CONTENT

Alina-Cosmina Ciocan
*Soft power. The deadliest weapon in diplomacy* ................................................................. 1–6

Lou Lauren Manalo
*Philippines’ war on drugs: A strategy toward order or lawlessness?* ....................... 7–16

Kristina Khodonashvili
*Migration and integration challenges* .................................................................................. 17–24
SOFT POWER. THE DEADLIEST WEAPON IN DIPLOMACY

Alina-Cosmina Ciocan
“Unirea” National College (Romania)

The dictionary says that leadership means going ahead or showing the way. To lead is to help a group define and achieve a common purpose. There are various types and levels of leadership, but all have in common a relationship with followers. Thus, leadership and power are inextricably intertwined. In the paragraphs below it will be argued that many leadership skills such as creating a vision, communicating it, attracting and choosing able people, delegating, and forming coalitions depend upon what is called soft power. But first we should ask, what is power?

Sometimes behavior may be affected without commanding it. If we think that one’s objectives are legitimate, they will be able to persuade us without using threats or inducements. For instance, loyal Catholics may follow the Pope’s teaching on corporal punishment not due to a threat of ex-communication, but out of respect for his moral authority. Or some radical Muslims could also be drawn to support Osama bin Laden’s actions not due to payments or threats, but because they believe the legitimacy of his objectives. Practical politicians and ordinary people often simply define power as the possession of capabilities or resources that may influence outcomes. Someone who has authority, wealth, or an attractive personality is called powerful. In international politics, by this second definition, a country is considered powerful if it has a relatively large population, natural resources, military unit, economic strength, territory, and social stability. The virtue of this second definition is that it makes power appear more concrete, measurable, and predictable. Power in this sense is like holding the high cards during a card game. But when people define power as synonymous with the resources that produce it, they generally encounter the paradox that those most endowed with power do not always get the outcomes they need. For instance, in terms of resources, the U.S. was the world’s only superpower in 2001, but it did not prevent 9/11. Converting resources into realized power in the sense of obtaining desired outcomes requires well-designed strategies and skillful leadership. Yet strategies are often inadequate and leaders frequently misjudge—witness Hitler in 1941 or Saddam Hussein in 1990. Measuring power in terms of resources is an imperfect but
useful shorthand. It is equally important to understand which resources provide the best basis for power behavior in a particular context. Oil was not an impressive power resource before the industrial age, nor was uranium significant before the nuclear age. Power resources cannot be judged without knowing the context. In some situations, those who hold high office, command force, or possess wealth are not the most powerful. That is what revolutions are based on. But when it comes to soft power, it rests on the ability to shape the preferences of others. In the business world, smart executives know that leadership is not just a matter of issuing commands, but also involves leading by example and attracting others to do what you want. Similarly, contemporary practices of community-based policing rely on making the police sufficiently friendly and attractive that a community wants to help them achieve shared objectives. Political leaders have long understood the power that comes from attraction. If you can get them to want to do what you want, then you do not have to use carrots or sticks to make them do it. Soft power is a staple of daily democratic politics. (Nye, 2004) The ability to establish preferences tends to be associated with intangible assets such as an attractive personality, culture, policies, political values and institutions, that are seen as legitimate or having moral authority. If a leader represents values that others want to follow, it will cost less to lead. However, soft power is not merely the same as influence. After all, influence can also rest on the hard power of threats or payments. And soft power is more than just persuasion or the ability to move people by argument, though that is an important part of it. It is also the ability to attract, and attraction often leads to acquiescence. Simply put, in behavioral terms, soft power is attractive power. Soft power resources are the assets that produce such attraction. If you are persuaded to go along with their purposes without any explicit threat or exchange taking place – in short, if your behavior is determined by an observable but intangible attraction – soft power is at work. Soft power uses a different type of currency – not force, not money – to engender cooperation. It uses an attraction to shared values and the justness and duty of contributing to the achievement of those values.

