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Perspectives on Africa's development

Red Dragon vs Black Continent

Positive and negative aspects of China-Africa relations

Roberta Maddalena

Abstract: The topic of the paper is the relations between Africa and China. Since the Bandung Conference (1955), the presence of China in Africa has been increasing so that in 2000 the cooperation was institutionalised with the Forum on China-Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). It is more an economic cooperation, but in the recent years China also provided humanitarian help and participated with UN Missions in Africa.

If on one side China has its own politics and interests to be in Africa; on the other side African countries also prefer looking at east because China is seen as the country of the miracle and because it does not interfere in domestic policy. It is a win-win cooperation: Africa has its infrastructure built, its agriculture and some industrial sectors developed, and China, by investing its money, gets more political and economic power on the international ground.

However, there is a lack in social cooperation and in more integration with the African civil society. Africans are concerned about the increasing presence of China because there are more Chinese people in the factories rather than Africans, and because traditional African economic activities are risked to disappear. Moreover, working conditions are not safe and the salary is low. In conclusion, the fear is that of a new imperialism. Although Chinese investments are helping African countries to develop, human rights issues still remain and this cannot be a surprise, as there are human rights issues in China as well.

In conclusion, the aim of this paper is to analyse all the aspects mentioned above in three chapters (historical background, description of aids and negative aspects), whereas the fourth chapter will give two examples of two countries where China is involved.

Keywords: China-Africa relations, development, human rights, economy, aids, win-win cooperation

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Introduction

"Studying China in Africa is much like pursuing a dragon in the bush. The dragon is imposing but the bush is dense" (D. Large 2008), with this phrase George Yu in 1968 described Sino-Africa relations.[1] Despite it was claimed many years ago, when China was only starting to put its foot in Africa's land, it is still a valuable sentence to describe nowadays relations.

Africa has 54 recognised states; each of them has different historical, cultural and social backgrounds, but a common colonial past and an ongoing process of development. In this context, Sub-Saharan countries notably have big issues, such as poverty, corruption, low human development, lack of infrastructure, few schools and hospitals, insufficient economic growth, and civil wars. According to United Nation Development Program (UNDP) 41% of Sub-Saharan African lives in extreme poverty[2], but regarding actions done to improve their conditions some countries show good performances, whereas some others do not. In this process of development it is also involved the assistance of International Monetary Fund (IMF), World Bank (WB), United Nations (UN), European Union (EU), United States (US) and China. The latter is appealing to African nations, especially in recent time, because China has been playing the role of a good giant, whose face is not that of a benefactor, but simply that of an economic supporter. The only sympathy that China shows to African countries is for its colonial past, so that its aids are offered "without strings" and with non-interference in domestic issues. Moreover, their financial deals are quicker, more generous and convenient for both parts.

However, studying Chinese commitments towards Sub-Saharan countries is not simple because data about the amount and the type of financial support are secret (data that will be shown in this paper come from many resources, not only Chinese), and we can only have an estimation. Hence, many critics are arisen by researchers and politicians regarding the nature of these aids, and if they can bring to a really sustainable development because it seems that China's presence in Sub-Saharan countries is causing both positive and negative consequences.

The paper will firstly give an historical background of Sino-African relations and the nature of them. In the second chapter it will be done a deep analysis of the different kinds of Chinese

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[1] George T. Yu, 1968. Dragon in the bush: Peking's presence in Africa. *Asian Survey*, 8, 12, p.1026.
[2] From UNDP reports about Sub-Saharan countries, available at: http://www.africa.undp.org/content/rba/en/home/regioninfo

aids, and it will be followed by a third part which will bring into light the negative aspects of this strategy. The last chapter will present two cases of two countries as examples and proofs of the observations made in the previous chapters. Overall the paper explores the features of China-Africa cooperation and how Sub-Saharan countries perceive it, who really enjoys from China's assistance and who does not. The study is supported by practical examples – beyond the two case studies in the fourth chapter – which will help us to see that the Red Dragon is bringing wealthy rains, but it is also spitting out fire on the already burnt land of the Black Continent.

1. History and main features of China-Africa relations

Nowadays, the historical international actors, such as United Nations, World Bank, International Monetary Fund, US and EU, have a new partner involved in the process of development of Africa, which is China. Especially since 2000, the pledge of People's Republic of China (PRC) for the development of Africa has been increasing. However, China's aid is different from the Western one, so that African countries are more and more open to welcome it.

"You are an example of transformation, we in Africa must learn from your success", Madagascar President Marc Ravalomanana told Chinese leaders during the African Development Bank meeting in Shanghai in May 2007 (Mingjiang Li 2009). This claim shows the appeal of Chinese economic strategy to African leaders, as a model to follow for improving their own economic situations. This is what Joshua Cooper Ramo defined as *Beijing Consensus[3], which is a new model of development followed by the less developed countries (not only Africa) that are trying to improve their own domestic conditions, but also to enter in the international order by keeping their own independence. China's new economic ideas seem to be very interesting to those developing nations that until now have received the help of western countries, which has not been totally successful. In 2000 PRC launched the "*Go global*" campaign to encourage its own enterprises to invest abroad. Between the end of 1990 and the beginning of 2000 the Chinese Ministry of foreign trade and economic cooperation has selected the best Chinese companies to start investing abroad. Even though this foreign strategy regards many countries in the world, undoubtedly Sub-Saharan African

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[3] J. C. Ramo, 2004. *The Beijing consensus.* London: The foreign policy center.

countries have been the main target. The Chinese government is adopting with Africa the so-called "*win-win cooperation*", which is to say helping their modernisation throughout investments, convenient loans and vocational trainings without interfering in their domestic affairs, and at the same time obtaining their row materials at low prices. This *win-win cooperation*, indeed, arises from the need to get natural resources, especially oil, which are in short supply in China, but which are necessary for its ongoing economic growth. It is a mutual benefit. As a consequence, both China and African States take advantages from this kind of relation: Africa gets infrastructure, industries, schools, hospitals; China obtains row materials to upgrade its own firms, and a new market area to foster its trade.

Besides the economic help, an important reason why African countries prefer Chinese's aids rather than UN's or EU's is the adoption of the principle of *non-interference* in domestic affairs. While European countries or the US ask for a good *governance* or changes towards democracy's rules in order to get economic funds, Chinese government does not impose any conditions because it believes that each country has to set out its own rights and laws independently. The aim of Chinese strategy is to forge positive relations with any partner state that can help advance its economy as well, regardless of its political regime. It is not surprising, then, China helped regimes like Sudan, Zimbabwe or Angola. It has to be noticed that many big western countries, like Great Britain or France, improved their power also thanks to the colonisation, especially in Africa. Therefore the western presence in these territories, even only as humanitarian aid, can still raise fear of a new colonisation that is one of the reasons why Africa prefers Chinese strategy of non-interference. China, in fact, introduces itself as a country that also suffered of foreign invasion (of Japan and western countries during the 19th century) therefore it does not want to interfere in domestic politics. Moreover, according to PRC, the international community has the moral responsibility to help Africa developing and benefitting from globalisation. However, it is also required that Africa creates conditions to facilitate economic growth, such as reducing costs of doing business or reform the taxation system, etc., so that China can easily give its financial support. African countries, from their point of view, has been starting a political strategy of "*go to East*", which is to say looking at China as the guide for their economic growth and as an important partner because of the amount of all kinds of aids. In addition to this, Africa prefers China's help because is faster than US. For example, it seems that Chinese experts take one week to conduct the feasibility study when a project's or investment's contract is signed, instead US firms take much longer.

Although the first Sino-African contact dates back to 700 CE and lasted until 1800, official relations started in 1950. In that time, China supported the *Third World* theory and the *Non-aligned Movement* (born in 1961) on the belief that the Third World needs to be developed as well as the First and the Second world, but outside the bipolar logic of the Cold War. China supported the struggle for decolonisation of Algeria, Democratic Republic of Congo, Zimbabwe, Angola, Sudan, Ethiopia and Eritrea by providing arms, munitions, guerrilla tactics, dialogue, etc. It was the first time that a developing country, as China was in that moment, was helping other developing countries. "The poor helps the poor" said Zhoun Enlai (J. Wang). Egypt was the first country having relations with China, and since 1950 the presence of China in the African continent has been spreading, especially in Sub-Saharan countries. Guinea was the first out of 14 Sub-Saharan countries to have diplomatic ties with RPC, in fact Guinea, immediately after the independence, obtained an interest-free loan of RMB 100 million (about $25 million) in 1960. Then, between December 1963 and February 1964, President Zhou Enlai did a tour in ten independent African countries and committed a total of $120 million of aid to Kenya, Ghana, Mali, Congo and Tanzania. After that visiting tour, many Chinese state-owned factories were opened, mostly specialised in textile, mining and oil, and medical and construction teams arrived from the Asian country.

Since the first economic and technical help during the 1970s to build the Tanzam railway, which links Zambia and Tanzania, Chinese investments in infrastructure, agriculture sector and industries has been boosting up to involving many other areas, such as education and health. The only condition that China demands for its help is the recognition of the *One-China* policy[4], which means the recognition of Taiwan as part of China and not as an autonomous state. Indeed, the only countries that do not receive any help from China are Burkina Faso and Swaziland because they are still linked with Taiwan. Some other countries, instead, which prior recognised Taiwan, changed towards the *One-China policy*, and so they received Chinese financing. For instance, Malawi interrupted its relation with Taiwan in 2007, and it consequently received a loan of $260 million from China which marked the beginning of a stronger and economically prosperous cooperation. During the reform period of Deng Xiaoping, in the 1980-1990s, there were fewer aids in Africa because the RPC was more focused on its own economic growth. The flow of aids started again in the new millennium and they are more diversified in comparison with those given from 1950s to 1990s.

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[4] The *One-China Policy* refers to the view that there is only one state, China, which also include Taiwan as part of it and it does not accept the existence of two Governments that claim to be "China". Therefore, all of states that seek diplomatic relations with PRC Have to cut off any links with Taiwan.

In 2000 the cooperation between Africa and China has given an incredible boost. The Forum on China-Africa cooperation (FOCAC) was established in order to promote dialogue and practical cooperation useful to coordinate bilateral relations. FOCAC, in fact, was founded on the principles of pragmatic cooperation, equality and mutual help. The first official plan on economic, political and trade cooperation occurred in 2003, when in Addis Ababa was signed the first Action Plan which claimed a zero-tariff treatment for exports towards the lowest developed countries. Since the establishment of the Forum, China's commitments to Africa has been increasing and enlarging to an overall of twelve areas of cooperation: agriculture, investment, enterprise cooperation, infrastructure, trade, finance, developing assistance, debt relief, energy and natural resources, climate change, poverty reduction, public health, education, academia, think tank. The 2006 was named the "*Year of Africa in China*", a Chinese delegation took many official visits in African countries and stipulated many cooperation agreements. The year 2006 ended with the Summit of 3–4 November, when economic relations between China and 48 African countries were strengthened, with a new Action Plan (2007–2009), and trade agreements worth about $1.9 billion were signed. The last Action Plan (2016–2018) was signed during the Forum in Johannesburg on December 4–5 2015. The Plan forecasts an improvement of cooperation at political level, not only in the form of bilateral relations, but also of collaboration with regional organisations, like AU or ECOWAS, and local governments. China will put more efforts to ensure peaceful and stable development, and to guarantee food security. For this last reason, the Asian country declared itself willing to act jointly with UNFAO Programme for food security, and to give priority to agricultural projects.

As we can see from the last Action Plan of FOCAC, Chinese strategy in Africa has been changing during the years. If at the beginning the Asian country was exclusively focused on economic development, now it looks at either security, maintaining or bringing the peace, which means being more present at military level and collaborating with governments and organisations. Many circumstances make impossible for China to totally not interfere in national affairs, this explains its efforts together with UN peacekeeping forces in the black continent and its official contribution for the security and the stability, by having more dialogues with regional organisations and supporting them, as claimed in the 2016–2018 Action Plan.

2. A deep look inside China's aid strategy

In order to better understand the China's way of helping Africa, firstly the "*Eight Principles for China's aid to foreign country*", claimed in 1964, should be known as they are the logic behind Chinese foreign policy in Africa. These principles are:

1. The Chinese Government always bases itself on the principle of equality and mutual benefit in providing aid to other countries.
2. The Chinese Government strictly respects the sovereignty of the recipient countries, and never attaches any conditions.
3. China provides economic aid in the form of interest-free or low-interest loans and extends the time limit for repayment when necessary, so as to lighten the burden of the recipient countries as far as possible.
4. In providing aid to other countries, the purpose of the Chinese Government is not to make the recipient countries dependent on China, but to help them embark step by step on the road of self-reliance and independent economic development.
5. The Chinese Government tries its best to help the recipient countries, so that the recipient governments may increase their income and accumulate capital.
6. The Chinese Government provides the best-quality equipment and material of its own manufacture at international market prices.
7. In providing any technical assistance, the Chinese Government will see that the personnel of the recipient country fully master such technique.
8. China dispatched experts to help in construction.

As we can see, Chinese strategy is a mutual benefit assistance without interfering in domestic issues. Another important aspect that has to be mentioned is the fact that China does not consider itself as a donor, like the western countries, but as a business partner. In fact, China introduces itself to African countries as a merely economic "assistant", in behalf of Africa to be in the future economically self-reliant. Chinese aids are not categorised as Official Development Assistance (ODA), except for some types of them, like OECD countries' aids are. To give an example, debt relief is counted ODA by OECD while is not for China, instead military support or concessional loans are seen as official assistance by China. Chinese aids are defined as "other official aids" because loans, investments, projects are made by state-owned banks or enterprises, so they are directly linked with and influenced by Government policies and not by market rules. Moreover, although support is spread to all those countries

with which PRC has diplomatic relations, the nature of it changes according to the economic background of the country. For instance, zero-interest loans are given to the Least Developed Countries (LDC), whereas to those resource-rich or more able to pay countries China pledges more concessional loans, like Nigeria or Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). This is what China means for *win-win cooperation,* "existing natural resource exports is a security to guarantee repayment" (D. Bown 2010). Eventually, the Red Dragon action is more about its economic interests rather than humanitarian.

Chinese aid program is organised by the Department of Foreign Aid, the Ministry of Commerce, and the China's Export-Import bank (Eximbank). Usually, China has directly collaborated with each single country, without participating in any donor-lead groups, like the Paris Club, because it considered their aids not really helpful for African development. However, in recent times (since the 6th FOCAC), President Xi Jinping has a bit abandoned this reluctance and opened to cooperation with some groups, also to mitigate critics of a "mercantilist approach towards Africa". Therefore, China is participating in a FAO project in Sierra Leone regarding food security; it has started signing bilateral agreement with the Africa Development Bank and participating with UN in peacekeeping actions, for example in Mali or Sudan. Generally, China has nine kinds of aid: medical, training and scholarship, debt relief, projects of infrastructure and factories (in sectors of oil, textile, agriculture, etc.), humanitarian aid, technical assistance, youth volunteering, aid, in-kind and budget support (loans, grants, credits) (D. Brautigam 2009). Investments in textile, mining, constructions and agriculture, volume of trade and loans have been spreading all over Africa and they are overtaking EU and US. In 2013 they were about $170 billion and they will be further increased, as Xi Jinping promised in December 2015. However, it is difficult to have the exact figures of aids during the years, hardly there are some official non trustworthy publications by Chinese Government, the first Chinese's official White Paper about foreign aids was only published in 2009. Obviously this lack of transparency arises critics and scepticism (as we will see in the next chapter).

Loans

The first instrument of China's aid is loan. Until 1995 grants ad zero-interest loans were given, but later on it turned into more concessional loans. Concessional loans are issued by Eximbank for the purpose of *promoting economic development and improving living*

standards in developing countries. As the website of China Eximbank explains, concessional loans are "medium and long-term, low interest rate credit extended by the China Eximbank under the designation of Chinese Government of the Borrowing Country *with the nature of official assistance*"; they are in Chinese currency and Chinese enterprises are always used as contractors or exporters. This kind of loans, then, is different from that given by World Bank, as Deborah Brautigam said "comparing loans from World Bank and from China is like comparing apples and lychees" (D. Brautigam 2009). World Bank's loans are zero-interest and with repayment over thirty-five to forty years (as they are ODA); China's concessional loans, instead, are more generous than market loans, but they need anyway a guarantee of repayment. Here there is the peculiarity of Chinese aid in Africa: the guarantee of repayment is given either by exporting natural resources, like in the cases of Nigeria and Angola (which are rich of oil), or by giving to Chinese companies preferential access to investments, as in Democratic Republic of Congo. On the whole, concessional loans are used to finance projects in transportation, manufacturing, mining, health-care, housing, telecommunication, energy.

