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Towards a world without nuclear weapons

Álvaro Palomo

Abstract: The paper provides a description of the history of nuclear weapons from the nuclear deterrence during the Cold War to the current nine nuclear countries which are upgrading their arsenals. It underlines the treaties to prevent a nuclear catastrophe and to halt proliferation and the initiatives to eliminate nuclear weapons. The last initiative is done by a global campaign, the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons, which faces the argument of deterrence, the military mind-set, the nuclear weapons industry and the political conflicts by prioritizing the humanitarian impact of these arms.

Keywords: nuclear weapons, denuclearization, deterrence, arms industry, nuclear terrorism

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The deadly nuclear weapons, Hiroshima and Nagasaki

In the beginning of 1939, when Europe was moving toward II World War, both Germany and the United States (US) launched a nuclear race. In July 1945, when Nazis were already defeated in Europe, the American nuclear program was ready and the first nuclear device was tested in Alamogordo, New Mexico. In the beginning, it was planned to deter a German nuclear attack. However, the 6th and the 9th of August, 1945, the US army dropped the atomic bomb on Hiroshima and Nagasaki (Japan). The two cities were destroyed and between 150.000 and 246.000 innocent civilians were killed.

“Nagasaki became a city of death where not even the sound of insects could be heard”, depicted former Mayor of Nagasaki Iccho Itoh in the International Court of Justice in 1995, and he added: “Four months after the atomic bombing, 74.000 people were dead, and 75.000

had suffered injuries, that is, two-thirds of the city population had fallen victim to this calamity that came upon Nagasaki like a preview of the Apocalypse”.

The first nuclear bomb showed the horror these weapons can create and set the beginning of the Nuclear Age. In Krieger view (2007, p.107), this era “opened the door to the destruction of the entire human species by tools of its own invention”. “A major exchange of nuclear weapons would so totally destroy places and people and so contaminate the earth’s capacity to provide uncontaminated food and water as to leave the planet unsuited to support life”, describes Pilisuk (2007, pp.98–99).

Nuclear weapons during the Cold War

The United Nations (UN) was created in 1945 to prevent another conflict and the first resolution of the UN General Assembly in 1946 set up the Atomic Energy Commission for “the elimination from national armaments of atomic weapons and all other major weapons adaptable to mass destruction”. In the same year, the US presented the Baruch Plan in front of the UN Atomic Energy Commission to destroy weapons of mass destruction and control nuclear power. In his speech, Bernard Baruch said: “We must elect world peace or world destruction”, but the distrust between the US and the Soviet Union (USSR) frustrated the plan, the Cold War began and on 29 August, 1949, USSR tested its first nuclear weapon.

Since the very first day of the existence of nuclear weapons, nuclear states have tried to get rid of them, but failed.

During the Cold War (1946-1991), the US and the USSR used nuclear weapons to deter attacks and wars, even nuclear war, pushing their conflict to mutual assured destruction. According to this security doctrine, any nuclear attack from one country to the other could have meant the same retaliation, an escalation of violence and the annihilation of both. There was not any nuclear attack, although the Cuba missile crisis, with soviet ballistic missiles pointing the US, almost finished with a humanitarian catastrophe.

The US and the USSR modernized and strengthen their nuclear arsenal in order to maintain the balance of power and developed weapons even more lethal than the atomic bomb, like thermonuclear weapons. The race run until 1986 when the inventories of nuclear weapons arrived to 69.368, its peak, which 68.317 belonged to the US (23.317) and the USSR

(45.000), the remainder belonged to United Kingdom (UK) (422) which became a nuclear state in 1952, France (355), a nuclear state since 1960, China (230), nuclearized in 1964 and Israel (44) which had its first nuclear weapon in 1967, as details Norris and Kristensen (2010).

Attempts of denuclearization during the Cold War

Despite the importance of nuclear weapons in the Cold War, there were attempts to control and diminish their proliferation, even pursuing their elimination.

The most important one is the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1970, with 190 state-parties, that forbids each signed state to transfer or receive nuclear weapons or assist on its creation; keeps the nuclear power of the countries under control by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) and its safeguards system and underlines the right to develop nuclear power for peaceful purposes and to share information. Disarmament is stated in Article VI that says: “Each of the Parties to the Treaty undertakes to pursue negotiations in good faith on effective measures relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race at an early date and to nuclear disarmament, and on a treaty on general and complete disarmament under strict and effective international control”. In the five-yearly review conference of 1995, all states agreed to complete nuclear disarmament.

Four nuclear countries, Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea, which withdrew in 2003, are not signatories.

The NPT separates countries into two categories, the nuclear-weapon states (NWS) which are the ones that had nuclear devices before 1967 (the US, Russia, China, France and the UK) and are the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, and the non-nuclear-weapon-states (NNWS). According to the treaty, NNWS agree to do not develop nuclear weapons and the NWS commit to eliminate all nuclear arms, but there is not included any data limit.

There were also bilateral deals between the US and the USSR to disarmament. The period known as *détente*, a relaxation of the tension between the two countries, motivated agreements on arms control. In 1972, the two superpowers began the Strategic Arms Limitation Talks (SALT) and in 1979 they launched SALT II to stabilize the arm race. Also

in 1972, both countries signed the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty (ABM), with which they thought that limiting antiballistic missiles would avert the improvement of the offensive ones.

The following accords came in the end of the Cold War. Krieger (2007) underlines the effort of the USSR leader Mikhail Gorbachev to eliminate all nuclear weapons together with the US president Ronald Reagan. In the meeting of Reykjavik in 1986 the two leaders explored the possibilities of a world without nuclear weapons. The summit was later defined by the journalist Frances FitzGerald as “the most bizarre summit in the history of the Cold War”. Again, now in a confrontation, two nuclear states tried to eliminate these arms and failed. This time, Reagan rejection to halt the Strategic Defense Initiative, also known as Star Wars, collapsed the talks.

But some work was done and the Intermediate Nuclear Forces agreement (INF) in 1987 eliminated the ground and cruise missiles with a range from 300 to 3.400 miles. Nowadays, Russia and the US call other countries which have developed the technology to build that kind of missiles to respect the limits of INF.

The Partial Test Ban Treaty (PTBT) was signed in 1963 prohibiting tests of nuclear weapons in the atmosphere, outer space or under water. Almost thirty years later, in 1991, the USSR initiated a moratorium on nuclear testing that was imitate by the US the next year. Also in 1991, the two countries launched the Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START) in order to reduce the number of nuclear weapons. This happened shortly before the disintegration of the USSR.

Nuclear Age after the Cold War


The Cold War finished in 1991, but bilateral agreements between the US and Russia have continued up to today. The negotiations of START II, in 1993, and START III, in 1997, never entered into force and were superseded by the Strategic Offensive Reductions (SORT) in 2002 and finally replaced by the Measures for the Further Reduction and Limitation of Strategic Offensive Arms (New START) in 2011 to reduce the deployed nuclear warheads, missiles, bombers and launchers.

In 1996 the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) appeared as a consequence of the PTBT to end tests of nuclear weapons, but it has not come to force because not enough countries

have ratified it. Among the nuclear states, China and the US have not ratified it and Pakistan, India and North Korea have not even signed it. The study made in 1991 by the International Physicians for the Prevention of Nuclear War (IPPNW) concluded that 2.4 million people could die of cancer due to radioactive residues coming from atmospheric nuclear testing between 1945 and 1980.

In the last decades, more countries have built nuclear weapons to use them as a military and political tool and also as a reaction of politics of fear. India tested the first bomb in 1974 and Pakistan reacted developing the nuclear program and in 1998 it tested the nuclear weapon. India and Pakistan are caught in a dispute over Kashmir region. In 2006, North Korea tested it too, arguing it was to defend the sovereignty of the country against threats like the US.

In 2015, these are the nuclear weapons inventories:



Source: Federation of American Scientists, September 28, 2015.

Russia has an inventor of 7.500 nuclear weapons and the US of 7.200, but the two have 3.000 and 2.500 retired warheads waiting for dismantlement.

In 2015, more than two decades after the end of the Cold War, there are less nuclear weapons, but they are more powerful, precise, flexible, expensive and smaller. Despite treaties and talks, nuclear states are modernising their arsenal and spending 100 billion USD per year in

their programmes, says the report ‘Don’t Bank on the Bomb’ (2014) in line with Global Zero (2011) that underlines the increasing spending on nuclear weapons in time of economic crisis.