Hard and soft power are related. They are both aspects of the ability to achieve one’s purpose by affecting the behavior of others. The distinction between them is one of degree, both in the nature of the behavior and in the tangibility of the resources. Command power – the ability to change what others do – can rest on coercion or inducement. Co-optive power – the ability to shape what others want – can rest on the attractiveness of one’s culture and values or the ability to manipulate the agenda of political choices in a manner that makes others fail to express some preferences because they seem to be too unrealistic. The types of behavior between command
and co-option range along a spectrum from coercion to economic inducement to agenda-setting to pure attraction. Soft power resources tend to be associated with the co-optive end of the spectrum of behavior, whereas hard power resources are usually associated with command behavior. Hard and soft power sometimes reinforce and sometimes interfere with each other. A leader who courts popularity may be loath to exercise hard power when he should, but a leader who throws his weight around without regard to the effects on his soft power may find others placing obstacles in the way of his hard power. Some skeptics object to the idea of soft power because they think of power narrowly in terms of commands or active control. In their view, imitation or attraction do not add up to power. Some imitation or attraction does not produce much power over policy outcomes, and neither does imitation always produce desirable outcomes. For example, armies frequently imitate and therefore nullify the successful tactics of their opponents and make it more difficult for them to achieve the outcomes they want. But attraction often does allow you to get what you want. The skeptics who want to define power only as deliberate acts of command and control are ignoring the second or “structural” face of power – the ability to get the outcomes you want without having to force people to change their behavior through threats or payments. At the same time, it is important to specify the conditions under which attraction is more likely to lead to desired outcomes, and those when it will not. All power depends on context – who relates to whom under what circumstances – but soft power depends more than hard power upon the existence of willing interpreters and receivers. Moreover, attraction often has a diffuse effect of creating general influence, rather than producing an easily observable specific action. Just as money can be invested, politicians speak of storing up political capital to be drawn upon in future circumstances. Of course, such goodwill may not ultimately be honored, and diffuse reciprocity is less tangible than an immediate exchange. Nonetheless, the indirect effects of attraction and a diffuse influence can make a significant difference in obtaining favorable outcomes in bargaining situations. Otherwise leaders would insist only on immediate payoffs and specific reciprocity, and we know that is not always the way they behave. Soft power is also likely to be more important when power is dispersed. A dictator cannot be totally indifferent to the views of the people under his rule, but he can often ignore popularity when he calculates his interests. In settings where opinions matter, leaders have less leeway to adopt tactics and strike deals. Thus, it was impossible for the Turkish government to permit the transport of American troops across the country in 2003, because American policies had greatly reduced our popularity there. (Hacaoglu, 2018) In contrast, it was far easier for the United States to obtain the use of bases in authoritarian Uzbekistan for operations in Afghanistan.
The conditions for projecting soft power have transformed dramatically in recent years. The information revolution and globalization are transforming and shrinking the world. At the beginning of the 21st century, those two forces have enhanced American power. But with time, technology will spread to other countries and peoples, and America’s relative preeminence will diminish. Not all hard power actions promptly produce desired outcomes. Even more important, the information revolution is creating virtual communities and networks that cut across national borders. Transnational corporations and nongovernmental actors will play larger roles. Many of those organizations will have soft power of their own as they attract citizens into coalitions that cut across national boundaries. Political leadership becomes in part a competition for attractiveness, legitimacy, and credibility. The ability to share information—and to be believed—becomes an important source of attraction and power. This political game in a global information age suggests that the relative role of soft power to hard power will likely increase.

The most likely gainers in an information age will have multiple channels of communication that help to frame issues, cultural customs and ideas that are close to prevailing global norms, and credibility that is enhanced by values and policies. Soft power resources are difficult to control. Many of its crucial resources are outside the control of governments, and their effects depend heavily on acceptance by the receiving audiences. Moreover, soft power resources often work indirectly by shaping the environment for policy, and sometimes take years to produce the desired outcomes. Of course, these differences are matters of degree. Not all hard power actions promptly produce desired outcomes—witness the length and ultimate failure of the Vietnam War, or the fact that economic sanctions have historically failed to produce their intended outcomes in more than half the cases where they were tried. But generally, soft power resources are slower, more diffuse, and more cumbersome to wield than hard power resources.

Information is power, and today a much larger part of the world’s population has access to that power. Technological advances have led to dramatic reduction in the cost of processing and transmitting information. The result is an explosion of information, and that has produced a “paradox of plenty.” When people are overwhelmed with the volume of information confronting them, it is hard to know what to focus on. Attention rather than information becomes the scarce resource, and those who can distinguish valuable information from background clutter gain power. Editors and cue-givers become more in demand. In 2012 Joseph Nye of Harvard University explained that with soft power, “the best propaganda is not propaganda,” further explaining that during the Information Age, “credibility is the scarcest resource.” (Nye, 2012) Among editors and cue-givers, credibility is an important source of soft power. Politics has become a contest of competitive credibility. The world of traditional power
politics is typically about whose military or economy wins. Politics in an information age may ultimately be about whose story wins. Reputation has always mattered in political leadership, but the role of credibility becomes an even more important power resource because of the paradox of plenty. Information that appears to be propaganda may not only be scorned; it may also turn out to be counterproductive if it undermines a reputation for credibility. Under the new conditions more than ever, the soft sell may prove more effective than a hard sell. Finally, power in an information age will come not just from strong hard power, but from strong sharing. In an information age, such sharing not only enhances the ability of others to cooperate with us but also increases their inclination to do so. As we share with others, we develop common outlooks and approaches that improve our ability to deal with the new challenges. Power flows from that attraction. Dismissing the importance of attraction as merely ephemeral popularity ignores key insights from new theories of leadership as well as the new realities of the information age.