In addition to concessional loans, China Eximbank provides export buyer's credits to African companies for their import of Chinese products, services and technology. Export buyer's credits have a better-than-market rate and, although they are subsidised, they promote Chinese exports. For instance, Zambia bought Chinese commercial airplanes through this kind of deal. In the 2016–2018 FOCAC Action Plan is claimed that China will pledge a total of US $30 billion in concessional loans and export credits in order to support China-Africa industrial cooperation, infrastructure building, development of energy resources, agriculture and manufacturing.

FDI

Foreign Direct Investments is another China's financial aid to African countries. From $20 million in 1990, the amount of FDI has been rising up to $32.4 billion in 2014 and the plan is to increase them up to $100 billion in 2020. They are mainly invested in mining, manufacturing, construction and finance sectors of all Sub-Saharan African countries, out of them South Africa, Zambia and Sudan are some important destinations.

Investments

As described above, China's financial aids are used for investments, which have been increasing since the first one issued during the 1960s. First of all, China invests in infrastructure, such as roads, railways, harbours, plants, water supplies, irrigation systems, oil refinery, etc. Other investments, instead, have been going to mining and to factories of machine tools, building materials, cotton production, shoes, leather processing, agricultural products, such as rice-mills, palm oil, sugar, maize flour. Originally, the factories were all state-owned, but nowadays the number of Chinese private companies investing in Africa has been growing, even if Chinese Government pushes them with favourable deals. Moreover, firms are merely Chinese and managed by Chinese people, with both Chinese and African employees, however in some cases there are joint-ventures with indigenous factories, like COMATEX in Mali. The last pledge announced by President Xi during the 2015 FOCAC summit, to support China-Africa industry partnering and cooperation, is of an initial $10 billion.

Trade

The volume of trade between China and Africa has been increasing, in 2014 it was of $220 billion (FOCAC 2015) with an annual increase of 19.3%. The growing trade has benefit not only from the Chinese economic growth, but also from trade reforms. China, in fact, has provided zero import tariffs on more than 180 products coming from 28 least developed African countries, and regional trade agreements in the black continent have contributed to liberalise the market. However, trade flows between Sub-Saharan Africa and China are not balanced. Africa imports from China many commodities and services, such as transportation equipment (38%), manufacturing products (30%), textiles goods (22%) and chemical products (5%). On the contrary, Chinese imports from Africa predominantly concerns oil and minerals, only 8% of manufacturing products and 5% of agricultural goods. The imbalance is also geographically, namely China's trade is obviously more concentrated with those Sub-Saharan countries rich of oil and other natural resources. As a matter of fact, more than 75% of China's trade takes place with South Arica, Sudan, Angola and Nigeria.

It can be assumed that the impact of Chinese trade on Sub-Saharan countries depends on which commodities the country can offer. As China's demand of oil, minerals, textile

products, etc. has increased, because of its economic growth, the global prices of materials has also risen up and only those natural resources-rich countries can benefit from exports. This is true for Angola, Gabon, Sudan, Mauritania, Mozambique, South Africa and Zambia, which have oil, copper, aluminium, platinum and iron. To make an example, between 2000 and 2005 international oil price has increased of 89%, and China contributed for 18% in the demand growth of oil. As a consequence, those African countries most benefitting from China's economic boom were Angola and Sudan. Having numerous natural resources fields in order to deal with China has been a big chance for some Sub-Saharan countries, because the revenue from oil exports has helped them for rebuilding after wars. Unfortunately, not all countries have oilfield and in these case trade flows with China are almost one-way.

Debt relief

Comparing to western countries and international organisations, China started cancelling debts later and it is not participating in the Highly Indebted Poor Countries debt reduction program launched in 1996 by the Paris Club[5]. The Asian country made its first pledge to cancel debts only in 2000, at the first FOCAC meeting, but only since 2005 this promise was put into action, by eliminating all free-interest loans matured by least developed countries. However, the debt cancellation also depends on whether the country sticks to One-China policy or recognises the Republic of China (Taiwan). Burkina Faso, Sao Tomé and Principe, and Gambia did not see their debt relieved because during 1990s recognised Taipei.

Scholarship and training

China is aware that education has a key role in the development process, Africans people need to be trained to make possible a self-reliant growth of the continent. Therefore, Chinese government provides training courses in China for African professionals on economy and technical management, like three weeks training course for workers of African chambers commerce in Beijing (D. Brautigam 2010). University scholarships to African students are offered, students can study medicine, engineering, science, but also Chinese history, literature

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[5] The Paris Club is an informal group of official creditors that tries to find sustainable solutions to payment difficulties of debtor countries. It dates back to 1956, since then the debt treatments in Paris Club agreements amounts to $583 billion. http://www.clubdeparis.org

and philosophy. In the last FOCAC Action Plan 30,000 government scholarships has been promised to African people for the next four years.

Not only Africans go to China, but also Chinese experts are sent to Africa, especially doctors. The first medical support arrived in Algeria, at the end of the war with France in 1963; after that, hundreds of doctors and nurses have been spreading, with medical equipment as well, in 37 countries. The last intense medical commitment of China was during the outbreak of Ebola in 2014. In that situation, the government sent $140 million of aids to Guinea, Liberia and Sierra Leone, the most affected countries, in forms of medical staffs, ambulances, equipment, funds, infrastructure and actions to prevent the spread of the disease.

Peacekeeping

Finally, it has to be mentioned the involvement of China in security and peacekeeping actions. Although PRC declared the non-interference principle, the escalation of threatens to international security, such as pirating and terrorism, leads China to take some measure and being involving with UN force. This new kind of involvement has occurred because, first of all, Chinese citizens are in danger in some African cities (many facts happened with Chinese people being killed, taken hostage or simply threatened), which implies that their businesses are in danger as well; secondly to break off criticism regarding its non-interference strategy in some critical moments. So, China sent troops in Mali, in cooperation with ECOWAS and UN, and in South Sudan; it is actively involved with multinational organisations in tackling piracy on Somali coasts, in fact, three ships flotilla of People's Liberation Army Navy were sent to the Gulf of Aden in supporting NATO army.

3. The other face of China's help

The China's aids strategy in Africa has two faces. On one side, Chinese investments, loans and experts have been improving African development; on the other side, this development seems not to be really fair, equal and sustainable. As a matter of fact, Chinese presence in Sub-Saharan countries also has some negatives aspects. First of all, it is not clearly known the exact amount of financial commitments and which are the criteria to receive them. Although PRC always points out that its actions are not benevolence but only an economic support to

development, the lack of transparency arises many critics regarding the real nature of them: who is benefitting more from these aids? Sub-Saharan countries or China? Researches, facts and figures may give an answer to this question.

As already noted above, the fact that China is more present in those countries rich of oil and minerals is not accidental. It is assumed that the Middle Kingdom needs natural resources to keep its economic growth and to get it even bigger, but it is in short supply of them, especially oil. Hence, Africa seems to be the solution, because it is full of natural resources, but it lacks of infrastructure, financial funds and experts in managing. In exchange for giving infrastructure and loans, China gets oil at better price or it gets preferential access to natural resources fields. It is, then, a capital-intensive exploitation, which would not help a long-term economic development, even because there will not be a local employment generation as both managers and the large part of workers is Chinese. For instance, in Congo in 2008 China did what was called by newspapers "The deal of the century". It consisted of $9 billion deal in copper and cobalt in return for roads and railways. However, in 2013 Congo tried to negotiate again the deal as the price of cobalt and copper was falling down and it was so low that at the end Congo would have to repay back China for the infrastructure. The story concluded with any renegotiation and with Chinese entrepreneurs going away from Congo without having paid taxes, equipment and workers. Due to Chinese high demand, the price of natural resources grew (even if sometimes is China itself to make the price according to agreements) and it relieved economies of those countries which have oil or other minerals. But it is not the same for other countries, such as Madagascar, Mauritius or Kenya which are not oil producers, for two reasons. First, they also import oil and because of the high price they might not afford the imports' costs; secondly, some of them produce cocoa and coffee, whose export towards China accounts less than 1%. At the end, it results as imbalanced trade to the detriment of African countries.

In addition to this, there is the problem of pollution, included illegal fishing and illegal trade of timber and wildlife (like rhino horns or ivory), because very little has been doing to adopt measures to protect the environment. In building or mining, environmental rules are ignored because doing business and developing come first. However, it has also to take into account that laws in African countries are weak and this makes easier for foreign companies to avoid them − there are also examples of western companies not respecting international environmental regulations. It should not be a surprise if one of the most polluted countries in

the world does not take care of the African environment too much. (Even if in the 2015 FOCAC Forum Xi claimed its duty to cooperate about pollution issue).

Another issue that comes out are the miserable working conditions. It is not rare reading on local newspapers about workers' protests demanding higher salary or security on work place, and these protests sometimes spread out after deaths or injured people. Two categories of African workers may be distinguished on the basis of their behaviour towards Chinese presence. Many Africans are happy to work for Chinese companies because they give them jobs, Chinese managers are hard-working, humble and, in case of women, they do not request sexual favour in order to get the job. On the contrary, there are those workers who are angry because China in Africa means having fewer jobs available for local people, as Chinese firms also use to bring their own country's workforce. In Zambia, in 2008, there were protests against Chinese contractors because they were hiring Chinese workers, willing to work at low salaries. Coexistence between Chinese and locals is not always easy, as Chinese entrepreneurs prefer bringing workforce from their home country because they work hard, for long hours, fast, also in inadequate conditions and for low salaries. This implies that less local people are employed, and, they are not always willing to work at Chinese requirements, as a consequence protests spread out. Moreover, in some kinds of jobs the problem of coexistence is given by cultural distance, that is to say by differences of working ways between the two ethnic entities. An example will make clear this statement. In Uganda, in shops there is the practice of *enjawulo*. It is a way of selling which consists in bargaining the commodity at higher price than that imposed by the shop in order to get a surplus, which goes straight in the pocket of the salesperson. In this way, they can make extra money to add to their low monthly salary. In Chinese shops, however, this is not possible as the logic is to sell as much as possible at low price, while for Africans is better selling at higher price in order to get *enjawulo*. Here it comes the conflict. African salespersons in Chinese shops complain because the owner is always in the shop, watching them and try to no let them bargain. But, employees do *enjawulo* as well, by distracting the owner, because for them it is very important gaining extra money to make ends meet, and Chinese shops may sometimes be the only solution to work[6]. The problem of integration, then, is always around the corner.

The sector which particularly suffers from China's presence is the textile. Textile industry historically was well protected, but in the last years things have changed. Since the end of the

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[6] Arsene, Codrin, 2014. Chinese Employers and Their Ugandan Workers: Tensions, Frictions and Cooperation in an African City. *Journal of Current Chinese Affairs*, 43 (1), pp.139–176.

Multi Fibre Agreement on Textiles and Clothing[7] on the 1st of January 2005 which imposed quotas for cloths from developing to developed countries and, despite African countries and US signed the AGOA Agreement – allowing duty-free access to US market for those countries respectful of human rights –, the competitiveness of African exports in the western market has decreased. In the meanwhile China's textile products exports were increasing due to lower production costs, also in Africa where the demand of cheaper products has been knocking down local textile market, as goods were more expensive, even if of better quality. The decrease of the demand of local cloths has led local firms to fire employees and, in the worst cases, to close off. Particularly, economy of Kenya, Botswana, Madagascar, Lesotho, Swaziland, Mauritius and South Africa were damaged. In Mauritius more than 10,000 people lose their job and similar high figure of job loss is registered in Lesotho and Swaziland (two of the poorest Sub-Saharan countries). Chinese imports, therefore, are not helping the development of local industries, on the opposite it may provoke the phenomenon of deindustrialisation.

The most controversial point of PRC in Africa is its non-interference principle in domestic affairs. Does China really follow it? The only criteria requested by China in order to get its aids is the recognition of *One-China policy* by Sub-Saharan countries, as a matter of fact those which have links with Taiwan do not receive any help. Hence, China looks at each country's diplomacy and politics before make it eligible of aids. There are also reported cases of China threatening of cutting its help or making very generous commitments if a country will recognise Taiwan as part of China and, at the end, cooperate with RPC. In 2006 there was Presidential election in Zambia. The opposition candidate, Michel Sata was complaining about the growing presence of China and Chinese labour practices; so he promised to reduce China's presence in Zambia and to recognise Taiwan if elected. China's response to this attack was threatening that in case Sata was elected Beijing would interrupt relations with Zambia.

The non-interference principle is like a double-edge sword, because it seems really convenient to both China and Africa at the economic level, but it is not for human rights and rule of law. China is firmly certain that human rights and good governance have nothing in common with economic development. As long as the Asian country can take advantages by investing or

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[7] The Multi Fibre Agreement on Textile and Cloths was untroduced in 1974 as a measure intended to allow developed countries to adjust to imports from the developing world, because their textile production was labour-intensive and with low labour costs. The agreement imposed quotas on the amount of products that developing countries could export to developed countries.

exporting in Sub-Saharan countries, wars, genocide, rule of law, and human rights in general are not its concern, as "standard need to be worked out by Africans not imposed by outsider" (Liu Guijin in Wissenbach 2007). China has been accused to send weapons or to be on the side of a President both in national and international situations, even against the Security Council. For example, in Kenya China supports criticism against the decision taken by the International Criminal Court in the case of the President Uhuru Kenyatta and the Deputy President William Ruto. Similar controversial arises also in Zimbabwe where China clearly supports the President Maputo, it even financed the building of the Presidential Palace with complaints about the amount of money spent in building the palace instead of investing in other more useful projects. The biggest scandal of China-Africa relations is the possible involvement of China in the Darfur conflict. Sudan is one of the biggest partners of China because of oil, and China by buying Sudanese oil gave money to the Government to buy Chinese weapons in order to use them against rebels, and it also helped Sudan to set up arms factories. China takes so care of its economy and financial relations that it abstained or voted against from Security Council resolutions to impose embargoes. By helping economically a country, or in the worst case by sending them weapons, China sometimes has interfered with Regional organisations' actions for conflict resolutions. For example, in May 2009 the UA requested UN Security Council to impose sanctions on Eritrea because it was supporting Islamist group which was trying to overthrow Somalia's government. China simply abstained to vote for this resolution-request because it has good relations with Eritrea. Even though it is appreciated by African countries, the non-interference principle, then, may obstruct the process of peace building and of reaching good governance.

Good governance plays an important role in the process of development and this kind of foreign policy makes difficult to solve these tough issues in African countries. China is not helping in tackling corruption in Africa. The fact that big flows of money goes to such countries that lacks of skilled systems to manage them has been fuelling corruption. It also seems that China itself is involved in corruption situations; there are some rumours that once the President of Malawi brought a suitcase full of money from a state-visit in Beijing. Like pollution's issue, it would not be expected China taking actions against corruption while this problem affects its country as well.

4. Case study

In the following lines we are going to see more in depth what is the practical approach of China in Sub-Saharan countries, and what are positive and negative consequences. The countries reported as examples are Angola and South Africa.

Angola

Angola became independent from Portugal in 1975, and since then China has been present in Angola's history. As a matter of fact, China supported Angola in the process of decolonisation (as it did with all African countries), but diplomatic relations were established only in 1983. Angola's history confirms how much African countries prefer China's financial aids rather than IMF's, and how much China could benefit from a poor but rich of natural resources country by giving them simply economic help.

Angola is the second biggest oil producer of Sub-Saharan region after Nigeria, however it could not totally exploit this richness because of forty years of civil war, which ended only in 2002. Due to the civil war, Angola had debts, poor and starving population, no infrastructure, no schools and no hospitals. In 2004 IMF promised Angola a loan in return of reforms, in particular it was demanded to improve transparency about oil revenue – which seemed to be used for the war. In the same time, China offered $2 billion of oil-backed loan for reconstruction of schools, hospitals and infrastructure. Angola, then, turned back the IMF's offer and accepted that made by China, because it was without strings, namely none social and political reforms were asked. Definitely, that of China was not a benevolent action as the debt would have been paid back by oil revenues. In fact, oil revenues go to an escrow account from which is detracted money to pay back China and the rest is freely available for Angola to use. It is unnecessary to say again that one of the biggest buyer of Angolan oil, and also other minerals, is China, which also influences the price. The Asian country has been investing in hundreds projects in Angola: schools, roads, railways, hospitals, hydro-electric plants, agricultural infrastructure, and some of these investments are FDI; moreover it provides scholarships to study in Chinese universities, and training courses.