The US is modernising the nuclear capabilities and only reducing a few number of arms, from 5.113 nuclear warheads in 2009 to approximately 4.700 in 2015. During the Obama Administration, the spending on nuclear weapons has been bigger than during any other post-Cold War Administration, says Kristensen (2014), even reaching the Reagan Administration level. According to the study ‘The Trillion Dollar Nuclear Triad’ by James Martin Center for Nonproliferation Studies (2014), the US will spend 1 trillion US dollars in the next three decades mostly in modernisation and purchasing nuclear submarines, bombers and Inter-Continental Ballistic Missiles (ICBM).

However, the US have reached the demands of New START on deployed warheads, reducing them from 1,800 in February 2011 to 1,538 in 2015, according to the US Department of State. The US has announced they will not use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear states that have signed the NPT.

Russia is replacing the obsolete nuclear arsenal. Global Zero (2011) underscores the Russian proliferation on submarines, rockets and warheads. In 2012, Moscow extolled they own ICBMs capable to overcome US defences, adds Arms Control (2015). Russia will only use nuclear weapons to react against a threat to the existence of the state or as a response to any attack with weapons of mass destruction against Russia or its allies.

Russia was already below the limit of New Start in 2011 with 1,537 deployed warheads. Since then, the country has begun to boost nuclear arms production, increasing deployed warheads to 1,648, according to the US Department of State.

France has 300 nuclear weapons mostly designed for submarine launched ballistic missiles. The country is modernising its bombers, submarines and missiles, but it has not increased the number of arms. France will use nuclear weapons if is invaded or if it or one of its allies are attacked by a nuclear-weapon state or by a country allied with one nuclear weapon-state.

The UK has 215 nuclear weapons exclusively deployed on submarines. There is a strong cooperation between the UK and the US in nuclear matters. The UK will use this arm only to defence in extreme circumstances.

China has 260 nuclear weapons and the plans of modernization and increase of nuclear capabilities last until 2050. In 2013, IAEA showed its concern about the growth of nuclear power in Asia. However, the nuclear Chinese policy relies on deploying the sufficient nuclear arms to deter an attack, according to the profile made by Arms Control (2015). China is related with exportation of missiles to Iran and Pakistan which is the most important partner in military technology, conforming to the US Director of National Intelligence. The government has ensured they will not be the first using a nuclear weapon.

India has between 110 and 120 nuclear weapons and it is working on expanding and developing its deployed ballistic missiles and a submarine launched ballistic missile capability. The government, stimulated by China and Pakistan proliferation, has said they will only use them to retaliate against a nuclear, biological or chemical attack. India was sanctioned by Bush Administration for exporting technologies to Iran and Iraq.

Pakistan launched their nuclear program just after India tested its first nuclear weapon. The uranium enrichment program was headed by Abdul Qadeer Khan who said that the main reason for developing the nuclear program in Pakistan was to “save my country from Indian nuclear blackmail”. “An issue of survival”, described it former Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Now, the country has between 120 and 130 nuclear weapons. The state is expanding faster than India its arsenal and its infrastructure. With cruise missiles and strategic bombers, it is planning to build a nuclear submarine.

Pakistan and India exchange information of their nuclear programmes to prevent any nuclear conflict. However, Pakistan has built nuclear ballistic missiles to respond to an Indian conventional threat. According to Khan, the mutual assured destruction logic of the Cold-War would have prevented a war with India. Khan was the responsible person of a clandestine network that transferred nuclear technology to Iran, North Korea and Libya.

It is difficult to know how many nuclear weapons have Israel and North Korea because their programs are veiled. Israel is supposed to have 80 nuclear weapons but enough fissile material to grow its stockpile up to 200, including missiles, submarines and bombers.

Among the nuclear states, North Korea is the only one considered a ‘rogue state’ by the US, which is the concept the US government use to refer countries which, inter alia, can destroy the current international system (George W. Bush called them “axis of evil, arming to threaten

the pace of the world”). The list of rogue states has changed over time, but all of them are perceived as a threat and the US and its allies keep them from building nuclear weapons¹.

North Korea is supposed to have six or eight nuclear weapons and it has been accused of exporting nuclear technology to other countries like Pakistan, Egypt and Yemen, and also to rogue states like Iran, by the firm Changgwang Syinyong, and presumably to Iraq, Libya and Syria.

Neither the sanctions from the US and the UN Security Council (financial restrictions, asset freezes and sanctions) nor the Six-Party Talks between North Korea, China, Japan, Russia, the US and South Korea prevented North Korea to develop their clandestine nuclear program. The government argued that they did it to grant their sovereignty and in response to “the US nuclear threat, sanctions and pressure”. In 2010, only after becoming a nuclear state, North Korea called the other nuclear states to non-proliferation and disarmament.

The asymmetry value of nuclear weapons means that only one can cause deterrence or terror. “Even a few nuclear weapons in the arsenal of a country such as Iran or North Korea could be successful in deterring a far more powerful country from imposing its political or military will on that country”, says Krieger (207, p.113). Khan, who says that Pakistan nuclear program has saved the country, adds that Iraq and Libya would have not been destroyed if they had been nuclear powers.

Some states plan to nuclearize to defend themselves, but other nuclear countries prevent them because they are seen as a threat to the world. Pilisuk (2007, p.95) explains that this is called attribution error. “Armaments of an opponent are typically viewed as an indication of aggressive intent, while one’s own arms are seen as a defensive response to a situation presented by the behaviour of others”.

Nuclear deterrence today

For many people, deterrence is seen as the best way to prevent wars between major nations. Waltz (2013, p.220) says that “the alternative to world government proved to be nuclear deterrence”. However, today nuclear deterrence is being challenged, also by political leaders,

¹ “The establishment of a neo-liberal world order could therefore entail the paradox of fighting wars for the sake of disarmament”, says Pilisuk (2007, p.99).

influenced by the background of treaties preventing a nuclear catastrophe, a new international chessboard and the social pressure trying to stigmatise and eliminate nuclear weapons.

“Deterrence is just a theory and nuclear weapons are a reality. You only need deterrence to not work once in order to cause a huge humanitarian catastrophe. At this time there are bombs ready to launch in minutes and kill innocent civilians”, says Beatrice Fihn (2015), executive director of the International Campaign to Abolish Nuclear Weapons (ICAN), which has more than 400 partner organisations in 95 countries.

This opinion often meets political reality. Despite many politicians support a free-nuclear world, they reject denuclearization in their countries and alliances as long as other countries and alliances have nuclear weapons. In 2009, US President Barack Obama said: “I state clearly and with conviction America’s commitment to seek the peace and security of a world without nuclear weapons”, but he added: “Make no mistake: as long as these weapon exist, the United States will maintain a safe, secure and effective arsenal to deter any adversary, and guarantee that defence to our allies”. Obama is promising they will get rid of a weapon that at the same time he encourages as a crucial tool to defence the country and its allies.

“If you fill the discussion saying that nuclear weapons are actually useful, it makes impossible to eliminate them”, says Fihn, who also talks about the attribution error. “If nuclear weapons are good, why other countries can’t have it? No, they are weapons of mass destruction that create more insecurity and they should be illegal”.

The International Court of Justice published in 1996 the advisory opinion ‘Legality of the threat or use of nuclear weapons’. Despite it was not unanimous, they underlined that “the threat or use of nuclear weapons would generally be contrary to the rules of international law applicable in armed conflict, and in particular the principles and rules of humanitarian law”. However, they marked an exception saying that “the Court cannot conclude definitively whether the threat or use of nuclear weapons would be lawful or unlawful in an extreme circumstance of self-defence”.

The humanitarian law in armed conflicts prevent combatants to kill innocent civilians indiscriminately. The violation of humanitarian law is called war crime. The point of The International Court of Justice is that the use of nuclear weapons would kill thousands of civilians. Therefore, the nature of nuclear weapons violates the international humanitarian law.

To illegalize nuclear weapons, ICAN highlights a view. “We must focus on the humanitarian impact of the weapon instead of discussing about security. We must stigmatize nuclear weapons and define them as unacceptable weapons of mass destruction that can kill a lot of people in a very short time, and also radiation kills. They should be illegal”, says Fihn.

Focusing in the humanitarian impact of the nuclear weapons is the strategy of ICAN to aware society and to push countries to abolish and ban nuclear weapons. Before getting to this point, society must overcome the military security mind-set which reflects “a deep pathology of a system preparing for war but not for peace”, says Pilisuk (2007, p.99).

Along the same lines, Quinlan (2009) says nuclear weapons must be turned from an important tool to irrelevance. “I do not think that at least NATO countries need them to defend themselves”, says Fihn. In Mueller view, nuclear weapons are useless and even the atomic bombs dropped in Japan were probably unnecessary for the Japanese surrender.

A treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons

“We need a treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons, to use, develop, possess and transfer them”, says Fihn. The treaty would defer from NPT by rejecting, eliminating and prohibiting nuclear weapons completely and without exceptions. With this treaty in mind, ICAN is following the path of the prohibition of biological and chemical weapons, landmines and cluster munitions.

Biological weapons were banned in 1972 under the Biological Weapons Convention (BWC) becoming the first disarmament treaty to ban the production, development and possession of one type of weapon. It entered into force in 1995. In 2015, there are 173 state-parties. The treaty does not prohibit the development of biological agents to peaceful purposes. It does not include any specific organisation to monitor the compliance.

Chemical weapons were banned in 1993 under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The treaty prohibits the creation, distribution and retention of chemical weapons and aims the destruction of any chemical weapons and its facilities. It was effective in 1997 with the creation of the Organisation for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) in charge of monitoring the destruction activities and its compliance. In 2015, there are 192 state-parties, but North Korea has not signed it and Israel has not ratified it.

Land mines were banned in 1997 under the Anti-Personnel Mine Ban Convention. The treaty aims to destruct all the stockpiles and clean the mined areas, although it allows mines for training purposes. In 2015, there are 162 states-parties. However, China, Russia and the United States are non-signatories, the latter together with South Korea use landmines as an important part of their security policies against North Korea. According to Pilisuk (2007), landmines cause at least between 15.000 and 20.000 deaths per year.

Cluster munitions were banned in 2008 under the Convention on Cluster Munitions. The treaty prohibits to produce, develop, retain, transfer or use cluster munitions. In 2015, 108 countries have signed it and 98 have ratified it. The US², China, Russia, India, Israel and Pakistan are not signatories.

The International Campaign to Ban Landmines (ICBL) and the Cluster Munition Coalition (CMC) succeeded and the treaties were done. “The treaty prohibiting nuclear weapons can be done now”, says Fihn. “It will probably not be signed by the nuclear weapons states, but the non-nuclear weapons states should go ahead with it anyway and create a norm that stigmatizes these weapons and makes them unacceptable. They can use the treaty to pressure nuclear states to get rid of their arsenal”.

In December 2014, ICAN and the Austrian government issued a humanitarian pledge to prohibit and eliminate nuclear weapons. In October 2015, it has been signed by 119 countries, and popular people such as politicians, activists and artists have shown their support by signing the appeal. Neither member of the nuclear countries nor any of the states of the North Atlantic Alliance (NATO) has signed the pledge.

There are three nuclear states in NATO, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, but the rest 25 countries also rely on nuclear weapons in their security policies and some of them have tactical US nuclear weapons deployed in their soil, especially the ones that were closer to the Soviet Union, like Germany, Belgium, Italy, the Netherlands and Turkey. They legitimate them as a defence tool.

Over the years, there have been many authorities who have rejected nuclear weapons. One of them was former Secretary of Defence Robert S. McNamara (1916-2009) who said that the

² In the 2008 US Cluster Munitions Policy Released, cluster munitions are seen as a useful weapon in combat that saves lives and produce less collateral damage to civilians. “Blanket elimination of cluster munitions is therefore unacceptable due not only to negative military consequences but also due to potential negative consequences for civilians”, says the U.S. Department of Defense.

US nuclear weapons policies in the 21st century were “immoral, illegal, military unnecessary, and dreadfully dangerous”. He did not make his opinion public when he was in the administration because it was “totally contrary to established NATO policy”.

After collecting the support of non-nuclear states, ICAN’s next goal is getting the support of the NATO states which have an active civil society.

The importance of lobbies

“Lobbies have strong interests to keep nuclear weapons, but the main obstacle is that the international community accepts the weapons”, says Fihn.

However, the report ‘Bombs vs. Budgets: Inside the Nuclear Weapons Lobby’ by the Center for International Policy (2012) connects the nuclear weapons industry with the US Congress. “In the 2012 election cycle, the top 14 nuclear weapons contractors (*Lockheed Martin, Honeywell International, Boeing...*) gave a total of \$2.9 million to key members of Congress with decision making power over nuclear weapons spending. These firms have donated \$18.7 million to these same members of Congress over the course of their careers”. These corporations gain lucrative Pentagon contracts to produce, maintain and modernize nuclear bombers, nuclear submarines, missiles, delivery vehicles, nuclear facilities of uranium, plutonium and nuclear-related materials, plants and laboratories and research and development.

These lobbyist undermine any effort towards denuclearisation in the US pushing to remove budget limits or even blocking signed treaties like New START³.

The report identifies a network of 137 lobbyist with decision making power, 96 of them from the Congress or the Congressional Committees, 26 from military services, 24 from the Department of Defense or the Department of Energy. It also specifies networks of hundreds of business and thousands of members interested in the proliferation and increasing spending on nuclear weapons. Only in the submarine lobby, it shows the Submarine Industrial Base Council, the Naval Submarine League and The Navy League. It also denounces the revolving door of the Pentagon executives to defence contractors, and conversely.

³ Congressman Denny Rehberg defended an amendment to prohibit taxpayer funds on reduction of America’s nuclear forces if there is no prove that Russia is complying the limits set on New START, and Rehberg argued that Russia has increased its inventory. The amendment passed at the House.

The Center for Public Integrity (2015) has pointed out that General Dynamics (70), Lockheed Martin (56) and Boeing (49) are the top three corporations with more lobbyists on defence issues from April to June 2015. Each company have spent millions on lobbying, especially to eliminate budget caps. Opensecrets (2015) has identified up to 718 lobbyist in the defence industry in 2015.

The ICAN publishes every year the report ‘Don’t Bank on the Bomb’ pushing companies to divest in the nuclear arms industry. The 2014’s report examines 28 nuclear companies, such as Boeing, Honeywell International or Lockheed Martin, which earn millions in contracts and work on the nuclear programmes of France, India, Israel, the United Kingdom and the United States. In Russia, China, Pakistan and North Korea this work is mostly or completely done by government agencies.

The report profiles 411 financial institutions investing in these corporations, the 62% from North America. The top-ranked are State Street, Capital Group and Blackrock, all three based in the US. It also congratulates financial institutions with a nuclear weapons exclusion policy banning investment on the nuclear weapon industry.

The threat of nuclear terrorism

While working towards denuclearization, a new nuclear threat has appeared. The US President Barack Obama said in 2008 that nuclear terrorism was “the gravest danger we face”. The asymmetry of nuclear weapons plays a key factor in terrorism groups, which can possess these arms by exploiting gaps in security, stealing fissile material, buying it in the nuclear black market or taking over a nuclear facility. During that year, 2008, the IAEA reported nearly 250 thefts. “The possibility of terrorists obtaining nuclear or other radioactive material remains a grave threat”, said former IAEA chief Mohamed El Baradei, although it was not enough material to build one nuclear weapon. From 1993 to December 2013, IAEA confirmed 2.477 incidents like illegal possession, black market, thefts or losses.

Terrorists could access to proper technology through the nuclear black market of proliferation networks. The most remarkable was the network of A.Q. Khan which illustrated the possibility to move nuclear technology clandestinely. Khan sold it, including centrifuges and weapons design, to ‘rogue states’ like Iran, North Korea and Libya.

“Acquiring (*nuclear*) weapons for the defense of Muslims is a religious duty”, said former leader of Al-Qaeda Osama Bin Laden (1957-2011). For decades, the US has been examining Al-Qaeda, but there is no evidence they have got nuclear weapons. Also Chechnya-based separatists, Lashkar-e-Taiba and Aum Shinrikyo have shown interest in developing nuclear weapons and together with Hezbollah and the Taliban are the terrorist groups capable of using them according to Allison (2010). In 2015, the threat of nuclear smugglers linked with Islamic State or the possibility that ISIS could steal nuclear material is raising.

To avert this to happen, the international community has put effort in strengthening the security of nuclear materials.

Nuclear terrorism was already a worry in the eighties. The Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Weapons (CPPNM) in 1980 established measures to protect physically nuclear facilities and expand global cooperation. The Resolution 1540 of the UN Security Council adopted in 2004 says that all states must develop and maintain measures to secure the productions, use, storage and transport of materials related to nuclear, chemical and biological weapons and prevent non-State actors to get, possess or develop them. In order to achieve the nuclear part of that the UN General Assembly created in 2005 the International Convention for the Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism which also criminalizes nuclear terrorism and fosters international cooperation. However, there is no specific organisation in charge to avert nuclear terrorism.

There are also NPT and IAEA safeguards and international nuclear conventions, treaties, partnerships and initiatives like the Nuclear Security Summits (NSS) that have gathered states against nuclear terrorism, raising awareness, reducing high enriched uranium and working together securing nuclear material.