Soft power has always been a key element of leadership. The power to attract – to get others to want what you want, to frame the issues, to set the agenda – has its roots in thousands of years of human experience. Skillful leaders have always understood that attractiveness stems from credibility and legitimacy. Power has never flowed solely from the barrel of a gun; even the most brutal dictators have relied on attraction as well as fear. When the United States paid insufficient attention to issues of legitimacy and credibility in the way it went about its policy on Iraq, polls showed a dramatic drop in American soft power. That did not prevent the United States from entering Iraq, but it meant that it had to pay higher costs in the blood and treasure than would otherwise have been the case. Similarly, if Yasser Arafat had chosen the soft power model of Gandhi or Martin Luther King rather than the hard power of terrorism, he could have attracted moderate Israelis and would have a Palestinian state by now. I said at the start that leadership is inextricably intertwined with power. Leaders have to make crucial choices about the types of power that they use. Woe be to followers of those leaders who ignore or devalue the significance of soft power.
References


* * *

© ICRP 2019
http://culturalrelations.org
institute@culturalrelations.org


For more information concerning the article and citation please contact us via email at institute@culturalrelations.org
PHILIPPINES’ WAR ON DRUGS: 
A STRATEGY TOWARD ORDER OR LAWLESSNESS?

Lou Lauren Manalo

In many countries, drugs are considered a “villain” to progress. They are often associated with criminality and deterioration of people’s minds and lives. Truly, drugs are substances that affect a person’s physiology and psychology once consumed repeatedly. Addiction of these substances is thus detrimental to people. However, there are also drugs that are beneficial for medical and spiritual purposes, and yet such drugs are criminalized.

Historically, countries have criminalized the use of drugs not on scientific grounds but rather on who is associated with the drug. In the United States in 1971, U.S. President Richard Nixon declared war on drugs in an attempt to vilify the young rebels – the hippies – and the black population (Drug Policy Alliance, 2019). The war on drugs has, therefore, been used as a strategy to heighten discrimination and impose a “justifiable” war against minorities.

Following the lead of this global superpower, nearly every country in the world has set a prohibitionist model in its attitude toward drugs (Drug Policy Alliance, 2019). With the United States and the United Nations’ great influence on international drug laws, the global drug policy is thus centered around a criminal justice approach rather than a health-oriented approach. Drug Policy Alliance (2019) finds that this drug criminalization is inefficient in dealing with the drug issue because prohibition has limited the supply of drugs; thereby increasing demand and price of the goods. In effect, the profitability of drug trafficking increases, organized crime prospers, and competing drug cartels end up resorting to violence instead of legal measures to settle disputes. The international community is, therefore, following a global drug policy that actually promotes lucrative underground markets dominated by organized crime.

Taking this prohibitionist model a step further, the Philippines has launched a violent anti-narcotic campaign with a policy of criminalization and punishment in 2016. In this campaign, Philippine President Rodrigo Roa Duterte mobilized law enforcement agents to arrest or detain suspects based on mere suspicion of drug use or drug dealing (Simbulan et al., 2019). This lack of due process has ushered in many human rights violations and criticisms from the public.
sphere. Whether President Duterte’s war on drugs will lead the Philippines toward a state of order or a state of lawlessness is an issue that the Filipino people remain divided about.

**President Duterte’s war on drugs toward a “state of order”**

Throughout the years, many people across the world have died in the hands of the police and other security forces. These homicides that are committed illegally by the state are called “extrajudicial killings.” The Office of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights defines this kind of execution as the “deprivation of life without full judicial and legal process, and with the involvement, complicity, tolerance or acquiescence of the government or its agents” (International Commission of Jurists, 2015, p.66). This act of violence is thus internationally condemned as a crime against humanity, for this deprives an individual of a fair trial and strips the accused of his/her right to life.

Since President Duterte rose to power in 2016, the Philippines has engaged in a drug war that opened the country to extensive extrajudicial violence. This anti-narcotic campaign targets anyone who is suspected of consuming, selling, trading, and producing drugs. The Philippine National Police (PNP) reports that a total of 6,600 drug suspects were killed from July 2016 to May 2019, however human rights organizations cite the death toll to have reached more than 27,000 by December 2018 (Rappler, 2019). Following Italian philosopher Niccolò Machiavelli’s thinking that “the end justifies the means”, President Duterte has advocated for a realist approach to establishing order in which he encourages police officers to use all measures to put an end to the drug trade.

In his 22 years of incumbency as mayor of Davao City, President Duterte transformed the city from lawlessness into one of the safest cities in Southeast Asia with his crime solution of extrajudicial violence by death squads. In fact, Davao City now ranks 54th out of 334 cities in the CEO World Magazine research of the world’s safest cities ranking in 2019 (Papadopoulos, 2019).

Taking his policy into the national level, President Duterte promised to decrease the crime rate in the country. He said, “If I make it to the presidential palace, I will do just what I did as mayor. You drug pushers, holdup men, and do-nothings, you better get out because I’ll kill you” (Human Rights Watch, 2019). With this campaign during presidential elections, he won by a landslide in which he garnered nearly seven million votes more than the second-leading
candidate. Regardless of the countless complaints against his administration throughout the years, his allies still won office in the Philippine Senate in the 2019 Philippine elections. This continued support for his rule brings into question about a puzzling phenomenon: why is the Filipino mass still supportive of him despite him bringing a human rights calamity in the country?