The historical Middle Kingdom contributed to Angola's development in terms of economic growth and infrastructure, however major problems are stuck in the society. One of this is corruption, which also involved China-Angola relations because of the lack of transparency of

flows of money from loans. Angolans even believe that the massive flux of Chinese migrants working in their country is due to corrupt dealings between economic and political elites of both China and Angola. The presence of Chinese workers in many building projects leaves Angolans jobless, and the same happens for local manufacture firms whose productions are threatened from cheap Chinese goods' export. But, China should not be the only one to be blamed – nevertheless it is proved that it makes possible economic improvement –, Angola's Government should be as well. The Government has to change rules in order to make Angolan enterprises be able to compete with Chinese ones; to improve education in order to create a more and more skilled-workers generation which will be able to weaken their dependence from China. Perhaps, IMF was not crazy to ask for reforms.

South Africa

South Africa–China relations are a little different from those with other countries. First of all, their official diplomatic ties only started in 1998, after South Africa recognised the PRC in 1996. South Africa, as former colony of Great Britain, is part of Commonwealth which, especially in the past and during the Cold War, influenced its foreign policy. This also explains why the Rainbow Nation, until 1996, cooperated with Taiwan. After having recognised the People's Republic of China, the relationships between SA and China on economic side has been improving; in 1997 as sort of gratefulness for the recognition, China planned to invest $300 million in South Africa.

The cooperation between the two countries started being shaped especially after the Pretoria Declaration in 2000[8] and they were strengthened after the Beijing Declaration in 2010[9]. Their partnership and dialogue are very intense also because South Africa is now part of BRICS (since the end of December 2010). However, South Africa is a big economic power as well. and this makes relations with China different comparing to other Sub-Saharan countries. In this case, it can be assumed that the relation is more at business level rather than at helping development level, as a matter of fact in 2007 there were more SA's companies in China than the opposite. Chinese investments in SA are focused on mining sector, manufacturing, solar and wind power projects, nuclear power, insurance and agriculture. But, the life of Chinese

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[8] It is a Declaration in China and South Africa claim their friendship and partnership in economic and international cooperation. Full text available at: http://www.fmprc.gov.cn/ce/ceza/eng/zghfz/zngx/t165286.htm
[9] The Beijing Declaration follows the Pretoria Declaration. It was signed to confirm again the mutual assistance and cooperation between China and South Africa.

entrepreneurs in South Africa is not easy. Because of the presence of strong unions, rigid labour market and the Black Empowerment Economy (to avoid racism in employment after Apartheid) it is very difficult for China to operate in the same way as in other countries, in fact they are more present with joint-ventures.

Despite its strong economy, South Africa is also negative affected by Chinese presence. Chinese imports from South Africa regard row materials, instead their exports are consumer goods, such as clothing, vehicles, data processing machines and vehicles, which are added value too. This means that the trade between the two is imbalanced, especially for manufacturing goods. South African manufacturing sector particularly complains of Chinese exports, in the last years big traditional firms registered high job losses figures because Chinese goods were sold at lower price. Moreover, because China is the first trade partner of South Africa, the country's economy is having bad performance because Chinese economy is slowing down.

Conclusion

China's aid strategy in Africa has a crucial role in its foreign policy, in Africa continent and in the international framework as well. It is evident, as the PRC's Government itself admitted, that Chinese commitment of helping Africa brings economic advantages to the both actors involved. Thanks to concessional loans, FDI, investments in general and trade China's economy can keep on growing on one side; on the other side, Sub-Saharan countries have infrastructure, hospitals, schools built, revenues from natural resources exports, and more skilled people, in one word "development". However, all that glitter is not gold.

First of all, not all countries and people benefit at the same way from Chinese supports, it depends on natural resources richness, kind of commodities produced, and their adherence to *One-China policy*. Second, African countries' social, economic and political systems need to be improved in order to get the best and the most from the cooperation with China, to have a sustainable development and be in the future independent from any financial aids, either from China, UN or other countries. Basically, Sub-Saharan countries should also improve their *governance*, and in this process China is implicitly involved. As a matter of fact, the non-interference principle, which drives its strategy, may spoil attempts of UA, UN and EU to request better *governance* in exchange of financial aids. The fact that for China *governance* is

only related to domestic issues and, for this reason, no improvements on this regard are requested in exchange, African countries prefer having Chinese aids as much as they can be useful for their economic growth.

Defining which aids' strategy is the best for Africa is not in our hands, but it can be proved that, at the moment, China's financial support is dominating. To what extent will the Red Dragon relieve the Black continent's development? It may be a new type of imperialism? Only the time will answer these questions as the process of development is ongoing, and it needs long-term solutions.

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The United Nations mandate in Mali:
The trouble with intrastate conflict

Frank R. Zarb

Abstract: The ongoing conflict in Mali started as an uprising of the Tuareg in the north of the country but soon spiralled into a complex struggle involving multiple parties. The Mali Theatre now involves the French military, the Malian government, forces loyal to the government, the Tuareg and numerous Islamist groups. In 2013 the UN Peacekeeping mission (MINUSMA) was created to stabilise and keep peace in the country. While a peace treaty has been signed by some members of the conflict, violence has continued between all parties, in addition to becoming the deadliest ongoing mission for UN personnel. If success is deemed to be measured in keeping and sustaining peace then to date MINUSMA has been a failure. This lack of success on the part of the UN in Mali can be attributed to the expanded mandates that have been developed in recent years to deal with complex intra-state conflict zones. This new multidimensional approach has allowed the UN to enter into conflicts for which it is ill suited, paving the way for it to move away from it core identity. The normative and strategic implications of this move will be explored in the context of the Mali conflict and the UN's diversion from their fundamental principles. The move away from their principles puts the UN in a position in which success is difficult to achieve while also causing damage to the reputation of the institution.

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Introduction

The ongoing conflict in Mali has raged on since January of 2012. A bloody civil war that started with a Tuareg uprising in the north and a call for independence has evolved into an increasingly complex conflict involving multiple parties. With the entrance of The United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilisation Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) in April 2013, the hopes were to stem the violence and broker and enforce a peace. The Algiers Peace and Reconciliation Agreement has been negotiated and signed by some parties to the conflict, however, the violence has not ceased. While official death toll numbers are scarce, the instability in Mali has led to almost a quarter million individuals uprooted as both internally displaced and refugees (Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, 2014). The MINUSMA operation has become the deadliest for UN Peacekeepers in all of Africa and violence between government forces, French Forces, Tuareg and terror groups persist (Dyer, 2016). Why has this MINUSMA operation been so unsuccessful? It can be argued that expanded peace-making mandates and expansion of UN actions to accommodate intrastate conflict zones simultaneously threaten the credibility of the UN as an institution in addition to limiting its utility as a peacekeeper.

The desire to bring peace within what has become an extremely complex conflict zone forces the UN Peacekeeping forces to engage in conflict that runs contrary to its design. The UN is well suited to deal with inter-state conflicts but lacks utility when in the context of intrastate conflicts. In particular, issues with impartiality have become apparent which has turned the Peacekeepers into peacemakers. The peacekeeping operations have transitioned from their traditional role to a more involved one. They have done this through expanded mandates which call for a multidimensional role in conflicts. However, these mandates have strategic and normative implications. As these mandates often depart in a significant way from the three principles of UN Peacekeeping, they have led to engagement into conflicts outside its expertise while also causing damage to the reputation of the institution.

The conflict in Mali has become emblematic of the issues within United Nations Peacekeeping operations. It provides an example of the increased scope of UN peacekeeping operations while also presenting a challenge in terms of the ability of the UN to deal with complex security environments. Often this is shown through their inability to effectively deal with multi-polar conflicts especially in intra-state war zones.

In order to see the evolution of the changes and departure from the UN's so called "bedrock" principles, this paper will look first at the three principles that guide UN Peacekeeping operations, recent changes to UN Peacekeeping doctrine and the recent deviations in approach. Second, a brief look at the background on the Mali conflict will be provided, with key players identified. The time frame outlined will start from the military coup of March 2012 until the present, July of 2016. As the recent conflict can be judged to start officially from the coup and the call for independence by the Tuareg in April of 2012, and the entrance of multiple Islamist elements into the conflict it is deemed to be a logical starting point. While conflict between Tuareg tribes in Northern Mali and the government held south have risen and subsided since Mali's 1992 move to democratic rule, the history of this conflict is outside the scope of this paper.

Third, this paper will look at specific departures between the mandate and principle which are occurring in the Mali. Looking at how the concept of "peacekeeping operations" is deployed in this specific conflict should allow for clarity in terms of what it means for both the United Nations as an institution and specifically their peacekeeping forces. The last section will look at the implications of expanded mandates, in terms of their departure from the core governing principles of UN Peacekeeping. Understanding the possible repercussions of actions in Mali and intra-state conflicts like it are crucial for future peacekeeping operations.

Development and Principles of UN Peacekeeping

Current UN Peacekeeping doctrine stems from their three principles and through the Brahimi report, the Capstone Doctrine and the New Horizon process. Since its inception the United Nations Peacekeepers have been guided by three core principles meant to ensure their ability to keep peace and security in post conflict areas. The three principles are consent of parties, impartiality, and non-use of force, except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. Adherence to these principles has been cited consistently as crucial in maintaining credibility and reputation of the UN peacekeeping.

Consent of parties refers to the United Nations obtaining the consent of the main parties to the conflict to enter said conflict. This ensures the parties involved have a desire to move towards peace and are willing to show this by allowing UN involvement. This principle is important because "In the absence of such consent, a peacekeeping operation risks becoming a party to

the conflict; and being drawn towards enforcement action, and away from its fundamental role of keeping the peace." (United Nations, 2016).

Not to be confused with neutrality, the second principle of impartiality refers to the UN Peacekeepers as a referee. They will be impartial in the post conflict zones and will penalise infractions on all sides without discrimination. This principle is a key component in maintaining consent of parties as well as maintaining the reputation of the United Nations. As stated "A mission should not shy away from a rigorous application of the principle of impartiality for fear of misinterpretation or retaliation. Failure to do so may undermine the peacekeeping operation's credibility and legitimacy, and may lead to a withdrawal of consent for its presence by one or more of the parties." (United Nations, 2016).

The third principle, Non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate is meant to confirm the UN's place as a defensive unit and not an "enforcement tool". Peacekeepers are deployed into these conflict zones to keep peace and protect civilians; an offensive stance could again harm their credibility. However, this principal is prefaced with a disclaimer by the UN on their concept of "robust peacekeeping". The UN states:

> *Although on the ground they may sometimes appear similar, robust peacekeeping should not be confused with peace enforcement, as envisaged under Chapter VII of the United Nations Charter. – Robust peacekeeping involves the use of force at the tactical level with the authorisation of the Security Council and consent of the host nation and/or the main parties to the conflict. – By contrast, peace enforcement does not require the consent of the main parties and may involve the use of military force at the strategic or international level, which is normally prohibited for Member States under Article 2(4) of the Charter, unless authorised by the Security Council." (United Nations, 2016).*

While these three original principles of UN Peacekeeping are still meant to guide their work, calls for reform started in the late 1990s. After multiple failures on the part of the UN in Bosnia and Rwanda where UN Peacekeepers stood idly by as civilians were slaughtered, a commission was formed to reform their approach in future conflicts. The Report of the Panel on United Nations Peacekeeping, often referred to as "the Brahimi Report," outlined an altered role and approach to peacekeeping. As stated in the report "the United Nations has bitterly and repeatedly discovered over the last decade, no amount of good intentions can substitute for the fundamental ability to project credible force if complex peacekeeping, in particular, is to succeed. But force alone cannot create peace; it can only create the space in

which peace may be built. (General Assembly Security Council, 2000). Advocating for the ability to "project credible force" is a change in the previous stance which was distinctly defensive.

The Brahimi report outlines multiple changes to Peacekeeping doctrine while also advocating for the continued adherence to the three principles. The first issue addressed is defining the term "Peacekeeping operations." "United Nations peace operations entail three principal activities: conflict prevention and peace-making; peacekeeping; and peace-building. Long-term conflict prevention addresses the structural sources of conflict in order to build a solid foundation for peace." (General Assembly Security Council, 2000). This was an expansion on peacekeeping as it was formerly known. Other important points that the report puts forward are the need for robust doctrine and mandates, including robust rules of engagement and deployment of appropriate strength to provide a credible deterrent. In addition, the call for an increased ability to gather and analyse information so as to become a force ahead of word events and not simply reactive to issues.

While the Brahimi report was arguably a large paradigm shift in Peacekeeping doctrine, the Capstone Doctrine builds even further on its changes. This report delves deeper into the concept of Peacekeeping operations, clarifying the term. Under the umbrella of "Peacekeeping operations" it also includes Peace enforcement where the Brahimi report did not (United Nations, 2008). Peace enforcement is quite different than robust peacekeeping in that enforcement did not require consent of all parties and could include strategic use of military force. Capstone was meant to be a comprehensive doctrine in which the entire history of peacekeeping and all of the lessons learned could be outlined for future operations.

While perhaps not as influential as the previous stated reports, the New Horizon process is meant to be an ongoing dialogue that would consistently address the current needs and reassess the capabilities of the UN Peacekeeping forces. The original "non-paper" as it is referred and its subsequent two progress reports focus on reinvigorating stakeholder's investment in peacekeeping as well as unified vision moving forward (United Nations, 2011). Further, the "non-paper" aims at addressing lack of clarity; often the UN Peacekeeping doctrine can appear quite complex and conflicting. The "non-paper" calls for the UN Secretariat to "clarify concepts" in reference to civilian protection in addition to moving toward a "comprehensive definition" (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009). This confusion tends to extend past the report pages and

into the field, as they often don't seem to completely align as will be shown in the Mali case study.

Mali: timeline of events

In order to understand implications of the United Nations position in Mali it is necessary to outline how the conflict evolved. Between 2007 and 2012, provocative acts by Tuareg tribes in northern Mali stoked fears amongst governmental and military elites. The incidents included Tuareg attacks on government positions and the killing of government soldiers (BBC News, 2016). As attacks escalated, a discord arose between the government of President Toure and the heads of the Malian military. The military believe the Tuareg are in open rebellion and the government is simply not doing enough to counter the threat. As a direct response to this perceived inaction, the military stages a coup, overthrowing President Toure. Upon the governments capture, the military junta appoints new civilian leadership in President Traore. Shortly thereafter a coup attempt by the former president and civilian protests ouster the interim government. It would take over a year for governmental stability to be restored and a democratic election to take place. In August of 2013 Ibrahim Boubacar Keita was elected President of Mali.

As the initial coup took place in the Malian capital of Bamako, in the North, the Tuareg were preparing a large scale move. After gaining control of northern Mali, in April of 2012 the Tuareg declare independence from the government held south (BBC News, 2016). The main Tuareg group (The National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad or as they are referred by the French acronym MNLA) was the party of control during this stage of the conflict. The group named their independent state Azawad and was created on the platform that Malian Tuareg could not achieve equal rights under the status quo. After the Tuareg claim of independence, the MNLA allied with Islamist group Ansar Dine. But within the complex environment of the Mali conflict this alliance was short lived. After Ansar Dine and other Islamic groups such as the Movement for Unity and Jihad in West Africa (MUJAO) and al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) took control of the Tuareg uprising these Islamist group's main objective was to found this northern Mali as an Islamic state and to institute sharia law across the territory (BBC News, 2013). These groups had gained substantial ground, with MUJAO even capturing Mali's largest northern city, Gao. The group held the area and instituted sharia law in the city. While in control they carried out harsh penalties

against violators of the law such as extrajudicial executions and cutting off hands for minor infractions.

As the conflict spun out of control, the interim President Traore implored the French to intervene in the conflict. In January of 2013 French forces are deployed to retake Northern Mali. Just four months later in April of the same year, the French have retaken all cities in the north, while Islamist factions are scattered (BBC News, 2016). At the time, the victory seemed to be a swift and efficient end to the conflict. At this point, in April of 2013, the UN Security Council authorises the formation of MINUSMA in Mali with a mandate to stabilise population centers in the north, assist the transitional government, and to deter the return of violent elements to the recently liberated cities (Karlsrud, 2015). By late summer of 2013, an official hand over of the Mali mission from French and African Union troops to the United Nations takes place. While the official transition was meant to take place, the French were to stay on in a more limited capacity to continue fighting against all non-governmental combatants.

While Northern Mali was officially retaken and transitional control was given to MINUSMA, fighting did not stop between forces loyal to the government, the Tuareg and Islamist groups. However, talks for peace took place in Algeria between the Malian government and the Tuareg groups eventually culminating in a peace deal in June of 2015 (UN News Centre, 2015). Islamist groups were not a party to the peace accord and were not involved in peace talks. Since the peace deal was signed just over a year ago clashes between all parties have continued. Tuaregs and pro-government militias fight periodically; while Islamist groups attack UN Peacekeepers and state targets including the mass shooting at the Radisson Blu Hotel in Bamako that killed 21 people (Hanna, 2015). Currently, peace in Mali has yet to be achieved regardless of the efforts by the UN and the warring factions. To a large degree, the unsuccessfulness of peace operations and the current situation in Mali can be attributed to involvement beyond its capacity.