Even though Obama is sure that “terrorist are determined to buy, build or steal one (*nuclear bomb*)”, there are contrarians who think that nuclear terrorism is unlikely if not incomprehensible. “First, no one could seriously intend to kill thousands of people in a single attack. Second, only states are capable of mass destruction; nonstate actors would be unable to build or use nuclear weapons. Third, terrorist would not be able to deliver a nuclear bomb to an American city”, says Allison (2010). “It is not the way they work”, says Fihn, but adds: “as long as they exists there is a risk that something can happen”. In Jenkins view, author of the book ‘Will Terrorists Go Nuclear’, there are nuclear terrorism and nuclear terror. The former is the actual possibility of a nuclear terrorist attack and the latter is the concern of an attack.

“It’s about our imagination. And while there is no history of nuclear terrorism, there is a rich history of nuclear terror. It’s deeply embedded in our popular culture and in policy-making circles”, says Jenkins.

A new world without nuclear weapons

Intentions of disarmament usually focus more on mechanisms rather than political conditions, criticizes Quinlan (2009), and conditions are more important. Disarmament, he says, can only be reached if geopolitical antagonism like the conflicts between Israel and Palestine, India and Pakistan over Kashmir or China and Taiwan are resolved or at least reduced to a relation in which war is not imaginable.

Blanton and Savranskaya (2011) say that denuclearization needs so much level of trust that they doubt it can be achieved in the current globalized and decentralized international system involving countries like Pakistan and North Korea. Pilisuk (2007, p.96) stresses the importance of transparency, openness and a restructuration of the world. “Hence, disarmament is often considered a long-range goal that is associated with a fundamental reordering of the international political environment. That change aims inevitably at ending the law of the jungle among nations by establishing some form of world government or an effective system of collective security”. The world, in order to build a culture of peace, also needs “to deal with gross inequality and exploitation of people and of habitats”, says Pilisuk.

In the same vein, Quinlan (2009) adds that to guarantee the abolishment of nuclear weapons the world needs “stronger political arrangements and better probabilities of obedience to them”.

However, not every supporter of denuclearization thinks it would come with some sort of world peace or readjustment. “The world will look exactly the same but without nuclear weapons. There will always be conflict, but what we can do is to limit and reduce the militarization of conflicts”, says Fihn.

Conclusions

Since the creation of the first nuclear weapon, there have been several treaties to prevent its catastrophic impact and even attempts to eliminate them. Today, nuclear deterrence is more challenged than ever before, but in many countries it is still considered crucial for security.

Social pressure to abolish nuclear weapons is increasing, but campaigns like ICAN still have a lot of work to create an active majority against them. However, to focus on the humanitarian view is a good path because in this area no one should defend these arms.

The nuclear-weapon states of the NPT –the US, Russia, France, the UK and China- are not taking serious steps towards complete denuclearization, as it is declared in the treaty. It is contradictory for the US President Barack Obama to increase the spending of nuclear weapons when he has pledged to work for a world without them. To achieve this, these countries, together with NATO states, should soften their military mindset on security knowing that they would have to face the arms industry.

Those nuclear countries that are not signatories to the NPT -Israel, India, Pakistan and North Korea- see the weapon as a tool to grant their sovereignty against their respective threats, so, in line with Quinlan, they would only eliminate nuclear weapons if these arms turn to irrelevance or there is another alternative for these states to feel safe. This task has to be done by the international community and, adapting the words of Pilisuk, it is about preparing the system for peace.

Whatever solution is found, it should come with more international communication, cooperation and transparency. In the current international chessboard with several political conflicts, disputes and conflicting interests it does not seem that this alternative can be achieved soon, but as Fihn and Pilisuk have stated, disarmament is a long-range goal and small steps can be done.

A stronger international cooperation would also help to prevent nuclear terrorism which, whether is real or not, aware us that some incident may happen if nuclear weapons and its related material are available.

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Interview

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Introduction: In October, 2015, the ICRP conducted an interview with Anna Péczeli, research fellow and assistant lecturer about contemporary issues concerning nuclear weapons and non-proliferation. She gave us her insights of the mentioned topics by pointing out the main theoretical approaches as well as current disputes regarding nuclear disarmament. Therefore the interview focused on her opinion and former academic researches about global nuclear politics, the challenges concerning the Non-Proliferation Treaty and the threats of nuclear terrorism.

The world has changed a lot since the end of the Cold War. Today not two, but nine countries have nuclear weapons. Do you think the world is becoming more and more dangerous?

When I get this question, I usually start by saying that if we look to the absolute numbers, there was a significant reduction of nuclear weapons since the Cold War. The peak was in 1986 with 65,000 nuclear weapons, so compared to the 50,700 nuclear weapons we have today, it is a significant reduction. I would like to draw the attention that there was some progress: we have much less nuclear weapons today than we used to have in the Cold War.

During the 1990s, the United States used to have more than 30,000 nuclear weapons; the Soviet Union had 40,000 in the 1980–1990s. Compare to what we have today it is significantly less. However, I would still argue what we have today is much more than we need, and we could implement more serious measures in the future. If I look at the danger, I am still convinced what kept the Cold War cold and started a nuclear war were the strategic considerations that are still solid today. Even with the Russian government being more aggressive than it used to be in the 1990s, I still believe there are very strong norms against the use of nuclear weapons, and I can only imagine that the United States or Russia would be ready to push the button in really extreme circumstances. So I really do not think between the US and Russia or between US and China, the chance of using nuclear weapons would be higher today than during the Cold War, actually it is probably less dangerous. The reason why I am more concerned is that we have other non-state actors in the picture. We know now that Al-Qaeda was pursuing the acquisition of nuclear weapon, the Japanese Aum Shinrikyo, responsible for Tokyo's 1995 chemical weapon usage, also claimed to look for nuclear weapons, so we know several really effective terrorist organisations that in one point of their history considered to acquire nuclear weapons. That is why I think new threats have entered the picture, making it less stable than it was during the Cold War. Until 1970, we had five nuclear states, the P5, who had a strong state control over their nuclear power. Today we have more states with nuclear weapons and we have new players who are threatening deterrence, because the traditional nuclear deterrence is very difficult to apply to these new actors. That is why I would argue that between the great powers, danger has not increase, but today we have to consider new threats, the nuclear terrorism. That is why I defend the nuclear disarmament of Global Zero.

Considering that four of the nine nuclear states did not sign the Non-Proliferation Treaty, what is your opinion about the success of this document? And what can be done to improve it?

I am still a big supporter of the NPT. It is a very successful treaty. When it was established in the early 1960's, President Kennedy said at that time if we do not conclude an international agreement that would establish the limits of the proliferation, then in one decade, 20 or 30 countries would possess nuclear weapons. NPT's intention was to avoid the proliferation, when Argentina, Saddam Hussein's Iraq or Brazil were thinking about getting their own

nuclear weapons. South Africa actually succeeded and it is until today the only country that has dismantled the nuclear weapon stock. We can list a number of countries that at a certain point in their history were thinking about acquire and develop a nuclear weapon. Without the NPT, I believe plenty of them would have succeeded and we would be living in a much more dangerous and much more instable world today. So from this perspective, the fact we only have nine countries with nuclear weapons, I think it proves the success of the NPT. The other reason I consider it as an important mechanism besides disarmament, prevention of proliferation, and safe use of nuclear technologies, is that it has a really advanced technological system, owing to the International Atomic Energy Agency and the agreements to verify what each country is doing and how they are using nuclear technology. We have the mechanism to report back if some government is diverting a military program; we have experts who control different region and there is the whole system of weapons free zone... There is a very wide system that leads to the non-proliferation and also to the nuclear disarmament and safe use of nuclear technology. So NPT is a complex system with many benefits. Even today, the NPT is one of the most efficient armament control agreement with 190 states signing it, which shows the importance and relevance to nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament. We have many bilateral agreements between the US and Russia to limit their arsenal, however, apart from these bilateral mechanisms, we do not have any obligations that would force the non-nuclear proliferation and disarmament besides the NPT. This is the only mechanism that obliges the United States, Russia, China and the United Kingdom to pursue the ultimate world disarmament and to reach Global Zero.

What are the biggest challenges today regarding the non-proliferation norm?