A journal article entitled “Extrajudicial Killing as Risk Management” argues that extrajudicial killing has a purpose in a country (Kessler and Werner, 2008). It is a risk management strategy by which the country modifies the current security policies in times of crisis. The Bush doctrine, which justified the use of pre-emptive war against countries as a necessary means to eliminate any potential threat of terrorist activities, has also made the United States as guilty as the Philippines in this human rights violation. Through this doctrine, the United States was able to convince people that the airstrikes on Iraq and Somalia were right and justified because the Islamist fighters in those countries were potential threats to the country. Comparing this example to the case being studied, President Duterte also convinced the Filipino majority that the country should impose drug war to get rid of drug personalities who are potential threats to society. In effect, drug suspects easily became the target of killings without due process. The current Philippine administration believes that drug war is the key to end the drug-related problems and secure peace in the country.

In fact, the Duterte administration employs the “Prisoner’s Dilemma” concept to its drug war. It believes that the drug war will somehow be a self-regulating system in which drug syndicates and drug users would turn each other in (or rather kill the other), in order to cut one’s loss if the other would think of turning against the other for his/her benefit. In a way, the administration views these vigilante-kilings – or killings allegedly funded by drug syndicates to silence the small-time drug users from disclosing information – as a contributing factor to restoring order because the “criminals” themselves get the job done by ratting out drug syndicates for a lesser sentence or killing drugs users who have the potential to engage in criminal activity.

In the Philippines, the crime volume has been quite high. Before President Duterte assumed office, the crime volume from July 2015 to June 2016 was more than 626,000 (Talabong, 2017). Two years after President Duterte assumed office, the crime rate decreased by 21.48% (Macapagal, 2018). This rate, however, excludes the murder rate which saw a rise of 22.75% in the first year of President Duterte’s presidency (Talabong, 2017). This continuous downward trend of the crime rate in relation to the increase of homicides in the country has thus triggered
a perceived correlation between decrease in crime rate and increase of extrajudicial killings. Extrajudicial killing, therefore, seems like a necessary strategy to rid the country of crime and ensure the security of the “non-criminal” population.

**President Duterte’s war on drugs toward a “state of lawlessness”**

Despite the perceived benefit of imposing extrajudicial killings in the state, others can argue that the current Philippine drug war actually brings about a state of lawlessness which outweighs the perceived benefit of reduced crime in the country.

In light of President Duterte’s explicit support and incitement for the extrajudicial violence, many more police officers engage in police brutality and negligence of their duty to the people. Human Rights Watch (2019) found that the Philippine police are justifying the unlawful killings as “self-defense” when in actuality the drug suspects were unarmed based on eyewitness accounts. These witnesses claim that the police falsified evidence by planting weapons and drug packets next to the dead bodies in order to justify the killings. Despite these controversies, President Duterte and previous Philippine Secretary of Justice Vitaliano Aguirre II have viewed the killings as proof of the campaign’s success. This continuous support for the police’s disregard for the rule of law, therefore, further encourages more police officers to cross the line between duty and abuse.

Having a career marked by impunity, the Philippine police force can thus excessively use lethal force without any accountability for their actions. This brings into effect a rather state of lawlessness in the country in which the ones who have sworn to protect the people are now also the ones responsible for the very homicides that occur in the state.

**President Duterte’s response to local criticisms: More human rights violations**

This human rights issue has caught the attention of the whole Filipino and international community. Over the past three years, the Philippine National Police has received countless criticisms from the Filipino population and human rights advocates for the numerous cases of human rights violations. Despite the calls for reform, President Duterte remains adamant in dealing with the drug menace in the country through his drug war. Hence, in response to such critics, President Duterte either ignores or silences them.
Those who have the courage to criticize and question the killings are even sometimes subjected to the killings themselves. Amnesty International’s annual report for the year 2017/2018 states that human rights defenders and journalists were targeted or killed by the police or unidentified armed men due to their criticisms of the campaign.

Some prominent local critics of the Duterte administration, on the other hand, have been subject to harassment, intimidation, and arrest. Philippine Senator Leila de Lima, for example, has been an outspoken critic of the human rights violations of President Duterte’s drug war. In response to her criticisms, she suffered from personal attacks and threats of a sex scandal leakage which would link her to her driver. Senator de Lima is now detained since February 2017 on politically motivated drug charges.

The Duterte administration is also systematically curtailing the freedom of the press through the use of Facebook and online trolls and the manipulation of the legal system. Through social media platforms, Duterte supporters have threatened critics of the anti-narcotic campaign – including journalists, activists, international officials and ordinary Filipino people. Among those victimized by the Duterte administration’s use of online trolls are the Philippines’ Rappler’s Chief Executive Officer Maria Ressa and United Nations’ Special Rapporteur on Extrajudicial Executions Agnes Callamard. Rappler’s CEO Maria Ressa reveals that she has been threatened online with rape, prison, and death for her critical reporting on the Philippine drug war (Whitaker, 2019). Furthermore, the Duterte administration has charged Ressa with multiple libel and tax charges, and even arrested her twice. CBS News’ 60 Minutes broadcast also shows a clip of other Philippine journalists coming forward with similar stories of online harassment in an attempt to silence them for their critical reportage (Whitaker, 2019).