The UN in Mali: partiality and diversion from principles

Multiple contradictory issues present themselves when looking at the diversion from the governing principles of peacekeeping by recent mandates for ongoing missions. The three principles are inherently linked, meaning violation of one often has an effect on another.

Violations of the concepts of impartiality and consent of parties are particularly troublesome. This is to say that the UN is required to obtain the consent of the main parties, without consent they risk their own credibility in reference to their adherence to impartiality. Although an important and grounding principal for successful operations, it is not always practiced on the ground to the extent the core guidelines would dictate. Often how the UN defines its terms can be a way to circumvent their principle position as shown in a recent article by Peter Mateja;

> "the problem of spoilers has always existed in peacekeeping, the new operations take an additional step away from seeking consent of the main parties. 32 Missions such as the ones in the DRC, Mali, and Somalia are deployed to empower the state's government and help it defeat one of the parties to the conflict. "Expansion of state authority" is now often part of a mission's mandate. Importantly, the targeted parties possess enough political and military power that governments are unable to defeat them by themselves. These groups therefore cannot be thought of as anything else but a main party to the conflict." (Mateja, 2015)

This has specific relevance where the many Islamist groups operating in the north are concerned. Multiple implications arise when looking at the designation of spoiler versus party to the conflict. The first is that while the Mali conflict certainly started as the result of division between the government and the Tuareg, the Islamists and terror groups quickly rose above the Tuareg as the more relevant party to the conflict. By most measures, the Islamist groups are a main party to the conflict but they have not been involved in the peace process. As a result of these groups being left out of the peace process the UN shows partiality by not working to gain consent from this faction and only engaging with two of the main parties in the conflict. Admittedly, gaining consent of parties and negotiating with what are considered "terror groups" is a difficult proposition; however the lack of involvement on the part of the Islamist groups continues to cause problems. The lack of consent and their unwillingness to engage in the peace process implies the conflict zone is not one where the UN Peacekeepers can succeed; Mali is a hot conflict zone and not a peacekeeping situation.

The second implication is how to react to these groups as they are declared terrorists and not a party to the peace treaty. With no real peace to be enforced the attentions of the multiple forces on the ground, including the UN, have been diverted to peace creation and enforcement. They have taken on new methods in combating the groups in the North which reflect the reality that UN peacekeeping is now in a position to make peace rather than keep it.

Offensives occur regularly with Peacekeepers conducting "pre-emptive strikes" in Mali against forces believed to be a threat to civilian populations (Gaffey, 2016). This presents a challenge as it moves missions into a proverbial grey area in terms of their third principle. Pre-emptive strikes infer an offensive rather than a defensive posture in addition to operating on an assumption that something will occur that must be defended against. While intelligence on the ground and previous experience may in fact show that this posture is warranted, it does present a moral quandary for peacekeepers as they are acting as a party to the conflict rather than impartial mediators. As can be seen by these points, this particular conflict presents many fundamental challenges as "UN peacekeeping missions aren't designed to take sides and target specific actors in a conflict: How can you have a UN peacekeeping mission that is also tasked with conducting a counterinsurgency?" (qtd. in Dyer, 2016). This position in which the Peacekeepers have taken sides and which is offensive in approach has resulted in peacekeepers finding themselves in a role for which they are ill suited. Many of the Peacekeepers have varying levels of training and are not properly prepared for this sort of conflict. In addition, UN forces have become a target for Jihadist groups. As stated in the beginning of this paper, this conflict has become one of the deadliest for UN Peacekeepers in the world.

The third implication is that without adherence to the principles of consent and impartiality in the context of Mali, the UN will have issues achieving success. As previously stated, while a peace agreement was signed between the Malian government and the Tuareg factions, the Islamist groups were not party to the deal. If only two out of the three main parties to the conflict have agreed to peace, then there is no peace to enforce. "They are peacekeepers in what is generally not a peacekeeping mission," said Andrew Lebovich, visiting fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations. "It is still an active insurgency." (qtd. In Dyer, 2016). This is an issue for a peacekeeping force which is conducting a mission outside its realm of expertise in addition to being a ground situation where it is ill suited to conduct its mission. This situation could have been foreseen though given that The Brahimi report discusses the ideal contexts in which the UN forces should be used and which contexts lead to success;

> *the missions of the past decade would be particularly hard to accomplish: they tended to deploy where conflict had not resulted in victory for any side, where a military stalemate or international pressure or both had brought fighting to a halt but at least some of the parties to the conflict were not seriously committed to ending the confrontation. United Nations operations thus did not deploy into post-conflict situations but tried to create*

them. In such complex operations, peacekeepers work to maintain a secure local environment while peacebuilders work to make that environment self-sustaining. Only such an environment offers a ready exit to peacekeeping forces, making peacekeepers and peacebuilders inseparable partners. (General Assembly Security Council, 2000).

The situation on the ground in Mali does not reflect this logic as the platform for a peace does not currently exist. This is a departure from how the Peacekeeping operations are meant to work.

In the context of Mali, the United Nations works closely with both government and French troops. The French are there to support the government and to fight these terrorist groups while the UN is meant to "stabilise" Northern Mali. The UN mission is in direct synchronicity with the French, which implies the principle of impartiality is again simply a façade. Therefore, these Islamist groups have been declared enemies by the UN and are being treated as such. Further are present in reference to impartiality when looking at civilian backing of Islamist groups. As these actors do not operate on their own, or within a vacuum, they do have local and civilian support for their presence. Many in northern Mali are proponents of their ideology and methods. How can the United Nations enforce a peace when segments of the local population support radical Islamist elements that the UN has declared enemies? By positioning themselves with the state they alienate other segments of the population. This inherently impartial position is the product of involvement in intrastate conflicts where populations are divided.

There is a need for consent and impartiality to keep peace, however their mandate is in direct opposition to the principled position. As stated in "New Horizon," "A mission's political, rule of law and security sector components also have important roles to play in assisting host authorities in building national capacity to protect civilians and in promoting early national responsibility for protecting the population" (Department of Peacekeeping Operations and Department of Field Support, 2009). This concept is extremely problematic in intra-state conflict as the state is generally a party to the conflict as is the case in Mali. This shows a clear departure between doctrine and the reality of this type of conflict. A distinctly partial position in favour of the state which cannot be relied upon to protect the people they are fighting. The mandate in Mali and extension of this doctrine and is therefore a diversion from all three principles. This separation from the core of what the UN peacekeeping forces are meant to do has implications for the institution.

Implications

Success may be unachievable when major departures between principles, current doctrine and practice occur. As shown in Mali, UN involvement has not resulted in peace, while reputational damage is occurring. As the United Nations was established with the intent that it be a force for good, the role of keeping the peace and ensuring stability post-World War II was a trademark of the organisation. The institution has relevance for all nations whom comprise its membership as they all can take part and have their voices heard. At least in doctrine, the United Nations is meant to also be an impartial institution. Peacekeeping operations have been a very important part of projecting the values of the UN on the world stage. Adherence to the core principles is meant to ensure those values remain intact and that their credibility will not be questioned. Recently, with the expanded mandate in Mali, (which can also be seen elsewhere in Africa) the United Nations credibility can certainly be questioned.

As mentioned previously, "the capstone doctrine highlights three success factors: legitimacy, credibility and local ownership. The legitimacy of UN peacekeeping operations is derived from its unique position in internal law, the UN Charter and UN Security Council authorisation. This legitimacy is rightly seen as one of the key assets, and comparative advantages, of UN peacekeeping operations. UN operations can lose legitimacy when perceived to be serving national or regional interests, and when it fails to secure local ownership." (de Coning, et al., 2008) The expanded mandates that are required to properly deal with intra-state conflicts certainly go against the previous quoted statement implying that legitimacy is in danger, if not completely lost; If these mandates run contrary to gaining consent of the main parties, to impartiality and to non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate, what can be inferred by onlookers?

The example set forth by the Mali case is important not only because it is a failed operation in and of itself, but, because it has lasting implications for future peace operations and credibility. The main point that one can garner when looking at the departure between doctrine and practice is that without adherence to the core governing principals, the UN becomes a party to the conflict and not an impartial body attempting to protect civilians and keep the peace. As a result, the credibility of the United Nations ability to continue to keep peace and be an impartial mediator is lost. In conflicts that have yet to arise, some parties to the conflict may not consent to the UN Peacekeepers given their recent history. If they cannot

be guaranteed to be impartial or if they are viewed to simply be an extension of government control, then why give consent to what could become their opposition within the conflict. This issue is already pervasive in the collective conscious of the global south, where some believe the UN is not only a conduit of governments but also of the global North. "The conceptual debate that underlies terminology issues in the UN is driven, in part, by a North-South tension, where the South is concerned about the North misusing UN Peacekeeping operations as a Trojan horse through which it is shaping the world system according to its own interests." (de Coning, et al., 2008). Considering this potential mistrust the UN should tread lightly in these situations.

Ultimately, if the global south loses trust in the UN, or it is deemed illegitimate, it will not be in a position where it can keep peace or their entrance into the conflict will be as an invading force. The UN Peacekeepers need to protect their institutional identity, being careful not to become an offensive force but simply an organisation that protects civilians and keeps peace in a post conflict space. The institutional credibility and the ability to provide peace should not be tainted by actions that will call into question whether they are an entity which exists for the greater good.

A common retort to this logic would be to simply question how the UN should approach conflicts such as Mali. Currently the UN is ill equipped to deal with complex intra-state conflict. It is much better suited to deal with state actors in the context of inter-state conflict. While the United Nations and its member states have the ability to deal with unruly or uncooperative states through sanctions and other means, they have no such recourse against non-state actors. As intrastate conflict is generally composed of non-state actors this lack of recourse becomes problematic. It is very difficult for the UN to engage in peacekeeping missions in intrastate conflict without becoming a party to the conflict. When using force their role instead turns into conducting counterinsurgency which should fall to state governments and their allies. States do not have as much of an institutional need to remain impartial, do not require consent, and can declare enemies.

However, the UN could have a role in Mali and conflicts like it if adherence to the three principles is kept. The concept of peace enforcement runs contrary to UN doctrine. This should be a job for other actors as previously stated. The UN role as an impartial mediator is too important and cannot be sacrificed for activities outside their expertise. Many of these activities wind up doing more harm than good in terms of cessation of hostilities and in terms

of the lives of peacekeepers. Therefore, enforcement mandates should be abandoned as they conflict with the principle of impartiality and impede long term peace building. This also goes to speak to when and what sort of conflicts the UN should be involved. The answer itself has been stated by UN officials in previous reports: They should be involved in keeping a peace, not making it. For this to be possible in multiparty conflicts, the peace process has to include all factions. Unfortunately, as is the case in Mali having all factions present and involved in the peace process is a virtual impossibility given the nature of some of the Islamist elements. If there is no peace to keep then they will be a party to the conflict.

Conclusion

While Mali is only a single case study one can see the issues that can arise in conflicts of a similar nature. The Mali engagement has presented many challenges for the United Nations. Like some of the other conflicts in Africa where Peacekeeping operations are underway, the challenges manifest both on the ground and with respect the core identity of the institution. While the doctrine of the United Nations Peacekeeping has changed over time so that it may reflect the changing realities of conflict in the modern world, it has also lost something key to its credibility. If the UN is deemed to be partial or to be an extension of western power over the global south, then the institution risks an existential crisis. This leads to questions about the UN identity moving forward. Their ability to keep the peace and be an impartial mediator is important in the current world system. They are the only current organisation that can provide this peacekeeping service globally while providing the possibility of impartiality.

The issues present within intra-state conflicts and the tactics necessary to combat those issues threaten the core identity of the United Nations. If they want to continue providing a peace-making presence, being more selective in what conflicts they are to become involved and changes in how they are approached is necessary. Peace enforcement is a concept that is outside the core identity of the UN. Peacekeepers should not take an offensive stance or a stance that would violate their principles such as pre-emptive strikes. While these actions may be correct from a strategic and/or tactical standpoint, the normative repercussions from such actions may be severe. Therefore, involvement and action in Mali runs counter to UN identity, as what is required of Peacekeeping forces in these complex security environments often forces them away from their core principles which will only inhibit future peacekeeping efforts.

Keeping the trust of the global south through the adherence to the three principles is crucial especially considering the vast majority of current peacekeeping are deployed in the developing world. Remaining relevant in an ever changing world is dependent on the unique role which they can provide. The loss of institutional credibility will only harm their ability to bring actors to the bargaining table and stifle their ability to keep peace in post conflict zones.

<p style="text-align:center">*</p>

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Interview

Johann Marx,
Ambassador of the Republic of South Africa to Hungary

Roberta Maddalena

Annalisa Baldassarri

Introduction: In summer, 2016, the ICRP conducted and interview with Johann Marx, ambassador of the Republic of South Africa to Hungary about the foreign policy priorities of his country and its economic programmes with a special focus on bilateral relations. He gave us his insights of the mentioned topics by pointing out the main features of South Africa's foreign approaches as well as the current political and societal system of the country. Therefore the interview focused on South Africa's role within international organisations and South-South Cooperation, as well as domestic policies, such as the challenges of the Black Economy Empowerment.

South Africa's economy has been growing in the past decade, indeed South Africa is part of BRICS now. However, since 2014 there has been a weakened growth. According to you, which are the main factors that have been contributing to this economic decrease?

There are three main issues: our biggest trading partner as a country is China; Chinese economic growth has reportedly been slowing down in recent years and they import a lot of our commodity products – such as steel. Secondly, we suffered this year and last year a very serious drought, not only in South Africa but also in the whole region, six of our nine provinces were declared disaster areas. The third issue has been power constraints, because of the growth in the period that you mentioned, our economic growth had outstripped for a while

our energy supply and that has also played a role in constricting our further economic growth. The government has addressed the energy issue, it has invested a lot of money in new energy production, not just coal-fired stations. By the way, we have enough coal for an estimated two hundred years supply but we realise in terms of the Paris climate change conference's commitments that we have to reduce our carbon emissions, so we are turning also to renewable energy's resources, such as wind power and solar panels.

How important is the Black Economy Empowerment program to avoid racism at all levels of South Africa's economy?

The whole purpose of Black Economy Empowerment is to rectify the wrongs of the past; remember we had three hundred years of colonial rule and Apartheid where anybody who was not a white citizen was disadvantaged in terms of economic opportunities. So the whole aim here is to bring the majority of our citizens, who are black, into the mainstream economy as fast as possible to ensure that they will have a decent income. This is crucial to provide homes, schools, proper medical treatments, and other facilities.

Which are the countries in Africa or outside the continent, with which South Africa has strong bilateral relations? Are those relations based on predominantly economic or political, historical reasons?

The main focus of our foreign policy is Africa. It has to be. We are part of the African continent - the way Hungary's main focus is obviously Europe, as a member of the European Union. For us, our principal priority is to cooperate with other countries in Africa, because we realise that our own economic prosperity depends on the economic prosperity of the rest of African continent. We must cooperate with the rest of the continent in its economic development; if we can assist in creating elsewhere in Africa more employment opportunities, there would be less migrants coming toward our country and also less moving north toward Europe. So Africa is the principal focus of our foreign policy, but outside Africa we are a member of BRICS, which means that Brazil, Russia, India and China are also important partners for us and we look at that partnership to assist with Africa's economic development as well. To give one example, in the China-Africa Forum that took place last year, China committed 50 billion US dollars for Africa's economic development, 10 billion of which is

coming to South Africa for skills development and industrialisation. Also we are part of IBSA, consisting of India, Brazil and South Africa, which is a separate body from BRICS. Our three democracies are working together on the global stage, regarding political issues.

May you explain the strategy of South Africa regarding South-South Cooperation, and in which way it is important for the country promoting the development of the African continent?

South-South Cooperation is focusing on self-reliance of the developing countries of the world to work together for their own economic development. This does not exclude the developed North but it is just trying to get the countries of the South to cooperate for their own economic advantage. We were chairing the so-called Group of 77, but it is in fact now a much bigger group of countries, including of course African countries and we try to work with this group inter alia for the economic development of its members.

South Africa surrounds Lesotho. This small kingdom is facing many problems, so that in 2010 Lesotho asked South Africa to be annexed to the country. What is now the relation between the two, and would South Africa consider annexing Lesotho?

Let me clarify the situation immediately, Lesotho has never requested to be annexed by South Africa. Lesotho is a proud independent kingdom and it has been since it got its independence from Britain in the 1960's. The country has its own national identity. What you might have heard was that some non-governmental entity in Lesotho reportedly proposed integration with South Africa. This might have been due to some ongoing political tensions within Lesotho, for which the South African Government had been providing mediation assistance to resolve peacefully. because we believe that talking is always better than fighting. And any long term solution to any political conflict requires talking to each other and trying to find a peaceful solution.