The biggest challenges come with the nature of the NPT as a discriminative treaty in the sense that it divides the world into two categories: the nuclear weapon states, the P5, which are legally recognised as nuclear weapon states; and the rest of the world, considered as non-nuclear states. The two categories have different obligations under the treaty. For instance, the nuclear weapon states are expected to pursue negotiations towards the Global Zero, but there is absolutely no verification included in the NTP to verify disarmament and there is absolutely no timeline regarding when they have to implement the reductions and its phases. This has been a problem since the beginning and puts a big tension between the nuclear and the non-nuclear states. Those states that are part of the non-alignment movement, in general, argue

that nuclear states should pursue much faster disarmament and they should reach Global Zero in the foreseeable future. There is a group between this two extremes, Hungary is one of the moderate countries, who are until certain extent attach to the nuclear weapon states by certain security insurances. In Hungary's case, we are under the umbrella of NATO, we are also protected by US strategic nuclear weapons and we are under the so called US umbrella. Israel is also perceived to be under this umbrella, as well as Japan and South Korea. Those countries are benefiting until certain extension from nuclear deterrence and from the deterrence of this weapons. Although they support nuclear disarmament, they say it can only be done step by step and as a slower process, rather than, as other countries defend, be done very quickly. This big tension between the nuclear "have" and the nuclear "have not" has been present since the early days of the NPT, but during this year reviewed conference this kind of problems were very vivid and very strongly present in the debate. The gap between the two categories is growing constantly and it might eventually undermine the NTP and trigger some other mechanism out of the scoop of NTP, because some of these countries feel that the treaty is no longer able to represent the best interests of non-nuclear states. Now they are looking for new alternatives and ways to advance nuclear disarmament.

Do you think the Article X of the NPT, where any country can withdraw from the Treaty, as it happened with North Korea, in 2003, represents a weakness of the document?

All treaties that I have seen so far in my career include a withdraw clause. This is not a specific of the NTP. The bilateral agreement between the United States and Russia contains withdraw clauses, saying that if the vital interests of the countries are threatened they have the right to withdraw. The US has withdrawn from the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty during the Bush Administration, so this is not uncommon. But I think the reason why you have to include it is because otherwise you might risk that the countries may not accede to the treaty, if they do not have the option to withdraw. It is like a loop whole: if their interests are not respected for the long term; if they have a withdraw option, they might be able to accede to the treaty and have national legislative bodies dug the agreement. Without the withdrawal, they might not be able to do that; they would be left with a treaty that only half of the states would be signatories. That is why having a withdraw clause does not make your treaty restricted. However, you can make it more difficult to withdraw, maybe making it less tempting to withdraw. In the framework of the NPT there has been an ongoing discussion

after North Korea announced that they wanted to withdraw (and in fact withdrew) on what to do about this issue. The 2010 and this year's NPT conferences tried to explore how to restrict those who use nuclear materials, how to not let them be used in production purposes, even after withdrawal. If you decide to withdraw from the treaty and go to the military option then there should be still some constraints exist to the use of those materials in the later phase. Today is an ongoing discussion in the NPT, how to restrict the withdrawal and how to make it more difficult to convert your program into a military program. In sum, I do not think to have a withdraw clause shows a weakness of a treaty.

In April 2015, as it happens every five years, the NPT was reviewed. The states could not reach an agreement to convene a regional conference to discuss issues related with the establishment of a Middle East free zone of all mass destruction weapons. Do you consider the meeting a failure?

If you ask people who attended the NPT reviewed conference, everyone will probably say that it was a failure. If we look at the evaluation of reviewed conferences, it has become a tradition that if you have a consensual final document the conference was a success; if you do not, then it was a failure. I think it is not necessarily black or white: it depends if you have some meaningful results coming from a reviewed conference, even if you were not able to reach a final document. However, this year's reviewed conference was, until a certain extent, a complete failure, but not only because of the Middle East. The NPT has three pillars: the first one being disarmament, the second is non-proliferation and the third one is the peaceful use of nuclear energy. The reviewed conferences are organised in every five years, but the treaty itself does not obliged you to organise it every five years; it says that you can organise reviewed conferences if you want to. So far it has been the practice to have these meetings organised every five years. In fact, they are organising preparative meetings three years prior to the big one and they had three prep meetings before this reviewed conference. The reason why this one was a failure was because we can see that in all three pillars there were extremely huge divisions and tensions during the debates. The Middle East has been traditionally the most problematic issue in the framework of NPT. The idea of establishing a Middle East nuclear weapon free zone was already raised in 1974, immediately after the inforce of the treaty and it has been a key issue since then. In 1975, we could only conclude the final document in exchange the countries would advance the goal of a nuclear weapon free

zone in the Middle East, and since then it has sort of keeping the NPT capture. In many cases the failure of the conferences was due to disagreements over this zone. Last time, in 2010, we actually concluded a final document and that conference was considered a huge success, but in exchange for the consent the countries promised to the Arabic countries there would be a Middle Eastern nuclear weapon free zone. They promised that by the end of 2012 they would organise a big meeting, where all countries of the region, which includes all Arabic countries, plus Israel and Iran, should be present to start the negotiations for a nuclear weapon free zone in the Middle East. They actually nominated a Finnish diplomat, Jaakko Laajava, to be a mediator between the parties and to prepare this Middle East summit. Over the course of those two years, when he was working on this issue, he had more than 300 personal meetings with different players around the region. It was really unbelievable how he was preparing it and bringing the parties together, but 2012 was a very busy year: we had the presidential elections in the US, we had election in Russia and in Iran and we ran out of time. By December, it was clear they would not be able to arrange this meeting, so they postponed it, but they did not define a date for the new meeting. So when we went to the reviewed conference this year, we already knew Egypt and other Middle East countries were really frustrated for postponing of the 2012 meeting, by having no progress at all in the Middle East free zone issue. So, we are kind of suspected that there would be disputes in this field. The pillar of non-proliferation was the reason why the United States, the United Kingdom and Canada, on the last day of the conference, said they were waiting the consent and they were not willing to accept the final document that was drafted before and specifically named the Egyptian tactics the reason of the failure. And what Egypt was trying to do in the previews three weeks, they came with a proposal saying the new deadline is the 1st of March 2016, by the time they have to conclude and organise a meeting on the Middle East nuclear weapon free zone and they said the meeting should not be organised by the three depository states of the NPT, which are the United States, United Kingdom and Russia, but it should be organised by the UN Secretary General. The reason why it was important is because if the Secretary General was responsible for organising this meeting, then Israel could no longer use the fact that it has never signed the NPT as an excuse to stay away from the conference. Israel has never signed and ratified the treaty, so they do not comply with this final document. In fact, over 2010 and 2012 they went to many of the preparatory meetings and they met with Ambassador Jaakko Laajava and tried to explore the option of the meeting. They were at least a bit open to the idea, but they could always use the excuse that the document was not obligatory to them. But if the meeting is organised by the UN Secretary General, then Israel

can no longer use this excuse. The other big problem is that the three depository states would not be responsible for holding the meeting, so they no longer would have the veto power over the agenda. Israel is afraid that if they do not have the right to agree to the agenda before the meeting, then the whole meeting would be about to perceive the Israel nuclear weapon program and nothing else will be discussed. The official Israeli policy in this regard is that they are open to the idea of disarmament, but only after there is a lasting and working piece of agreement in the region. So, if security is provided in the region, then after that, they are ready to talk about disarmament. The Arab and Iranian approach to the issue is the other way around: they say disarmament is the trigger that will lead to peace in the region; so disarmament first and peace talks after. The US, the UK and Russia would no longer be responsible as depository states of the meeting and would not have a veto in the agenda and Israel is afraid this might mean that US would not veto any kind of agenda that not comply with Israeli national security interests. From an Israeli perspective this framework of the meeting was totally unacceptable and, of course, the reason why the US vetoed it and said they were not consent on this issue, was that it would go against the national security interests of Israel. It is interesting to see that Benjamin Netanyahu and President Obama are not the closest friends in these days and have had serious arguments over the past years. However, the day after the US broke the consent, Benjamin Netanyahu thanked President Obama for it. From an US perspective it was the Egyptian negotiator tactics that led to the failure. But I have talked with people who have been there and they said it was not only the non-proliferation pillar that was shaken this year, but also the disarmament pillar. Like I said, there are a lot of tensions between nuclear and non-nuclear states. From the side of non-nuclear states, they tried to push many new initiatives that would bring the issue of disarmament out of the scoop of the NPT and tried to find other mechanisms that would advance to this goal. The most important was the Humanitarian Initiative, which was first organised in 2013 by Norway, then we had a second conference by Mexico and in the end of 2014, we had the meeting in Vienna. These days Austria is the strongest supporter of this humanitarian approach to nuclear disarmament. They argue that a new treaty could be concluded by the UN General Assembly, which could create a normative to do a much faster disarmament, giving the historic example of the landmine agreement, which was a creative moment for disarmament of landmines and triggered in a similar negotiation. But, honestly, I am a little sceptic about the Humanitarian Initiative, because the NPT is about much more than the question of disarmament. There are so many reasons why the NPT is important that anything that undermines the legitimacy of the NPT is a wrong approach, in my perspective. The

reason why I was mentioning the Humanitarian Initiative is that there are significant problems in the First Commission, and in the NPT as well. Many people told me that if the consent was not broken in this Middle East issue, then many members of the non-nuclear group would break consent due to the disarmament concept of the final document, which they did not find strong enough. In this sense, officially it was the Middle East, but there were many tensions in the conference and the reason why I think it was a big failure it was because it missed the opportunity to fill these gaps. It actually made some of these gaps even bigger. In the future it will be a huge challenge to bring the parties together again to the same table.

