastern European nations (hereinafter - Balkans) that fosters regional co-operation and expedite integration into European and Euro-Atlantic structures. It is pertinent to research areas of the theoretical arena encompassing the integration of the Balkans region into the Euro-pan Union (EU). Since in 1981 Greece became a EU member state and recently Bulgaria and Romania in 2007, it is on the frontline issue of integrating Balkan region states into the EU since Croatia is marked to be a full EU member state in late July 2013. The basis of this urge for the Balkan region integrating into EU spans multi- perspectives as bilateralism, institutionalism, nationalism, and the full integration into the European labor market. In this paper I will focus on the research question whether there is a gap between the social and cultural norms, behaviors, and identities and political environments in Bosnia-Herzegovina and Serbia and the EU? Given this gap I will also focus on the question of what are the possibilities of these countries’ integration into the EU and if there is a transformation and convergence of values and norms and how can we understand this theoretically? These questions will be looked upon in the lens of a social constructivist model to further explain how EU norms and behaviors are followed within applicant countries drastically to enable their nations to obtain full EU membership.
The new phase of the integration process: Croatia’s accession

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Croatia represents a unique case in many aspects as Zagreb will become the second former Yugoslav republic after Slovenia and the first Western Balkan country to enter the European Union. It is the first country that has recently had a terrible war to join the European Club. In addition, no state faced such a strict criteria being at the same time burdened by the regional heritage, the world’s biggest economic slump in the last 70 years and the most cautious European Union enlargement policy since the fall of communism. Croatia will be the first country part of the Stabilization and Accession Process (SAP) to accede the EU. This is a precedent both for the region and the EU because apart from the ordinary Copenhagen criteria, Croatia has to fulfil criteria of the SAP like full cooperation with the ICTY, return of the refugees, prosecution of war crimes and regional cooperation.

It seems to be a trend in the enlargement of the Union that it prefers when small groups of countries are accessed to the Community. A new feature of enlargement was introduced, i.e. the principle of differentiation that was very influential at the beginning of the accession negotiations and really motivated the candidate countries to compete, since it has not been clear for long which states would be in the first round. Though, starting the negotiations with only one Western Balkan state, Croatia in 2005, the EU has voted for differentiation again. This would mean that Croatia will be the second country (after Greece) to enter the EU on its own. Whereas the previous eastward enlargement of the EU was a „big bang” process, Croatia has been alone in its lengthy accession process.

The SAP scheme established that the connection with the EU was to be „tailor-made”, based on the specific situation in the given country. In this context, Croatia’s integration process was to be assessed against the country’s „own merits” as well as the capacity to deliver the required reforms.

Following the regime change in 2000, the EU membership became the primary strategic objective of the country. In response to these changes the EU offered Croatia the prospect of membership through the SAP. However, in 2003 the EU gave European perspective for the SAP countries, there was no change in EU relations as the SAAs with Croatia (and Macedonia) kept „potential candidate status”, without promising integration into the EU. Thus, instead of being linked to membership, only the successful implementation of the SAA led to candidate status (2004) and the initiation of the accession talks (2005). From this point of view the SAP can be seen as a (pre-) pre-accession policy framework. Croatia’s accession to the EU is realized through a number of stages: the first one is the pre-pre-association period of the SAA, the second is the pre-association stage starting with obtaining candidate status and the last one is the accession.

Through strengthening enlargement criteria in fact, that Croatia was subject to the most rigorous, draconian and uncertain form of membership conditionality ever used by the EU, as Croatia negotiated alone which decreased its negotiation power. Furthermore, it negotiated about an increased ‘acquis’ and bigger number of chapters while the whole negotiations methodology has been changed. The process had been marked by ups and downs, and the EU’s ‘stick and carrot’ policy as well. It is clearly seen that the EU does not want to get engaged to the region as much as to the Central and Eastern European region, it refrains from concrete promises regarding membership or its datum, and this statelessness can be detected in such expressions in the European rhetoric like it is an “open ended process” and “the date of the accession is not defined till the end of the accession negotiations”. Therefore, the Croatian path to the EU is actually in many senses a ‘sui generis’ for both the EU and the candidate countries.

In the Croatia’s accession several differences came into focus, like the longer term and stricter criteria, the insecure end of accession, the stop of opt-out chance, the introduction of new instruments and techniques, furthermore, the strengthened negotiating position of the Union, meanwhile that of the candidate countries weakened. Therefore, Croatia’s accession should be considered as the new phase of the integration process.

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“Turkey should solve its Kurdish conflict first”:
The impact of the EU on the Kurdish conflict in Turkey