Still speaking about South Africa's foreign policy, what is the role of the country in the African Union?

We are trying to assist with the development of the African Union along the lines of the EU. We are moving to increase the economic integration among African countries but we have to consider the size of the continent. The EU has a huge advantage compared to us; it has highly

developed infrastructure which makes it very easy to travel from one country to another and for trading with one another, while Africa does not have that kind of infrastructure yet. So our Head of State, President Zuma, has been designated by other African leaders to promote the development of infrastructure on the African continent; for example we would like to see a Cape to Cairo rail- and road network. We are also looking at developing energy projects on the continent. For instance, in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) the Congo River is massive and at the moment all the water is just pouring into the sea, so a contract has been signed between us and the DRC to help developping a massive hydroelectric power station. Through this some 40 000 megawatts of electricity will be produced eventually, which could reportedly provide electricity for half the continent. So, African Union cooperation is focusing on two main areas: infrastructure development and industrialisation. But at the same time we have regional economic blocks on the continent, such as the: Southern African Development Community, (SADC) which consists of 15 African countries out of the total of 54 states on the continent. Other regional communities include ECOWAS in West Africa, the East African community and the Maghreb countries of the north. So we see these regional groups as building blocks leading to increase African Union economic integration.

On the 29th of July, there was the 6th conference of the Forum of China and Africa Cooperation (FOCAC). How important do you think, is the role of China in the development of Africa's countries, and especially of South Africa?

China promises development aid to the African continent and the levels of it is increasing, including in South Africa. China is a major power, it is currently the second biggest economy in the world, and the same way we welcome USA and European investments in Africa, we also welcome Chinese ones. Two years ago in Brazil, BRICS countries established the BRICS development bank with an initial capital of 50 billion US dollars, a substantial part of which will come from China and the idea of this development bank is to assist with projects in developing countries, not just in Africa. It is not in competition with the World Bank, but it is to assist in financing projects that the World Bank is not prepared to invest in. So, in all of this, China is playing a very important role. While the EU is South Africa's biggest trading partner as a block, as an individual country China is however our largest one.

Since the mid-1990s the country is facing serious societal challenges regarding poverty, unemployment, crime and spread of HIV/AIDS. Does the ANC-led government have any programmes to tackle these problems? Do these programmes involve regional cooperation as well?

Yes, especially since our current government administration under President Zuma, who came to power in 2009, it initiated a very active anti-AIDS program which involves two main activities. First of all, a massive roll-out of antiretroviral drugs, in fact recently a state pharmaceutical company was established to provide, these medications directly to the Ministry of Health. Secondly, an AIDS-awareness program, which aims to train people in various communities to create awareness of the dangers of AIDS, how to deal with it and how to prevent it. The Government is also taking active steps to reduce crime and alleviate poverty, inter alia by increasing decent employment opportunities in the country.

1994 is a crucial year in the history of South Africa as the Apartheid regime ended. Since then, which are the most meaningful changes in the society of your country?

The vast majority of people who were excluded from participation in our mainstream economy during the Apartheid era are now becoming active participants., they have also been provided with houses with running water and electricity which in many cases they did not have prior to 1994. The other important change is regarding the social interaction between South Africans. Before 1994 most of the ethnic groups, the blacks, the whites and others, mostly did not interact with each other except in work situations, due to the apartheid policies. Today if you go to South Africa you will see there are very good races relations, I sit here as a white ambassador representing a mainly black Government. It is a proof of how far the country has come since 1994. President Nelson Mandela, our iconic first democratically elected Head of State, played a huge role in this regard.

Since 1994, South Africa is called the "rainbow nation" because of the coexistence of many ethnic groups. Multiculturalism is a peculiarity of this country and a symbol of it, as also represented in South Africa's flag. Do you believe this feeling of integration is still present in nowadays' South Africa's society, or there are still divisions among the many different ethnic groups? Does the past still influence their coexistence?

Yes, I think the past must always influence the present, it is always in the background. But building a new South Africa is a process and it is ongoing. I think that race relations are very good today in South Africa. I will give you one example, we just had municipal elections and now some of the biggest cities such as the administrative capital Pretoria, Johannesburg and Port Elisabeth have to form municipal coalitions to govern and you can see they are working together and everybody accept the results of the elections, they say "we have to work together". So the overall sense that you get in South Africa is that the relations are very good. Obviously there are individuals that don't want to reconcile, that will probably always be the case, but there is ongoing progress in the right direction.

In March and April 2015 there were attacks against migrants. Considering the history, how could you explain nowadays' sentiment against those migrants coming from other African countries to work?

First of all, we have between 6 and 7 million foreign migrants at present living in South Africa. Some of them are desperate for work, so they often are prepared to work for salaries lower than what South African citizens are prepared to accept. And the problem you are referring to started last year when an employer allegedly dismissed some South African workers and replaced them with migrants from other African countries who were reportedly ready to work for lower salaries. This brought about anger among some South Africans. But the government immediately condemned this in very strong terms. The President personally met with representatives of foreign migrants in South Africa and indicated that attacks against foreigners in our country would not be tolerated.. The big problem was the perception among some poor people in South Africa that these migrants were taking jobs away from them, given the high unemployment rate prevailing in our country. We have an unemployment rate of about 25% for the population as a whole, but among the youth between 18 and 29 the rate is much higher, it is around 37%. In many cases migrants help in creating new jobs, because there are entrepreneurs from other African countries coming to establish enterprises in South Africa and this creates jobs for South Africans. The incidents last year were therefore, to my knowledge, not due to hostility against Africans migrants, it was just a matter of the prevailing economic situation. In my view, there is only one long term solution to solving the African migrants' problem, namely to assist in creating decent employment opportunities in their own countries.

South Africa has eleven official languages. The country also recognises several unofficial languages which may be used in certain official uses in limited areas, where it has been determined that these languages are prevalent. What effect does the linguistic diversity have on public administration processes?

The reality is that the common language we all use for official government work is English. But an important point is that, for instance, in Parliament you can use any of the official languages that you wish to choose and there must be translation and interpreting of the language, but everyone knows that the principal international language is English. So the fact that there are 11 official languages does not affect the situation one way or the other. My own mother tongue is Afrikaans, which is derived from Dutch, English is my second language.

What are the future perspectives about the role of South Africa in global geopolitics?

To us, multilateral cooperation is a very important issue and we would like to see above all the reform of some of the multilateral institutions such as the UN, IMF and the World Bank that were created in the aftermath of World War II, when there were particular circumstances prevailing. For instance, we feel strongly that the Security Council is not representing today's world in terms of ensuring that all parts of the world are a permanent part of it. There are five permanent members who have the veto right and we are pushing very hard to reform the Security Council to bring in more permanent members. Furthermore, we would like to see IMF and the World Bank reformed, in order to have a greater representation of the South, so that the concerns of the South will receive more focus in these organisations. Another area we are really keen on is nuclear disarmament; South Africa is the only country to my knowledge that had nuclear weapons and gave them up voluntarily. Since our first democratic government's election in 1994, a major focus has been to try and to reduce nuclear weapons in the world and have them eliminated eventually. This is a very difficult task and probably it will not take place in our lifetime.

As Ambassador of South Africa in Hungary, could you illustrate the role played by Hungary in South Africa's development process?

One important role that Hungary can play in South Africa's economic development, as well as elsewhere on the African continent, is in the enhancement of skills. Hungary has outstanding universities and people of Hungarian origin have won 14 Nobel prizes for scientific and technologic achievement, which per capita is said to be higher than any other country in the world. The Hungarian government is offering scholarships for students from African countries, and skills development is an absolute prerequisite for creating employment. There are approximately one billion people on the African continent but if you do not have the necessary skills to create decent employment many of them cannot be employed. So Hungary is playing a major role in this regard. We are also trying to encourage Hungarian companies to get involved in infrastructure development projects in Africa, for instance water management is one area in which we are trying to secure their involvement, as this is an area in which Hungary has developed notable expertise. We think this could be a win-win situation of Hungarian companies teaming up with our companies to create new employment opportunities in Africa, which could also reduce the flow of African migrants to Europe.

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Background

Namibia:
The future trading centre of Southern Africa

Anna Süveges-Szabó

Namibia is a South African country, which gained its independence from the Republic of South Africa in 1990. Today it is a modern democracy, which population is 2.3 million on the surface of 825,418 km2 by the side of the Atlantic Ocean. Beside all its natural beauties Namibia is rich in different minerals, like the gem-quality diamond, and also the world's fourth-largest producer of uranium.

Since the beginning of the 2000s Namibia have settled a very fair and friendly business area for foreign investors from all over the world. Maybe the most important action was the joint to the AGOA (African Growth and Opportunity Act) which is a United States Trade Act to enhance market access to the US for qualifying Sub-Saharan African (SSA) countries. By this arrangement the producers from Namibia can export different products, like textiles, crafts etc. duty and quota free into the US. This opportunity makes Namibia very attractive for the foreign investors. The government help this initiative by legal preferences and tax relief beside the all security attempt and social protection, which a modern state is able to provide. Years earlier one Malaysian textile manufacturing company, Ramatex took advantage of this very fair opportunity, exported textile to the US via AGOA and provided livelihood for many locals, but without the proper accountancy their company had to be closed. This shows the difficulty of the developing countries. Trying to provide the fairest opportunities to attract the foreign investors meanwhile developing the rule of law and the legislation becomes more and more specific.

The other specific area of the foreign investments in Africa, is the labour. In Namibia in the foreign companies the foreign experts are allowed to work – said Bernadette Artivor,

secretary of the Ministry of Industrialisation, Trade and SME Development. If any company wants to go to Namibia the facilities are set up in Namibia, but the experts can come from the home country – only the experts. Not who do the tiding. The problem is that the skills are not available in the country – there are only a few experts, who are employed already somewhere else, so you cannot say that only Namibians should be employed, because we are lack of skills yet. This is the requirement for all nations.

The problem of unemployment is urgent in Namibia, so the set-up of new firms by foreign capital is essential, so as the improvement of the education is. As the records of Trading Economics show, from 1997 to 2004 the rate of unemployment was increasing slowly (from 19.5% to 21.9%), but in 2008 it reached highest record of 37.6%, which was a reflection to the depression and the result of the closing Ramatex. In the last years the rate has decreased from this radical level, but still not reached the previous rates. It is still around 28%, which is rather high, but already started the solution for decreasing. So as the National Development Plan 4 was not enough fast, the Harambe Plan was to set up to accelerate and show the progress by quota quarter yearly. By this plan 8-10 thousand jobs are to set up, which is rather effective in a population of 2.3 million.

Although today Namibia is considered as a developing country, facing all kind of problems of theirs, the forming legislations and the fair area for business might make the country the future trading centre of Southern Africa, which is the main aim of the government of Namibia.

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Roving terrorists or innocuous cattle grazers?
Between herdsmen's economic survival and community annihilation in Nigeria

Mike Opeyemi, Omilusi, Ph.D.

Abstract: Clashes over land use between the semi-nomadic, cattle-herding Fulani people and more settled communities that practice a mix of farming and cattle rearing, claim hundreds of lives each year, but have increased in frequency in recent months. Though with occasional manageable conflicts, Fulani herdsmen have cohabited peacefully with their host communities and land-owners in parts of the country for ages. Thus, some pertinent questions posed by this study: Why the sudden upsurge of invasions and violent criminalities among these gangs of "herdsmen"? Are the aggressors Fulani herdsmen or terrorists masquerading as herdsmen? Or are the herdsmen adopting terrorist method to install fears in the heart of peasant farmers as a survival strategy? Is there a clandestine agenda of the herdsmen? Who are those arming the Fulani herdsmen to unleash mayhem on innocent and defenceless Nigerians? Why are the police incapable of protecting the farmers from violent attacks by Fulani herdsmen? Why is it that the Fulani herdsmen alleged to be behind the inhuman killings and destruction of property in the affected states and indeed across the country always get away with their crimes without being brought to justice? Drawing extensively from secondary sources with the aid of descriptive and narrative tools, this study seeks to provide answers to these posers.

Keywords: herdsmen, community, terrorists, economic survival, annihilation

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Introduction and problem statement

There have been serious and continuous threats to national and individual security in the form of organised crimes, election related violence, and violent extremism, including oil bunkering and kidnapping initially associated with the Niger-Delta Crisis but which later spread to the other parts of the country following the amnesty deal in 2009. There have also been alarming incidences of car snatching and ritual killings (Musa, 2013, p.60). The menace of the Boko Haram sect, that has killed thousands of people in the last six years, is yet to be finally tamed. In recent times, violent crimes, including armed robbery and kidnapping have been on the increase. And of more concern is the spate of violent inter- and intra-communal clashes leading to death and maiming of hundreds of citizens. As noted by Amuta (2016), itinerant herdsmen that have been part of our ancient cattle rearing and transport culture have actively joined the competition for pre-eminence in violence with Boko Haram, Niger Delta militants, sundry gunmen, transactional kidnappers, and the rest. The supposed herdsmen are killing people on an industrial scale, burning people's houses in their route communities, razing whole communities and spreading hate and instability even in places that had hosted them for decades.

Put differently, the country plays host to another terrorist group yet unrecognised – nomadic pastoralists. The Fulani herdsmen – cattle grazers – have been named one of the deadliest terror groups in the world amongst Boko Haram, Isis, Taliban and al-Shabaab. Although they are overlooked in Nigeria and in certain parts of the Central African Republic, the group has wreaked enough havoc to be acknowledged by the global community as the fourth deadliest terror group in the world. The group of "Fulani militants" as they have come to be known, is made up of individuals from the Fulani or Fula ethnic group, a tribe of over 20 million people – 70 percent of whom are nomadic grazers – who exist in at least seven West African countries (Egbedi, 2016).

Various cases of conflicts in Nigeria involving the Fulani pastoralists and farmers consist of significant variables in economic, social, political and ecological parameters. These conflicts occur mostly in areas of stiff competition for grazing land and farming but the degree of intensity differs from state to state depending on the ecological location and the communities involved (Ali, 2013). The conflicts occur when Fulani herders move into non-Fulani homelands with their cattle. This usually leads to the destruction of farmers' crops. Thus, the herders provoke their victims to acts of resistance (preventing entry into farms, killing or

stealing cattle, or poisoning fields). In response, the herders wage deadly attacks on farming communities (Okeke, 2014, p.67). Before now, clashes between mostly Fulani herdsmen and settled communities have been concentrated in North Central Nigeria, particularly the states of Benue, Plateau, Kaduna and Nassarawa.

However, in the recent time, from the plains of Plateau, Nasarawa and southern parts of Kaduna States, these armed desperados have increased in numbers, pouring southward into Oyo, Ekiti, Ondo, Osun, Ogun, Benue, Taraba, Kogi, Enugu, Abia, Anambra, Delta, Edo and parts of Rivers States. They brazenly herd their livestock into people's farmlands and threaten them with their deadly weapons at the slightest sign of protest. Some of them even go beyond that and engage in criminal ventures such as kidnapping, armed robbery, murders and rape. They sometimes block the highways and inflict life-threatening injuries on their victims (Vanguard Editorial, April 28, 2016).

Some have depicted the violence as a continuation of ethno-religious struggles that predate the colonial era. However, the relative absence of such widespread bloodshed throughout much of Nigeria's post-independence history suggests more contemporary factors are to blame. Specifically, it appears the upsurge in farmer-herder violence stems from the confluence of four developments: the ongoing expansion of land under cultivation, environmental degradation across Africa's Sahel region, the decline of traditional authority figures, and the recent rise of large-scale cattle rustling (Baca, 2015).

Although ethnic differences are often given as the reasons for similar clashes, access to land is at the root of these confrontations. Triggered by desperation to protect and advance an ever-shrinking ecological space, characterised by resource-scarcity, population explosion and climate change-induced migration of pastoralists from the far North to the North-Central region of Nigeria in search of grazing fields, the country has recorded deaths by the thousands from clashes between predominantly Fulani herdsmen and local farmers (Odemwingie, 2014). Though with occasional manageable conflicts, Fulani herdsmen have cohabited peacefully with their host communities and land-owners in all parts of the country for ages.

Thus, some pertinent questions posed by this study: Why the sudden upsurge of invasions and violent criminalities among these gangs of "herdsmen"? Are the aggressors Fulani herdsmen or terrorists masquerading as herdsmen? Or are the herdsmen adopting terrorist method to install fears in the heart of peasant farmers as a survival strategy? Is there a clandestine agenda of the herdsmen? Who are those arming the Fulani herdsmen to unleash mayhem on

innocent and defenceless Nigerians? Why are the police incapable of protecting the farmers from violent attacks by Fulani herdsmen? Why is it that the Fulani herdsmen alleged to be behind the inhuman killings and destruction of property in the affected states and indeed across the country always get away with their crimes without being brought to justice? Drawing extensively from secondary sources with the aid of descriptive and narrative tools, this study seeks to provide answers to these posers.