One week after the attacks in Paris, United Nations, as requested by France, allowed every country with capacities to take all measures to stop the Islamic State. Considering the rise of the jihadist group, do you think the world is now facing the threat of nuclear responses?

There are many radical organisations that have the intention of acquire nuclear weapons. I have not heard this about ISIS, whether they are pursuing nuclear materials or not. I do not know if they planning to do that. Regardless the advance of ISIS and the attacks in Paris, I do believe that nuclear terrorism has grown compared to the 1990s and the end of Cold War, we are definitely facing new threats. What is important that President Obama is also concerned about this and he has even launched an initiative that tries to limit the dangers of nuclear terrorism. In 2010, he started the so-called Nuclear Security Summit series. The first summit series took place in Washington DC, the next one in Seoul, and the third one took place in The Hague. We will probably have the last meeting in Washington DC again in the end of next March. In the framework of these summits, what the leaders of the world are trying to do is focusing on those weapons materials, which could be stolen by terrorist organisations and be used to produce either dirty weapons or nuclear weapons. In the framework of these NSS series, from 2010 until 2012, they have made very significant and very successful advances in this field. In the end of the Cold War, we had around 50 states that were in possession of high rich uranium; today we have about 20 of such countries. A third of this progress was achieved owing to the framework of the NSS summits. Since the Washington Summit, twelve countries have got rid of their high rich uranium stock piles; one of them being Hungary. Very significant action has been done by world leaders to reduce the threat of nuclear terrorism, simply by secure those materials that could be use by terrorist organisations. Of course there are still plenty of materials out there. The problem is that President Obama, in this NSS series,

is focusing on weapon material that are in civilian control and that is only a small portion of all weapon usable material. I think only a quarter or one fifth that are in civilian control and all the rest is in military control. But I would immediately add here that although these NSS series does not touch the issue of military materials, in general those materials that are in possession of military are much better guard than those in civilian control. So, I think the danger has grown in the past few years, but owing to these NSS series the awareness of world leaders has also significantly grown and now we can see some concrete measures that have been taken to mitigate the risks of nuclear terrorism.

In December 2008, around 300 world leaders launched the Global Zero campaign, an initiative with the main goal of eliminating all nuclear weapons. What is your view on this campaign?

Personally, I am a supporter of Global Zero and I consider it a very important goal to be reach in the foreseeable future. President Obama has already said it is not going to happen definitely during his presidential term and probably not during his lifetime. He was very supportive of the idea, but also realistic to see this is going to take a long time. And I agree with that, this will not happen from one day to another, but I also consider this goal as something that should be pursued and be reach maybe by the end of my lifetime. Who knows? The activities of the campaign are very interesting. I am not sure how the whole campaign started, but I always have the feeling they have a really good mixture of activism, mobilising especially young people in the US. They have organised so many different and visible activities, like taking bikes and circulate around the White House, showing what would be the epicentre and what would be the range effect of a nuclear weapon, if it was dropped there, like in Hiroshima and Nagasaki. They are doing really good campaigns and they are very good mobilising the next generation, young scholars and next leaders. However, I would also add immediately that they are much more than their campaigns; they also have very strong supporters from the expert community and also from the military. One of the most influential supporters of the campaign is a US Army general, who was responsible for the management of the nuclear weapons and the preparation of war plans in the US. Having a commander like this as a supporter is a big advantage for the organisation. Whenever I read Global Zero reports sometimes I do not agree with the timeline they draw, when I think is not feasible in such a short time, but, still, they

have the expertise behind it. Also, from a technical perspective they came up with some really good arguments and articles.

The New START program entered into force in February 2011, promoting the transparency and the reduction of United States and Russia nuclear arsenal. However, on the summer 2014, Russian's President Vladimir Putin stated in a speech that "other countries should understand it's best not to mess with us". Three months later, Russian newspaper Pravda published an article entitled "Russia prepares nuclear surprise for NATO". Can you comment on this?

The crisis in Ukraine had a very strange effect on the relations between the US and Russia and on the dynamics of arms control as well. Sometimes this kind of policy of loose lips is scary, which basically means high ranking leaders and officials are using some really harsh words, which reminds us to the worst days of the Cold War time. But I would still say that, when it comes to actual policy, I am not sure these loose lips have a big effect on the action of the leaders. The New START is a very good example in this regard. It was conclude in 2010 and then ratified by 2011. The US said two years later, in July 2013 in Berlin, they are ready to go deeper. Unfortunately, Russia was not on board for further reduction. Even if the US and Russia have some significant problem today, the notification that are possible in the ratification of the New START agreement have been ongoing since the treaty enter into effect and the crisis in Ukraine did not have any negative effect on this. Since 2011 they have changed data and notify each other for military exercises, more than seven thousand times, that is really a huge amount of data that has been shared with each other. The agreement allows for each part, on a year basis, to conclude eighteen insight inspections. On the other side, and even though the crisis in Ukraine happened, still they have maximised and conclude all the eighteen insight inspections. In this sense, on the technical level they still have a strong cooperation. The quote clearly shows that there are very harsh rhetorical exchanges; Putin is very hard on his rhetoric towards the US. The new Russian military doctrine says that NATO military developments has the biggest threat to Russian national security and make some strong arguments against the other side. However, still, when I look at the implementation of the New START agreement, both sides have started to reduce their nuclear armament. They are cooperating, visiting each other in their nuclear field, and this does not seem to weaken because of the tensions. I hope that part of this rhetoric is only for the Russian and US

population. For Putin is very important to make Russian believe that there is a valid threat coming from NATO and that Russia needs to stick together to stand against the threat coming from the West. So, part of this rhetoric is for the Russian population and not really for NATO, because when I see what is going on in real terms, in arms control, the New START agreement is still solid and I really hope this is going to remain.

In July this year, Iran and P5+1 reached an agreement, the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, regarding Iran's new nuclear program, in order to reduce the nuclear arsenal of the Middle East country. Iran is a signatory state of NPT, however is known for its non-compliance attitude towards the international treaty. What is different with this new agreement? How can the international community be sure that Iran will now respect the agreement?

One of the most positive effects of the new deal is that it will make sure Iran will implement this so called protocol. The International Atomic Energy Agency, under the umbrella of NPT open the option of signing an additional protocol in 1997 and, although in early 2000 Iran have signed the additional protocol, they have never signed the treaty. This means the additional measures are not enforced for the inspectors when they come to verify what Iran is doing underground. This new agreement will actually force Iran to enforce the additional protocol, so we will have advance verification mechanisms to make sure Iran is compliant. The additional verification measures will inspect everything in the nuclear field, from mining to nuclear waste disposal; inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency will also be able to go to facilities, which has never been open to them before. That is definitely an important aspect of the new deal and it is also going to be good from the perspective of the international community, because it will see that Iran is compliance with the agreement and this might restore the trust of international community in the country. Apart from verification, the agreement itself settles very hard reductions in Iran's nuclear program. The number of centrifuges today is about 90,000 and it has to be two thirds of it and only first generation centrifuges can be maintained. The amount of high rich uranium they have today can build nine nuclear weapons, but with the reduction, these ten thousand kilograms will be reduces to three hundred. That will be enough for only a small portion of a nuclear weapon, maybe two percent of a nuclear weapon material. So, the material and the centrifuges will be significantly reduced and limited in their technical capabilities. Besides that, verification will be

implemented. One of those facilities which cause the biggest concern for the international community, the heavy water reactor, which moves on plutonian fuel, will totally reconverted, with the ultimate purpose of limiting the weapon usable material of this facility. There are many different technical aspects with the new deal which are creating very strong limitations on what Iran is going to be able to do for the next ten to twenty five years, depending on the limitation. And, although Republican Senators and representatives did not like that after ten, fifteen and twenty five years all these limitations will be gradually lifted and Iran will be able to do again whatever they want to do, as it is stated in the framework of the NPT, still I say that, if there is an agreement that works for ten, fifteen or twenty five years and Iran has complied since the beginning, then probably in ten years we will not have any reason to be worry about it. I can understand the concerns of Israel and conservative circles in the US, but ten years from now we can have a completely different situation. I always say it is time to give a chance to this deal, because without it Iran's nuclear program will develop very fast and without limitation, and with this deal we can limit its nuclear program. Also, I see the potential in the deal to build some trust between the West and Iran.