Notably, the Duterte administration has been legally harassing the Philippines’ Rappler ever since this news outlet exposed the drug war’s rising death toll. In 2018, Rappler was banned from presidential coverages. President Duterte referred to varying reasons for the ban, such as alleged relations with the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and false reporting. The Office of the President finally settled with one reason to send as an official comment to the Supreme Court. This reason consists of the Securities and Exchange (SEC) ruling that Rappler has failed to meet accreditation requirements (Buan, 2019). Hence, it appears that President Duterte merely tried to find any reason to punish and somehow hinder one of its major critic’s constitutional right to information.
The Philippine House of Representatives has further set new draft regulations that would allow Congress to ban reporters from covering the national legislature if their reporting would tarnish lawmakers’ reputation (Human Rights Watch, 2019). The Duterte administration has thus been entering a vicious cycle of human rights violations in which it infringes on the freedom of expression, of the press, and of information in an attempt to silence criticisms regarding his drug war’s infringement on the right to life.

President Duterte’s response to foreign criticisms: Weakening international relations

President Duterte’s drug war is not only met with local criticisms. Foreign countries and international organizations have continuously attempted to pressure President Duterte to stop his violent campaign and ensure accountability. United Nations member states – such as Germany, Japan, Chile, Ghana, and Canada – are some of the Philippine drug war’s critics (Kine, 2017). International organizations – such as the United Nations, the International Criminal Court, the European Commission, the European Parliament, Amnesty International, and Human Rights Watch – have also tried to diplomatically persuade President Duterte to stop his bloody anti-narcotic campaign.

Ignoring these foreign criticisms have made President Duterte a harbinger of change in the geopolitical order in the Philippines. Steering away from his critics, President Duterte enforced a non-interventionist policy which caused the Philippines to garner less international support.

The Philippines’ longest ally, the United States, is no exception to this policy. Criticisms from U.S. President Barack Obama regarding the Philippine drug war led to weakened U.S.-Philippines relations. After insulting President Obama in response, President Duterte ordered U.S. troops to withdraw from Mindanao and reduced maritime security cooperation with the United States. Although U.S. troops still remain in Mindanao, the United States have introduced a bill – the Philippines Human Rights Accountability and Counternarcotics Act of 2017 (Human Rights Watch, 2018). This bill aims to restrict arms exports to the Philippines, which led the U.S. to suspend in 2017 the sale of 26,000 military assault rifles to the PNP.

Aside from the United States, President Duterte has also weakened relations with 18 other countries which have expressed contempt for the Philippine drug war in the Iceland-initiated resolution in July 2019 (Mendez, 2019). Starting August 2019, President Duterte temporarily cut ties and shunned aid from the countries that voted in favor of the July resolution – namely
Argentina, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Fiji, Iceland, Italy, Mexico, Peru, Slovakia, Spain, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and Uruguay (Mendez, 2019). To recall, this Iceland-initiated resolution called on the United Nations Human Rights Council to monitor the human rights violations in the Philippines and for the Philippines to cooperate with the international community. Instead of appeasing the Council members, President Duterte responded by shunning aid from this group of nations in protest of the UNHRC Resolution. What this consequently means for the Philippines is less foreign aid, and thus lower financial capability for government projects.

President Duterte’s unfazed resolve to eradicate drugs in the country and incompliance to international standards have further affected the Philippines’ relations with the international realm. When the International Criminal Court decided to launch an investigation into his drug war killings in 2018, President Duterte withdrew the Philippines from the ICC. In April 2018, the European Parliament also adopted a resolution to use all means – including suspension of trade benefits such as tariff-free export of up to 6,000 products – to pressure the Philippines to end the drug war (Human Rights Watch, 2019). By placing great importance in his drug war, President Duterte has thus been jeopardizing the accumulation of foreign capital and international support; both of which have been helpful in stimulating the Philippine economy in the past.

**Conclusion: Order or lawlessness?**

Weighing the benefits and disadvantages of President Duterte’s “War on Drugs” is no easy task. It should be a given that any policy established that infringes on an individual’s human rights – whether that individual be a criminal or not – should be condemned. However, to deny the statistics of how the crime rate in the Philippines has drastically decreased ever since the implementation of the anti-drugs campaign is wrong as well. Looking outside the dominant ideological lens of the world, one can find a certain degree of order being established in the state of lawlessness brought about by the Philippine drug war. Whether this degree of order is enough to justify the evident disadvantages will thus be a matter of perspective.

If an individual is a realist, then this drug war might seem like a necessary means toward the goal of a safer society in the Philippines. Perhaps President Duterte and his war on drugs is exactly what the Philippines needs. In the Philippines, the crime rate is very high and those who
have sworn to protect the people – from politicians to the authorities of the justice system – are sometimes corrupt. Hence, people are tired of empty promises by politicians who do not actually seem to be doing much aside from filling their pockets with tax money. People are also tired of the justice system that sometimes fails to punish criminals because of these individuals’ ability to bribe people in the system. President Duterte, on the other hand, seems to represent a fresh change and strong hand that could potentially bring discipline in the country through a renewed ideology. With the lack of sufficient correctional facilities in the Philippines, killing drug personalities seems like a feasible solution so that the mass incarceration will not overwhelm the Philippine penal system. Extrajudicial execution, in this sense, is therefore a necessary measure to serve justice and deter crime.