The cultural and historical perspectives to nomadic Fulani herdsmen

The early origin of Fulani People is most fascinating and deepened in mystery with widely divergent opinions. Many scholars believe that they are of Judaeo-Syrian origin. However, it is generally recognised that Fulani descended from nomads from both North Africa and from sub-Sahara Africa. They came from the Middle-East and North Africa and settled into Central and West Africa from the Senegal region they created the Tekruur Empire which was contemporary to the Ghana Empire. Then, they spread in all the countries in West-Africa, continuing to lead their nomadic life style. They created here and there mixed states where they sometimes were the dominant group. But more often, they were absorbed by the indigenous population whom they had dominated.[1]

The Fulani were the first group of people in West Africa to convert to Islam through jihads, or holy wars, and were able to take over much of West Africa and establish themselves not only as a religious group but also as a political and economic force. They are the missionaries of Islam and continued to conquer much of West Africa. The Fulani are primarily nomadic herders and traders. Through their nomadic lifestyle they established numerous trade routes in West Africa. Many times the Fulani go to local markets and interact with the people, getting news and spreading it through much of West Africa (Anter, 2011). According to the encyclopaedia of world culture (Cited in Amzat et al, 2016), the Fulani are found in twenty nations across Africa – from Mauritania and Senegal to Sudan, Ethiopia, and Kenya. The only country that may not have any Fulani settlements is Liberia. The encyclopaedia estimates the population of the nomadic Fulani to be around 7 to 8 million while the settled Fulani is estimated around 16 million. In Nigeria, the tribe known to be predominantly cattle herders is the Fulani also known as the Fula or Peul. They largely reside in the northern Nigeria, but

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[1] Read more at: https://www.modernghana.com/news/349849/who-are-the-fulani-people-their-origins.html

they follow their livestock along migratory patterns. This wandering lifestyle has brought them into conflict with settled farming communities in Nigeria, who have accused the Fulani of cattle rustling, kidnapping, and murder.

The people whom historians identified as Fulani are quick to resort to combat in the defence of their interest but also have a reputation for waiting for the opportune moment to seek revenge if the situation demands patience, according to the encyclopaedia of world culture (ibid). This fact may explain why there are clashes often between mostly Fulani herdsmen and settled communities, particularly in the states of Benue, Plateau, Kaduna and Nassarawa. The socio-economic lives of both the farmers and the herdsmen revolve around land and therefore, land matters become easily conflictual.

With origins in the Senegambia region, the Fulani now stretch across some 20 states in West Africa and the Sahel belt, ranging from Guinea-Conakry to Sudan. Though the Fulani herders once existed in a symbiotic relationship with sedentary agriculturalists in this region (involving the fertilisation of fields by cattle who fed on the vegetative debris left over after crops had been taken in and the exchange of meat and milk for grain and other agricultural products), this relationship has been disturbed in recent years by environmental changes that have driven the herders further south, massive growth in the size of Fulani herds, the growth of practices such as agro-pastoralism, the expansion of farmland into traditional corridors used by the herders and the general collapse of customary conflict-resolution methods (McGregor, 2014).

For the fully nomadic Fulani, the practice of transhumance, the seasonal movement in search of water, strongly influences settlement patterns. The basic settlement, consisting of a man and his dependents, is called a *wuru*. It is social but ephemeral, given that many such settlements have no women and serve simply as shelters for the nomads who tend the herds. There are, in fact, a number of settlement patterns among Fulani. In the late twentieth century there has been an increasing trend toward livestock production and sedentary settlement, but Fulani settlement types still range from traditional nomadism to variations on sedentarism. As the modern nation-state restricts the range of nomadism, the Fulani have adapted ever increasingly complex ways to move herds among their related families: the families may reside in stable communities, but the herds move according to the availability of water. Over the last few centuries, the majority of Fulani have become sedentary (http://www.encyclopedia.com/topic/Fulani.aspx).

Those Fulani who remain nomadic or semi-nomadic have two major types of settlements: dry-season and wet-season camps. The dry season lasts from about November to March, the wet season from about March to the end of October. Households are patrilocal and range in size from one nuclear family to more than one hundred people. The administrative structure, however, crosscuts patrilinies and is territorial. Families tend to remain in wet-season camp while sending younger males – or, increasingly, hiring non-Fulani herders – to accompany the cattle to dry-season camps (ibid). The economic mainstay of the pastoralists is animal-herding e.g. cattle, camels, goats and sheep. In Nigeria, the Fulani own about 80 to 95 percent of the large animals available. They also own a good number of the goats and sheep. Their method of animal exploitation and management is predominantly pastoral nomadism or subsistence pastoralism. Under this system, pastoralists engage in labour-intensive forms of animal herding and dairy production and only occasionally sell or slaughter animals. The pastoralist most times sell unfit animals and surplus animal produce i.e. milk and butter. The marketing of surplus animal products is the role of women, who use the proceeds to purchase other foodstuff, utensils and ornaments while the sale of animals in hoof is the sole responsibility of the men (Etsename, n.d).

According to literature, the Fulani grazing lands were initially classified into dry season grazing land (Hurumi), rainy season grazing land (Mashekari) and cattle route (Burtali). The global climate change phenomenon and the resultant exacerbation of desert encroachment in the North East and North West regions of the country (the traditional abode of the Fulani) over the years, has gradually diminished the Hurumi and Mashekari pushing the pastoralists further southwards as they search for fodder for their cattle (Ndibe, 2016).

The Fulani indisputably represent a significant component of the Nigerian economy. They constitute the major breeders of cattle, the main source of meat, the most available and cheap source of animal proteins consumed by Nigerians. The Fulani own over 90% of the nation's livestock population which accounts for one-third of agricultural GDP and 3.2% of the nation's GDP (Eniola, 2010, cited in Abbass, 2014, p.332). Nomadic pastoralism is at the heart of the Fulani cultural lifestyle, and that is why there has been so much labelling of the Fulani in the emerging narrative, whereas the violent herdsmen certainly do not represent Fulani interest. For centuries, the Fulani, living across West Africa, have herded cattle from one part to the other, across borders. In Nigeria, the migration is seasonal or cyclical: as the dry season begins in the North, the herdsmen travel with their livestock down south in search of pasture and water, and to avoid seasonal diseases. After about six months, with the onset of

the rainy season and farming in the South, they travel back to the North. Along the route, they sometimes settle down, develop a relationship with the farming communities and function as transhumance pastoralists (Abati, 2016).

Cattle rearing, arms proliferation and the terrorist strategic dimension

Nigerian security forces have claimed that some groups of semi-nomadic Fulani herdsmen engaged in bitter and bloody conflicts with farmers in several Nigerian states are actually composed of members of Boko Haram. A statement from Nigerian Director of Defence Information Major General Chris Olukolade claimed the potentially dangerous identification came during the interrogation of Fulani herdsmen arrested after a series of killings and arson attacks in Taraba State (*Vanguard*, April 23; *Leadership*, April 24; *Nigerian Tribune*, April 24). Reports of Boko Haram members (who are mostly members of the Kanuri ethno-cultural group) disguising themselves as Fulani herdsmen while carrying out attacks in rural Nigeria are common (McGregor, 2014).

The menace of the rampaging herdsmen are such that in Benue and Plateau states in the north-central of the country, their activities have been likened to a genocide on the native Tiv, Idoma, Berom, Angas, Kwalla and Taroh people (Odufowokan, 2014). As noted by Obi (2016), the recent activities of Fulani herdsmen in southern Nigeria is suggestive of insurgency. It is Boko Haram in a different form and shape. According to him, the target is to infiltrate the South of the country, which the conventional Boko Haram could not penetrate.

Despite being overlooked by the international media for the most part in recent years, the herdsman-farmer clashes are on track to be a significant destabilising security issue for Nigeria over the next few years. And unlike with Boko Haram which was ostensibly defined by religious boundaries, these clashes have more potential for a ripple effect within Nigeria when the sensitive issue of ethnicity is added to the mix (Amaza, 2016). The jihadi group Boko Haram are usually characterised as the biggest threat to Nigeria's state security and even as one of the world's deadliest militant groups. Between 2010 and 2013, Fulani militants killed about 80 people in total, but by 2014, they had killed 1,229 people, and in 2015 that figured had doubled (Dickson et al 2016). But in the first four months of 2016, Boko Haram have actually been responsible for less deaths-208 to be precise-than other sectarian groups in Nigeria combined, which have accounted for 438 deaths so far, according to the Council on

Foreign Relations' Nigeria Security Tracker. A huge chunk of these are down to an ongoing conflict between predominantly Fulani herdsmen and settled farming communities, which is costing the Nigerian economy billions of dollars per year as well as hundreds-if not thousands-of lives (Gaffey, 2016).

However, unlike Boko Haram which only operates in Northern Nigeria, the nomadic militants, before now, dominated the middle belt region. The Global Terrorism Index of 2015 states that over 90 percent of the attacks carried out by the group are on private citizens, accounting for 81 percent of deaths in the area. And these attacks have mainly been through armed assaults, killing an average of 11 people per attack. Before the report, the largest attack was in 2014 when the group killed over 200 people – community leaders and residents that were meeting in a remote village in Zamfara state, Nigeria (Dickson et al, 2016).

Alamu (2016, p.3) posits that contrary to the dangerous bogey being fed to the nation, the herdsmen are not a new mutation of Boko Haram. There might have been an influx of arms and munitions from the Libyan debacle and the open corridor of the Maghreb through Mali. There might have been a militarisation of herd-protection as a result of organised cattle rustling and organised resistance to free roaming as the logic of settled and sedentary culture violently collides with the logic of nomadic free passage. Alamu further contends that while Boko Haram is ideologically driven and principally targeted at the state, the herdsmen are culturally propelled; a regnant residue of ancient customs and nomadic shuttling which targets entire communities and their people.

A study of major conflicts between the Fulani herdsmen or the Nomadic and the Agriculturalists or the Pastoralists and Farmers shows that the land related issues, especially over grazing fields account for the highest percentage of the conflicts in other words, struggle over the control of economically viable land cause more tensions and violent conflicts among the Nomadic and farmers (Ali, 2013). In a study by Olayoku (2015, p.20) it situated and analysed fatal incidents resulting from cattle grazing within its historical, political, and social contexts. Using the Nigeria Watch database data from June 2006 to May 2014, it identified the major stakeholders as being basically communities of farmers and Fulani. State security agents, the political authorities, and local or foreign "mercenaries" also played a role. The causes, however, were identified to be fundamentally economic and centred around land issues, showing that the creation by the government of grazing routes did not mitigate the problem. In the final analysis, the study revealed that violence from cattle conflicts was not

restricted to specific periods of the year and occurred during all months, with the highest number of fatalities recorded in both the rainy (June) and dry (December) seasons. Some established facts, according to Obaze (2016), subsist:

> First, the grazing conflict is needs-based and cross-cultural, if only in name. Second, the grazing conflict has assumed high-level of intensity and destructiveness and risks becoming intractable. This affirms the conflict as a classical distributive conflict; with grazing land as the contentious resource. Third, though Nigeria may lack monitoring capabilities and parameters for measuring the intensity of the conflict, the spiralling rise in fatalities, destruction of properties and the growing number of internally displace persons (IDPs), should suffice as early warning signs. They should also serve as informal benchmarks for measuring the scope and intensity of the grazing conflict.

The deadly terrorist group has since 2011 embarked in mindless killing of defenceless women and children in the Middle Belt. Between 2011 and 2014, they took over many of communities in the four local government areas of Guma, Gwer-East, Buruku and Gwer as well as Tom-Anyiin, Tom-Ataan, Mbaya and Tombu in Buruku Local Government Area of Benue. In 2013, the group was credited with mindless murder of about 60 women and children seeking refuge in church in Plateau state while those who went out for their funeral a few days later including serving senator, Gyang Dantong, and, Gyang Fulani, the Majority Leader of the Plateau State House of Assembly, were equally murdered (Oluwajuyitan, 2016).

In 2015, the people of Egba village in Agatu Local Government of Benue claimed about 90 of their compatriots were killed by Fulani herdsmen. The then state police commissioner, Hyacinth Dagala, insisted 'only 30 corpses were recovered' as if that was a relief to the bereaved families. But neither for the 90 nor the 30 deaths was anyone apprehended or prosecuted. In May 2015, Governor Gabriel Suswan narrowly escaped an ambush by Fulani herdsmen. All a governor who could not protect himself or his citizens could do was to lament the fate of 'displaced farmers and their family members who live in refugee camps in Otukpo, Ojantele, Ataganyi and Ugbokpo (Oluwajuyitan, 2016). The attacks in the Middle Belt has been described by Moses Ochonu (2016) as an organised, systematic and repeated invasion of communities with the obvious aim of displacing them from the land. According to him, these nomads are not the familiar seasonal nomads who migrate southward through Middle Belt communities during the dry season and northward during the rainy season.

> They are invasions that result in the massacre of defenceless indigenous people in purportedly vengeful orgies of bloodletting. Clashes require two sets of combatants. In these massacres, there is only one heavily armed group of combatants, a militia armed and hired by the herdsmen, a militia that the leaders of the Fulani herdsmen boldly and proudly admit is doing their bidding. These massacres do not fit into the traditional, familiar mold of "farmer-herdsmen" clashes (ibid).

On the 24th of January 2016, Fulani militants were responsible for the death of 30 people in Adamawa State, including a Divisional Police Officer. They were also responsible for the kidnapping and killing of His Royal Majesty, Akaeze Ofulue III of the Ubulu-Uku kingdom in Aniocha, Delta state. The nomads brought about enough destruction in the south west of Nigeria to cause leaders in the region to convene an emergency meeting resulting in a call for government intervention (Dickson et al, 2016). In all the incidents reported, especially in the first few months of 2016, it has been a case of a band of cowmen barrelling through other people's territories and acting with a certain proprietary hubris as though the legitimate owners are impostors. A few cardinal incidents could help to put the violence in perspective. One of them took place in Agatu community in the middle belt where the Fulani herdsmen razed down the community, burnt down homes, and slaughtered everyone in sight, old, young, children and women. They also raped and brought the once vibrant, cohesive soul of the place to its knees (The Nation Editorial, April 28, 2016). More than 300 people were reported to have been killed by Fulani herdsmen who invaded and occupied the area in Benue State. The police and other military forces appear helpless (Omonisa et al, 2016).

After the highly publicised attacks in Agatu, the herdsmen once again stormed Agwabi community in Buruku Local Government Council of Benue State on May 13, 2016 killing five persons. The Cattle Breeders Association of Nigeria, MACBAN stated that the herdsmen attacked the community because Tiv youths in the state stole 800 cows. So, instead of reporting the incident to the appropriate security authorities, the herdsmen took law into their own hands and killed Benue villagers. Also, on May 20, suspected herdsmen attacked a village in Ikole Ekiti, Ekiti State, killing two and severely injuring three others. This incident sparked an outrage across the state with the state government, banning cattle grazing and warning that the incident could lead to reprisal attacks against Fulanis in the state (Ashiru, 2016, p.18). On January 5, at Ofagbe community, Isoko North Local Government Area, Delta State, herdsmen reportedly killed a man and wounded another who identified himself as Thompson Ogege. The following day, suspected Fulani attacked Amoji in Delta State and

abducted no fewer than four persons according to a community leader, Emmanuel Odili. On the same day, a gang of youths attacked and razed down Suwa and Burukutu in Lamurde local government area of Adamawa State. The assailants were said to be well-armed Fulani herdsmen. In November 2015, an armed group alleged to be Fulani herdsmen reportedly attacked nine different communities in Dekina Local Government Area of Kogi and killed twenty-two people. A month before, women from four local government areas in Enugu State, called on the state government to save them from Fulani herdsmen who regularly molest, maim, rape and destroy their farmland and livestock (Amzat et al, 2016).

The other incident was in Edo State where the herdsmen killed a man without any evidence of provocation. The community was enraged and they lashed back and razed down the herdsmen's post and led to a sense of community alert and an air of adversarial relation between the herdsmen and the local communities. Silence has replaced raw nerves of conflict since. The third incident occurred in a forest near Aba in Abia State, where numerous bodies were buried and the Directorate of State Services stoked ethnic umbrage when it said five Fulani persons were killed. But tens of other corpses were buried but they were invisible to the eyes of the secret service. How did they identify who was Fulani or not? (ibid).