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Turkey’s Kurdish conflict is a deep-rooted conflict. Its consequences are substantially destructive; 45,000 people have been killed since 1984, over a million have been internally displaced (Çelik, 2005). Yet, conflict resolution activities so far have not resulted in a substantial reduction of violence and a permanent peace agreement (Gunter, 2007). Concurrently in this context, Turkey, as a European Union candidate since 1999 and a negotiating country since 2005, was asked by the EU to fully implement Copenhagen Criteria, reform its legal system, provide minority rights for Kurds, and lower the 10% election threshold. This pull by the EU in a context of democratization further changed the domestic environment of Turkey’s Kurdish conflict. The idea was that Turkey’s full membership chances would significantly increase if a long-term solution to its long-standing Kurdish issue would be found. Thus, steps Turkey would take in the EU accession process would have a positive impact on the solution of the Kurdish conflict. However in this paper, contrary to the vast literature on the positive effects of the EU on the Kurdish conflict, I argue that the EU negotiations process has also negative direct and indirect effects in the context of Kurdish conflict. First of all, the reforms that were implemented for Kurds living in Turkey were perceived rather negatively by Turks, as they were perceived them as a threat to the territorial integrity of Turkey due to the emphasis on minority rights (Kirişçi, 2011). This, in turn, caused to the resistance of implications of certain laws and reforms, and prejudice towards Kurdish people. Second, the opposition for the Turkey’s membership within the EU also negatively affected the process (Tocci, 2005). This caused the questioning of sincerity of EU, and in turn, caused to the increased suspicion for EU and its reforms within nationalists in Turkey who do not support the EU from the beginning of the process. Third, the current ruling party, Justice and Development Party (JDP), started the Kurdish Initiative in 2009 in order to end the Kurdish conflict. However, it also did not result any substantial reduction of the conflict due to the JDP’s not having capability to deal with the oppositions, but also EU’s reluctance for Turkey’s EU membership (Kirişçi, 2011). Fourth, JDP could manage to push the Turkish Armed Forces (TAF) out of political sphere and into its barracks thanks to the accession process, yet in a very controversial manner. This added to the concerns and fears of Turks, specifically among secular circles, and contributed to the suspicion and hatred towards the EU. Later, although an indirect effect, the power vacuum formed after TAF’s retreat from political sphere enabled JDP to suppress its opponents, specifically from Kurdish camp. To elaborate, the investigation into the Union of Communities of Kurdistan (KCK), the alleged urban wing of the PKK, significantly expanded to silence the Kurdish opposition group. Currently, approximately 10,000 people are alleged with KCK. These factors combined contributed to the worsening of the Kurdish issue in Turkey, as well as earlier positive effects of the EU membership process on its Kurdish issue. Overall, the impacts of the EU on the Kurdish conflict are discussed in a more detail in relation to the internal and international dynamics of the conflict.

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Regional or global European Union? Turkish membership as a test

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In the post-cold world, the European Union has emerged as a ‘normative power’ in the world politics. The EU is a normative power because it has an ability to affect other preferences and to structure its own values and norms (e.g. liberal democracy and free market economy) as universal values and norms. In this sense, there is no doubt that a normative power highly needs a strong legitimacy to be influential in the world. Regarding the EU’s normative power, the enlargement waves provide a great legitimacy to the EU. For example, after the Eastern enlargement, the EU has started to be defined more cosmopolitan/universal and less Western, and this also makes its values and norms more universal and so more influential. Despite this fact, the enlargement still presents regionalism and the unification of Europe. However, the possible Turkish membership is more than the unification of the continent and will strengthen the EU’s global image. Therefore, this paper argues that Turkish membership will provide a greater legitimacy to the EU as a global normative actor. Otherwise, the EU, within a limited geography, could not maintain its legitimacy that is necessary for its normative power, and in time, it could become less effective in the global arena and more regional due to increasing protective tendencies against globalization. For example, the recent economic crisis has already triggered regional protective attitudes within the EU.
Only an EU Apart: Bulgarian-Turkish Economic and Political Relations in the Post-Accession period

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This paper analyses the dynamics and the evolution of the Bulgarian-Turkish economic and political relations following Bulgaria's accession to the EU against the backdrop of changing Bulgarian socio-cultural attitudes towards Turkey and its large Turkish minority. Despite the lingering effect of the anti-Turkish propaganda during the former communist regime, the specific Bulgarian “memory of the Turkish bondage” and the ethnic assimilation of the Turkish minority in mid-1980s, Bulgarian-Turkish relations progressed rapidly on both the economic and political fronts especially in the mid-1990s after the Bulgarian transition to democracy and the free market economy. Strong trade and FDI ties developed in recent years based on bilateral agreements and a growing number of Turkish firms and joint ventures with Bulgarian partners have been established and penetrated the market, as Bulgaria came to be viewed as a gateway to the larger EU market. On the political front, the EU membership has given Bulgaria greater political leverage, while at the same time constricting Bulgarian-Turkish relations within the framework of EU-Turkish relations and potential EU membership for Turkey. Additionally, the two countries interact within a complex web of political and socio-cultural relations marked by a history of tension and conflict with much undeveloped potential for closer cooperation. The Bulgarian domestic political environment seems to be the key obstacle in developing stronger ties, along with the newly found of “neo-Ottomanism” due to the growing importance of Turkey as a key economic and political power both in Europe and Asia. Despite the much-praised “Bulgarian ethnic model” of the 1990s, and the peaceful democratic transition that stood apart from the spreading ethnic conflict in the Balkans, the issue of ethnic Turkish minority rights is a recurring source of contention in Bulgaria’s political arena. Notwithstanding these trends, the advent of Turkish film productions has started to change Bulgarian perceptions towards Turkey in a more positive and objective direction, while attenuating existing prejudices. This is taken as evidence for our claim that growing cultural interaction between the two nations carries the potential to advance future economic and political cooperation. We use a combination of aggregate data, public opinion polls, and interviews to analyze the evolution of economic and political relations and to identify obstacles and potential areas of further improvement.

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