However, just as people should not forget the benefits of the anti-narcotic campaign, people should also not forget the negative consequences that this campaign has for the country – such as police brutality, a vicious cycle of human rights violations, and weakening of the Philippines’ international relations.

Just because something is “justified” or “justifiable” does not mean it is “just”. This is something that authorities sometimes forget in the exercise of their duties, as they blur the lines between duty and abuse. With the justification of “self-defense”, brutal police officers can excessively use lethal force without any accountability for their crimes against humanity. This impunity of the police force has ushered in an era wherein police brutality has become a prevalent practice in the state. In this case, the drug war does not serve justice as well as some may assume. In fact, it creates a wider range of injustice, as more people are victimized; the perpetrators get off unscathed “in the name of duty”; and those who speak out for the murdered victims become subject to some form of human rights violations as well. The question, therefore, arises: is this campaign a war on drugs, or a war on the minorities, the weak, and the poor?

It is important to note that the drug problem is not an issue isolated in the Philippines. The international drug trade affects many countries, but not all countries resort to extrajudicial execution. Drug Policy Alliance (2019) finds that health-centered drug policies in parts of South America and Europe have actually been more effective in improving public safety and health than drug criminalization. Hence, not all countries forget that before the suspects are drug users or drug syndicates, they are, first and foremost, simply human beings.
Global Commission on Drug Policy (2018) recommends other solutions to actually address the drug problem and not promote it through drug criminalization. For this commission, legalization and regulation of drugs would work best to undermine organized crime and safeguard human rights. Treating the drug personalities as patients – rather than criminals – would be efficient in reducing crimes against humanity, while making such “patients” undergo rehabilitation would reduce drug demand; consequently destabilizing the drug trade worldwide. Reforming the international drug control system that is based on the inefficient U.S. prohibitionist model is thus necessary to prevent other countries from resorting to such inhumane war on drugs as that of the Philippines.

*References*


Human Rights Watch, 2019. *Philippines’ ‘War on Drugs’* [online] Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/tag/philippines-war-drugs>


* * *

© ICRP 2019
http://culturalrelations.org
institute@culturalrelations.org


For more information concerning the article and citation please contact us via email at institute@culturalrelations.org.
MIGRATION AND INTEGRATION CHALLENGES

Kristina Khodonashvili

Right now Europe is facing its worst migration and the refugee crisis. People flee conflict and poverty in neighbouring regions like Syria, Iraq, Afghanistan, Africa, Ukraine, Kosovo, and Western Balkans. “Experts have characterized the influxes as mixed migration, defined as flows of different groups of people – such as economic migrants, refugees, asylum-seekers, stateless persons, trafficked persons, and unaccompanied children – who travel the same routes and use the same modes of transportation” (Archick and Margesson, 2015). Millions of refugees and migrants are trying to reach the borders of Europe in hopes of finding asylum and being provided with welfare benefits. Although the major arrival and transit points are Greece and Italy, most people travel to the northern EU member states, due to their stable economies.

There are a few issues that need further discussion regarding the subject. First of all, it is important to look at the measures the EU has taken to solve the issue and provide the facts that resulted in a current situation. Since the EU is already facing the challenge, what are some specific issues regarding solidarity that it has to overcome? Will this immigration process prove to be a possible threat to the Schengen area of free movement? Does the EU need to overlook renewed concerns about integrating minorities? What are some possible economic implications, if any at all, that could be prevented or resolved? And of course what are some future prospects?

Processes leading to the current situation

2015 is considered to be the height of the immigrant and refugee flow. In order to have some kind of control over the situation, various EU initiatives were implemented, for example, “In 2016, the EU began to focus on discouraging people from undertaking the journey as a way to stem the flows and save lives. In March 2016, EU leaders agreed to end the ‘wave-through approach’ that was allowing individuals arriving in Greece (primarily across the Eastern Mediterranean from Turkey) to transit the Western Balkans to seek asylum in other EU countries. At the same time, the EU also announced an agreement with Turkey to curtail the flows to Greece.” (Aamann, 2016). Since these arrangements with Turkey and Libya went into
effect, the number of migrants and refugees reaching Europe has decreased. “Nevertheless, this issue is controversial and human rights advocates claim the EU violates international law and the rights of refugees.” (Nielsen, 2017). According to the official website, the measures taken against this migration issue has proved to be successful and “as a result, irregular arrivals to the EU have been reduced by more than 90%.” (Consilium.europa.eu, 2019).

European Commission coordinates the delivery of necessary resources and materials to support the Member states via the Civil Protection Mechanism. If any of the countries request additional help because their capacity is already full, then other countries provide all the necessary assistance to deal with the issue. This can be a monetary, voluntary or material contribution. “The Mechanism has been activated to help cope with an increased refugee influx several times in 2015 and it is still active in some member states of the mechanism in 2016. Hungary, Serbia, Slovenia, Croatia, and Greece have received material assistance such as winterized tents, beds, and blankets from the Mechanism participating countries to help them better cope with the arrival of refugees and asylum seekers.” (European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations – European Commission, 2019) Despite this, the EU is still facing considerable criticism for lacking effective migration and asylum policies, which have been difficult to implement and then reinforce.