The new phenomenon of the nomadic pastoralist now behaving as a conquering group of invaders, ready to inflict terror, and not ready to ask for permission for land use, is where the big problem lies. The bigger problem perhaps is the refusal of the nomadic pastoralist to give up an old tradition that has become antiquated in modern times, or perhaps in urgent need of modernisation and reform. And to insist on that old mode on the grounds that the life of a cow is more important than that of a human being is worse than the Boko Haram phenomenon (Abati, 2016). Prior to this time, herdsmen did not carry these kinds of weapons. Before now, herdsmen were not hostile to the communities through which they pass. Above all, they did not allow their cattle to feed on and destroy farmlands. All these have changed in many radical ways. Herdsmen have transformed into brutal killers; they are violent, murderous, bloodthirsty, aggressive and provocative. They wage hateful wars against peaceful communities and villages located thousands of kilometres away from the states where the herdsmen originated (Obijiofor, 2016). Yet, in response to the public opprobrium to the attacks, the Chairman, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, Plateau State, Nuru Abdullahi, said nobody could deprive Fulani herdsmen of their constitutional right of free movement. Abdullahi said:

Why would they ask them not to go to the southern part of the country? It is their constitutional right to move freely as guaranteed by the laws of the land. What the various governments and security agencies should do is to prevent attacks and counter-attacks and such things that breed violence like cattle rustling and trespassing into farmlands. The Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria guarantees freedom of movement for every citizen of the country; this includes the right to live, work and carry out any legitimate activity in any part of the country. If and when you breach this freedom, then, the law should deal with you. So, asking anybody not to go to any part of the country is unconstitutional.

In a report, titled "Terror in the Food Basket" published by SMB Intelligence, a data mining and research firm that provides analysis of Nigeria's socio-political and economic situations, described the attitude of the Federal Government toward the Fulani herdsmen and host communities in the North Central Region as "head-firmly-in-the-sand". SMB Intelligence stated that the report was compiled through ground reporting in three states in the region – Benue, Nasarawa and Plateau States – interviewing survivors, visiting Internally Displaced People's camps, review of media reports, visiting markets and curating available causality figures. First, the report debunked the over-simplification of the conflict as caused by the activities of cattle rustlers and said what is happening in the region is "wholesale slaughter of communities" that required urgent attention. According to the report, over 2,000 people have been killed in conflicts between the herdsmen and host communities in the region in 2015 alone. In comparison, according to the report, the Boko Haram insurgency kills 2,500 people annually (See Ibekwe, 2015). The report stated that although the conflict in the region, aptly referred to as the "food basket" of the country due to its largely agrarian communities, is under-reported by local and international media, its implications are far-reaching and as deadly as the Boko Haram insurgency in the North East:

No war has been declared. Unlike the more high profile and internationally recognised Boko Haram insurgency, the conflict in the Middle Belt is under-reported in both the domestic and international media, and the government's response to it has been a sort of denial that this conflict exists, with senior government officials preferring to focus on either Boko Haram, or the issue of cattle rustling in the North-West. While the number of Nigerians that have been killed in this violence rivals the numbers affected by Boko Haram in 2015, the killings are just as indiscriminate – women, children, young men, the elderly – everyone is a target. In March 2014, Gabriel Suswam, then governor of Nigeria's Benue State, came under attack (ibid).

Going by several reports of herdsmen encroaching and grazing their cattle on farmlands and the pattern of attacks on farmer's settlements and communities, the Fulani appear overwhelming as the aggressors. And there are allegations that the Fulani community is so resolutely committed to fighting their cause that they engage mercenaries, who are sometimes dressed in Nigerian army fatigues and use sophisticated weaponry on hapless local community members. However, there has, so far, not been any evidence of official sponsorship, although Miyetti Allah Kautal Hore, a Fulani rights protection group, regularly rises in defence of the herdsmen. Again, the inability of the law enforcement agencies to check the proliferation of Small Arm and Light Weapons (SALW) worsens security situations in the Northern part of Nigeria, leading think tanks, research groups, and advocacy organisations have repeatedly reported (Odemwinge, 2014).

The conflict highlights the prevalence of weapons in the hands of non-state actors in Nigeria. A 2009 Small Arms Survey put the number of illegal small arms and light weapons in Nigeria at between one million and three million, a number that is bound to be an underestimate as it was before the start of the Boko Haram insurgency, which has increased the number of weapons in circulation. The flow of arms within the West African sub-region increased after the fall of Libyan dictator Muammar Gadhafi and the disintegration of the Libyan government, worsening conflicts in the region from Boko Haram in Nigeria to Tuareg rebels and Islamist groups in Mali and other parts of the Sahel. It is not inconceivable that these arms also flowed into the hands of ethnic militias like the Fulani herdsmen, in addition to arms smuggled into the country through the ports (Amaza, 2016).

Since 2000, nomadic herdsmen have arrived with AK-47 guns and other light weapons dangling under their arms. In this situation, their herds are often deliberately driven onto farms, and they will attack any farmers who attempt to push them out. These reprisals could occur several hours or days after initial encounters and at odd hours of the day or night. Attacks have often been orchestrated when farmers are on their farms, or when residents are observing a funeral or burial rights with heavy attendance, yet when other residents are asleep (Odufowokan 2014). The Fulani herders do not have an established political structure and tend to be represented by various cattle breeders associations. Alhaji Bello Abdullahi Bodejo, the leader of one of the largest of these groups, the Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association, claims that most of the attacks attributed to the Fulani herdsmen are actually carried out by "terrorists" who have infiltrated the Fulani to carry out violence (*Leadership*, April 25, 2014). The association has also explained that many of the clashes between herdsmen and farmers

were caused by the encroachment of the latter on traditional cattle routes (*Daily Sun*, April 18, 2014). But the Chairman, Miyetti Allah Cattle Breeders Association in Plateau State, Alhaji Mohammed Nuru Abdullahi defended the activities of the herders:

> Fulani herdsmen do not have any security backup because they are in the rural areas where the security operatives may not be able to access. Now cattle rustling and killing of Fulani have become a lucrative business. Therefore, Fulani herdsmen will do everything possible to protect their lives and property since government has failed to do so. The Fulani use the AK47 for defence since the government has failed to protect them (The Punch, May 8, 2016).

Nigerian borders are porous, allowing herdsmen from across West Africa to enter Nigeria unchecked, wielding dangerous weapons, left-overs from wars in Mali and Libya. Border controls must become stricter, and Nigeria should take a more serious interest in the ECOWAS Convention on small arms and light weapons. The cost of negligence in this regard is to be measured by the frightening number of persons that have been killed by herdsmen since January 2016 alone (Abati, 2016). Recently, soldiers of the Guards Brigade of the Nigerian Army arrested a truckload of herdsmen in Abuja. The herdsmen, according to the army, said they were on a mission to recover their stolen cows. Assorted ammunition, including pump action rifles, was recovered from them. Although the army said the herdsmen were in custody, pending further investigations, it is worrisome that dangerous weapons, including high calibre firearms, are in massive circulation among non-state actors who have been terrorising citizens (ThisDay, 2016).

With climate change and desertification in the North, and the availability of cheap arms from wars in Libya, Chad, Mali and other places in the desert, sophisticated weapons are purchased and given to hired hands from all over the West African sub-region to move hungry cattle to Southern greener pastures (Nnanna, 2016). Some of the major drivers responsible for the frequent violent confrontations between farmers and herdsmen have to do with population dynamics, namely the high population growth rate in Nigeria, increased livestock that is estimated at 19 million cows; 45 million sheep; and 35 million goats. Thus, the need to cater for these animals, in a country that is confronted with an increasingly small space for grazing, leads to frequent encroachments on farmlands by herdsmen, which in turn lead to violent confrontation with farmers. Despite the fact that grazing routes were created in the past, urbanisation has led to a situation whereby these routes have been tempered with. For

instance, only 141 grazing reserves out of the 415 initially established were gazetted (Yusuf, 2014, p.11).

Security agencies and the observable sobering ineptitude/lapses

Presently, the nation is squeezed to death between the murderous hordes of primitive herdsmen on the rampage and the rallying hearse-men of social and economic cannibalism feasting on its entrails while screaming blue murder (Alamu, 2016, p.3). From minor eruptions in the past months, the crisis has grown to become major eruptions capable of threatening national security. Since there was no deliberate and imaginative effort to tackle the crisis, it has festered quietly but dangerously (Akinlotan, 2016, p.64). Thus, in response to the mounting insecurity, many populations have formed self-defence forces. Although set up to protect vulnerable communities, these groups generally present another security challenge to Nigeria. The evolution of Ombatse, an ethnic militia founded by members of Nasarawa State's Eggon people, illustrates this point. Initially formed to counter perceived herder encroachments, Ombatse transformed into a chauvinistic organisation engaged in acts of political violence and criminality. At one point, it came into direct conflict with Abuja, reportedly killing over 700 Nigerian security personnel in a May 2013 ambush (Baca, 2015).

Most victims, however, believe that rather than arrest and punish the herdsmen, the security operatives had, in some circumstances, aided them. The people of Ukpabi Nimbo, (Enugu State) for instance, believe that the attack on the village would have been prevented had the security agencies acted on information made available to them by the villagers. In the 2014 Fulani herdsmen attack in Benue, the survivors also hinted that the army collaborated with raiders to destroy property and kill the people (Amzat et al, 2016). Though both the police and the army have debunked this allegation, the explanation which was recently given by the Inspector General of Police, Solomon Arase, in his interview with Channels television confirms the weakness of the police in tackling the problem. On the crisis between herdsmen and farmers in the Agatu community, he said some policemen were deployed, but also expressed concern over the cost implication of deploying men to a troubled spot. According to the IG, the deployment of security was usually unbudgeted for: "If I deploy them and their welfare is not appropriately taken care of then I am creating another problem" (ibid).

In the Benue State killings, the Inspector General of Police (IGP) was exasperated that the media was blowing casualty figures out of proportion because the Agatu and their political representatives, such as former Senate President David Mark, had indicated that about 500 people, including women and children, were slaughtered. Some police officers even suggested without proof that the herdsmen were non-Nigerians. But when Fulani leaders addressed the press on the Agatu killings, they indicated they were retaliating the murder of a few respected Fulani leaders, even supplying graphic details of the aforesaid provocations. Yet, the police have neither invited the avengers for questioning nor even embarked on investigations into the vendetta. Self-help, the police seem to be saying, is not out of place (Akinlotan, 2016, p.64).

Following the lackadaisical attitude of the security agencies and the federal government towards reining in the sophisticated gun-wielding herdsmen, there is a growing perception that otherwise law abiding citizens may have to make their own security arrangements to secure their lives and property. This feeling that help would not come from official quarters have intensified with the extension of the aggression of the herdsmen to the southern part of the country as more farming communities fall under their unprovoked attacks. Such feeling of insecurity and the compelling urge for citizens to arrange for their own defence can only worsen the situation on the ground.

Put differently, the incessant attacks by herdsmen, kidnappers, vandals, cattle rustlers, insurgents and the inability of the security forces to proactively stop them has led to an increasing number of Nigerians vowing to protect themselves and their communities by arming themselves. This act will significantly increase the prevalence of illegal weapons across the country, thus exacerbating crime and insecurity in the country (Ashiru, 2016, p.18). Thus, private or community arrangements for security against gunmen would require private accumulation of arms. In this bid to balance terror, Nigeria runs the risk of becoming home to massive illicit arms with assured disastrous consequences (ThisDay Editorial, 2016). According to Adeniyi (2016):

> Given the long tradition of the nomadic cattle herding in the country, we ought by now to have acquired enough human assets among the herdsmen as to rely on flawless human intelligence to pre-empt and prevent these attacks. Indeed, that our security agencies are failing on this crisis is evident from the fact that they have not even interrogated the challenge to understand what exactly we are dealing with.

Fulani herdsmen are seen all over the country with these weapons, creating tensions and putting farmers on edge- farmers who are not allowed to bear such arms. This impunity on the part of the Fulani herdsmen is inexplicable. It is as though there are different sets of laws for the Fulani nomads (Ochonu, 2016).

The more these attacks happen without security agencies able to stop the attackers, the risks of the people self-arming to protect themselves or even carrying out a reprisal attack on people who have similar ethnic and religious affiliations as the herdsmen becomes increasingly likely. Such a reprisal attack will likely set off another reprisal attack and it will be an endless cycle of violence (Amaza, 2016).

The Fulani herders, however, often find themselves on the receiving end of communal violence or attacks by government forces. On April 3 2014, a uniformed group alleged to be Hausa-speaking Nigerian soldiers arrived at a Fulani settlement in Nasarawa State in armoured personnel carriers (APCs) and killed over 30 Fulani, most of them elderly members of the community who were too slow to run away. The attack came only 24 hours after Fulani herders had signed a peace agreement with local Tiv agriculturalists. Military authorities would only say they were "investigating" whether the attackers were actually Nigerian troops (Premium Times, April 9; Nigerian Tribune, April 4, 2014 cited in McGregor, 2014). Within days, Fulani herders were carrying out mass attacks on Tiv agricultural communities in Benue State while nearby security forces failed to respond (*Vanguard*, April 12, 2014 cited in ibid). Aside leaving huge casualty figures, these incursions also created enormous refugee situations in the affected communities where the ancestral homes of the helpless victims are razed and most times occupied by the marauders.

There have been accusations and counter-accusations between the herdsmen and farmers in many of the states. In Oyo State where the leadership of the Police tried to broker peace among them, the farmers, as noted by Amzat et al (2016) accused herdsmen of grazing on their crops without restriction, rape their women, threaten them and sometimes use dangerous weapons to rob innocent commuters along several roads within the state, the herdsmen in turn accused the farmers of killing their animals by poisoning the water which their cattle drink. The Fulani Bororo cattle rearers also pointed out that those troubling the farmers and committing crime are non-resident herdsmen and strangers who are insensitive to the farmers and other locals.

The citizens exercise no restraints in individually or collectively protecting the security and safety of their resources and lives. Since safety and security have become scarce commodities, only those that can afford them protect them with all the means available, at the detriment of others irrespective of the risks involved (Abbass, 2016). Now, angry farmers, youths, and some local hunters in many communities in the country said they have decided to acquire weapons against unprovoked attacks by Fulani herdsmen. According to The Punch (May 8, 2016), they said they decided to resort to self-help because they had lost confidence in the security agencies' ability to protect them against attacks. They vowed to stop what they described as the mindless killings and destruction of their farmlands by rampaging Fulani herdsmen. According to them, they will no longer watch the herdsmen attack them and destroy the sources of their livelihood. The alleged failure by the government to contain the cruel activities of the herders, prompted the angry farmers and the youths to begin to amass arms and other weapons such as machetes, and axes in preparation against sudden attacks.

The ethnicity-ticking-time-bomb narratives

Though religious and ethnic identities have received a predominant share of responsibility for politically instigated conflicts, inter-group relations more generally have been guided by religious-ethnic factors. Since the return of democracy in 1999, inter-group relations in Nigeria have been largely influenced by ethnic and religious identity. In this context, therefore, can then be situated the contestation for land based resources between the Tiv farmers and the Fulani pastoralists (Genyi, 2014). The fact that the majority of farmer-herder clashes pit Muslim Fulani pastoralists against Christian peasants has exacerbated ethno-religious hostilities at both a national and local level. Prominent Christian clerics have claimed that the Fulani act as proxies for northern Nigeria's elites and/or Boko Haram, while some Muslim organisations have bitterly denounced the alleged mistreatment Fulani herders suffer at the hands of empowered Christian communities and state agents (Baca, 2015).

However, the infusion of ethno-religious and political colourations appear to have befuddled our understanding of the underlying character of the pastoralist/farmers conflict given audacious armed banditry, robbery, kidnapping, and cattle rustling allegedly perpetuated by the arms bearing herdsmen. Rather than framing the pastoralists-farmers violent conflict appropriately as contestation over valuable resource use, there have been growing tendency

towards dressing it with the toga of ethno-religious uprising. As rightly observed by Adeniyi (2016):

> Converting the national security threat posed by some herdsmen to another North-South/Christian-Muslim issue with which to score cheap political points is a dangerous thing to do and I could see that very clearly. While some political leaders in the South were exploiting the tragedy to send out inciting messages that propagate hate and revenge, some highly placed Northern defenders were also mobilising behind the herdsmen who have remained marginalised and pushed to the fringes of existence by a succession of political leaders from that same region.