How do you think the new agreement with Iran has affect the balance of powers in the Middle East, being Israel now the only with nuclear arsenal in the region?

Israel from the very beginning argued that this deal is not good, because is not strong enough. They are afraid that Iran, under this agreement, will still be able to develop a nuclear weapon and argued that, if not now, in ten or fifteen years there will be no limitations. They were heavily against the deal and launched a really effective campaign in the US. I was following it on a daily basis and it was crazy to see how much tension it was on the deal. One of the most effective lobby organisations in the US sent 14 million dollars on the campaign against the deal, and we could see Benjamin Netanyahu coming almost once every day against the deal, stating that it was against Israel national security. But now the deal is enforce, so Israel will have to find a way to live together with this agreement and to start trusting in these international mechanisms. In general, I think this agreement may create some difficult movements for Israel in the future, because if there is a nuclear agreement with Iran, the only diplomatic player in terms of nuclear weapon is Israel, in the Middle East. After the Iran deal we may see some renewed moment for the Middle East free zone or nuclear disarmament in the region and this will push the shoulders of Israel to engage in conversations for nuclear

disarmament. Of course the first step of this should be Israel, at some point in the future, to come clean about its nuclear weapons capabilities. Until today Israel has not officially acknowledge it has nuclear weapons, they have this opacity in their nuclear policy. International community believes Israel has nuclear weapons since the 1960s. Now we have some declassified documents from the United States, from conversations between Richard Nixon and Golda Meir, and they show some signs, in direct reflections or mentions, on this nuclear weapon arsenal. But, still according to the Israeli officials, they have never confirmed or denied the existence of these weapons. In this way, if you start negotiating on nuclear disarmament in the region, the first step should be they to come clean with their capability, acknowledging what they have and start discussing about what kind of insurances they will need in exchange for nuclear disarmament. I think Israel is afraid this deal will bring out this issue of nuclear disarmament in the region again. So far, they could point the finger on Iran, stating is Iran who is destabilising the region, and they could use Iran nuclear problems as a shelter, but now we have the deal. This might bring some difficulties to Israel in the future.

Saudi Arabia has indicated its willingness to have nuclear weapons from time to time. Since 2013 it is also often claimed that Pakistan would sell such weapons to the Saudis. Recently the kingdom's ambassador to London said that "all options are on the table" if talks fail to keep Iran in check. What do you think about the possibilities for the Saudis to go nuclear?

Honestly, I am not an expert on Pakistan or Saudi Arabia, but from the very beginning I have a feeling most of it was directed against Iran, when there were some really tensions between Iran and Saudi Arabia. We know Saudi Arabia was really afraid of Iran developing a nuclear weapon during the Bush Administration, we suspected there were some behind the doors things, when Saudi leaders asked President Bush to launch a strike against the Iranian facilities. We can see there is an honest concern on Saudi Arabia about Iran and the balance of powers in the Middle East and most of these statements were, for me, due to their fears that they might lose the leadership. I do not think Iran would be able to take this leading position from Egypt and Saudi Arabia, who are the most influential players among the Arab states. Iran will probably never have the same kind of legitimacy in the region, but, still, we can see that Iran is supporting organisations among the Middle East, like Shia activities, and in some aspects this undermines the power of the kingdom. So, there is an honest concern about Iran, but, to what it stands, they really thought that a nuclear weapon would solve these problems. I

cannot say if it was just rhetoric or if there are some people who actually believe this is the solution for all of their problems. Personally, I do not agree with this, I do not think that if Saudi Arabia acquires a nuclear weapon it would restore the balance of powers in the region; I think it will destabilise it and cause more problems to Saudi Arabia than they are facing today. On the Pakistan, side if I look to the policy these days, they want to be members of the Nuclear Suppliers Group, which is the biggest export controllers of nuclear technology, and for them to sell nuclear weapons would be a big violation of every possible norm that we have in nuclear control. I do not think Pakistan would take the chance of pick one nuclear weapon from the shelf and sell it to Saudi Arabia. They could not get away with it. If that weapon would be use, you could find out its origin, so everyone would know this weapon came from Pakistan. They could not even denied it and I do not really think that they will take the chance of selling one of their nuclear weapon and facing really harsh sanctions against them, losing the chance of acceding to some organisation that is fighting for the nuclear disarmament and arms control. They are trying to reach the Nuclear Supplier Group, so I am not sure about the seriousness of the Saudi's intentions. I would not be surprise if it was only some loose lips policy to threat Iran and I do not think Pakistan would be willing to sell nuclear weapons to Saudi Arabia and have all negative consequences that would come with it.

The United States has invented the most powerful thermobaric bomb in 2003, called the "Mother of Bombs". In 2007, Russia tested a similar one and named it "Father of All Bombs". Since then more tests and developments have been made. Is it likely that highly destructive non-nuclear bombs could replace the nuclear ones in the near future?

I know there is a very strong intention in the US to develop conventional weapon that could, maybe not replace, but take some of the roles that nuclear weapons play today. I am not sure about this weapon, because it is to hit softer and medium targets. Most of nuclear weapons in US are supposed to target really heavy targets, so this "Mother of Bombs" would not be able to pose a risk to Russia submarine base, for example. But of course this is just the first step on the long run. I can see the potential in conventional development and they might take over nuclear weapons. In the US, they have a program called Prompt Global Strike, still in the research and development phase, which means the acquisition of the weapons has still not started and probably will not start in the next five to ten years. But they are exploring the idea of precision guidance of conventional weapons, which are long range weapons, meaning they

can reach any part of the world within one hour. They would not carry nuclear weapon as long range weapons, but they will be carrying conventional weapons and bomb packages. Whenever I talk to people who negotiate with Russian or with a Russian expert, they always say that one of the biggest sources of their concerns is that the US and NATO, as an alliance, may in the long run be able to develop effective precise long range conventional weapons, because that would undermine the strategic balance between the US and Russia. At the moment, there is still a balance between the two countries in strategic arsenal capabilities and this would definitely give a special state to the US. But as we are lowering these numbers and the US is becoming more able to develop precision guides and long range effective conventional weapons, then that might create some leverage for the US and NATO, that Russia may not be able to counterattack with different measures. Consequentially, they are really worried about these conventional weapons developments. I think in the long run, what these weapons will cause, is that we will have an even more complicated arms control process that we have today. I think as we are getting close to zero and lowering the numbers of nuclear weapons in US and Russia, it will be more imperative to consider every aspect that could pull the stretch from Russia perspective. They will not accept a disarmament agreement unless some of their fears are addressed. In the long run, I believe there will be some limitations on conventional weapons, on ballistic missile defence as well and it will also be necessary some limitation on the outer space. All needs to be channelled into the debate and into the negotiations, otherwise Russia will never accept to get rid of their nuclear weapons. They feel these weapons are the ultimate guarantee to their security and if NATO and US do not agree to some limitations on the other field, then the arms control process will be jammed. This is one of the biggest consequences of these modern programs on the conventional field. They complicate the nuclear arm control negotiations and, in the long run, they will have to be included in these talks, if we want to Russia stays on the table and to continue the process.

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Small states and the European Union

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The emergence of small states

During the colonising times, actors that could change the international scene, were named as Powers. The Powers were five which consisted of; Great Britain, France, Prussia, Austria and Russia. Smaller states served only as colonial holdings and as a more or less exploitation reserve. Small sovereign states have largely emerged after de-colonialism took place. The emergence of small states was a result of three international occurrences. Firstly there was the break-up of the Habsburg Empire in 1919 which saw the rise of many small states. The Second World War, was another premise, the expense of having colonies was over-bearing on the Powers national's economy especially in trying to rebuild bombed places, and so much of the small states were given independence. Lastly, the breakup of the Soviet Union in the last decade of the 20th century saw many ex- satellite states appearing in the international community. Nowadays, small states amount to almost half of the United Nations General Assembly votes. Likes such as Latvia, Macedonia, Malta and Eritrea have all been a product of the dissolution of a colonial rule.