**Challenges to EU solidarity**

Solidarity is a social issue and is being tested not by certain mathematical measurements but by everyday social situations. The main concern of the EU towards migrant solidarity could be that immigrants threaten the “sustainability of the European Social Model” (Oorschot, 2017). Even the European Values survey of 1999/2000 shows shocking results. “We find that in all European countries the public is least solidaristic towards migrants, in comparison with elderly people, sick and disabled people, and unemployed people. Contrary to expectation, there is little relation between welfare state characteristics and people’s solidarity, while the relative solidarity towards immigrants is higher in culturally more diverse countries.” (European Values Study, 1999). So, we face problems not only on the national level but on a personal level as well. Since migration is connected with the extent of people’s acceptance and tolerance towards immigrants.
“Solidarity is one of the core values of the European Union and has been recognized as a guiding principle of the EU asylum policy since the coming into force of the Treaty of Amsterdam. It is now incorporated into Article 80 TFEU, which provides that EU policies on border checks, asylum and immigration must be ‘governed by the principle of solidarity and fair sharing of responsibility, including its financial implications, between the Member States’.” (Goldner Lang, 2019) However, the migrant and refugee flows have caused a huge division within the EU. Understandably because some states are experiencing bigger flows than others and they have different mechanisms in order to cope with the problem which is connected to financial issues and maybe even economic difficulties.

EU countries complain that authorities are forcing many to leave the country and seek asylum elsewhere. This goes against the EU’s “Dublin regulation” (Migration and Home Affairs - European Commission, 2019) according to which the first EU country an asylum-seeker enters is responsible for examining that individual's asylum application.

**Threats to the Schengen area of free movement**

The migration and refugee flows have definitely affected the Schengen area – which provides a unique opportunity to more than 400 million EU citizens to travel, work and live within the area freely without extra formalities or special border control. The core responsibility in protecting the area lies in the countries which are “external borders” and essential for initially getting into a zone. “Schengen has been tested not only by the magnitude of the migration flows but also by concerns that some terrorists may have been able to slip into Europe as part of the flows” (Everycrsreport.com, 2018) The Schengen agreement states that member countries are allowed to reintroduce border checks for up to six months for security reasons. These can be extended to up to two years when facing major challenges – and an ongoing migrant crisis is considered to be such a challenge.

In 2015 Germany, Austria, Denmark, and Sweden established temporary border controls in some areas where migration flows were too high. These temporary controls are still there and there is a possibility of them turning into something more permanent. “In June 2018, mounting German concerns about ongoing “secondary movements” – or flows of asylum-seekers who already had applied for asylum in another EU country – prompted fears of new border closures in Germany, Austria, Italy, and other Schengen countries.” (Faiola and Samuels, 2018)
Very recently, in 2019 Emmanuel Macron the French President suggested shrinking Schengen zone because EU migration policies”do not work”. “First at the European level, we decided to have common borders; the famous Schengen area with the rules of the Dublin agreement. It does not work anymore,” he said in front of tens of French and European journalists. Macron also said that to him, the migration issue is the second biggest challenge for Europe, after climate. He insisted that “Europe must profoundly refound its development policy and our migration policy.” (Schengen Visa Information, 2019)

Renewed concerns about integrating minorities

Current and renewed concerns about integration minorities are connected with the question of whether Europe has enough recourses and enough competence to be able to integrate minorities in various fields, might that be economical, cultural or societal. In theory, all member states are acceptant of pluralism, tolerance, justice, solidarity, and equality, but certain facts still concern them about full integration of minorities.

Uncertainty and concern come from reports of criminal activity and sexual assaults committed by some migrants and asylum-seekers. Also, it is unfortunate that recent terrorist attacks in Europe were carried out by extremists of Muslim background born and raised in Europe. This has a huge effect on the way the society thinks and some EU citizens have expressed verbal and physical violence against immigrants. “Some member states in Central and Eastern Europe cited potential terrorism or other security risks in arguing against accepting migrants and refugees into their countries. At the same time, concerns exist about increasing societal tensions and xenophobia in the EU. Germany, Sweden, Italy, and other EU countries have seen an increase in the number of violent incidents against migrants and refugees.” (Yardley 2016)

UN Migration Agency has created a platform called “I am a migrant” with the main goal of promoting diversity and inclusion of migrants in society. The platform unifies anyone with a goodwill-support volunteer groups, local authorities, companies, associations, and anyone who is concerned about the hostile public discourse against migrants to voice their opinions. “i am a migrant” allows the voices of individuals to shine through and provides an honest insight into the triumphs and tribulations of migrants of all backgrounds and at all phases of their migratory journeys. While we aim to promote positive perceptions of migrants we do not shy away from presenting life as it is experienced. We seek to combat xenophobia and discrimination at a time
when so many are exposed to negative narratives about migration – whether on our social media feeds or on the airwaves.” (I am a migrant, 2019)