Of recent, several socio-cultural and militia groups in the southern part of the country have indicated their readiness to reject the invasion of their communities by Fulani herdsmen. For instance, Agbekoya gave the Federal Government a 14-day ultimatum to stop the incessant attacks by suspected Fulani herdsmen on farmers in Yorubaland even as it vowed to retaliate any attack on its members. According to it National Publicity Secretary, Olatunji Bandele, if the Federal Government fails to act decisively within the stipulated time, the Agbekoya will have to defend its people with whatever means at its disposal. He said the association held an emergency meeting last Thursday where it discussed the incessant onslaught by Fulani herdsmen against Yoruba farmers, especially in the Oke Ogun area of Oyo State. He stated that if the situation was not brought under control, the group would "close down all markets in the South West; make sure that Fulani herdsmen do not enter any village in Yoruba land with their cows. And if they dare enter, they are doing it at their own risk.

> We have alerted Agbekoya South West warriors across Yorubaland to be battle ready in case the Fulani herdsmen do not heed our warning because this thing has continued for the past four to five years now. We have other security measures that we are taking but keeping to ourselves. If the Fulani herdsmen failed to heed our warning and they dare enter Yorubaland, they will be doing so at their own risk. We are waiting for the Federal Government to take decisive action (The Punch, May 1, 2016).

Another Yoruba group, Oodua People's Congress, said although the Yoruba were perceived as accommodating, the group would not sit by and pretend as if all was well. The National Coordinator of the OPC, Mr. Gani Adams, told one of our correspondents in a telephone interview that the attacks by Fulani herdsmen in the region had gone out of hand. Adams said, "Nowadays, it is becoming too rampant in the South-West. Now, nobody is provoking the Fulani herdsmen; they are the ones taking laws into their hands, killing and maiming innocent

people in their (victims') communities. These Fulani herdsmen may even be Boko Haram in disguise. If government is looking at this as if they are an influential tribe or race in Nigeria and that they can't tackle it, it may become a very serious security treat. We the Yoruba think that we are highly accommodating and that if a stranger who is living in our community has committed an offence, the law should take its own course" (The Punch, May 1, 2016).

Following the clashes between herdsmen and farmers in the South-East, there has been an increased sense of caution between indigenes and northerners. On a few occasions, the Police had to dispel rumours of impending attacks including a false report in that a cache of ammunition was evacuated from a Mosque in Aba (Ashiru, 2016, p.18). After the attacks by Fulani herdsmen in Enugu and other parts of the federation, Movement for the Actualisation of Sovereign States of Biafra, MASSOB, gave a 30-day ultimatum to President Muhammadu Buhari to end the attack on innocent Nigerians or face its wrath. MASSOB, which said it was worried by the inability of the federal government to stop the increasing destruction of farmlands, raping of women, robbery, kidnapping as well as killing of innocent Nigerians by Fulani herdsmen, accused President Buhari of protecting the attackers. In a statement made public, MASSOB notes that:

> We condemn attack on Biafrans by Fulani herdsmen at Uzo-Uwani council area of Enugu State. We wish to remind Ndigbo and Biafrans that this killing and destruction of property of our people by Fulani herdsmen is getting out of hands. It is on record that the Nigerian Police received security report, last Friday, that over 500 Fulani herdsmen gathered in that community to attack them. This ethnic cleansing was planned against Ndigbo in 2003. Now that the power has gone to the Fulani man, they have begun to execute this evil agenda. MASSOB is calling on all the pro-Biafra groups, Igbo youths to wake up and let us unite and face our enemies. We are warning the Fulani herdsmen to leave Biafra land or they will face our wrath (Umoru, Henry et al, 2016).

The Ijaw Youth Council, IYC, worldwide, also described as "suspicious" and a "deliberate plot," the recent armed attacks and killings in some communities in the South East and North Central by persons alleged to be herdsmen. It said those involved in the attacks were terrorists sponsored to disguise as Fulani herdsmen to kill and promote tribal clashes across the country. Spokesman of IYC, Eric Omare, condemned the persistent attacks by terrorists disguised as Fulani herdsmen in several parts of the country. The Ijaw youth body warned indigenes of Niger Delta communities to be vigilant and set up structures to prevent and respond to any attack if launched in the region. Omare said: "We believe that the attacks by

the so called Fulani herdsmen are deliberate terrorist acts with religious agenda to wipe out some communities in the middle belt and southern part of the country. We, therefore, call on communities in the Niger Delta region, especially the Ijaw communities to be vigilant and watch out for these terrorists who are disguising as Fulani herdsmen. We also call on community and youth leaders in different Niger Delta communities to set up structures to prevent such attacks and also speedily bring such activities to the knowledge of security agencies" (Oyadongha, 2016). The notion of ascribing ethnicity to a pure criminal issue or limiting the scope of discussion to a particular occupation (Cattle rearing) has been described by Amuta (2016) as manifestations of the lazy and simplistic Nigerian approach to discourse and governance:

> To simply content ourselves with referring to these mindless butchers as 'herdsmen' is to taint an ancient and legitimate occupation with a bad name. Furthermore, to limit their ethnic source to 'Fulani' is again to assign this criminal brigandage an ethnic badge and use that badge to profile one of Nigeria's proud nationalities. Both approaches are manifestations of the lazy and simplistic Nigerian approach to discourse and governance. Simply put, these murderers are not made so because they are either Fulani or happen to be engaged in cattle herding.

Those who are familiar with the beginnings of the Darfur crisis in Sudan would understand the role played by the Janjaweed militia, a mobile killer squad in the escalation of the Sudanese crisis. These squads were armed and mobilised by powerful political interests to carry out relentless attacks on settlements of non-Arab Sudanese in the Darfur province. These raids and attacks were at first sporadic until they became systematic. The raids had common characteristics with the unfolding herdsmen scourge here: they were carried out by squads that seemed well armed and carefully trained. They killed people in large numbers, razed whole villages and never stopped to hold territory (Amuta, 2016). More disturbing, there is a gruesome intentionality about some of the recent attacks, an indication that these supposed herdsmen set out with a more pointed definition of mission objectives than the mere escort of livestock would warrant.

Stemming the ugly trend: the needed intervention

In seeking a lasting solution to this menace, a number of options have been highlighted among which is the need for grazing reserves, banning of itinerant cattle- rearing and making

it compulsory for cattle owners to establish ranches. It was reported that in the First and Second Republic, federal government established grazing routes and reserves much of which has been taken over by transgressors who have either turned them to farmlands or build on such (Ojo, 2016). Speaking in January 2016, on conflicts between farmers and herdsmen, while receiving a delegation from the Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, an organisation active in the promotion of peace in Nigeria, President Buhari said that a plan to map out grazing areas would soon be presented to the Nigerian Governors' Forum (NGF) as a temporary solution to the frequent conflicts until cattle owners are persuaded to adopt other means of rearing their cattle (Omonisa et al, 2016).

The idea of herdsmen roaming freely all over the country, particularly in areas where they are not domiciled, is described as a cultural anachronism which clashes with the precepts of a modernising nation-state and can only be sustained by violence (Alamu, 2016, p.3). According to Ojo (2016), "the most effective solution is ranching. That is the best practice in civilised countries. Poultry and animal husbandry are supposed to be done in an enclosed environment. It is pathetic to see cattle grazing at our airports and major highways. Everywhere in Nigeria you see these herdsmen with their cattle on the roads and vehicles have to park for them to cross". As many others have noted, what the nation expected was a well-reasoned intellectual template for confronting the menace and a militarily coordinated programme of action for bringing the tragedy to heel and the offenders swiftly to book. Obaze (2016) proposes a four-pronged solution that can be adopted as a panacea to the incessant conflicts:

> First, is stopping nomadic Fulani herdsmen from wielding automatic weapons and ensuring the security of lives and property of susceptible communities. Second, federal and state authorities should henceforth deploy armed patrol teams along designated grazing routes within the federation. Third, as an ancillary to the Land Use Act, the Federal Government should set up immediately, designated grazing areas in the six geopolitical zones, thus restricting herdsmen to those grazing reserves. This recommendation aligns with a recent proposal by Senator Shehu Sani (APC-Kaduna Central), to create designated grazing zones in Northern States. Finally, by law, movement of cattle from these reserved areas to selling points must be by trucks as is the case in other parts of the world.

Cattle rustling, (which the herdsmen use as excuse to take laws into their hands) is a crime that should be punished whenever the culprits are identified. But that should not be a license

for the herdsmen to take laws into their hands, robbing, raping, maiming and killing in the name of retaliation (Adegboyega, 2016, p.13). If herding is another method of raising domesticated animals, then it is livestock farming. It prevailed as a method under two related realities which no longer exist. First, there was large expanse of land most of which was unclaimed by any specific groups or individuals. Second, the land was unsuitable for crop farming and the shrub and plants on the land was good for the animals. Neither of these realities now exists (Gbadegesin, 2016, p.13).

As a way of preventing the recurring tragedies between herders and farmers, several interventions have also been made at different levels. One of such is the recommendation by the 2014 National Conference. The delegates at the conference resolved that nomadic cattle rearing should be stopped; instead, the delegates recommended that ranches for cattle should be established across the country (Amzat, et al 2016). Over the years, the herdsmen are demanding grazing land and stock-routes. As a response from the government, a bill empowering the federal government to establish grazing reserves in all states has passed a second reading in the Senate (Odufowokan, 2014). Minister of Agriculture, Audu Ogbeh, revealed President Muhammadu Buhari's directive for him to establish 50,000 hectares of grazing reserves within six months. According to him, this is meant to end the conflicts between Fulani herdsmen and farmers in the country. He was quoted as declaring:

> We are faced with cattle grazing challenge now... A lot of people are getting killed, it is my business to solve that problem. The president has told me so. I have done my survey and I have taken my decision that we have to grass-up 50,000 hectares of land in the next six months across the northern belt before we move south. I'm bringing improved grass seeds. I will multiply it and I'm going to solve the problem of grazing (See Vanguard, April 28, 2016).

It is argued that rather than people's lands being forcefully confiscated for allocation to nomads in the name of "grazing reserves", the Federal Government should partner with interested and willing state governors to unfold a policy of ranching for all animal husbandry practitioners. Those involved in it must make the necessary investments, including the purchase or lease of land to carry on their businesses. As noted in the Vanguard Editorial (ibid), there is no credible alternative to the adoption of well-established best practices in modern animal farming which increase productivity, create wealth and offer opportunities for nomads to settle down and enjoy the benefits of modern life such as education and health facilities. According to Effanga (2016):

For many of our communities, farming and aquaculture are the main source of livelihood. These productive activities rely on access to farmland and source of water, which may be nothing more than the local stream, river or lake. The suggestion on the creation of grazing routes is therefore, one that would clash with this reality, especially if such a creation is going to be arbitrary, without the consent of the locals along the planned routes. In any event, the planned routes would certainly cut across various states and communities and if there is resistance in any location along the route, it would affect the entire plan.

It is reported that there is a Bill for an Act to establish The National Grazing Reserve Commission for the Preservation and Control of National Grazing Reserves and Stock Routes and other matters connected therewith before the National Assembly (Leadership, 2016, p.6). The mere suggestion that grazing reserves could be established in all parts of the country is causing ripples across partisan, social, ethnic and religious divides. It is instructive that the bill has met with resistance from across the country. It was first sponsored by Senator Zainab Kure in the 7th National Assembly (The Nation, May 24, 2016). Those opposed to a Grazing Reserve Law premise their suspicions on some of its provisions. It seeks to establish grazing reserves across the country for Fulani herdsmen as a way of ending conflicts between them and farmers. The reserves are to be provided with facilities such as earth dams, water points, dairy processing centres, schools, functional barns and livestock service centres (Leadership, 2016, p.6).

The express reason is that the cattle herders need pasture for their cattle. The exponents of the bill argue that, largely due to desertification and overgrazing, grazing lands in the home states of the Fulani are much less than in the past and the remaining ones are fast diminishing. Hence, the Fulani have found it necessary to move southwards to seek pasture. In the course of doing so, they have often come into conflict with farming communities, and, consequently, have often lost large numbers of their herd. To prevent such conflicts from reoccurring, the sponsors of the bill want the federal government to designate grazing routes and reserves in non-Fulani communities for the Fulani (Okeke, 2014, p.70).

Also, by its provisions, the commission will acquire lands from any state of the federation. But an intriguing twist to it is that the fundamental and ancestral rights as well as rights to pursue a means of livelihood of farmers whose lands will be taken for the purpose of the grazing reserves, are not considered in the bill. The issue of compensation or resettlement of those whose lands will be taken over was also not mentioned. A grazing law as being

proposed, will serve the interest of one ethnic group out of over 250 others, without recourse to the lifestyle, culture and businesses of people in other parts of the country. In the first republic, when grazing reserves were first created, they were restricted to the part of the country where the pastoralists naturally come from (Leadership, 2016, p.6).

The reasonable thing to do, as suggested by Sekoni (2016, p.14), is to look for why it was not necessary for Fulani herdsmen (from Nigeria or Niger/Mali) to bring their cattle from their communities to destroy the farms of other communities in the days before the first military coup d'état. According to him, there is no doubt that the Sahel has been expanding in the last few decades, thus limiting the amount of space available traditional livestock pasture. But it has been possible in the same northern states to embark on irrigation that has enabled significant vegetable farming in okra, tomato, pepper, beans, maize, millet, soybeans, etc., that Fulani herdsmen coming from the far north are not allowed to destroy, because they are also considered to be economic crops that are as profitable to their growers as cattle to their farmers.

It is contended that livestock farmers who employ the services of herders must not be allowed to put their economic interest above national interest. The nation has a primary interest in harmonious relationship among its various groups. In addition, it also has an abiding interest in the economic prosperity of all its citizens. Private ranching as a globally tested method of livestock farming is the best approach to the promotion of the interests of livestock farmers and herders that work for them as well as the interests of crop farmers (Gbadegesin, 2016, p.13). The way out of this mess is not to temporise on when to start modern animal farming. Canada is a beef exporting country. Yet it is hard for people to see cows running around cities, towns, and vegetable farms in Canada as they do in Nigeria. Also as suggested by Ojo (2016) effective border control is equally needed to ward off Fulani herdsmen who migrate from other countries to wreak havoc here in Nigeria.

As a matter of fact, the quest for solutions must be comprehensive and go beyond the mere arrest of a few criminals. On the face of it, there is criminality, which needs to be apprehended and severely punished through the appropriate machineries of law enforcement and the judicial process. There is also national security, which needs to apply greater analytical intelligence to understand the changed nature of the behaviour of our herdsmen (Amuta, 2016). An online newspaper, Premium Times, reported that Senator Shehu Sani (APC-Kaduna Central), once tasked the Federal Government as a matter of urgency to

convoke a national security conference to tackle the spiralling herdsmen-farming communities violence where the participants would include the representatives of the warring parties: the Miyetti Allah Fulani Cattle Breeder Association of Nigeria, Association of Nigerian Farmers, Federal and States Ministries of Agriculture and Environment, Traditional Rulers, representatives of affected Middle Belt communities, Ethno-cultural organisations such as Arewa Consultative Forum, Afenifere, Ohaneze Ndigbo, as well as security agencies. According to him, the conference would provide short and long terms solutions to the incessant violence. Amongst others, the Senator, representing Kaduna North, recommended the establishment of seven grazing reserves and setting up of a National Joint Task Force on Cattle Traffic Movement (NATFOC) (http://nigeriaonline.ng/2016/03/22/farmersherdsmen-clashes-way-forward).

Conclusion

The eruption of violent conflicts between the Fulani pastoralists and farmers as manifested, in many forms and dimensions have wide range of implications on the Nigerian federation. The conflicts have brought about fundamental problems of human security in the region particularly with regard to humanitarian crises (Abbass, 2014, p.340). If herdsmen-farmers clashes have suddenly assumed national security concerns, it is simply because past governments treated the crisis irresponsibly and amateurishly as a law and order problem -of nomadic cattle rearers versus angry farm owners. It is, however, far beyond that. Though the government sometimes recognised the clashes as a cultural and tangentially climatological issue, they have done precious little to anticipate the mushrooming crisis, not to talk of proffering farsighted and realistic solutions (Akinlotan, 2016, p.64). The recurring attacks and increased level of carnage committed by these nomads have led many to question whether or not there's a larger issue at play, something other than their widely acclaimed quest for land, resources and justice (Egbedi, 2016).

The danger of not getting to the root of such issues is that it could encourage farmers and communities in the savannah belt to make their own private security arrangements which would be nothing more than a resort to self-help. Right now, there is a subtle but growing online campaign to "go protect your land" which is no more than an incitement for communities to start acquiring arms. When that happens, anarchy is at the door for our country (Adeniyi, 2016). Yet, as rhetorically asked by Mathias (2016): "Do we not delude

ourselves if we believe that across the country, Fulani cattle herders take vengeful steps in those military fashions to address killing of a herdsman or the rustling of their cows? Obviously there is a security failure to develop a clear narrative that will help us address the disturbing trend".

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