Defining small states

In defining small states, disagreements arise on what characteristics should be assessed that outline a small state clearly. As a result of these variances there are different definitions of what is a small state. There are different features that make a state small or weak; size, power, labour force, economy, governance, sovereignty and military capability are a few illustrations.

Keohane maintains the idea that a small state is a state that either acting alone or in a small group cannot make an impression on the globe. (Rabby, 2015a) It is important to note that small states in different regions of the world face completely different challenges and opportunities. Small states in Europe are dissimilar to those in Africa, Latin America and Asia. For the purpose of this assignment I will hold prominent the idea of how the European Union measures small states due to the reason that I will discuss small states in Europe. The European Union measures states by their economic and political power such as GDP and seats in the European Parliament. (Gulmohamad, n.d., p.4)

Surviving politically

Right after independence, small states realized that once the colonial power had left there was no mother country that could contribute economically by providing subsidies, invest in employment and provide efficient trade relations. Moreover there was no protector state that would defend their interest in the international arena via military and negotiation means. Most of the newly-independent states faced terrible challenges in making their country stable, both politically as well as economically. In addition to this these weak states always had to watch out for threats to their sovereignty.

In order to cope with the international threats, most of the small states chose to hide or either bind themselves. (Steinmetz and Wivel, 2010) The hide strategy aimed for the weak state to stay out of trouble by staying out of the power's sight. They meant to deal with their national issues alone and not to get entangled or dragged into an international issue. Those small states following the bind approach were more motivated and decided that instead of trying to stay out of trouble, they would strive to prevent war from taking place at all. This, they held, is done through the strengthening of the governance of international affairs. This would in turn lead to a more peaceful co-existence among states.

The non-aligned movement tried to achieve peace through the refusal of non-military alliances and giving support to one particular bloc during the Cold War period. Regions in Africa and Asia did not want to be colonized once more under a new form, such as the European satellite states under USSR influence. Nehru developed the concept of non-alignment and its functions were to combat colonialism as well as military alliances with any major power. This is in view of achieving economic success and not be given the back burner

in the international arena. The movement managed to allow small states to reap the benefits of the Cold War's political configuration. The non-alignment movement managed to gain votes in the United Nations as well as give a new dimension to small states in the international arena, in fact it had proved to make itself a transnational organisation. (Gopal, 1976) The NAM made it available for small states to make their presence known in the international arena not through military capabilities but through diplomacy.

Diplomacy is only available in a diplomatic environment such as the United Nations, NATO and the European Union. These efforts not only prevented a third world war to occur, but also gave equal rights to small states. These international institutions managed to create an international law that protected the sovereignty, economy, rights and voice in the international arena. This is specifically inscribed in the UN Charter, Chapter one Article 2;

The organisation is based on the principle of the sovereign
equality of all its members. (The UN Charter, 1945)

Cyprus' Foreign Affairs Minister, Dr. Erato Kozakou-Marcoullis regards this as one of the successes of the international body, this is because the safeguarding of sovereign rights besides force has brought overall stability and development in the international system. (Kozakou-Marcoullis, 2011)

This stability and the bind strategy have led the small states to develop foreign policies which protect their interests instead of trying to rely on super powers. One of these policies was the neutrality route in international relations. A neutral state is a state that declares itself neutral towards any belligerent. This is a legal notion which has been personified in international law. (Baidul Alam, 1977, p.169) When a state declares itself neutral, the states that recognise this neutrality are obliged to respect it, guarantee its respect and finally to protect the neutral state. (Kunz, 1956, p.419) Brecher notes that;

“Neutrality is simply a legal status of states which demand certain rights of the belligerents in time of war and accept certain obligations toward those belligerents. It is a status which comes into existence only after a war has begun.” (Brecher, 1962, p.224)

There are different formations of a neutral state. Hersch Lauterpacht lists different types of neutrality. Among them one finds, perpetual neutrality, voluntary and conventional neutrality, benevolent neutrality and armed neutrality. (Oppenheim, and Lauterpacht, 1952, pp.661–663) Switzerland was the role model of perpetual neutrality when the Neutrality Act was adopted

in 1955. When a state chooses to follow a permanent neutrality foreign policy such as Switzerland and Finland, the state in question is removed from the forum of conflict when it comes to power politics. There have been small states such as Belgium and Luxembourg which their neutrality was established in a treaty between great powers, therefore permanent neutrality was imposed on them in order for them to act as a kind of buffer zones for the powers. Laos and Austria are two instances of this. (Kunz, 1956, p.418) This signifies that there are neutrality can be either voluntarily or by force. Neutrality benefits those who lack high military capabilities, since it protects the state from being dragged into war either by an attack or being accused of siding with a particular bloc. Benefits of neutrality are similar to the non-alignment ideology. One has to note that when these neutral states joined the European Union, their neutrality has been compromised.

The states that decided to follow the hide strategy tried to stay out of conflict and to improve their economies by staying in a power's good books and followed the dependency theory. By the dependency ideology one is referring to the situation whereby the development and expansion of a country may condition the economy of the other country/countries. The dominant country can be self-sustaining and enlarge itself. In contrast, dependent state can only be a reflection of the development in the dominant country. (Dos Santos, 1970, p.231) The tendency is that when the wealth of poor states decrease, the wealth of rich states increased. The dependent states supplied cheap labour and cheap resources to the dominant states. This would many a time bring about poorness because the profit is not equally shared but it is given to who the dominant state says it should be given to. This was a risky move for the dependent states because they developed their economy in view of how they integrated into the world's economy. Due to monopolistic control of the market, the profit of dependent states is passed on to dominant ones. And so the development of one state is at the expense of another.

This had devastating effects in some dependent states and chose to change their policies so that they could survive and be more efficient in maintaining a stable economy in their states. They searched for a strategy that would not have them accept anything that comes their way due to their lack of economic and political power.

The strong do what they have the power to do,
and the weak accept what they have to accept

- Thucydides

Surviving economically

Small states following the dependency theory had to rely mostly on imports and had a low per capita GNP, many a time this led to them being a dependent state. Many states tried to break off from this dependency by blocking out all imports and investing in the country's industries to produce their own products. Many leaders believed that greater economic growth potential lay in import substitution. This would allow them to be self-reliant and not necessarily integrate themselves into the world market. They planned to become self-sufficient by protecting their industries from competition by legislating high tariffs on imported goods. The planned end-result would be that the industry would grow so much that it can withstand international competition, in turn making a great contribution to the national economy. Many a time, by shielding the local industries from competition, the outcome would be for the industries to be less innovative and monopolistic. This, of course, would not make them successful when they reach the point to compete internationally. Mintoff, a former prime-minister of Malta was an advocate of this theory and implemented it into Malta.

In order to solve this problem, many small states following the Import Substitution theory, reformed their policy and progressed into a regional integration economy. This would make the states which agree on integration interdependent and each would grow dependently at a more or less same pace. By removing customs tariffs and trade barriers each state's industry will have more room to make profit and so produce more. Moreover it will create healthy competition and the customer is guaranteed to have a product which has proved to be better than others and so get the best. This is unlike a monopolized economy where the buyer is allowed to buy local products. Therefore, small states such as Malta are employing the notion of economic diplomacy. It has been given prime importance in the international arena due to its political and economic aspects. Through this notion, small states have effectively managed to gain the maximum for their national economies in terms of exports, imports and investment. (Rabby, 2015b) Due to their economic contributions there is a majority of small states which have been given an important seat when it comes to influence in the international arena.

One should appreciate that states' economies' in this day and age are becoming increasingly interdependent, especially with the fast-paced movement of globalization. Institutions such as the historic Zollverein Union have been created in support of interdependent economies and reduction of trade tariffs. A leading institution is the European Union which has employed a

common currency to further enhance this interdependency. The European Union has not only benefitted small states when it comes to security and economy but due to its institutional set-up, the EU permits small states to punch above their weights. The 2004 enlargement of the European Union, which included the following ten countries; Poland, Hungary, Slovenia, the Czech Republic, the Slovak Republic, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Cyprus and Malta, have shifted powers in the European Union. There has been an increase of seats in parliament and a more unified and coherent policies throughout the member states which allow small states to have the same rights as more powerful states.

Conclusion

Throughout the decades, small states have applied different theories so that they can become more secure, stable and independent in their being. Some of the theories have proven to fluctuate in their advantages and other have also demonstrated their lack of compensations in the long term. Nowadays it is clear that the modern way of conducting foreign policy in order to survive in the anarchical international arena is to apply economic diplomacy and interdependent economic structures. This would increase trade and would create more opportunities for businesses to expand and also attracts foreign investment. This win-win situation has proven to be successful for small states in this political configuration of the 21st century.

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