**Economic implications**

There has always been a huge debate over the economic impact of the migrant and refugee flows in the EU. The surge in migrants and refugees in 2015–2016 have had an incomparable impact on multiple fields, such as welfare, education, and housing systems in many European countries. One of the main worries accounted for by the public sector that the newcomers could take jobs or reduce wages. On the other hand, people think that such a huge wave of an incoming migrants could prove to be economically beneficial and “help offset unfavourable EU demographic developments (such as aging populations and shrinking workforces), thus strengthening fiscal sustainability. Many experts point out, however, that much will depend on how well migrants and refugees are integrated into the labour market in European host countries (European Commission, 2015)

The ever-lasting question still remains unanswered: Has immigration had a positive or a negative impact on economies in asylum-giving countries? German Institute for Economic Research (Deutsches Institut für Wirtschaftsforschung, or DIW) has published a research paper which shows that EU immigration had boosted Germany’s GDP growth by an average of 0.2% “For every year since 2011, EU migrants have participated in the labour market slightly more than Germans. That is to say, they’ve worked more. According to Dr. Clemens, this is down to the simple fact that most EU migrants come with the express intention of working in Germany “therefore they either are working already or are searching for a job.” (Lindsay, 2018)

**Future prospects**

The EU’s migration and asylum policy is a work in progress and it strives to develop a more comprehensive, all-inclusive migration policy. Ideally, it will include and deal with all or nearly all elements or aspects of migration, both legal and irregular. However, progress has been slow since it is a hard and time-consuming process. One of the issues that frequently comes up is revising of the Dublin regulation. “Proposed reforms to the Dublin regulation include a "fairness mechanism" to relieve some of the burden on frontline states facing heightened
asylum pressures during times of increased migratory flows, as well as measures to curb secondary movements that can strain favoured destination countries.” (Paravicini and Herszenhorn, 2018)

EU member states have divided opinion about potential migration policies. “In June 2018, EU leaders announced they would set up ‘controlled centres’ within the EU for housing asylum seekers, processing asylum claims, and speeding repatriations of rejected asylum-seekers; they also decided to explore developing ‘regional disembarkation platforms’ outside the EU for people saved at sea. However, some analysts note that these plans were vague and efforts to flesh them out have produced additional disagreements.” (Rankin, 2018)

EU officials are strongly committed to Schengen and have the willpower to contribute to EU border controls. In October 2016, a new European Border and Coast Guard became legally operational. Its main aim is to reinforce Frontex, which is “European Border and Coast Guard Agency, promotes, coordinates and develops European border management in line with the EU fundamental rights charter and the concept of Integrated Border Management”. (Frontex.europa.eu, 2019).

**Conclusion**

To summarize, the EU has experienced a huge migration flow, which consequently raised quite a diverse set of concerns. A long history of immigration process has clearly shown that this process is affecting not only economic sector, but also the job market and in general, society. Processes leading to the current situation have been complex and complicated, requiring new policies and ways to adapt to a changing environment. The new, better working ways to deal with it are yet to be discovered.

Migration has challenged the EU member states in more than way. The first challenge was an ethical and a moral one, testing solidarity. Of course, migration and refugee flow affecting the Schengen area have to be mentioned as well but even if both of these concerns are covered, there still remains the issue of migrant integration in society and economic implications. As mentioned above, the migration policies are a work in progress, and they change according to the current affairs. This is a time-consuming job, considering that policies have to be
coordinated and be mutually acceptable by all the state members. So, as long as the migration 
flow continues, the EU has to be at the peak performance to make sure all of the challenges are 
overcome and resolved.

* 

References

Available at: <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/IF10259.html> [Accessed on 8 May 2019]

Aamann, P., 2016. EU-Turkey statement, 18 March 2016. *Consilium* [online] Available at: 
[Accessed on 8 May 2019]

Consilium.europa.eu, 2019 EU migration policy. *Consilium* [online] Available at: 

Refugee crisis in Europe - European Civil Protection and Humanitarian Aid Operations - 
European Commission [online] Available at: <https://ec.europa.eu/echo/refugee-crisis> 
[Accessed on 9 May 2019]

European Commission, European Economic Forecast Autumn, 2015. Institutional Paper #11, 
November 2015; International Monetary Fund, The Refugee Surge in Europe: Economic 
Challenges, January 2016.


[Accessed on 8 May 2019]

[online] Available at: <https://www.everycrsreport.com/reports/R44249.html#_Ref454275413> [Accessed on 8 May 2019]

Faiola, A. and Samuels, R., 2015. As Human Flood Continues, Germany Slaps Controls on 


Goldner Lang, I., 2019. Is There Solidarity on Asylum and Migration in the EU? *HRCAK* 
[online] Available at: <https://hracak.srce.hr/index.php?show=clanak&id_clanak_jezik=168957> [Accessed on 8 May 2019]


Karnitschnig, M., 2018. Kurz: Austria to Impose Brenner Controls If Germany Turns Back 


* * *

© ICRP 2019
http://culturalrelations.org
institute@culturalrelations.org


For more information concerning the article and citation please contact us via email at institute@culturalrelations.org.